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AN INQUIRY
INTO THE
COLONIAL POLICY
OF THE
EUROPEAN POWERS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

By HENRY BROUGHAM JUN. ESQ. F. R. S.

VOL. II.

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AN INQUIRY

INTO

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE
EUROPEAN POWERS.

BOOK II.

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF COLONIES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE external relations of any independent state, that is to say, its influence upon its neighbours, and its interest in their affairs, must always be regulated by its relative importance, and its relative position. When a state is not independent, but inseparably connected with another country, or attached to it as a subordinate branch of its empire; in a word, when the state in question is a colony, or a distant province, its relations to other colonies or independent states in the neighbourhood, must be influenced chiefly by the external relations of the

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}

metropolis. *. There are, however, certain circumstances in the situation of different contiguous colonies, which may be considered apart from the foreign relations of the mother countries, and which influence the mutual relations of those colonies. Thus, independent of any foreign consideration, a sudden increase of power in the colonial dominions of any one nation, or an alliance between the colonial forces of two powers, would materially affect the security of the neighbouring colonies. In a word, colonies may be considered as ranged together in separate communities or classes, mutually related to each other, and to the neighbouring states, in the same manner as if they were independent powers. Thus, we may talk of the great Colonial Republic, in the same manner as we talk of the great European Republic. Within certain limits, too, we may speak of the Colonial balance, as we speak of the European balance of power, although the various relations of the parent states must constantly enter into every calculation which we make concerning the equilibrium of the colonial system. In this point of view, we may consider the different classes of European colonies, as forming so many different

* Book I, Sect. I.

ferent systems of federal power, analogous to the great political machine of Europe. Thus, there is one such system in the Asiatic, and another in the American settlements of the European powers. The trifling establishments in Africa, are at present altogether subordinate and subservient to the two great colonial communities of the East and West.

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The foreign relations of any one member of those systems, are, either its relation to the other colonial establishments in the same part of the world, or its relation to the independent states which exist there, including what are commonly called the native powers. In the Asiatic establishments, the weight of the native powers is very great. In the New World, the independent states form a very small and insignificant portion of the political system. The events of late years, however, may furnish just grounds for apprehending that a very formidable addition to their number will, at no distant period, be the consequence of the blind policy of those nations which have poured into the Antilles the savage tribes of Africa.

I purpose to confine myself, in the following Book, chiefly to the mutual relations of the American colonies, and that principally for two reasons. In the first place, 'because, for many years, all colonial balance appears to have been

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utterly destroyed in the East Indies, by the decided preponderance of the British power, and the almost total annihilation of its natural enemy. And, in the second place, because the discussion is thus reduced to the relations between the British colonies and the native powers; a subject of infinite difficulty, and almost boundless extent, where the materials are very scanty, and where our conclusions must be regulated, not so much by general principles, as by the caprice of individuals, from the fluctuating and despotic nature of the Eastern governments. It will, however, be found, that our general conclusions apply to all colonies, although our particular details are confined to those of the New World. In this Book, therefore, I shall consider the mutual relations chiefly of the American colonies; and those relations depend, in a great measure, upon some circumstances which have already been explained in detail. So that the present Inquiry would be limited to an application of the conclusions formerly established with respect to the relative importance of the different settlements, if some peculiarities in colonial affairs did not occur to diversify this subject, and to introduce new discussions, altogether unconnected with any of those in the First Book.

The

The circumstances to which I allude, are chiefly of two kinds—the tendency of colonies, in certain circumstances, to separate from their mother countries; and the distinguishing singularity in the situation of the American colonies, arising from the introduction of a race of men, differing equally from the original natives of those countries, and from the Europeans, who partly extirpated, partly enslaved them. The former of those circumstances is of a general nature, applicable to all colonial systems; but, from various peculiarities, which we have already described, and which are particularly applicable to the American establishments, we shall find that it is one of the most powerful deranging causes which can operate upon the modern colonial system. The other circumstance is almost entirely peculiar to the colonies of America. Its effects are still more powerful and universal; the frequent recurrence of its dangerous influence is much more to be apprehended; and at no period was it ever so justly the cause of alarm as at the present. But although, for this reason, we may look upon the times in which we live as a great colonial crisis, yet it is evident that the intermixture of races is a fundamental part of the colonial system, and so essentially interwoven with the whole fabric, as to present us with general considerations and

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conclusions, not of a temporary nature, but applicable at all times to colonial affairs, so long as the bulk of the American population shall consist of persons in a servile condition, and of a different race from their masters. Thus, any principles which we may deduce from our experience of past years, will be applicable, not only to the present posture of affairs, but to all future times, while Europeans shall possess territories in the New World, and shall remain separated from the inferior classes of the people, by physical differences and political privileges. The inferences, too, which we shall draw from the state of things in the West Indian settlements, (the most interesting object of attention, at the present moment), will be applicable to those continental territories, also, where slavery is permitted, and the difference of race exists, since those communities are all hastening towards the same crisis to which superior wealth and industry have already brought the islands. Nay, many of our conclusions, although stated for the particular case of the African negroes, will be applicable to the state of all communities composed in a great measure of oppressed and uncivilized men, unconnected, by natural ties or similarity of circumstances, with their oppressors. The subject, then, to which we are now to proceed is, in fact, neither of a local,

local, nor temporary nature ; although our speculations, from a constant reference to practice, may often assume the appearance of minute detail.

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The two great circumstances of dismemberment, by a rebellion of the colonies, or the establishment of civilized and independent states in the colonial territories—and the separation of the colonies by a rebellion of the inferior races, or the establishment of uncivilized and independent communities in the colonial system, are now to be considered, not with respect to their effects upon the interests of the mother country, or upon the internal state of the system (composed of colonies and mother country) in which the circumstances operate ; but with respect to their effects upon the interests of the neighbouring colonies, or upon the internal arrangements and structure of the colonial system, that is, the mutual relations of the different colonies viewed independently of their parent states. Thus, we are to consider the effects of successful revolt, or successful negro rebellion, in the French settlements, not upon the interests of France, but upon those of her neighbours in America ; and we are to inquire, what the probable consequence of such changes would be to the colonial interests of those neighbours.

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Besides the two leading circumstances which I have stated, there are some others, unconnected with them, and of more easy consideration, which will properly come under our observation in the next Book. The present Inquiry, therefore, divides itself into three parts, which I shall consider in their order.

In the *first* place, I shall endeavour to explain the effects of colonial independence being established in any part of the colonial system.

In the *second* place, I shall consider, more particularly, the probable effects of independence being established in the West Indian colonies, and the probable consequences of tranquillity being restored in the revolted islands, either by the re-establishment of the ancient order of things, or by the submission of the negroes to the authority of the laws under a system of freedom.

And, in the *third* place, I shall examine the natural consequences of the French islands remaining in a state of revolt, and of negro independence.

S E C.

SECTION I.

OF THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF COLONIES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE MOTHER COUNTRIES.

It may be observed, in general, that a colony is much weaker, and less fitted for vigorous measures, either of defensive or offensive warfare, than an independent state, of the same natural resources.

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The distant possessions of a despotic sovereign are never ruled with that energy which is characteristic of absolute government in the parts near the centre of the system. An unlimited monarch is always afraid of arming his deputies with the same power which he himself enjoys, lest they should turn it against his supremacy; and never entrusts them with the delegated authority for a length of time sufficient to render it solid and effective. The same regulations which would secure the vigorous administration of the colony or remote province, would endanger its dependence upon the parent state. These must, of necessity, consist in such arrangements as tend to render each subordinate agent dependent wholly on his immediate superior, in order to preserve complete discipline,

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discipline, regularity and promptitude in every part of the system ; and to prevent the inevitable dangers that result from delay, from the jealousy of office-bearers, and from the opportunity of an appeal or complaint to the government at home. A vigorous government can only be insured, by entrusting some one with discretionary powers, and keeping as much as possible out of view, the fountain from which this delegated authority is derived. But these are the very circumstances most dangerous to the maintenance of dependence, and most repugnant to the views of all rulers. In every government there must exist absolute authority somewhere. In colonial or provincial governments, this power resides at a distance. In every vigorous system of administration, the executive power must be concentrated within the fewest hands possible. In whatever manner it is vested in the mother country, the executive power in the colonial government must be divided between two classes of rulers, one in the colonies, the other at home. In fact, the former are subordinate and dependent ; the latter essentially possess the supreme power.

In all the despotisms of the East, it has been observed, that the farther any part of the empire is removed from the capital, the more do its inhabitants enjoy some sort of rights and privileges ;

privileges ; the more inefficacious is the power of the monarch, and the more feeble and easily deranged is the organization of the government. Montesquieu has fancifully compared the condition of the people, under such a system, to the stratification of the earth according to the geological theories of the ancients. Whilst the centre is devoured by perpetual fire, and the middle regions are the scene of barrenness, the surface is blest with salubrity, and clothed with verdure.


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The authority of the Viceroy in Spanish America, though far more unbounded than that of any governor of the New World, is, nevertheless, limited, according to the maxim *divide et impera*, by the right of appeal, and the independent judicial powers vested in the Audiencias by the legislative and inquisitorial supremacy of the great council of the Indies ; but chiefly by the shortness of the period during which any one is allowed to hold so magnificent a station. In this respect, the Spanish government has imitated the jealous policy of some republics and aristocratic commonwealths towards those domestic office-bearers whom, contrary to their general system of suspicion, they thought proper to entrust with considerable privileges and powers. The extent of the authority was always in an inverse

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verse proportion to its duration. The Doge of Venice, whose office lasted for life, had scarcely the shadow of power. ‘*Rex in pur-pura*’ (says the Venetian proverb, so admirably descriptive of this office); ‘*senator in curia; in urbe captivus; extra urbem privatus.*’ In Genoa, the Doge had more influence, from his right of exercising a *veto*, before as well as after discussion; but he only remained two years in office. The smaller republics in Italy were still more jealous of the executive power; partly because the members of small communities are naturally more careful of their liberties; partly because, in those states, abuses of power are more felt. They deprived their chief magistrate of all real power, and limited, at the same time, the duration of his office. The Capitani of St Marino were chosen for six months only. The Gonfaloniere of Lucca was changed every two months. The Rector of Ragusa held his place for a single month; and the Governor of the Citadel was changed every day. It is from a jealousy, much more natural, of their colonial administration, but no less fatal to all energy and vigour of government, that the Spanish Monarchs have endeavoured to counterbalance the effects of that extensive delegated power which the distance and magnitude

tude of their colonial dominions render abso-
lutely necessary, partly by sowing the seeds of
dissension among the different constituted au-
thorities, partly by limiting the duration of the
most splendid appointment which any subject
in the world enjoys. They have endeavoured
to unite energy of government with a system
of checks and counterpoises; to reconcile a
vigorous administration with the very circum-
stances which weaken and paralyze all the
movements of delegated authority.

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The powers of the governor in the French colonies, under the ancient system, were much more limited, and his means of acquiring influence far more confined. His office was seldom allowed to continue for more than three years. His conduct was carefully watched at home by the Council of Commerce, who had branches in every seaport town, to examine all persons returning from the colonies, and to encourage, systematically, all manner of complaints against his administration. His prerogative in the colonies was limited by the rights of the superior councils, and the influence of the colonial assemblies. His most important functions were shared by the intendant, who, on the other hand, was supreme in his own department of finance. From this system of divided power resulted an administration equally vexatious

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vexatious to the inhabitants, and destructive of all efficacy and vigour, and, in the end, ruinous also to the interests of the Crown.

In all those systems of colonial government, the undivided energy and quickness of execution which characterises the primary operations of absolute power, has been sacrificed to that jealous timidity so conspicuous in its conduct towards subordinate agents, and so destructive of its best interests in all schemes of delegated authority. The problem which Velasquez so often attempted to solve, will always present the same difficulties to those who, by deputy, would perform great actions, or govern extensive and distant territories. After a Cortez has been found, the most difficult part of the enterprize remains to be achieved: the necessary contradiction must be reconciled, of retaining in subjection him who is fit to conquer or to rule; and of calling forth, at the same time, all those powers which lead to victory, or command obedience.

Montesquieu * has observed, that a republic governs its conquered provinces with more absolute and intolerable sway than a monarchy: that its remote possessions suffer all the evils, without enjoying any of the advantages of monarchical government:

* Esprit de Loix, Liv. X. chap. 7, 8, & 9.

government : and that the distant provinces of
an aristocratic commonwealth are, in this re-
spect, in the same situation with those of a re-
public. Here, as in many other speculations,
the love of conceit and paradox appears to
have misled this witty and ingenious author.
That the government which a commonwealth
establishes in its colonies and provinces must
of necessity be extremely different from its do-
mestic administration, and that the subjects of
the distant territories will always enjoy very
different portions of liberty from those in the
capital and the neighbouring provinces, cannot
be disputed. It is, indeed, a proposition so ex-
tremely evident, as scarcely to acquire corro-
boration from the uniform example of all the
republics which have ever plundered and in-
fested the world. But it is rather singular, that
Montesquieu should discover any thing in the
nature of this form of government more friend-
ly to the prerogatives of deputies and govern-
ors of provinces, than in the monarchical con-
stitution ; more especially as, in the very chap-
ter before, he had explained the dangerous
tendency of intrusting extensive powers to sub-
ordinate agents in a commonwealth, and ac-
counted, upon this principle, for the apparent
unwillingness of the Carthaginians that Han-
nibal should succeed in his enterprise against
Rome.

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Rome. The Roman proconsuls, indeed, (whom, in another part of his work,* he describes with great animation as the basihaws of the republic) exercised over the provinces a power unknown in Latium during the free days of the state. But their office only lasted for a year; they were subjected to various checks and controuls; and they owed the maintenance of their authority, during that short period, not to any influence which they had an opportunity of acquiring over the people, but to the terror of the Roman name, of which they were the representatives, and to the legions of which they received the command when they set out for their government. It may be worth while to attend a little more minutely to the structure of the Roman provincial governments, as this subject, so full of political instruction, has been very much misunderstood.


While Rome continued under a republican form of government, the conquered countries were in general converted into provinces, and committed to the care of the consuls or prætors, but more commonly to proconsuls and proprætors—magistrates whose sole occupation was the provincial administration. They were chosen by the Senate; clothed with extensive

* Liv. XI. chap. 12.

tenfive powers of civil government and jurisdiction; and invested by the people, in the *comitia curiata*, with the chief military command. But this high authority was limited in two ways:—they received their appointment only for a year; and they were accompanied by a quæstor, likewise chosen by the Senate, whose department was that of the finances, and who was always an officer of high authority and splendid rank. Under the republic, the governor was sometimes accompanied also by an officer called *Legatus*, the lieutenant, or second in command. We are told, indeed, that the closest connexion subsisted between the governor and his quæstor: ‘*Ea necessitudo,*’ to use the words of Cicero, ‘*ut illi proconsul parentis loco esset.*’ But as the quæstor’s appointment was altogether independent of the governor, as his separate functions were of great importance, and as his own private station was always one of great dignity in the republic, it is scarcely to be imagined that the power of the governor should receive no modification from the privileges of this associate. That a great familiarity should subsist between them, and a mutual complaisance should be cultivated by both, was certainly necessary for the management of the public business; and would, in general, be conducive to their own interest and ease.

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But if the presence of the quaestor was not intended as a controul upon the proconsul or proprætor, it is not easy to see the use of his appointment. The whole business might have been entrusted to the governor himself. He was commissioned to administer civil and criminal justice, as well as to command the forces; and his powers might have easily been extended to the management of the revenue, and the arrangement of the accounts of provincial expenditure, for the inspection of the Senate. We may therefore conclude, that, besides the limitation of the governor's power by the short duration of his office, he was farther checked by the quaestor, whose office seems, in many points, to have resembled that of the Intendant in the government of the French colonies.

Augustus introduced a new arrangement into the provincial administration. He took upon himself the management of a great part of the provinces, and left the rest to the care of the Senate. The former were called *provinciae Cæsaris*; the latter *provinciae populares*. The imperial provinces were committed to magistrates called *præsides*, and sometimes *rectores*, invested with as full powers as had ever been enjoyed by the proconsuls or proprætors, but accompanied by *rationales*, or *procuratores principis*, who resembled the quaestor in the nature

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nature of their offices, and exercised, it is probable, a similar controul over the governors. The popular provinces continued under the government of proconsuls and proprætors; but Augustus no longer allowed those magistrates, chosen by the Senate, to command the forces of the republic. * One province, Egypt, seems to have been reserved by the Emperor exclusively, and with peculiar concern. It was governed by a *Præfectus Augustalis*, whose powers were apparently of a still more extensive nature than those of any provincial governor during the republic; for no senator was allowed to enter the province without special permission; and Tacitus, talking of Egypt under the new form of government, says—
*‘ Ægyptum copiasque quibus exercetur, jam inde
 ‘ a Divo Augusto equites Romani obtinent loco
 ‘ Regum.’* † But though not accompanied either by a quæstor or procurator, his powers were controuled by a magistrate of high judicial authority, called, *Juridicus civitatis Alexandrini*—*‘ qui præfecti actiones speculatus videtur, ne res novas moliretur.’*

All these officers, then, *quæstores*, *procuratores principis*, *rationales Cæsaris*, and *juri-*
 B 2 *dici,*

* Heineccii Antiq. Rom. lib. I. Append.—Tit. ff. de off. Procons.—Ibidem, de off. Præsidis.

† Histor. lib. I. cap. 11.

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dici, appear to have served the purpose of the French intendant ; the two first by the management of the finances, and by their personal dignity ; the last by the exclusive administration of justice.

Under some of the emperors, however, there is reason to believe, that the prerogatives of the *præses* or *rector* were extended, and those of the associated offices curtailed. Indeed, the necessity of that superior energy which belonged to the imperial administration, for the government of countries not completely subdued, was the pretext upon which Augustus obtained the new arrangement of the provinces, and their division into senatorial or popular, and imperial. In both, the associated officer remained in his place during the Emperor's pleasure. *

From a passage in Tacitus, † we learn, that Claudius (A. U. C. 806.) resolved to make the decisions of his *procuratores* of as much effect as his own, and obtained a decree of the Senate, investing them with powers, ‘ *plenius et uberius quam antea.* ’ It is true, that Heineccius, in his Commentary on the Pandects, ‡ makes the term *procurator*, in this passage, apply to the *rationalis* ; and conceives that Claudius intended, by his

* Dion. Cass. lib. LIII. cap. 13.

† Annal. lib. XII. cap. 60.

‡ Tom. I. p. 19.

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his new law, to bestow the jurisdiction of fiscal causes upon that officer. But this is quite inconsistent with the context. ‘*Nam*’ (continues Tacitus) ‘*divus Augustus apud equestres qui Ægypto præsiderent lege agi, decretaque eorum proinde haberi jusserrat, ac si magistratus Romani constituissent: mox alias per provincias, et in urbe pleraque concessa sunt, quæ olim à prætoribus noscebantur. Claudius omne jus tradidit, de quo toties seditione aut armis certatum, cum Semproniiis rogationibus equester ordo in possessione judiciorum locaretur, aut rursum Serviliæ leges senatui judicia redderent.*’

This is a distinct assertion, that Claudius extended to the governors of provinces, though of equestrian rank, those powers of jurisdiction which the Servilian law had restored to the Senate. Neither the seditions of the Gracchi, nor the laws of Servilius, had any particular reference to fiscal causes. The term, *procurator*, is often used to signify the Emperor’s delegate or president in the provinces. Many of the lesser provinces were governed altogether by magistrates bearing this title; as Judea, * Corfica, † and Thrace. ‡ The powers of the provincial governors were still farther extended by the Emperor Alexander in the year 225, and

B 3

Constantine

* Tacit. Annal. lib. XV. cap. 44.

† Id. Hist. lib. II. cap. 16.

‡ Id. Hist. lib. I. cap. 11.

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Constantine in the year 322. § The Emperor Constantine gave the *rationales* the sole jurisdiction in fiscal causes. † But it appears, from various authorities, that they possessed this before his time. Ulpian says of the proconsul, ‘ *Majus imperium in ea provincia habet omnibus, post principem. Nec quicquam est in provincia, quod non per ipsum expediatur. Sane, si fiscalis pecuniaria causa sit, quæ ad procuratorem principis respicit; melius fecerit, si abstineat.* ’ ‡ And afterwards, ‘ *Quæ etiã omnium præsidum communia sunt: et debent ab his observari.* ’ || A short time after Constantine had made the law above mentioned, the Emperors Valentinus and Valens ordained, that the *rationalis* should, for oppressive conduct in his administration, be tried by the *præses*, and, upon sufficient proof, be publicly burnt alive. * A clear demonstration, at once, of the evils experienced by the people under the provincial government of the emperors, and of the marked inferiority of the *rationalis* to the governor. The Emperor Constantine gave the governors also certain powers over the chief men in the provinces who might prove unmanageable or formidable. ¶

It

§ L. 1. & 2. Cod. de off. Rect. Prov.

† L. 5. Cod. Ubi causæ fiscales, &c.

‡ Ibid. § 6. || Id. ibid.

¶ Note A a.—L. 2. Cod. de off. Rect. Prov.

* L. 9. Cod. Ubi causæ fiscales, &c.

It would appear, then, that the administration of the imperial provinces was most arbitrary; that the popular provinces, so long as the distinction remained, were ruled by divided authority, centred partly in the proconsul chosen by the Senate, partly in the commander of the forces, and partly in the financial administrator, both delegated by the Emperor: that the government of the provinces under the republic was much more tyrannical than the government of Rome and the contiguous territory, but not so absolute as the provincial governments of the emperors: and that, in every instance, it was less despotic, effective, and vigorous, than the administration of the Emperors, or of a Dictator in the metropolis.

It is manifest, therefore, that the proconsular tyranny in the provinces, must have been more grievous, in various respects, than the limited dominion of the Consul and Senate at home, perhaps even more odious than the short-lived power of the dictator, watched as it was by a people habituated to freedom, and terminating with the emergency for which it was created. But, at all events, there can be no reason to imagine that the proconsuls of the republic enjoyed a more limited sway than those of the empire; or that Rome, so jealous of her powerful citizens, should have been more liberal in clothing her provincial magistrates with

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authority, than the monarchs of the East were in their commissions to commanders and satraps. It is probable that both received the same share of delegated power, because they received their appointments from Sovereigns equally jealous of agents placed beyond the immediate sphere of their controul, and had to exercise their functions upon theatres where the same exertions of authority were required.

In modern times, we find, that aristocratical and republican commonwealths, and limited monarchies, have invested their deputies with powers similarly restricted.

The governors of the Venetian *podestas* were not indeed fettered by the various restraints which reduced the authority of the Doge to a mere name; because the provinces were governed without the complicated system of aristocratic tyranny which prevailed in the city. Yet the subjects of the republic in the *terra firma* were ruled by so gentle a sway, as made the inhabitants of those provinces which were conquered in the war that followed the league of Cambray, lament their separation from the dominion of Venice, whilst this relaxation of the provincial government certainly contributed not a little to the unfortunate issue of that conquest. *

It

* The collection of Venetian laws, entitled, ‘ *Parti e bandi Veneti*, ’ contains various edicts limiting the powers of the governors of provinces.

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It was not to be expected that the States-General, whose extreme jealousy of all subordinate authority cramped the operations of their generals with the preposterous invention of field deputies in the campaigns on the Rhine, should entrust their commanders in South America with that unlimited power, without which the possession of distant settlements can scarcely be acquired, and can never be long retained. Accordingly, the rapid conquests in Brazil, which the Republic owed entirely to the enterprising genius of Prince Maurice, and the patriotic zeal of the whole nation against Spain, were sacrificed to that cautious and timid policy which subjected his measures to the controul of a mercantile board appointed to watch his operations, and to prevent him from counteracting the vigour suddenly acquired by the Portuguese government, under the newly established dynasty of the house of Braganza.

The constitutions of the British colonial governments in North America were formed upon the model of that admirable system of domestic policy, which has secured the happiness of the mother country, raised her to an unexampled height of prosperity, and, notwithstanding its theoretical defects, left her in a situation of envied tranquillity, and solid practical freedom, amidst all the political experiments and convulsions that have shaken

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shaken the other nations of Europe. The governments of the British West Indies are still constructed upon the same excellent plan. But it is impossible to deny, that this form of government, of which we are so justly proud at home, has communicated to our fellow subjects in the New World, few of those advantages that we ourselves enjoy under it. The author of the '*Wealth of Nations*' seems not to have considered this matter with his usual accuracy *, when he says, that the English colonists had their rights secured to them, in the same degree, and by the same means, with their fellow citizens in Britain ; and that the colonial forms of government approached still more nearly to the perfection of liberty, than the model upon which they were originally constructed. In theory, indeed, this is the case. They had, almost all of them, two Houses of Legislature, and a governor entrusted with the executive power. The consent of these three branches of the constitution was required in every public act of legislation. But it appears very clear, that the relation of dependency which a colonial establishment supposes, could never be ensured by a delegation of that authority to the governor, or an extension of those rights to the people, which give energy to the executive power, and secure complete liberty to the subjects

* Book IV, chap. 7.

subjects on this side of the Atlantic. To take one example, only, of the radical difference between the two systems. The influence of the Commons, from their power of withholding supplies, which almost always prevents the negative of the Crown from being exerted in Great Britain, and is indeed the great corner stone of the British constitution, has, evidently, almost no existence in the Colonial system. Accordingly, every measure proposed by the Colonial Legislatures, that did not meet with the entire concurrence of the British Cabinet, was sure to be rejected, in the last instance, by the Crown. So that, whilst the directing influence of the people of Great Britain prevents the Crown from exerting its constitutional prerogative, and in a great degree regulates all the operations of the Royal authority; in the colonies, the direct power of the Crown, backed by all the resources of the mother country, prevents any measure obnoxious to the Crown from being carried into effect, even by the unanimous efforts of the Colonial Legislature; and indirectly obtains from it all the measures that are desired.

If examples were required, we might refer to the history of the abolition of the slave trade in Virginia. A duty on the importation of negroes had been imposed, amounting to a prohibition. One Assembly, induced by a temporary peculiarity of circumstances, repealed this law by a bill which received

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received the immediate sanction of the Crown. But never afterwards could the Royal assent be obtained to a renewal of the duty, although, as we are told by Mr Jefferson, * all manner of expedients were constantly tried for this purpose, by almost every subsequent Assembly that met under the Colonial government. The very first Assembly that met under the new constitution, finally prohibited the traffic.

Nor is this political arrangement, which altogether reverses the balance of the powers in the government of the colonies, the consequence of any arbitrary or accidental part of the system. It is essential to the dependence of the colonies, and a necessary part of the subordinate constitution. It is the legal mode of enforcing subjection, consistently with the forms of the British government. It can only be counteracted by such a growth of resources, as may prepare the independence of the colonies, and must, in the end, produce a complete separation. This event will of course be more speedily brought about in the colonies of free states ; but, even in them, we have had fatal experience of the obstinate struggle with which such a consummation is always likely to be attended.

We may conclude, then, that the provincial or colonial government established in the distant dominions of commonwealths and mixed

* Notes on Virginia, Qu. 8.

ed monarchies, although more free than that with which an absolute sovereign rules his distant territories, is nevertheless extremely different, in its principles, from the constitution of the parent states ; and that, as the delegates of the absolute monarch, though armed with power sufficient to annihilate all freedom, yet rule with far less sway and energy than their masters at home : so, the subordinate systems of free governments secure, in a very inferior degree, the rights and privileges of the colonial or provincial subjects, without falling into the opposite extreme of despotic government. Hence, one consequence must inevitably follow ;—neither of the two systems of delegated power will possess the advantages, either of a despotic or of a free constitution, in those situations which call for the exertions of national force. While the one is destitute of that undivided energy, and appropriate promptitude in all military operations, with which a despotic government is always armed, the other, possessed in a still less degree of this advantage, must likewise want all that force which a popular form of government exclusively derives from the united exertions of a free people. In the conduct of military operations, therefore, whether defensive or offensive, all colonial governments must be extremely imperfect ; and the colonial governments of
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free states more imperfect than those of despotic or absolute monarchies.

But it is not merely from the necessary structure of their governments, that colonial establishments are ill adapted to the measures of vigorous warfare. The very circumstance of their dependence on another state at a vast distance, must be productive of consequences the most fatal to promptitude of counsel, and activity of exertion. Supposing that an absolute Monarch may safely delegate undivided power to his representative, and that a free state may organize the government of its colonies, so as to communicate to the inhabitants the most ample privileges ; still, such distant possessions, of whatever kind, are in a very different situation from primary states. In them, it is not to be imagined that the influence of the government upon the internal administration, can operate so strongly as in the mother country. The principle of fear, or loyalty, or religion, or whatever it is that renders the people thoughtlessly submissive to absolute power, exists in a much less degree, where the Monarch appears in the person of his deputy, than where he shines himself in the magnificent fulness of despotic glory. The feelings of patriotism, or virtue, or political expediency, or whatever it is that inclines a free people to obey its rulers, can have very little

tle force in a small part of a state, cut off from the rest by physical boundaries, connected with the whole by no common interest, and regulated by a government which is itself dependent on a distant power.

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Indeed, if we consider the kind of men by whom colonies are always peopled, we shall be convinced that they are neither fit for submitting to the discipline of absolute monarchy, nor for being animated by the spirit of a free constitution. They are either settled, for a time, with the view of increasing their fortunes, and then returning to their native country; in which case, it must be a matter of indifference to them in whose hands the possession of the province is placed, provided they are not themselves molested: or they have taken up their residence in the province, and made it their abode for life; in which case, they are much more likely to feel the desire of separating from the parent state, than of espousing its quarrels.

Whenever, then, a free state would carry on war from its distant provinces, it has not only to attack the enemy, but to retain its own subjects in tranquillity and subordination. To look for vigorous assistance from those subjects, is absurd. They cannot be expected to fight and to toil, that others may wear the laurels, or divide the spoil. To them, it is much the same thing what
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nation receives the taxes and contributions which they must pay; and if their exertions are to turn the fate of campaigns in the planning of which they had no share, it seems but reasonable that they should continue those exertions a little longer, in order to render themselves independent, so that they may reap the fruits of their own dangers and toils.

But, besides the nature of colonial governments, and the situation of the inhabitants over whom they are established, other circumstances essential to distant and dependent settlements, must always weaken and distract the operations of provincial warfare. It is seldom that a cabinet ought, in prudence, to entrust a general with full command, unfettered by any restrictions; and more rarely still, that a cabinet can be found willing to grant such discretionary powers, when circumstances render it necessary or prudent. When plans are to be formed by a council or prince on one side of the globe, and executed by their delegates on the other, all the bad consequences may be expected to oppose the success of each measure, which can arise from local ignorance, and from constant delay. If a general has been found worthy of bearing the most unlimited commission, and a cabinet wise and liberal enough to grant it, still the fate of the contest is periled on a single

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gle stake—his personal safety and good conduct: for it is scarcely to be expected, that one army will contain two such men: and, before time has been given to form them, or to select them from the bulk of the forces, their services are indispensably required. As to the middle expedient of councils of war, they seldom or never produce any good effect. If they are appointed as a check, they must hamper the general, and do nothing but mischief. If they are confined to the office of giving advice, they may still have the effect of controuling him; and, at all events, they must share that responsibility, which can never fall with too undivided a force upon the single head of the leader.

On the other hand, when the government is near its military agents, they may safely be entrusted with ample authority, and can be directed by continual instructions. Their conduct is closely watched—their deficiencies easily supplied—their places soon filled up. No great plan of operations can, in such a case, be frustrated by a random shot. The state which has the best troops, and most ample resources, will, in general, find a succession of able men to command the one, and direct the other. Had Cortes been cut off in any of those enterprises which so rapidly succeeded each other

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during the whole of his vast and hazardous career, the Mexican empire was saved, at least for a season. But when Montezuma was slain, a Quetlavaca was easily found to meet the increased difficulties of the emergency; and, on his accidental death, in the course of a few weeks, there was no difficulty in finding a Guatimozin, who displayed talents that would have saved his country against any ordinary combination of dangers.

But, further; troops may always be expected to fight better in presence of their countrymen, in scenes with which they are acquainted, and under climates to which they have been habituated from their birth. With how many additional disadvantages have those forces to struggle, which are sent into distant regions;—where the people with whose defence they are entrusted, and the enemies whom they have to combat, are almost equally strange and foreign to them;—where they may languish in an unwholesome air, after spilling their blood in the field; and must submit to all the risks and delays of a tedious return, before they can receive the meed of their country's applause, for the victories which their scars and their toils have won? Nor are the leaders themselves on equal terms. They have not the same eyes watching their conduct; they do
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not take the field with the same local knowledge; they are called upon to act in a strange country, at a vast distance from their supplies; and having in their rear, should they be forced to retreat, if not an enemy's territory, at least one which belongs to a lukewarm friend. In short, the nation that carries on war in its colonies, either for their defence or extension, acts under the principal disadvantages to which every power is subject, when it engages in offensive warfare, and which, other circumstances being equal, must always turn the fortune of war in favour of an enemy who fights on his own ground.

The history of the Greek and Roman colonies will probably occur to my readers, as furnishing exceptions to the proposition which I have been endeavouring to establish. The subjection of the most flourishing of the former, although independent of the mother country, and the great assistance which the Romans derived from their colonial settlements, in extending and securing their conquests, may at first sight appear to preclude the application of the foregoing remarks, at least to the policy of ancient states. But, a little attention to the real nature of those establishments will show us, that their history presents, in fact, nothing anomalous to our view.

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The Greek and Roman colonies, as we have already shown,* were essentially different in their constitution and origin. The former arose from emigrations caused by an overgrown population, and seldom retained any dependence on the parent states. The latter owed their establishment principally to the ambition of Rome; and they remained in strict subordination to her power. But another difference between the two sorts of colonies has not been so much regarded. The colonial settlements of the Greeks were planted in distant countries, and amongst barbarous tribes. They were established, not in Greece, or in the states immediately in the neighbourhood which had already been well peopled, but in Gaul, Sicily, and the south of Italy; in Cyrene, and Egypt; in Illyria, and Asia Minor. The Roman colonies, on the other hand, were planted in the immediate vicinity of Rome. During the second Punic war, the city was surrounded by no fewer than thirty establishments of this kind,† which served as so many garrisons or advanced posts, for her defence. Ancient authors mention no less than one hundred and sixty-four colonies settled in Italy, from the foundation of Rome to the death of Augustus.‡

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* Book I. Sect. I.

† Livy, lib. XXVII.

‡ Onuphrius Panvinius; Imper. Rom. cap. VI.—Note B b.

It was not until after a neighbouring state had been completely conquered, that the Romans thought of colonizing its territories. In laying the plan of a new acquisition, their first step was, to secure the alliance of some state in the vicinity of the power marked out for plunder or destruction, and, if possible, to excite dissensions in the interior of the country itself. Having succeeded in this enterprize, they faithlessly involved their allies in the same subjection. An advantageous treaty of peace, securing the payment of tribute, and prescribing a change in the form of the government or the persons of the rulers, generally terminated the first war. This treaty was then treacherously broken, and hostilities recommenced, for the complete subjugation of the country, with circumstances of barbarity and oppression, which at once destroyed the spirit and the force of the vanquished.

It was now that these savage plunderers of the world poured into the conquered territory a band of hungry adventurers, leagued by a constitution similar to that of the parent city. Systematically regardless of the rights of property, they uniformly introduced those settlements by an Agrarian law, which transferred part of the subjugated territory to the allied

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powers who were not yet swallowed up, and divided another portion among the Roman soldiers. The vanquished people easily incorporated with their new masters, whom they nearly resembled in manners and in warlike habits; and the colonies, by which Rome was surrounded, became, in fact, neither more nor less than an integral part of her own territory, lying contiguous to the centre of the state, governed by similar laws, and peopled by the same sort of mixed and warlike breed. The Social war was thus, as we formerly remarked, a civil war, in the strictest sense of the word. It was a contest between the inhabitants of the country, and those of the city, for the possession of certain political privileges, formerly disregarded, because they conferred no advantageous distinction; but now more highly prized, because they served to mark the superiority of the Romans over the inhabitants of the provinces or remote territories. It must, however, be observed, that the transmarine and transalpine possessions of the republic were in a very different predicament from its Italian dominions. They were indeed subdued by force of arms and intrigue, by baseness and political profligacy of every sort, just as the body of the state had been more slowly added to the city; but they were not retained and secured by

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by the system of colonizing and incorporating. They continued to form distinct states, though governed by Roman magistrates and laws; and they were kept in subjection by Roman armies. They did not contribute to the farther conquests of the republic, unless by the tribute which they paid, and the passage which they afforded to the republican forces. After the second Punic war, in which the enemy was reduced to the lowest state of humiliation compatible with the preservation of nominal independence, no lands were seized, no colonies planted, no provincial government established, in Carthage. But the jealousy of Masinissa was excited against that neighbour, whom common danger should have taught him to consider as his best ally: and full scope being given to that system of policy which conquers by dividing, and by fomenting wars, the arms of Masinissa were employed to smooth the way for the total destruction of the Carthaginian name, and, ultimately, for the accomplishment of his own ruin also; while the forces of both, so long as they retained any power, were directed against the independence of Macedonia and Greece.

When the Romans would avail themselves of one conquest, in order to make another, they adopted a middle line of policy. They did not at once complete any part of their work,

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however easy. Instead of reducing a subjugated state to the form of a Roman province, they allowed it to remain under its own laws ; and, by means of its conquered rulers, who were permitted to retain their places, they swayed its sceptre, and appropriated its resources : a method of proceeding, not peculiar to those crafty warriors, but adopted by military communities, in all ages, and in every part of the world ; by the Tartar hordes, by the conquerors of the Mogul empire, by the Princes of Abyssinia, and, still more recently, by the French chiefs, who have surrounded their dominions with directories, and vice-presidents, and landamtman, and petty monarchs ; as the conquerors of the East did with cawns, and nawaubs, and sultans.

It appears then, first, that the Roman colonies were, in most material respects, totally different from those of every other country : and, secondly, that the Romans never extended the policy of conquering, or ruling, by means of colonies, to their distant settlements. But the history of the Roman policy, rich in every species of instruction, furnishes us also with positive proofs of the weakness of colonial establishments, when attacked by the consolidated power, and energetic administration peculiar to independent states.

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The first conquest that the Roman arms made beyond the bounds of Italy, was the island of Sicily, and, soon after, those of Corsica and Sardinia. The greater part of the first, and the whole of the two last, were subject to the provincial government of Carthage: they were all ceded to Rome by the treaty which terminated the first Punic war. Spain, the first country on the continent of Europe in which the Romans obtained a footing, had, immediately before the invasion of Scipio, been conquered by the troops of Carthage.

The rapid progress of the Punic arms under Hannibal, and the wonders which that singular man performed, chiefly with a force collected from the conquered countries, may rather appear an instance against our general principle. But before drawing such a conclusion, we shall do well to consider the chance which any nation has of producing so great a captain as Hannibal. The events of the second Punic war, and the victories of Epaminondas, form, perhaps, the only instances in the history of the world, wherein great changes of affairs have, for a time, been brought about entirely by the accidental appearance of extraordinary men upon the theatre of human affairs. It is, in fact, the astonishing part of Hannibal's story, that, even according to the accounts of his enemies, he succeeded, to a certain degree, in overcoming

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vercoming those physical and moral obstacles which all other men have found insurmountable. ‘ *Ac nescio, an mirabilior adversis, quàm
‘ secundis rebus, fuerit. quippe qui, quum et in ho-
‘ stium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab
‘ domo, variâ fortunâ bellum gereret, exercitu non
‘ suo civili, sed mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium,
‘ quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis ;
‘ alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus,
‘ alia sacra, alii propè Dei essent : ita quodam uno
‘ vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nec inter ipsos,
‘ nec adversus ducem seditio exstiterit ; quum et
‘ pecunia sæpe in stipendium, et commeatus in ho-
‘ stium agro deessent.*’ * Such were the circum-
stances natural to a war carried on against an
independent state, from the remote provinces
of the invading power. They were circum-
stances which may be expected with certainty
to recur in similar situations, and inevitably
to baffle similar attempts, unless carried on un-
der the auspices of such a leader as Hannibal.
In modern times, indeed, the more complicated
system of warfare, and the more combined ope-
rations of foreign policy, which regulate the
intercourse of states, render it still more un-
likely, than formerly, that the appearance of a
singular genius, or any other fortuitous occur-
rence, should again produce consequences of
importance

* Livy, lib. XXVIII. cap. 12,

importance sufficient to make them be considered as exceptions to the general position I have maintained.

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And, after all, it should be remembered, that even in the case before us, Hannibal was not completely successful. The Roman colonies and provinces in Italy, as yet but partially consolidated, readily joined the invaders. * The jealousy, and weakness of the motives which ruled the Carthaginian councils, as well as the great distance of the scene of action, and the length of the war, prevented proper supplies from being sent to Hannibal. The Romans, fighting on their own ground, refused, after their usual manner, to hear of any terms, until the enemy should, as a preliminary, evacuate Italy. Every defeat rendered them more obstinate; concentrated their forces; and inflamed them with the valour of despair. The talents of Hannibal himself, could not inspire his troops with those sentiments; because they were a mixed and disunited race, debauched by success, fighting chiefly for plunder, at a vast distance from their homes. All these circumstances were necessary to the relative situation of the parties, and might fairly be taken into the calculation, as sure to influence the ultimate fate of the contest. They are among the

* Livy, lib. XXI. cap. 38. & lib. XXII. cap. 61.

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the necessary obstacles to a warfare, carried on from colonies or provinces against primary and independent states ; and in the end, they overpowered even the wonder-working genius of the Punic commander.

Nor is the history of the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, any exception to the proposition which I have been attempting to illustrate. They were indeed conquered, as many other states have been, by powerful neighbours. The Asiatic Greeks occupied a narrow stripe of territory, surrounded on all sides, excepting the west, by the great empire of Lydia. Like many other communities of men as well as of nations, in similar circumstances, although opposed by a common enemy, they did not lay aside their hereditary antipathy, derived from diversity of origin, and the ancient rivalry of their European ancestors. The federal constitution of each state was ill adapted to promote the union dictated by their obvious interests ; and, so far from the two nations agreeing in any military combination, it was seldom that the different cities of either, could be brought to act in one way. While the aristocratic government prevailed in Sweden and Poland, it was not wonderful that Russia should acquire an absolute preponderance in their affairs, and seize upon part of the latter. The mutual animosity

animosity of the Northern Powers has, for the last century, rapidly augmented the influence of their natural enemy over them both; and the divisions of the Germanic Empire have enabled France to dictate at Vienna, Berlin, and Ratisbon. Divided councils are fatal; because they are weak and irresolute, and never effective but in some transient fit of a still more dangerous rashness and precipitancy. Distant councils have the same imperfections in a degree little inferior; and the difference is more than compensated by the division of supplies, and the various delays essential even to the most active and energetic secondary government. If the scheme entertained by the cabinet of Versailles upon the Polish crown, previous to the Austrian alliance in 1756, had succeeded, and a French prince had been established in subordinate authority at Warsaw, the events of 1794 and 1795, would in all likelihood have taken place in 1774, after a short and ineffectual struggle. If Philip II. had succeeded in restoring the Spanish dominion over the Dutch Netherlands, the armies of Lewis XIV. would not have been forced to retreat from the gates of Amsterdam, and we should never have heard of the family compact.

The history of America presents us with a variety of examples, all strongly confirming the same

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
same positions. It was from colonies, indeed, and from colonies recently established in the islands, that the first conquests of the Spaniards on the continent were made with a rapidity which astonished all mankind. But although the Crown of Castile reaped the whole benefits of those brilliant exploits, they were almost entirely the achievement of private adventurers, and resembled, in their energy and success, rather the speculations of mercantile adventure, than the operations of a distant cabinet. The settlements in Cuba, Jamaica, and St Domingo, served only as so many convenient points of attack—so many ports where the adventurers were collected, and from which the voyages were fitted out. The enemy, though numerous, was greatly inferior in all the arts of policy, as well as in military science; and, though his force was concentrated, he was not in a situation to make reprisals, or attempt a diversion. Yet, with all those advantages, it is manifest that the Spaniards must have failed, had they not followed the maxims of the Roman conquerors, and paved the way to each success, by forming alliances, and fomenting divisions. The Peruvian empire was subdued entirely by perfidy and intrigue. The invasion of Chili was frustrated, partly by dissensions among the plunderers, partly by the better policy of the native tribes; and it is
worthy

worthy of remark, that the subjection of Mexico was effected by conquering, in detail, the remotest provinces in the kingdom, and acquiring at the same time the firm alliance of the Tlascalans, a powerful and distant appendage of the empire, without whose assistance Cortes could never have reached the capital, and whose antipathy to their former masters saved him from utter destruction in his retreat.

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We have already taken notice of the effects which the Dutch policy produced upon the operations of Prince Maurice, and the power of the States-General in South America. The comparative trial of force, indeed, between an independent nation, and a province or colony in the new world, has never yet been fairly made. The European power in that quarter of the globe, has never, till very lately, received any check, either from the growth of the white population, or the increased number of the African labourers; and the wise policy of the United States has kept them at peace with all their neighbours, since they became independent of the mother country. But, in the very first year of the unhappy conquest which brought about that event, a striking proof was exhibited, of the dangers to which the best regulated colonial establishment is exposed, by the neighbourhood of an

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an independent community, even during its early infancy, and its struggles for existence. My readers will immediately perceive, that I allude to the celebrated expeditions of Allen, Montgomery, and Arnold. While the most sanguine friends of American independence scarcely ventured to hope that the colonists would be able to maintain their ground against the forces of the mother country, they astonished the world, by commencing offensive operations. The very first campaign of that unhappy war, was signalized by a successful expedition of the revolters against the stations of the British forces on the frontiers of Canada; and the gates of that province were thus thrown open to a most formidable invasion, which threatened the total conquest of the country before the end of the same year. The gallant leaders to whom those operations were entrusted, actually reduced the whole of Upper Canada, and were only foiled in their attempts on Quebec, by the ill choice of the season, owing chiefly to the divisions of opinion that constantly attend the offensive measures of governments newly formed upon a popular model; the union of the besieged in defence of their large property, which they were taught to believe would be exposed to the plunder of the rebels; and the extensive powers wisely confided by the British government to
General

General Carleton—powers formerly unknown in any of the colonies, and utterly inconsistent with a government bearing the faintest resemblance to a popular form. Thus had the infant republic of America, immediately at the commencement of separate operations, and above half a year previous to the formal declaration of independence, almost succeeded in the conquest of a British colony, strong by its natural position, by the vigour of its internal administration, by the experience of the veteran troops who defended it, and by the skill of the gallant officer who commanded those forces; while the only advantages of the assailants consisted in the romantic valour of their leaders, the enthusiasm of men fighting in their own cause, and the vigorous councils of an independent community.


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Let us now suppose, that in any other part of the American colonies, a free state was established, either with the consent of the mother country, or by forcibly disclaiming her authority. Let us conceive, that this new community is placed in the neighbourhood of colonies not connected with the new state by the ties of blood, or habits of subjection to the same government, but inhabited by a people whose proximity of situation, diversity of origin, and similarity of pursuits, as is uniformly the case, rendered them a rival or hostile nation; and that, of

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consequence, in any contest that may take place between the two communities, neither of them can labour under the disadvantage of a disputed title to independence, as was the case in the American war. Let us, for instance, suppose that the cabinet of Lisbon, weary of the dependent situation in which it is placed by every political difference among the European powers, shall abandon so trifling a portion of its territory as Portugal, and transfer the seat of government to the great body of its dominions, the Brazils. In its present state, Portugal can neither preserve her independence in Europe, against the united force of that power which, since the accession of John IV. in 1640, has been her natural enemy, and of France, the natural ally of Spain; nor can she, by a diversion in South America, secure the safety of her European possessions; nor can she again look for such a series of good fortune, as that which, in the war of 1762, enabled England to save her from the power of the Bourbons, by the brilliant campaigns in North America and the West Indies. But if the Court of Lisbon, with the military and naval force of the kingdom, and the nonresident proprietors of American estates, remove to St Salvador, and adopt such reforms in the administration, as a complete change of any kind may be supposed to render less terrific than innovation generally

nerally is to absolute governments; then the colonies of France and Spain in South America, will have to contend with a people possessed of a fertile, extensive, and compact territory, more populous in Europeans and Creole whites, than any other portion of that vast continent; and, above all, forming an independent state, governed by a cabinet in the centre of its dominions. Disputes have even already arisen between the Spaniards and other nations, about the limits of possessions which, under the Spanish government, seem fated to remain a wide desert; and the Portuguese settlers have repeatedly endeavoured to injure their neighbours in America, and to increase a territory already too extensive. But, in the case which we have supposed, it is not necessary to assume, that views of ambition in the new world shall actuate the transplanted cabinet. The safety of the territories which it will retain in Europe, forms a more legitimate and more probable object of anxiety. While the court of Madrid, then, continues to prefer the rich colonies of Peru and Grenada, to the undivided possession of the Spanish peninsula; while France is unwilling to increase the dominions of Spain in Europe, at the expence of those territories in Guiana which have cost her so many millions; at the expence, too, of a great diminution of the Spanish empire in America;

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and while Portugal retains a wish to figure as a European power, to possess ports in the neighbourhood of her best markets, and to retain the territories to which she owes her name and origin : so long we may expect to see, in consequence of the proposed change, the present arrangement of dominion maintained in America, as well as in Europe ; but with this difference, that Portugal will have become independent of all foreign assistance, and will have greatly increased the value and strength of her South American possessions ; she will owe the safety and aggrandizement of every branch of her empire to the vast superiority which all primary states possess over colonies in similar circumstances. This superiority, although the situation of her European possessions may prevent it from actually increasing her American territories, will, nevertheless, raise her to a far more exalted rank than she at present holds, and will, in every sense of the word, augment her resources, and extend her power. *

The same consequences will follow, if any of the European settlements in the West Indian Archipelago shall, by whatever means, become independent of the mother country. The power of France to attack the neighbouring islands of Jamaica, Cuba, and Porto-Rico, from St Domingo,

* Note C c.


mingo, is much more limited than the power of St Domingo would be, were an independent government, and a primary nation, either of whites, mulattoes, or negroes, or of a mixture of the three races, established there, by whatever means ; always supposing that the population and natural strength of the island is sufficient to enable it to stand without the support of the mother country. Now, as any revolution of this nature must, in all probability, take place directly against the will of the mother country, it is manifest, that the colonies will never be emancipated before they can exist independent of her aid.

In general, then, it appears that the emancipation of any colony, or its establishment as a primary state independent of the mother country, is dangerous to the neighbouring colonies which retain their dependence, although we should not consider the very powerful effects of example, and the contagious nature of revolt, in all communities similarly circumstanced. Such an event will be dreaded by all the powers having colonies in that quarter, as directly subversive of the colonial balance, and the first step towards the ruin of their own colonial system.

We have seen, during the eventful history of the last twelve years, how fatal to the balance of Europe the sudden changes in the internal

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affairs of one great nation have been. Although various opinions have been entertained with respect to the merits of that revolution, considered in itself; although many have doubted the justice and expediency of interfering with its progress; although some have even maintained that its consequences, in the end, will be favourable to the interests of other states: no one has ever denied, that the great system of European power has, in the mean time, been deranged, and that the cause of the derangement must be looked for in the new energies which the French revolution has developed, and in the views of policy which have regulated the actors in the great drama. Besides all those disturbing causes which a colonial emancipation would immediately introduce into the system, others which we have pointed out, of no less importance, are peculiar to the colonies; and the nature of subordinate governments would deprive those settlements which still remain dependent, of the energy and vigour so necessary for meeting the new crisis of affairs.

It may be remarked, in general, that where a number of nations are placed in similar circumstances, no change of importance can ever happen in one, without inducing a similar change in the rest also. This arises chiefly from three causes;—from the force of example upon na-
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tions united by constant intercourse, and placed in similar degrees of refinement; from the direct necessity which every increase of power in one member of the national community imposes on all the other members, of providing for their security by similar means, or from the power which any diminution of resources in one member affords to the others, of diminishing their preparations for self-defence; and, lastly, from the circumstance, that every great change in one part of the system which is not wholly accidental, must be prepared and brought about by a certain combination of events common to the other parts, and may consequently be expected to take place nearly about the same time, and in a similar manner, in those other parts also.

The whole history of that collection of small states which occupied the territory of ancient Greece, as well as of the petty states into which the North of Europe was formerly divided, furnishes us with constant illustrations of this general fact, that changes, but more particularly slowly progressive changes, are always equable and regular over the whole members of such national systems as we are at present contemplating. But the history of modern Europe affords still more striking and recent examples of the same truth. Consoli-

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dated into one system of provincial government under the empire of Rome, the different states, of which Europe is now composed, were separated from their unnatural union, by the same causes, and nearly at the same time. Reduced by a people whose character and manners were never effaced by the most rapid conquests, or most remote emigrations; they were formed into divisions, under constitutions of the same nature, peculiarly calculated to preserve that uniformity of customs which originally marked the whole. The progress of political government has been similar in all, from the dominion of the nobles to the tyranny of the prince, and, in these latter times, to the freedom of the people. That spirit of commercial intercourse, which produces a perpetual connexion, little known in the ancient world, has conspired with similarity of situation, and the resemblance of manners, to render Europe a united whole within itself, almost separated from the rest of the world; a great federacy, acknowledging indeed no common chief, but united by certain common principles, and obeying one system of international law; a vast system, composed of parts similarly constituted, liable to be affected in the same manner, and nearly in the same degree; by every external event, mutually influencing each other, and keeping pace with each

each other's improvements, in science, in liberty, and in national resources. Thus, to take a more particular instance, as soon as the grand improvement of standing armies was introduced into one part of Europe, by the rise of the more peaceful arts, and the diminution of the power of the barons, the same important change was effected about the same time, and by similar steps, in all the nations of Europe. The progress of this improvement, and its remote effects, were likewise similar in all. It was extended, by the ambition of princes, to the keeping of a large force, for the purpose of enslaving their subjects, and enlarging their dominions. This improvement was first introduced into France; and the example was followed by the neighbouring states, both as a useful invention of policy for securing the prince's power, and as a measure necessary for the safety of nations exposed to the new resources with which this important change had armed the French king.

A circumstance, not so obvious, appears to have regulated the formation of most of the European states, and presents an illustration, equally striking, of the principle which I have explained. There can be no doubt, that the consolidation of the smaller dynasties into which the different European empires were
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once divided, took place, in all, about the same period. The united empire of the Franks under Charlemagne, was too formidable a neighbour to the heterogeneous masses of divided power, which were then presented, on all sides, by Britain, Spain, Italy, and the Northern kingdoms. Accordingly, we find that, in the space of little more than half a century, all the great unions took place, of which the present nations of Europe are composed. The empire of Charlemagne was completed in the beginning of the eighth century; the Saxon Heptarchy was united under Egbert the first King of England, in 827; the Picts and Scots by Kenneth II. King of Scotland, in 838; the Norwegian petty lordships into one kingdom by Harold Hafager, in 875. The more contiguous of those states were consolidated at the very same time; the rest within a few years afterwards.

A number of colonies, situated in the same quarter of the globe, planted about the same time, by the same people, and placed in almost every material respect in similar circumstances, will always form a national system, the members of which are mutually affected by each other's fortunes. Any great change of circumstances in one important colony, will be followed by a corresponding revolution in the rest. The sudden

sudden emancipation, for instance, of the slaves, or abolition of the slave traffic in one settlement, will soon be followed by a general cessation of the slave system in all the West Indian colonies. In like manner, a sudden separation of one important colony from the mother country, will, ere long, be followed by a general destruction of the colonial system.

Hitherto, we have only viewed the mutual relations of the American settlements from a point whence their appearance is uniform in itself, and the same with that of all colonies. The deductions to which we have been led, are accordingly of a very general nature, and apply to every colonial or provincial system dependent on distant governments. But the same conclusions will derive additional force, as applied to the following Inquiry, if we attend to those peculiarities in the situation of the West Indian islands, which distinguish them from all other provincial and colonial settlements. This forms, in part, the subject of the next Section.

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SECTION II.

OF THE INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN COLONIES, AS CONNECTED WITH THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH POWER IN THE WEST INDIES.

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I have explained, in the last Section, the reasons why a colonial establishment is always, other things being equal, a more harmless neighbour than a primary state; and why the separation of any one important member of the colonial system, from its relations of dependence upon the mother country, would be most probably followed by a universal separation of the colonies. I now proceed to examine, *first*, The peculiar circumstances which render the application of this conclusion to the state of the West Indian settlements particularly striking; and *next*, the peculiar circumstances in the situation of the French settlements, which render the conclusion most particularly applicable to them.

The result of this inquiry will enable us to determine the probable consequences of a total re-establishment of the French colonial system, and to compare the effects of this event, with those of a total separation of the French colonies,

nies, to the other powers who have dominions in those parts of the world.

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I. The West Indian colonies differ from colonial establishments in general, chiefly in the following particulars—

1. They are not peopled by separate nations, like the countries of Europe, or the larger colonies upon the two continents of America.

The fate of war has frequently transferred the dominion of almost all the islands from one power to another. Sometimes the permanent sovereignty of the conquered islands has been transferred by treaty; sometimes a cession of territory has taken place by purchase or exchange. In the Seven-years war, Britain was in possession of all the French Windward islands. In the American war, she lost, to France, almost all her own: and during a great part of the late war, she possessed several of the Dutch and French settlements. In the treaties which concluded each of those wars, indemnities and equivalents were fought for, by the belligerent powers, among the West Indian islands. The Dutch owe their whole continental colonies to an exchange with England: and the Swedes, having long ago lost their continental

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continental territories, are indebted to a bargain with France for their only settlement in the new world. The consequence of all those changes of possession, whether temporary or permanent, is, an intermixture of the different races of Europeans, who inhabit the West Indian Archipelago.

But the spirit of commercial intercourse has produced the same effect, perhaps, in as great a degree, even in those settlements which have constantly remained under the same masters. The temptation of cheap and fertile land, large profits of stock, and high wages of labour, have been found sufficiently powerful to overcome the attractions of home; and adventurers, after leaving their native country, have often found it easy to make a second change, from the same inducements, and to remove to foreign islands. The policy of almost all the states of Europe towards foreigners, in their colonies, has been such as to render their privileges and security equal to those of the natives: And, as a residence in any of the West Indian islands, is commonly a temporary exile, submitted to for the acquisition of wealth *, the comparative advantages of the different colonial governments, are objects only of secondary

* Book I. Sect. I.

ary consideration, as each constitution sufficiently confers security of person and property.

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Thus, the mixture of inhabitants in the different islands, co-operates with the identity of the climate and other physical circumstances, the similarity of pursuits and of complexion (an important consideration in countries where colour is the grand mark of distinction) to coalesce the white inhabitants of the different islands into one people, united by a common origin and common interests. Although nominally distributed into different political societies, and participating in the views of their respective mother countries, only in so far as their immediate interest seems to be concerned, colonies and provinces never can feel, in any strength, those national antipathies which divide primary states, and draw their fuel from independence, whilst they excite or blow up the flames of war. But least of all can we expect to see principles of this sort arise in societies formed after the manner which we have just described, so long as they remain in the state of colonial or provincial dependence. If, however, a separation from the parent state takes place, the newly formed community is placed in the situation of all nations at their first establishment. With the new political institutions, a distinction of manners, characters and habits, begins to appear in its members,

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bers, and to divide them from the neighbouring colonies, unless they, too, have followed the same course, and joined themselves in one community with the rest.

2. In another point of view, the circumstances of the West Indian colonies are peculiar. The attachment of the white inhabitants to the soil, is perhaps weaker there than in any other part of the world. I have already traced the great outlines of the West Indian character, and contrasted it with that of the North American colonists. * I have enumerated the circumstances which tend to form that character; and have particularly remarked, as a leading feature in their situation, the temporary nature of their connexion with the islands, and the want of wives and families. The prevalence of the negro slavery, too, and its effects on the manners of the whites, have also been noticed. † It is easy to perceive how little a society, thus constituted, partakes of that compact and solid form in which national strength consists, and how destitute it must be of the great bulwark of nations—that animated zeal and warm interest which men take in the safety and honour of a particular country,

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Ibid.

try, because it contains their property, the place of their birth, the habitation of their fathers, the scenes of their childhood, the persons of their friends, their wives and their children.

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These views can scarcely acquire additional strength, from the recollection of that extreme unwillingness which West Indians have ever shown to take a part in military service, unless for the immediate purpose of repressing insurrection. The history of St Domingo during the administration of the Prince de Rohan, is well known to every one who is conversant with colonial affairs ; and the opinions of some of the most enlightened planters upon this point demonstrate, that their repugnance is defended by them on principle, as well as manifested in practice. *

Now, it is not difficult to perceive the magnitude of the change which will immediately be operated upon the structure of society in the West Indian colonies, by any political revolution which shall destroy their connexion with the European powers. The peculiarities in the state of the population, must indeed render the abolition of colonial subordination a difficult task. But if the West Indian dominions of

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* Laborie, Coffee-planter of St Domingo, Appendix.—
Malouet, Mem. sur les Colonies.

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one of the European powers should become independent, by any of those revolutions in the affairs of nations, which all the events of the last thirty years forbid us to consider as chimerical, or be abandoned in consequence of some change of views, not impossible, on the part of the European states, then we may safely conclude, that the face of things will undergo a rapid alteration in the new community, and that a state of society will be introduced widely different from that which we have been contemplating as one of the distinguishing features of the West Indian colonies. The islands which remain in their present circumstances will then be exposed, in all the imbecility of their unnatural situation, to the strength of a neighbour, animated with the ardour of spirit, and armed with the newborn energies of an infant state possessing the ordinary resources of an independent community, inhabited by a race of men connected with the place of their residence, as the conquerors of Xerxes and Darius were with Greece, and the warriors of Stockach and the Nile were with Austria and England.

3. But the grand feature, which, more than all the rest, distinguishes the West Indian islands from other colonial establishments, and chiefly merits our attention in this inquiry, is the proportion

portion of slaves to free men—of slaves, too, whose race is totally different from that of their masters, who are distinguished from them as much by their habits and their character, and by the extent of their progress in civilization, as by the formation of their bodies, and the colour of their skin.

If even colonies of free men, connected with their mother country by a common origin and similar habits, mingled in the same body, so as to form homogeneous communities, and united to each other by a similarity of interest and character; if such establishments are inferior to independent states in solidity and political strength: how vastly is the difference augmented, by the existence of a foreign nation in the heart of the colony, held, by force and intrigue, in subjection to the handful of white inhabitants, who, by violence or fraud, have transported them from their native country? Military operations must increase beyond all calculation the danger and insecurity of this unnatural state of society. It is not the free subjects only whom a distant government has to keep in subordination, and animate to activity and vigour. The slaves, in number and force far more formidable than any European enemy, must be held in obedience, whilst their masters are engaged in the field, or divided by

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the factious disputes so natural to a colonial government. Under whatever system of policy the islands are administered, it is evident that their capacity for the operations of warfare is extremely weakened by the mixture of their inhabitants.

Those who are delighted to contemplate the grandeur of ancient commonwealths, or the romantic exploits of conquerors in the dark ages, may perhaps be inclined to doubt, whether the external security and glory of a community is so incompatible with domestic slavery as we have maintained.

With respect to the bondmen or villeins of the Gothic nations, they were evidently of the same race with their liege lords ; and they appear to have been most peaceable subjects, degraded indeed by their situation, but contented with their lot ; entirely ignorant of any higher condition, and in a great measure destitute of the capacity for enjoying it. It is a fact, known to such as have visited those parts of Europe, where the institution of villenage still subsists, that the peasantry have no desire for emancipation. After the Austrian law had been introduced into that part of Poland which fell to the Emperor's share by the partition of 1773, it was found necessary to surround many parts of the new frontier with imperial troops, to prevent

prevent the escape of peasants into those parts of Poland where they might still be received into the possession of a master. * S E C T.
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But in the Greek and Roman republics, it will be said, the influence of domestic slavery, in its severest form, neither destroyed the security of the state, nor embarrassed the operations of war. I will not insist on the radical difference between the character and composition of the free population in those countries and in the West Indian colonies, nor expatiate on the structure of their laws, and the tenor of their customs, by which every citizen was made a soldier, while the slaves were devoted to the meanest and most enervating occupations. It will be sufficient to remark, that in two particulars, a difference still more essential to the comparison, existed between the slave-system of ancient, and that of modern times—the distinction of race, and the relative proportion of the numbers. The captives taken in war, and still more their descendants; the home-born slaves, although of foreign extraction, and therefore denominated ‘*Barbari* ;’ were men of the same complexion, and in the same state of society with their masters. When liberated, they immediately amalgamated with the mass

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* Voyage de deux François, tom. V. p. 106.—Note D d.

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of the free population ; and whilst in a state of slavery, they differed as much from each other as from their masters. It was once proposed at Rome to distinguish the slaves by a particular habit ; but this idea was soon abandoned, for fear of the consequences which might result—
‘ si ’ (as Seneca says) *‘ nos servi nostri numero rare possent. ’* In Attica, they were obliged to distinguish themselves from the citizens ; but in practice, partly, we may presume, from the vanity of the slave, and partly from the policy of the master, these distinctions were so much neglected, that severe penalties were inflicted upon him who struck another man’s slave, *‘ lest, ’* (says Xenophon) *‘ he should, by mistake, injure the sacred person of a citizen. ’* *
 In the colonies where negroes are employed, the marks of slavery are plain and indelible. *‘ Nos servi nostri numerare possunt. ’*

The number of slaves in the capital of the Roman empire, at the period of its greatest luxury, is reckoned by Mr Gibbon to have been equal to that of the free citizens. † We are told, that the citizens of Attica, including ten thousand freed men and foreigners of free condition, amounted to ninety thousand ; and, the slaves

* Rep. Athen. p. 693.

† Decline and Fall, chap. ii. (vol. I. p. 68. 8vo. edit.)

to four hundred thousand ; which is about the proportion of one to four and one half. It is probable, that this number of slaves is exaggerated, otherwise the Athenians would scarcely have enacted the laws above mentioned, to distinguish the two classes of inhabitants.* However, that refined people treated their slaves with the greatest indulgence ; and to this we may ascribe their uniformly peaceable behaviour. The slaves in Laconia are said to have been somewhat more numerous ; but the poverty of the Lacedemonians induces one to suspect an error in the calculation. The helotes, for instance, may have been confounded with the slaves. The helotes were an intermediate class between the δούλοι and the ελευθεροί ; but they had always the chance of obtaining the right of citizenship by their services and good behaviour. They were engaged in agriculture, and allowed to farm the lands at a very low rent. However, the cruel treatment and injustice of the Spartans frequently excited revolts, both among them and the slaves, particularly after the conquest of Messenia had increased their numbers. Nor could any thing have kept those inferior classes in subjection, but the perpetual state of discipline, and the martial

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habits which peculiarly distinguished the free barbarians who inhabited Laconia. In Thes-
faly, the great slave market of Greece, there was a class of serfs, resembling the helotes, occupied like them in agriculture, and renting the land from the free citizens, on very moderate terms. In that country, rebellion among the slaves was very frequent, which must have arisen from the large proportion of imported and unseasoned hands, as it is not probable that a great stock of slaves would be kept up for sale.

The proportion of slaves to free men in the colonies and provinces of Rome, must have been much smaller than in the city, from the inferior wealth and luxury of the inhabitants, and their greater distance from the great slave market. In Sicily, where the fertility of the soil, and the near neighbourhood of Rome, may be supposed to have encouraged agricultural speculations, and diffused greater riches among the inhabitants, the slaves appear to have been very numerous. Accordingly, that island was the scene of the most formidable servile insurrection recorded in ancient history. In the cruelty of the slaves; the influence of fanaticism and forcery over their conduct; the extent of the infection, which seems to have spread over the whole island, and to have broken out repeatedly after being quelled :—in the successes of the rebels

bels against the Roman commanders, who, after many defeats, only subdued them at last by famine,—this servile war seems to have borne a close resemblance to the rebellions of later times.


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When the Roman empire was tottering by its own weight, or verging to decay amidst the various dangers that beset it; among the causes of its internal debility, we certainly cannot reckon the mixture of slaves. Long before this period, the cessation of conquests had prevented the possibility of importing new slaves, and had turned the attention of masters to breeding, and consequently to gentle treatment, as the only means of keeping up their stocks. The public law, and the policy of the emperors, concurred with, or arose out of the interests of the citizens, and restrained the master's powers within narrow limits. The restrictions on emancipation were removed, and the privileges of slaves were increased, while their treatment became milder. By degrees, they came to form a subordinate class of men, in the same community with their masters, and attached to the same country; neither formidable by their numbers, nor separated by their character and constitution, nor alienated by the hardness of their lot.

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The proportion of negroes to whites in the West Indies, is extremely different from that of the slaves to their masters in the worst times, and in the most wealthy parts of the ancient states. The average in the British colonies was, in 1790, about ten to one, exclusive of Barbadoes, the Bermudas, and the Bahamas. In the French colonies, the proportion was nearly that of fourteen to one; and in the Dutch colonies, it was that of twenty-three to one. The average of the whole West Indies, was about ten to one. This average varies from the proportion of twenty-three to one, to the proportion of four to one. Instead of abounding in the towns where the free men are most numerous, and the government most vigorous, as was the case in the ancient states, the negroes are chiefly distributed over the country. The capital of Jamaica contains between one fourth and one fifth of the whole white population of the island, and not above one fifteenth of the negroes. In Italy or Greece, these proportions would have been just reversed.

The proportions of slaves to free men, in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, on the continent, and in the southern states of North America, more nearly resemble those of the ancient nations. In the Portuguese colonies, too, and in

in most of the Spanish settlements, the employment and distribution of the negroes, are somewhat similar to those of the slaves in ancient times.

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To the wide distinction of race, and the difference in the relative proportions of the numbers, we have to add the various advantages of the West Indian slaves over the citizens, in bodily strength, activity, and fitness for the climate, none of which distinguished the ancient slaves from their masters; and we shall be convinced, that in this, as well as many other points, the situation of ancient states differed widely indeed from that of nations in the present times, and that the greatest caution is necessary in applying the examples of their policy and history to the affairs of modern communities.

We may rest assured, then, that the structure of society in the West Indian colonies, is in an eminent degree unfavourable to internal security at all times, and still more so to security or strength in a state of warfare.

But, on the other hand, there can be as little doubt, that the fatal disproportion of the two classes, the great proportion of imported negroes, and the cruel treatment of the slaves in general, would be all materially altered by any revolution that should separate the colonies from the parent states, whilst the more vigorous administration

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ministration of an independent community would lessen the danger arising from such a mixture of negroes, or such abuses of the slave system as might still remain.

We have frequently had occasion to observe, that the cultivation of the West Indies, or, what is the same thing, the importation of African labourers, is carried on in a great measure by credit obtained in the mother country, and by the funds of mercantile houses, which embark in West Indian speculations, but are chiefly engaged in the European trade, or at least in the trade of importing or carrying West Indian commodities. Now, the greatest part, if not the whole, of the capital thus employed in loans to planters, will be withdrawn as soon as the government of any island ceases to be dependent. Men are never fond of risking their money in the hands of foreign merchants, out of their sight, subject to the rapacity of a different government, and only recoverable by the laws of another state. How little of the monied capital of individuals in Great Britain has ever been drawn to Hindostan, by the temptation of enormous interest, although recoverable by action in an English court of law! How much less has been lent to traders in Batavia! Nay, how seldom does any British capital find its way across the channel to countries such as France and Holland, the mercantile transactions

transactions of which are as well known on the 'Change of London, as in Paris or Amsterdam! If any traders continue to risk their stock in plantation loans, the interest must be raised as a temptation; and this will have the immediate effect of retarding improvement, and diminishing the importation of negroes. As the planters of one island, or confederacy of islands, will not have it in their power to lay the increased rate of interest upon their commodities, and as the produce of their grounds will not be augmented, the net produce will be diminished by the rise in the demands of creditors. The planters who employ a small borrowed capital, and they who add a borrowed capital to their own stock, in order to make up a sufficient stock for carrying on the business, will be unable to continue in the planting trade; and a number of small capitals, both real and borrowed, will thus be thrown out of the plantation employment. But the demands of European creditors, who resolve to withdraw their capitals; the rise of interest required by others, as the price of the increased risk and inconvenience; and the impossibility of small traders now continuing in the business; must immediately cause a number of planters to dispose of their whole stock, and many others to sell a part of theirs. The consequence of their necessities will be, that their lands,

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lands, buildings and negroes, will be sold much under their real value. This cheapness will tempt the rich planters to lay out their surplus capital in such purchases, instead of engaging in the less profitable and more hazardous speculation of clearing new land, by importing, or purchasing imported negroes. Or if, instead of purchasing lands, they assist the debtors with money to satisfy the European claims, the rate of interest will be increased, by the amount of the bonus: so that the lenders will be satisfied, without embarking their money in new speculations of clearing and importing. This cheapness will at the same time attract settlers from other countries; and the old planters, reduced in their circumstances by the change, will probably, from their knowledge of the business, be employed on the estates, and in the warehouses of the new owners.

Those capitalists, then, who, under the colonial system, would have employed their stock in importing negroes, will now employ it in supplying the place of the capital withdrawn by the merchants in the mother country, while the old system of credit, being almost wholly at an end, every proprietor will reside upon his lands, instead of employing a factor or attorney. Great care will be taken of the stock of negroes in hand. The proportion of creole to imported

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imported negroes will be much increased ; and humane treatment of the slaves will produce its natural and constant effect—fidelity and attachment on their part. The condition of the whole body of negroes being greatly ameliorated, they will gradually improve in habits of sobriety and voluntary industry ; they will become more civilized and safer inmates of the community. In the mean time, the diminished demand for negroes will not occasion much capital to be withdrawn from the Guinea trade, at least for some years ; but its profits will be lowered ; and nearly the same quantity of slaves being imported to the West Indies as before, the planters of the islands remaining under colonial government, will buy them cheaper than formerly ; they will be tempted to engage in more extensive speculations, and to manage their stock with much greater carelessness. While the dangers of the independent islands are diminished, and their internal weakness is corrected, the settlements that remain in the state of colonies will be placed in circumstances of increasing danger and weakness.

But, in the new communities, a rapid change will also take place upon the numbers and characters of the whites. We have formerly had occasion to remark the difference between the conduct of those whose residence in a country is only temporary—whose object is to accumu-
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late wealth in order to return home, and those who live at home and spend their money where they make it. * The stock of whites in the new state will not be kept up by emigration, but increased by marriage. The connexions with mulattoes and negresses will be abandoned, or, if they are continued, their fruits will be considered as lawful children, and the people of colour will thus be blended with the whites. In a short time, the disproportion of females will cease, and the augmentation of population will be carried on by natural means. Additional good treatment of the negroes may be expected to result from the improvement of manners, and the greater stake which masters will have in the country that contains their wives and families, even if the admixture of women in the composition of the society should fail to humanize the manners of the people, and ameliorate directly the condition of the subordinate race.

It is thus, that the change which we are supposing to take place in the political condition of any one of the islands, must absolutely, as well as relatively, increase its resources and internal security, and counteract the evil effects which the negro slavery produces upon the military strength of the state.

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* Book I. Sect. I.

4. But, in another point of view, the West Indian colonies, and the other provincial settlements of the European states, are placed in peculiar circumstances; namely, by the system of foreign policy which has arisen out of the relative situation of the European powers in modern times.

When a state, whose territories are of moderate extent, and whose dominion is not established over distant provinces, engages in warfare, its resources may all be called forth in one effort; its attention is not distracted by remote and opposing interests. A single victory may permanently increase its dominions, or a short reverse of fortune reduce its power. A state, on the other hand, whose possessions are widely diffused over different parts of the globe, exposes, in every contention, a variety of points to the attacks of the enemy. In resolving upon hostilities, all those dangers must be taken into account. The weakness of a particular settlement belonging to a rival power, is not more to be considered than your own defenceless situation at some distant point. While the inducements to maintain a peaceable demeanour are increased, the chances of various success in war are multiplied. As complete good fortune in all quarters can scarcely be expected: so, neither need total discomfi-

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ture in every part be apprehended. The chances of success and failure during a war between nations placed in such circumstances, are always much more likely to balance each other, than in any single and narrow contest between states possessing small and compact dominions. If an unlucky campaign forces one of them from part of its possessions in the east, a contrary event may turn the scale in the west. The obvious convenience of retaining each its ancient territories, founds the treaty of peace, in general, upon a mutual restitution of conquests, and commonly leaves the territorial extent of the two powers nearly the same as before the war.

But the policy of modern times has still farther diminished the probability of sudden changes in the distribution of national dominion. The similarity in the situation of the European powers; the resemblance of their languages, manners, and laws; the extension of their intercourse by travelling and foreign residence; their union by the relations of scientific and commercial pursuits—have given birth to an intimate connexion in times of peace, and a common feeling of interest in maintaining the existence of the present state of affairs. Each power, then, views with solicitude the dangers which beset the rest, and feels itself attacked when

when any of the weaker states are exposed to the insults or oppressions of their more formidable neighbours—in the same manner that each nation watches over the security of its distant possessions, and prepares to put all its forces in motion, when any aggression in those remote quarters calls for revenge. As the power which would seize on a defenceless province or distant colony of another state, must be prepared to meet the whole force of the mother country, and defend all its own remote settlements : so, the power that would encroach upon the territories of any one feeble neighbour, must lay its account with preserving the usurpation, by exposing its whole dominions and colonies to the combined attacks of the other states, who will immediately unite to restore the former balance of power. Such, at least, is the theory of political equilibrium ; and we have only to lament, that an impolitic ambition, or thoughtless security, should have so frequently prevented its full application to the affairs of modern Europe. Yet we may easily perceive how great the influence of the system has been in maintaining the independence of the different states, if we only consider the very trifling extent of the changes which have taken place in the relative situations of the European powers, and in the distribution of the Continent, un-

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der separate governments, 'during the long and splendid period of modern history.

In like manner, we may remark, how few alterations have taken place upon the position of the European states in the West Indies, and the distribution of those valuable islands, unequally as the strength of the different states in that quarter is proportioned. During the five long and eventful contests of the eighteenth century, the only change which took place owing to the fate of war (if we except the expulsion of the French inhabitants of St Kitts), was the cession of Tobago by Britain, of Grenada by France, and of Trinidad by Spain. The first of those islands had only been annexed to the British Crown for twenty years, and the last had just begun to be planted by the Spaniards. The surrender of St Bartholomew to Sweden, and of the eastern division of St Domingo to France, can in no degree be imputed to the fortune of colonial war. The former of those changes was the result of a transaction between two powers, who had remained during the whole century in constant alliance; and the latter was an acquisition made by France, through her preponderance in Europe, at a time when she had more territory in the West Indies than she could govern. So few have been the permanent transferences of colonial possessions in
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that part of the world where war has reigned the most constantly; where every campaign has been attended with some important conquest; and where every island, except Jamaica, Barbadoes, and Porto-Rico, has experienced a temporary change of masters. S E C T.
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But if any of those European settlements were to become independent of the mother country, and to remain unconnected with the other parts of the globe, it is evident, that the fate of West Indian warfare would be insulated on the part of the new state, and would be productive of constant changes, which opposite events in different quarters could not modify or correct. If, for example, the French West Indies had, during the American war, been unconnected with Europe immediately, and mediately with Asia and North America, the peace of Versailles could never have restored the conquered islands to the British crown. Britain must have lost them for ever, and with them, most probably, her larger settlements also, unless she could recover each conquest directly by force of arms. The same may be said of the British conquests during the Seven-years war, and during the late war, restored on account of the North American colonies in the one case, and of the Asiatic settlements in the other. In the Spanish war of 1740, the restoration of Cape Bre-

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ton affords a striking illustration of the position for which we are contending. That important settlement was taken almost entirely by the exertions of the North American colonists; and it was restored by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in order to procure the restoration of our principal East Indian settlement taken by France. If Pondicherry and Cape Breton had not belonged to the same European power, it is evident, that the events of that war would have transferred the possession both of Calcutta and Cape Breton.

In all such circumstances as we are now supposing to be combined, the fortune of West Indian warfare alone would decide the possession of West Indian territory. We should no longer hear of America being conquered in Germany; nor of balances or sets-off; nor of treaties on the footing of the *status quo ante bellum*. The chance of war, in a few campaigns, confined to the Charaibbean Sea, would determine the permanent sovereignty of the islands. The right of property would be vested by the mere act of occupancy, without the necessity of confirmation by convention, or acknowledgment by the other nations; and the *uti possidetis* would of course be the basis of each pacification.

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Now, it may be said, that the independent state which we are supposing to arise in the West Indies, will be deprived of the security arising from a power of making reprisals upon an enemy in distant quarters; that, of consequence, though more unembarrassed in its offensive operations, it will be exposed to hostile neighbours, likewise less hampered; and that its defeats will be as irretrievable as its victories will be secure.

To a certain degree, indeed, this must be the case. The new community cannot unite all the advantages of compactness and insulation with the benefits arising from extended and remote dominions. But we must remember, in the *first* place, that while it is placed at a distance from the great commonwealth of Europe, it cannot be an object of so much jealousy and apprehension to the states composing that body, as any of the European powers possessing colonies in the West Indies must always be. Suppose St Domingo to be the independent settlement, and that it is conquered by the Spanish government in the neighbouring island of Cuba: Great Britain, we may be assured, would view with greater alarm this aggrandizement of Spain by the conquest of St Domingo, than the aggrandizement of St Domingo by the conquest of Cuba. We have indeed

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proved, that an independent community in those parts, would be a more dangerous neighbour, than a colonial settlement to those colonies which should remain dependent. But this danger would only affect the colonial interests of Great Britain; the accession of wealth and power to any of her European neighbours, brings the danger nearer home; and Spain, the natural ally of France, would not be allowed to retain her conquest without a war in Europe or Asia. I do not assert that this policy would be the most enlightened; but I maintain that it would be the most consistent with that spirit of national rivalry which divides the European powers, which is the great corner-stone of the balancing system, and which, notwithstanding its many evil consequences, has certainly done more to preserve the independent existence of nations, than all the refinements of abstract politicians, their treaties of guarantee, and their codes of public law.

In the *second* place, whatever might be the wish of European powers, their opportunity of checking the growth of the independent state, and of preventing it from being conquered by a neighbour, is extremely different. In order to check its growth, they can only interfere by direct attack on the spot; in attempting to prevent it from being conquered, they have all the

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the opportunities of attack which extended and severed possessions present. To revert to the supposition which we have just now made—The permanent conquest of Cuba by St Domingo could only be prevented by a recapture of the one, or an invasion of the other. But the permanent conquest of St Domingo by Spain, could be opposed in Florida, in Cuba, in Mexico and South America, in the Mediterranean, and in the Philippine islands. All the powers of Europe must be averse to any change, either at home, or in the neighbourhood of their distant settlements. If their interference can prevent or correct one kind of revolution or change of power; and if this interference cannot be effectual in opposing another; we may be assured, that without completely weighing the comparative evils of these events, or inquiring how far the prevention of the one may tend to bring about the other, they will intermeddle, as soon as the occasion presents itself in which their interference is likely to be attended with effect.

Lastly, we may remark, that the powers of Europe possessing territories in the West Indies, are, from their relative position at home, always ranged on opposite sides of the great European balance. Such a change of international policy, as should unite France, Spain and Holland,

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Holland, with Britain and Portugal, is not to be supposed in any practical question.

However clearly, then, the colonial interests of those powers may point out to them the policy of a combination against any one of the colonies which shall have thrown off its dependence on the mother country, such a coalition can scarcely be expected to be vigorous and sincere. Notwithstanding the guidance of the most enlightened statesmen, the councils of nations are often impelled by passion and prejudice, as well as those of less abstract beings. A more immediate and more urgent danger than the neighbourhood of the new state, whose existence we have been figuring, would probably be necessary to induce Great Britain to risk a direct increase of the French power, by uniting with the councils of the Thuilleries, or the court of Versailles, in an offensive West Indian league; and if the rulers of the nation were guided by those wise and temperate views, they would have to encounter the strongest prejudices of the people, whom the spirit of our free constitution arms with a power sufficient to sway even the foreign policy of our national councils. We have not forgotten the part that France, Holland and Spain, took in our own colonial disputes against their most obvious transatlantic interests, which they sacrificed, perhaps with sufficient wisdom, to the desire

desire of curbing our more formidable maritime superiority in Europe. Upon some occasions, the right and prudent line of public conduct may be adopted. We shall afterwards endeavour to prove, that a policy is recommended by the present colonial crisis, similar to that which we at present maintain is the one always least likely to be adopted. But surely it is very fair to argue upon any measure, from the probability that, in many cases, perhaps in a great plurality of instances, the unwise and popular views of foreign policy will predominate in the councils of several states.

The new West Indian power, then, will probably find allies even among the states whose American settlements lye exposed to its attacks. But, admitting that a community of interests in those parts may unite all the rival states against the new nation; it will find warm and powerful allies among the other commercial countries of Europe, which have no nearer interest in American affairs, than that of obtaining a market for their goods, and attracting to their dominions a share of the rich produce of the West Indian territories. Russia, Austria and Prussia, not to mention the Italian States, are perfectly unconcerned in the distribution of the colonies, unless indeed that they would profit by any change which might overthrow

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overthrow the whole system of colonial sovereignty. It is not easy to conceive a stronger inducement to either of those ambitious powers, than the prospect of obtaining a footing in the West Indies, or the advantages of a favourable commercial treaty, which the new power would readily grant them in any crisis of its affairs. * Things are widely changed since the time when the proud spirit of Katharine refused to acknowledge the independence of the United States. That thirst of dominion and territory which has guided the House of Brandenburg since the days of the Great Elector, and which neither the neighbourhood of Russia, or of France, have been able to subdue, is only equalled by the desire of the Prussian monarchs to extend their mercantile resources; and the nineteenth century has opened with the foundation of maritime policy in the extended Imperial dominions. It is manifest, that the union of the Germanic powers with the states immediately concerned in the affairs of America, could only be occasioned by a rapid extension of Russia over the Northern and Eastern parts of Europe; an event which would, on the other hand, render the alliance of the great Baltic state no very difficult achievement of policy to the new power, whose independent existence in the West Indies we have figured.

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* Note F f,

We may conclude, then, that besides the resources of internal strength, this state will not be deficient in those of a federal nature, and that, while it exposes no distant territories to the arms of its natural enemies or its rivals, it may avail itself of divisions arising from their relative position in all parts of the globe, and of alliances with their natural enemies and rivals in Europe.

It is surely no speculative inference, from all the facts and principles which have been stated, that so long as the European powers shall persevere in the system of colonial policy, the establishment of any independent dynasty in the West Indies must be immediately and directly hostile to their interests.

II. Hitherto we have compared the relative strength of a colony and an independent state in general, and of a colony and an independent state in the West Indies, without entering into the circumstances of the particular settlements in that quarter. It remains to be considered, whether the different colonies are not distinguished by diversity of circumstances, and whether the French dominions in the West Indies are not placed in a state of singular weakness by the peculiarities of their situation, by the events which have lately happened, and by those which must accompany the restoration of tranquillity.

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The state to which the whole Archipelago, as well as the surrounding continent, once belonged, still possesses the best established, though far from the most valuable empire in the new world. Vast extent of territory, towns and settlements thinly scattered chiefly over those parts which are farthest from the other colonies, a policy singularly adapted to preserve internal tranquillity, and a free population to which the negroes bear but a small proportion; these important circumstances concur to render the continental possessions of Spain as secure as provinces so remote can well be. The insalubrious nature of the climate on the east side of South America and Mexico, while it has kept the settlements on that coast in the state of a desert, except at particular seasons of commercial resort, effectually prevents any successful invasion from the West Indies, and takes away the inducement to invade, by destroying all the immediate objects of attack. In no part of the South American colonies are so few negroes employed as in the Spanish settlements; and their treatment is better there, than in any other of the European colonies. Both in the Spanish and Portuguese dominions on the Continent, the white population is much more flourishing than in the West Indies. Vast bodies of emigrants have been constantly settling there since the conquest, as in the North American states. The Creoles form a large part of the community; and

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and their numbers increafe with confiderable rapidity, though not fo quickly as they would under a better form of government, a lefs corrupted religion, and a lefs indolent ftate of manners. The whites in the Spanifh colonies amounted in 1550 to fixty thoufand; at present they are not under a million. Yet the ftructure of the fociety does not endanger the dependence of thefe colonies. So much of the national importance, both of Spain and Portugal, has always been thought to depend upon their American poffeffions; and fuch large fupplies have been received from thence, in the form by which governments are moft apt to be tempted, that a very large fhare of attention has uniformly been paid to colonial affairs in both thefe countries. Particular councils and minifters have been appointed to fuperintend them. A regular fyftem of colonial government has been formed, and every thing hurtful to the fupremacy of the mother country has been carefully prevented from finding admittance. In the Spanifh colonies, particularly, the Papal jurifdiction, fo abfolute over the mother country, has never been allowed to acquire a footing; and the tithes, the difcipline, and the patronage of the Church (the inheritance of the Triple Crown all over the Pontifical dominions) have been monopolized by the temporal monarchs of Caftile.

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There has resulted, from this attention constantly paid to American affairs by both the powers of the Spanish peninsula, a system of division highly favourable to the security of permanent rights. A spirit of disunion is carefully fomented between the Spaniards and Creoles; and a superiority is given to the former, which greatly diminishes the dangers of a separation, encourages the habit of temporary residence, and thus corrects the tendency of the increasing Creole population to promote the independence of the settlements. A similar superiority is bestowed upon the negroes over the Indians; and a division is cherished between those two classes, which gives the whites an opportunity of uniting with either against the other, and generally attaches to their interests the least numerous though most warlike of the two races. A policy of the same nature has connected the Europeans with the Indians in the French and Dutch settlements of Guiana, where the negroes are by far the most formidable both in numbers and in strength. In those continental colonies of Spain and Portugal, then, as well from their position and extent, as from the state of their population and their systems of policy, there is less danger of a separation, and less risk from foreign attempts, than in the settlements of Guiana; and less danger and risk in all those continental settlements, than in the West Indian islands.

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We have before remarked, that the indolence and want of adventurous spirit, so conspicuous in the Spanish character, as well as the restrictive spirit of the colonial laws of Spain, has prevented the islands of Cuba and Porto-Rico from being cultivated, like the other colonies, by the rapid importation of African labourers; but, of late years, this difference has been sensibly diminishing. The mercantile company under the Asiento which lasted from 1769 to 1779, carried to the Havanna, yearly, from two thousand five hundred to three thousand negroes, for the use of Cuba and Trinidad, and only carried half that number to Carthagena and Portobello, for the use of the northern and western parts of the continent. * The field negroes of Cuba were found, by actual enumeration in 1787, to be fifty thousand in number. Since that time, the ordinance of 1789 permitting the free importation of slaves, granting a bounty on field negroes, and imposing a yearly poll-tax on house negroes, must have greatly increased the numbers of the former. But, still, the mild treatment of the slaves, provided for by new laws which keep pace with the increased importation, the great proportion of whites, and the numbers of free blacks (estimated at twenty thousand in the Ha-

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* Report of Committee 1789, part VI.



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vanna alone), who are always attached to the Europeans, and serve with distinguished zeal in their regiments, must render the possessions of Spain in the West Indies more secure, in those particulars which we have been considering, than the colonies of the other European powers.

The Dutch islands are in a situation very different from their colonies on the continent, as we have formerly shown, * and equally different from the other West Indian islands. But, whatever may be their internal situation, their trifling extent must always render them an easy prey to any neighbouring West Indian power, which may be tempted to attack them by the hopes of mercantile plunder. The Danish and Swedish islands are in the same situation with the French and British islands; so that our attention is now confined to a survey of the predicament in which the latter would be placed should the tranquillity of the former be restored.

It is impossible to deny, that the dominions of France in the West Indies, are more extensive and more fertile in natural resources, than those of any other power except Spain; neither can it be dissembled, that the restoration of tranquillity will put her in possession of a much more extensive and scattered territory than any independent power in those parts can be expected to consolidate

* Book I. Sect. III. Part I.



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date under its dominion for some time after its emancipation. But the example of Spain, both in the Old and New World, and of France herself, in Europe, may convince us, that political importance and national strength, are not so much proportioned to the natural resources and capability of a country, as to the state of its society and the nature of its institutions. The relative influence of France and of Great Britain, in Europe, is not less proportioned to their natural resources, than their relative power in the West Indies is to their colonial resources. Whatever may be the fertility and extent of any colony peopled by a mixture of whites and negroes, the inhabitants cannot avail themselves of their advantages according to the slave system, without diminishing, at the same time, their security and military strength; and this exactly in proportion to the rapidity with which they increase their wealth. Every hundred hogheads of sugar or rum, whereby their annual produce is augmented, must be purchased at the expence of that security which is destroyed by a proportional addition to the stock of negroes, and an augmentation in the proportion of the imported to the Creole slaves. A colony which continues to raise the same quantity of produce, will send home fewer overgrown fortunes, and augment, in a smaller degree, the mercantile opulence of the mother country; but it will enjoy greater security,

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security, and have less to fear from its powerful neighbours, than if it had been constantly increasing in point of wealth.

It must indeed be admitted, as we formerly stated, that the same number of negroes in the French islands, from the superior fertility of the soil, yield a greater quantity of produce.* But the tendency of this superiority, is by no means to save either the labour or the importation of slaves: It operates, on the contrary, as an encouragement to extravagant speculations, and careless management of the stock. The treatment of the slaves in the French islands has been alleged by some † to be gentler than that of the British slaves; and Dr Smith, in particular, seems to take this for granted, as a matter of common notoriety. ‡ Others have asserted, that this class of men are nearly upon a level, in point of comforts, in the colonies of both nations ||. But, from the inquiries of the committee of 1789, it appears clearly, that the mortality among the negroes in the French islands, is much greater than in the British. It was computed, that of those imported, one third died in three years, and of the Creoles, one fifth

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

† Laborie's Coffee Planter, Appendix.

‡ Wealth of Nations, book IV. chap. VII.—Note G g.

|| Edwards' History of St Domingo, chap. i.

fifth yearly more than the number born ; * while the annual diminution in Jamaica was only one fortieth *per cent.* ; and, in several of the islands, the stock was kept up, and even increased, without any importation. I have frequently had occasion to notice the vast importation of slaves annually made into the French islands, and the consequently rapid increase of the numbers during the ten years immediately previous to the revolution. It is manifest, however, that the total increase was far from being in proportion to the number imported, either before or during that period, admitting that the births had been nearly sufficient to fill up the blanks occasioned by the deaths, and allowing for the disproportion of females in the numbers imported. †

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It would appear, therefore, that the natural advantages of St Domingo will never be turned to account without a very dangerous increase in the negro population. But, in another point of view, this island, and indeed all the French colonies, are in a situation much less favourable to solid power than the British possessions, and more apt to render their independence a cause of comparative strength.

I have already had occasion to notice the extensive system of commercial credit, in-

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* Report 1789, part V.

† Note H h.

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terwoven with the cultivation of all the West Indian islands, and to point out the probable effects of their independence upon this system. But there are several other circumstances connected with it which well deserve our attention. The credit upon which planters speculate, and in many cases exist, is not of a solid and permanent description, like the credit interposed by commercial confidence in the transactions of European merchants and manufacturers. The risk is much greater, the profits of consequence higher, and the spirit of gambling more intimately connected with it. A rapacity of gain, and, in many instances, an eagerness of speculation approaching to the desperation of the gaming-house, influences both the creditor and the planter. The fair idea of reciprocal advantage does not always preside over such transactions; and a capitalist frequently risks his money to a planter in circumstances nearly desperate, in order to have a claim upon his estate, and to obtain it at a price prescribed by the necessities of the debtor. The complicated difficulties under which a great proportion of the planters labour from these causes, has been admitted by writers on both sides of the great question that has divided political inquirers into colonial affairs. The facts which the advocates of each opinion have brought forward, with the most opposite

posite views, are extremely important. The immediate consequence of the difficulties which thus oppress the planters, is an eagerness for quick returns upon their stock of negroes, and a constant demand of new supplies from the Guinea trader. The slaves are worked out; breeding is of course neglected; and the numbers are kept up or increased by importation. Accordingly, the demands of creditors, and the necessities of debtors, have been uniformly pleaded by the supporters of the African trade, as arguments demonstrating the necessity of its continuance; while the advocates of the abolition have urged the very same facts to show the evil effects of the trade, as well upon the happiness of the master, as upon the condition of the slave.* The new actions, we are told, which are raised in the different courts of Jamaica, amount annually to three thousand, of which the greater part are actions upon bond; and of these, nine tenths are brought by slave factors as creditors.† In three years, half a million Sterling passed through the hands of one Sheriff, in consequence of judicial sales on executions chiefly arising from such bonds; and the principal

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* Edwards' West Indies, b. IV. c. 4.; and Parliamentary Debates 1791 & 1792.

† Clarkson's Impolicy of the Slave Trade, part 2. cap. 1. sect. 3.

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part of the debtors in jail during that period were confined in consequence of those obligations.* A similar account is given by authors who wrote long before the question of abolition had begun to divide the public opinion, particularly by Mr Long, in his valuable History of Jamaica.†

But the planters in the French islands have always been involved still more deeply in this ruinous and cruel system, partly from the superior temptations of more fertile and extensive lands, partly from the deficiency of capital, both among the creditors and colonists, but chiefly from the gross defects of the French laws respecting the recovery of debts. In the First Book of this Inquiry, I have explained the singular effects of these circumstances upon the state of property in the French islands. Cultivators placed in the situation which I there described, have no immediate interest in what is called their property. The care of their stock is the last method of increasing it that ever enters into their minds. Immediate returns, by whatever means, are the only method of improvement that occurs to them; and as for any danger to be apprehended from increasing the number of the negroes, that belongs to the whole

* Clarkson's Impolicy of the Slave Trade, part 2. cap. 1. sect. 3.

† Vol. I. p. 437.


whole community at once, and therefore affects
none of its members until it is realized. S E C T.
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‘ Things will last my time,’ says the West Indian farmer, as men have said before him in all ages, and in every part of the world—financiers on the brink of national bankruptcy, and princes, or their favourites, on the eve of a revolution.

If this was the state of the French islands in the year 1789, it is easy to conceive how the system must have been affected by the events which have happened since that time. The restoration of tranquillity in the revolted colonies, cannot at once render them a desirable residence. Those only will repair to the spot, or remain there, whose money has already been vested in West Indian property, from the temptations held out to purchasers during the period of the greatest confusion, or whose estates have remained on their hands for want of purchasers. The men possessed of such extensive capital as is required in West Indian speculations, will be still less inclined now, than before, to superintend a plantation in St Domingo. The cultivators will, as formerly, consist, in a great degree, of persons inclined to risk their health, and sacrifice the comforts of home, for the chance of acquiring a competency—persons of small capital, or mere adventurers. The devastations of the revolutionary times, with the accumulated

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accumulated interest of old debts, will render credit at once more necessary, and more expensive than ever. Indeed, to such a state have the proprietors been reduced, that the best informed persons seem to despair altogether of the colonial affairs of the republic. The interference of government will probably be necessary; and the nature of the expedients proposed by some of the most intelligent planters, affords, as I before remarked, * abundant proof of their desperate situation. Any assistance which the government can afford, will, at the very utmost, only enable the planters to go on. They are still in a situation infinitely more desperate than before the revolution—borrowing money at higher interest—forced to extract more labour from their slaves, in order to extend their culture, or restore their desolated plantations. Some correction of the evils arising from the state of the colonial laws, may indeed be expected—more particularly, the recovery of debts may be facilitated. But, besides that this must, in the first instance, increase the necessities of the planters before it can lower the demands of their creditors for interest, we may observe, that the imperfections of the colonial laws arise, in a great measure,

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

ture, naturally from the circumstances of the islands, and cannot be wholly removed so long as the dangers of a tropical climate render imprisonment a punishment of the highest severity, and so long as creditors are willing rather to obtain the chance of repayment, or profit, by enabling their debtors to work, than, by completing their ruin, to lose all chance of getting either, without repairing to the spot.

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The low state of credit, and the complicated difficulties of the planters, will always produce considerable derangement in the administration of the colonies. The first assistance which government may find it necessary to give, will be the abatement of some colonial imposts, such as the poll-tax on slaves; and the encouragement of abolishing the duties formerly known by the name of ‘*droits du domaine d’occident*.’ The administration of the islands, and their defence, will thus fall a burthen on the exhausted finances of the mother country. As soon as the cultivation has begun to revive, we may be well assured, that the government will attend more to the direct expences, than to the indirect advantages of such establishments. Like all governments, it will view these islands in the fiscal spirit, and will alienate the oppressed planters, by imposing on them the charge of ruling and defending themselves. We have already

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already seen what their opinions are upon the subject of colonial militia, even in the most easy and peaceable times. It is not probable that they will now grudge their labour less when their occasions are much more pressing. To the troops or services required for suppressing insurrection, they may possibly make no objections. But the furtherance of any views of conquest, or even the measures necessary for their internal security, will be viewed as encroachments upon their exhausted resources, and will either be opposed or received with decided aversion. As to conquest, it must be clearly against their interest to be at variance with the neighbouring colonies; and the dominion of England would probably be preferred to that of France, as was the case about the beginning of the revolution, if she burdened them with the expence or interruption of providing against an invasion. So long, indeed, as the plantations depend upon credit from the mother country, their proprietors can have no objection to be connected with that nation whose trading capital is the most extensive, and whose government is the mildest and most equitable of any in the world.

These consequences which, I apprehend, may be fairly expected to result from the late calamities, and the present state of the West Indian

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Indian colonies, are by no means to be considered as accidental, or peculiar to the circumstances in which they have been placed. It is the lot of every distant province of an empire to experience many disadvantages which the contiguous districts never feel; and when such provinces are involved in any unusual calamity, much less care is bestowed upon their re-establishment, than if the like misfortune had happened to a nearer part. I have explained the reason of this in various parts of the First Book. A colony or remote appendage is, by the policy even of those states which have most favoured the colonial system, considered merely as a mine from which wealth is to be drawn in the form of direct revenue, or, at the utmost, as a spot to which the overflowing population of the metropolis may resort in order to acquire opulence. Any unforeseen expence which this possession may cost, is always grudged, as so much actual and uncompensated loss. In seasons of calamity, it is left in a great degree to struggle with the burden of its own adversity. After the storm is over, it is left to recover as it best can. The contiguous provinces, on the other hand, are viewed as necessary and integral parts of the empire, whose misfortunes must be shared by all the rest, while they must be nursed with sedulous care, for their own sakes,

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fakes, in every unforeseen disaster, and cherished without a murmur, not from the prospect of future revenue, but because they form an inseparable portion of the community. Calamities, then, from which the contiguous provinces soon recover without sustaining any serious or permanent injury, are long and severely felt by the colonies or remote provinces. Coldness or disgust arises between them and the mother country; and the seeds of separation are sown, which may either break out in actual rebellion or in factious divisions, whenever a war is transferred, as all wars are, to those quarters.

The probability of the French government being actuated in its conduct towards the revolted islands by less liberal views than the reduced situation of the planters demands, may be collected, not only from the fiscal spirit which has uniformly presided over the policy of all states towards their colonial establishments, but from the state of the French resources, and from the accounts of the late transactions in some of the Windward islands, more particularly the requisitions made in Guadeloupe, if, indeed, any reliance is to be placed on those statements.

But however enlightened its policy, and however easy its yoke may be, if the co-operation

tion of the planters is required in active measures of defensive, or, still more, of offensive warfare, we cannot expect that any thing but disobedience and discontent will be the consequence.

Such, then, are the probable effects of the French colonial system, and of the increased difficulties of the planters in the revolted islands, in consequence of the losses in general which their unhappy situation during the late years has occasioned. But if we attend more particularly to the nature of those losses, we shall find reason to assent still more implicitly to the foregoing conclusion. The greatest devastation which the rebellion has occasioned, is in the numbers of the negroes. M. Malouet reckons, that during the first ten years of revolt in St Domingo, the negro population was diminished from five hundred thousand to three hundred thousand; that the loss was chiefly in males; and that the number of children had rapidly increased.* Laborie, in 1797, estimated the reduction at much more than one half of the numbers in 1789; † Edwards supposes it to have been two fifths of the same numbers. ‡

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* Mem. Vol. I. p. 52.

† Coffee-planter, Append. Art. X. § 12.

‡ St Domingo, cap. X. : Note to page 173.

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All the plantations, therefore, must be extremely understocked ; and the first consequence of a restoration of tranquillity, will be the importation of a vast number of new slaves to supply a deficiency fatal to the colonial agriculture.

In general, the proportion of females to the whole number imported, has been that of one to three. But now a much smaller number of females will be required, at least for some time : so that the proportion of imported males will be much greater than before. The situation of the island will indeed be more favourable for breeding, from the superfluity of females. But the consequence of increase from this source must be slow, in comparison of the effects produced by the other kind of increase. The yearly augmentation will be at first more rapid than formerly, because the births will more nearly balance the deaths. But the treatment will be more harsh while the hands are deficient, and the importation will be greater than ever : so that the natural increase will be now brought to its former level, and the proportion of Creoles to new slaves will soon be much less than before. At the very first, the whole will be Creoles ; but their peculiar situation will render them still more dangerous than if they had been imported. They are just reduced from a rebellion, completely successful
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for a series of years, bloody beyond all former example, and, from the variety of its military operations against all kinds of enemies, peculiarly adapted to render those engaged in it warlike, if not skilful. Almost all the men have borne a part in it. The women and children have enjoyed the sweets of freedom and idleness; they have sympathized in the cause of their husbands and fathers. All the considerations which before induced us * to admit the difficulty of restoring the ancient slavery, and which have inclined many to believe it a hopeless project, prove the difficulty of retaining the whole mass of blacks in subjection, more especially when new imports are perpetually adding fuel to the heap, and aggravated ill treatment is blowing up the sparks of the scarcely smothered flame. If it is uniformly found that imported negroes are dangerous in a colony, though many of them only exchange the scene of their slavery, and all of them are kept in subjection by irons during the voyage, and taught to regard their white masters as beings of a superior order; how much more dangerous must those be, who have never known the yoke, or forcibly broken it, and who have been for years in the situation, formerly unknown to Africans, of

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* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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masters over white men and mulattoes by the right of conquest! In order to keep the new slaves in subordination, and to teach them habits of labour, as well as to disarm them by division, it has always been found necessary to distribute them among the old stock, and gradually to incorporate them with the whole mass. But now, there is no stock with which to combine the revolted slaves. They are reduced to obedience, not in small numbers and gradually, but suddenly, and all at one time; while those newly imported are mingled with a body still less fit than themselves for the tasks and the station of servitude.

While the revolt has diminished the numbers of the negroes, and rendered new importations more necessary than ever, it has also swept away vast numbers of the whites, by massacres, by emigrations, and by disease, the constant attendant upon hard duty in the tropical climates, at least to European constitutions. *

Malouet reckons that their numbers have been reduced to one half the population of 1789, or between seventeen and twenty thousand. It seems proved, that this statement of the whole amount is above the truth; and the effects


* Laborie's Coffee-planter, Append. X. 12.—Malouet, Mem. &c. IV. 32.—Edwards' St Domingo, cap. x. note to p. 173.

effects of the subsequent events, with the necessary struggles that must yet be undergone before tranquillity is restored, will at least counterbalance the increase of numbers arising from new settlers.

When order is re-established, indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that a considerable number of new settlers will repair thither with the stock which may be employed in restoring or extending the cultivation. But not to mention the temptations held out by those islands which have never experienced the horrors of insurrection, the acquisition which France has made of the Spanish part of the island, cannot fail to attract towards that quarter a large proportion of those new settlers. The most valuable part of them, those who remove with their families, and with the purpose of making the colony their home, will certainly prefer a residence separated from the quarter where murder and devastation have been naturalized, and will consider the society of their countrymen, when surrounded by the actors in those scenes, as well exchanged for that of the Spaniards, whose slaves are few in number, and, from gentle treatment, have remained untainted with the spirit of insurrection. The eastern part of St Domingo, too, contains a vast extent of the finest plains perhaps in the whole island. The

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land is a rich virgin foil, watered by the largest and most useful rivers. The access from Europe and the Windward islands is easier, and the harbours are extremely convenient. Hence, we may expect that this quarter of the colony will allure speculators and merchants, as well as other settlers, and thus prevent the old French territory from receiving a great increase of white inhabitants. But the partial increase of the whites in the western division where the negroes are, and not the total augmentation of whites in the island, is the circumstance that must influence the security of the French power over the negroes ; for the two divisions are separated from each other by a difficult country, of great extent, abounding in heights and ravines and impenetrable forests.

The situation of the colony, then, whether we consider the state of the black, or that of the white population, has been rendered infinitely more precarious than before, by the events of the last twelve years. The tenure by which the one of these classes is held in subjection to the other, must now be weak and delicate beyond all former example. No political society that ever subsisted in the world, has had so much reason to desire a state of complete tranquillity and repose from all external danger ; none has ever existed so utterly unfit for being the scene of
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new contests ; none ever offered to its neighbours more certain pledges of pacific intentions, shewed less capacity for aggression, or presented to its enemies a greater number of defenceless and vulnerable points.

The military establishment which France will certainly maintain in this island, must find ample employment in preserving internal tranquillity, and checking the seeds of new revolt as they spring up. It is idle to say, as some writers on colonial affairs have done, that she derives a formidable aspect in that quarter, from the pretext which her colonial possessions afford her, of increasing to a dangerous degree her force in those parts. It is not a pretext ; it is a real necessity. In the West Indies, she has ample occasion for more troops than she can spare from Holland and Belgium, and the departments of the West, and the Italian republic, and the protection of whatever dynasty may happen for the time to be established in the Thuilleries. With all her force, she will find the preservation of her colonies, as they at present stand, the most difficult task which she has yet accomplished in the career of her towering ambition.

The remarks which have been suggested by the recent history of St Domingo, apply, though with less force, to the present state of

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Guadaloupe. That island has, though in a more slight degree, been visited by serious insurrections : the defect of importation since the revolution, has checked the extension of cultivation, and probably diminished the stock of slaves. There, as in St Domingo, the negroes have enjoyed the sweets of liberty, and will return with great and natural reluctance to their former occupations.

The conquered islands have been exempted from all those calamities, and their cultivation has rapidly increased. Some danger must, however, always arise from change of possession : and we shall afterwards have occasion to describe more fully the probable effects of this event upon the administration of those colonies. But the question now turns chiefly upon the state of the larger colonies, whose fortunes the others must follow : and if, from the circumstances of St Domingo and Guadaloupe, France finds it impossible to combine military operations there, we may rest assured that for the very same reason she will remain at peace in her other islands. A rupture with her neighbours, in whatever quarter, must be attended with danger to the whole system ; and we may reckon upon the weakness or dangerous situation of her revolted islands, as if it extended to those which the fortunes of the British arms saved from destruction.

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Thus it appears, in the *first* place, that a colony or remote province, in the general, is always less adapted than an independent state to the operations either of defensive or offensive warfare, by the necessary circumstances of its situation; *secondly*, that the peculiar circumstances of the West Indian islands, and the international policy of modern Europe, would render the independence of any one of *those* colonies peculiarly dangerous to the rest, and would render the colonial regimen a greater source of weakness to them than to any other establishments of the same kind; and, *lastly*, that the situation of the French colonies, after slavery is restored, must be far less secure than that of the other West Indian settlements, both from the peculiar circumstances of those colonies, and from the manner in which the changes have been effected. We may conclude, therefore, that the maintenance of the colonial existence of the French islands, and of the negro system, as established before the revolution, is much less hostile to the interests of the other European powers, who aim at preserving their West Indian settlements, than the separation of the French colonies from the mother country, more especially if that event is attended with the independence of the negroes. We are now to consider the probable consequences of a

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partial subjugation of the negroes, to the dominion of France, and the interests of the other powers in the West Indies.

It cannot be doubted, that the total abolition of slavery in any one of the sugar colonies, and the cultivation of its territories by free subjects, whose constitutions are adapted to the climate, would be attended with the most beneficial effects, and raise its comparative resources and strength to a very high pitch. The labour of slaves is much more expensive than that of free men; and the colonies, which should continue the old system of cultivation, would be deprived of all that additional force with which the acquisition of a vast population of free men would arm the new-modelled settlements. But although the islands are at present inhabited by a race of negro slaves, they are not possessed of men fit for the situation of subjects. They have as yet only the bodies of subjects—bodies animated by the minds of slaves, in the rudest state of society; and no power under that which called them into existence, could at once transform them into men capable of supporting the relations required for the constitution of a free and civilized community. We shall, afterwards, in discussing the various plans for the improvement of the West Indian system, have occasion to enter more fully into the subject

ject of the negro character ; and to demonstrate the utter unfitness of those men for the relations of voluntary labourers, in a regular and civilized state. At the end of the present Section, too, we shall attend a little more minutely to this matter.

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But, even if the negroes already in St Domingo could be suddenly transformed into peaceful and industrious subjects, their numbers are so reduced, that, in order to restore the cultivation of the island, and still more, in order to extend it, a much quicker supply of hands will be necessary than the natural increase can afford. While the stock at present in the island continues free, the importation of slaves is impossible ; and to expect industry or submission from Africans newly brought over, and suddenly let loose, would be no less chimerical. Indeed, it is not easy to conceive how they could be brought from Africa, as no one can have any inducement to import a savage over whom he retains no exclusive authority after he has landed him. All sudden addition to the number of hands, then, is inconsistent with the supposition of a community peopled by free blacks. In the mean time, until the chains of the negroes are either firmly rivetted, or broken for ever, the island must remain in a state of insecurity within, which will require the most undivided attention of the rulers to the maintenance of order among the whites,

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whites, and to the preservation of external tranquillity.

But admitting, for the present, the possibility of keeping the negroes in a state of partial subjection, and of forming a regular community, consisting of free Africans for the populace and Europeans for the higher classes; let us see what dangers the neighbouring colonies might have to apprehend from such a political establishment.

It has been supposed by some,* that if France shall fail in restoring the ancient order of things, she will have at her disposal, a formidable body of the soldiers best adapted to West Indian warfare, and trained to military service, by a series of hazardous operations. How can she so well employ them, (it has been demanded), as in expeditions against her neighbours, at whose expence her turbulent subjects will thus be occupied with military service, and her dominions rapidly extended?

As this is perhaps the most obvious of the dangers which can attend a partial re-establishment of the French power in the revolted islands, and as it has, at first sight, a very formidable appearance, it may be worth while to examine, a little more minutely, whether or not the alarm is real,

* See, particularly, the 'Crisis of the Sugar Colonies,' *passim*.

real, and to what extent such apprehensions deserve to be entertained.

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We must remark, in the *first* place, that those who dwell upon this topic, have greatly overrated the disposeable force likely to be left in the hands of France after the suppression of the rebellion in St Domingo. The author of the '*Crisis*' estimates the whole negro population at five hundred thousand, and the number of men able to bear arms at two hundred thousand. Neither the one nor the other of these accounts is in any degree near the truth. We have before shewn, from the authority of the best-informed writers upon the subject, that the whole number of negroes has been reduced to less than one half during the rebellion; and it is evident, that the recent transactions in the island must have still farther diminished their force. It is equally clear, that almost all this extraordinary loss must have fallen upon the males rather than the females, and upon the young and vigorous men rather than the infirm or the aged. In the imported Africans, indeed, there may be nearly the proportion of males able to bear arms which the author of the '*Crisis*' has supposed. But as all importation has ceased for twelve years, and as the blank occasioned by deaths has in some degree been filled up in the natural way, and not otherwise, it is clear, that,

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
that, even if as many females as males, and as many weak or decrepit as able-bodied men, had fallen in the troubles, the natural proportions of the two sexes, and of the different ages, would by this time have been restored. The polygamy which prevails among the negroes might have retarded the total progress of population; but its effect would have been the same upon both sexes; and it never could have destroyed the relative proportions of those able to serve and those unfit for war. The proportion of men fit to bear arms in any community is certainly not two in five of its whole population. It has never been reckoned more than one in four; and Sir William Petty makes it only one in six. Admitting, then, what is evidently impossible, that the revolt, and subsequent reduction of the negroes, neither diminished their total population, nor altered the proportions of their different classes, the utmost amount of men fit for military service, could not possibly exceed one hundred and twenty-five thousand. But, in supposing such a body at the disposal of government for expeditions against the neighbouring islands, or for the defence of St Domingo, we must imagine that the plantations are to be cultivated, and the inhabitants served by women and children alone; in which case, it is easy to perceive, that the planters must be ruined,

ruined, and entirely alienated from the service of the state, and that the colony will no longer be worth keeping : so that, in every view which can be taken, after making all manner of concessions, it appears, that the estimate upon which the alarm is founded, is exaggerated many times above the truth.

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On the other hand, when we consider the multitudes who perished in the contest ; when we think upon what part of the black population the loss must almost entirely have fallen ; and when we take into our view, also, the new losses which must happen before a final settlement can take place, and the manner in which those losses must of necessity be distributed, we shall probably not underrate the total amount, if we conclude, that France will be unable to employ, in any military operations, more than ten thousand negroes, consistently with the most moderate attention which she can bestow upon the planters, and the colony at large, as a valuable possession.

Now, in judging of the danger to be apprehended from the use that a rival, or an enemy, may make of any resources, we are always to consider the point to which his own evident interest directs him. As, in the detail of military operations, we are never to calculate upon gross blunders in the plans of the opposite party :

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party : so, in systems of policy, we are not at liberty to suppose that a neighbouring power will commit palpable errors, and act inconsistently with its own obvious interests. If, then, any scheme proposed appears, upon a plain and simple consideration of its consequences, to be diametrically opposite to the colonial interests of France, we may certainly conclude, that her neighbours are more surely guaranteed against its effects, than if they had bound her down by the force of treaties, or pledges, or hostages, to pursue a specified line of conduct.

It is possible that the apprehensions arising from the existence of a considerable number of warlike men in the heart of a state formerly the scene of their successful rebellion, and the desire of annoying a formidable and envied rival, may, for a moment, suggest to the rulers of France the idea of sending forth an army of negroes against the British islands. But a very little prudence will certainly incline them to consider, whether the execution of this plan may not be attended with still more alarming consequences than any which are likely to result from the dangerous crisis that suggested the idea. The success of the measure can only be insured in two ways ; either the negroes, under the command of Europeans, and assisted by white troops,

troops, may, by the regular progress of a campaign, conquer the enemy's troops, and reduce his possessions, or they may be led against him as the oppressor of their brethren, and for the purpose of effecting their emancipation. If ten thousand negroes from St Domingo, accompanied by a body of French troops, land in Jamaica, and commence a regular campaign, it is not easy to see why they may not be opposed by the British forces, with the assistance of a chosen body of slaves, which the British islands will be much better able to spare for military service than the exhausted colonies of France. So long as the spirit of insurrection is not fomented among the negroes, they are uniformly found to be peculiarly adapted to the operations of war; they uniformly serve with unshaken fidelity that government which has levied them from the plantations. The sudden acquisition of liberty, by the free gift of the state, and the exchange of servile drudgery, for the comparatively easy and honourable life of a soldier, is a benefit of sufficient value to secure their loyalty: and men in this situation are probably better adapted to receive the lessons of discipline and subordination, than those who have always enjoyed the rank and privileges of free men. They have acquired habits of implicit obedience; and the freedom now conferred upon them,

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them, without weakening those habits, inspires them with that impulse to voluntary exertion which they before wanted. The situation of soldiers is, indeed, the only one for which they are fitted by their previous mode of life. Unaccustomed to have a will of their own, or to act with any view but that of direct obedience to another, they are formed to make part of the great machine which consists of men, and moves at the sound of a single voice. Troops raised in this manner have been found serviceable, even against insurgents of their own colour. The revolted negroes of Surinam have been frequently opposed by bodies of slaves enrolled for the service: the acquisition of freedom has uniformly secured their faithful obedience to the government, and their zealous services against the liberty of their brethren. I shall afterwards have occasion to explain this circumstance more particularly, when, in the Fourth Book of this Inquiry, I come to examine the situation of the free negroes. If so great reliance can be placed upon the exertions of the negroes against the immediate interests of their brethren, and the cause of negro freedom, it is evident that much more may be expected from their assistance when called out against bodies of their brethren, who are in subjection to the Europeans, and fighting solely for their cause. Such a force

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as the negro population could spare from the labours of the field, would be more than a match for the embodied and half-subdued rebels of St Domingo, accustomed to riot in licentiousness, and as formidable to their employers as to their antagonists.

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But, suppose the expedition has been attended with success; that the negro army of France has proved victorious, without any assistance from insurrection among the slaves of the invaded islands, and that it returns to St Domingo in regular order, after adding a rich province to the French empire: will the admission of all these improbabilities bring us nearer to the point? It is not the nature of great services to lower the pretensions of those who perform them. If the existence of the half-subdued negroes, in the heart of the community, was so alarming as to render some enterprise necessary, which might find employment for them; surely their return after victory, and victory over a European power, is not less to be dreaded. In order to prevent them from uniting, and renewing the insurrection, Government has separated them from the rest of their brethren; called them off from their peaceful occupations; armed and embodied them; allowed them to conquer, and thus formed them into a military body—a separate

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class in the heart of the colony—a rallying point to their scattered countrymen, who are free but oppressed, and only wait for their permission to join them. The government has weakened and divided its own forces by the conquest. Every white man that has fallen in the expedition, or is stationed at Jamaica, is an irreparable loss; while the negroes are in the country of their supplies, and can easily repair the losses which their numbers may have sustained.

The expedition, then, has only removed the danger a step farther, in order to render it doubly formidable; and the Europeans in the colony have procured the short respite of a West Indian campaign, by the notable expedient of changing a probable into a certain catastrophe. If, on the other hand, the negroes are left in the conquered island, their consent to this banishment must be obtained, and some means must be discovered to render them less formidable in a country where they have conquered, than they were at home before the expedition; otherwise, the danger is only removed across the narrow channel which separates the one island from the other—an exchange, of which we are immediately to speak.

But the only certain means of succeeding in the supposed enterprise, must be sought for in an appeal to the peculiar feelings of the negroes.

groes. In order to render their services effectual, they must be marched against the neighbouring settlement, as the scene where their countrymen are suffering. The object of their efforts must be, to liberate the slaves; and the assistance of universal insurrection must be expected in such an enterprize. But, after the dominion of their old masters has been forcibly overturned by a successful and general rebellion, it is not very likely that the insurgents will peaceably submit to the controul of the invaders.

The French will have the same work to undertake in their new island, which they have just performed at St Domingo; with this important difference, that their force will be divided between the insurrection to be quelled, and the newly established order to be maintained. The troops, too, by whose assistance the insurrection has been excited, will surely present a more formidable aspect than they did before they were embodied for the service; and, after the new island shall be reduced to the same state of nominal subjection with the old, it is not easy to imagine, that the retaining of both in subordination will be an easier task than the preserving of tranquillity in St Domingo alone. But if the more probable event takes place—the complete establishment of a negro

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commonwealth in the conquered island, partly by the exertions of the invaders, partly by those of its own slaves, we shall, in the next Section, have an opportunity of seeing, that the dangers of such a neighbourhood to all the other colonies, are manifold and immediate. Much more formidable to St Domingo, whose negroes are with difficulty held in subjection, will be the neighbourhood of a people of their own race, almost within the bounds of the same visible horizon, retaining, in consequence of their efforts, a manifest superiority in every respect, and rioting in all the sweets of that licentiousness which they themselves have but lately lost. Without giving the rulers of France, or the local superintendants of her colonial affairs, credit for any extraordinary sagacity or prudence, we may expect, that experience will have taught them to foresee the dangers of using such a weapon as negro rebellion, and that they will feel considerable repugnance at renewing, in any part of the West Indies, those scenes which the insane councils of 1791 displayed in their own possessions. It is not to be imagined that any thing less than utter despair of retaining their sugar colonies, will ever induce them to think of an expedient so full of dangers; and while the government of St Domingo shall possess sufficient

sufficient energy to embody the negroes for a foreign service, the planters will never despair of accomplishing their fair and natural object, the restoration of permanent tranquillity, by the complete subjection of those men and the entire re-establishment of the ancient order of things.

If, on the other hand, all hopes of restoring slavery, or retaining the colonies without it, shall be abandoned; if France shall finally perceive that her power in the West Indies must quickly expire; we need not very anxiously inquire what conduct she will pursue in her last moments. A more formidable danger than any French invasion, though assisted by free negroes and favoured by insurgent slaves, will then threaten all the neighbouring colonies—the establishment of an independent African state in the centre of the West Indies. Nor does it seem of much consequence to inquire, whether the universal destruction of the European name in the Charaibean Sea shall be hastened by the machinations of a French government, or consummated by the less regular and systematic attempts of negro chiefs.

We have now been contemplating an imaginary state of things, which will indeed, most probably, be the intermediate and temporary result of the colonial crisis, but cannot be expect-

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ed long to subsist—the partial and nominal subjection of the negroes, or their submission, as subjects, to the authority of those men whom they formerly obeyed as slaves. Various circumstances, both in the situation of the negroes themselves, and in that of the Europeans, concur to render such an arrangement only temporary, and to prevent it from being any thing more than an intermediate state preparatory to a farther and more permanent change.

There is at least as wide a difference between the habits of a slave and those of a free subject, as between the nature of an African and that of a European. A slave has to learn the difficult lesson of industry, as different from compulsory labour as it is from indolence and sloth. Hitherto he has only obeyed the impulse of another man's will; he has been actuated by no motives but the fear of the lash. The gift of liberty brings with it the burden of thinking, and willing, and planning; the task of providing subsistence for himself and for his family; the obligation of performing all the social duties. The slave restored to liberty, has only had experience of those parts of the functions of a citizen, which, in themselves, are so disagreeable to his nature, that nothing but violence could have induced him to perform them. The negroes of St Domingo have only known

known the two extremes of slavery and rebellion ; and it is hard to say from which of those two states the transition to the rank of a free subject is the greatest and most difficult.

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But the negroes are not only in a state of slavery : they are in a low state of civilization. The industry of a savage ; his habits of voluntary obedience ; his capacity for enjoying civil and political rights ; and, in general, his fitness for becoming the subject of a peaceable and regular community, is, if possible, more limited than that of the mere slave. He has all those habits of voluntary exertion and peaceable submission to learn, which are wholly unknown to the members of barbarous tribes, and which form the bond of union among the inhabitants of civilized society. The inhabitants of rude nations, indeed, know of no medium between the extremes of servility and despotic sway. They consist only of two classes of people ; tyrants or masters, and slaves. Force is the only inducement to exertion, and indolence the chief reward of wealth or power. The slave, then, only works, and the master alone enjoys. But the former does not toil for himself, or of his free-will ; and the envied privilege of the latter station, is to be idle and tyrannical. We shall afterwards have an opportunity of seeing (in the Fourth Book of this Inquiry), that these re-

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marks apply, with peculiar accuracy, both to the African tribes in their own country, and those who have been transplanted to the European colonies in America. Enough has now been said, to show the impossibility of expecting any success in so chimerical a plan as that of forming the revolted negro slaves into a community of free subjects, under a regular European government.

But it must also be remembered, that the peculiar situation of these men in the new community will have very little tendency to promote their contentment and peaceable demeanour. They will form the oppressed and labouring part of the community; destitute of property; deprived of the most essential political privileges; toiling for a mere subsistence, whilst others are enjoying the fruits of those exertions. The class thus oppressed, too, will be united by common origin, habits and complexion; indelibly distinguished from the superior order by the same circumstances; united to the rest of the community by no common principles or interest; and held in subjection, though not in slavery, by a handful of strangers. It is easy to see, that so unnatural a state of things cannot have a long duration; that a body, formed of such jarring principles, must contain within itself the seeds of speedy dissolution;

lution ; that power, so established, must quickly fall to pieces. A race of men such as the Africans, can only be kept in subjection by the whites, so long as they are in chains. ‘ The day that makes a man a slave ’ (says Homer) ‘ destroys half his worth. ’ The day that breaks his fetters, destroys the whole authority and security of his master. Whilst the slave system exists, the division of the negroes, the watchful eye of the overseer, the constant fear of the driver’s lash, may prevent the multitude from uniting and overpowering the least numerous class of the community. The masters, though few in number, are civilized and united. Each proprietor of slaves has one constant and simple end in view, the preserving of subordination, and the furtherance of work. The slaves are powerful indeed in numbers, but incapable of acting with premeditation or skill ; and are prevented from combining, not only by the perpetual attention of the master, but by various circumstances in their own character and habits.

If, however, for the close inspection, the interested care, and the absolute authority of the master, there is substituted the general superintendence, the limited power, and the unconcerned exertions of the government, checked by the acknowledged rights of the negro subjects,

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subjects, divided by faction, and distracted by multiplicity of cares: it is easy to see how rapidly a still further change will be accomplished; how short will be the duration of European property and power.

On the one hand, then, the circumstances of the negroes, and their relative situation to the whites, will be constantly tending to consummate the colonial revolution, by establishing the complete independence, or, which is the same thing, the supremacy of the most powerful class, and by effecting the total extirpation of their former masters. But, at the same time, the opposite interests of the Europeans will on the other hand be constantly tending to bring about an opposite event; to abridge still more the rights of the negroes; to reduce them to a more complete state of obedience; to perfect the restoration of the ancient order of things, upon the basis of the slave system.

Every proprietor of West Indian stock will speedily perceive how much his profits are diminished by the new order of things. He will find it impossible to recruit his stock of negroes by new importations; to extend or restore his cultivation by an increase of his stock; nay, even to satisfy the demands of his creditors, or provide for his necessary wants, out of the scanty and capricious industry of hired negroes.

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His security will be as much endangered as his profits, even if no jealousy should arise from the inferior order possessing certain legal rights. Government, as well as individuals, will perceive the frailty of the tenure by which they hold the possession of a society so unnaturally constituted. The efforts of individuals will all be steadily directed to the accomplishment of one end—the restoration of the ancient system; and government, we may be assured, will favour the attempt. The contest, then, will be carried on quietly indeed, but unremittingly, by the skill, the intrigues, the united interest and combined operations of Europeans, against the wavering and unsteady efforts of savages half subdued, incapable of acting in concert, and united under no ruling heads. It will be carried on by the men who monopolize, not only all the talents and skill in the community, all the influence of government, and the force of the army, but who possess also the whole of the property, and who were once masters also of the persons of the inferior class. It is most probable, that a contest so unequal will speedily terminate in favour of the Europeans, and that, unless the opposite event is consummated before their plans shall have time to operate, the slave system will again be established over the revolted colonies. At any rate, it seems

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seems certain, that the partial subjection of the negroes, or their reduction to the state of a free but subordinate race of citizens, can only be a temporary change, preparatory to a more complete and permanent arrangement of things: that there is no medium between the supremacy and the bondage of the negroes; between the mastery and the extirpation of the whites: that any other settlement which may be made in the mean time, must either be a delusive situation for the negroes, or a deceitful calm to the Europeans: that a very short time will bring about the final adjustment, and either deprive France of her colonies, or overthrow the nominal freedom of the negroes.

The probable consequences of these two extremes to other colonies, must be a matter of the deepest interest to all the neighbouring powers in the West Indies. I have already considered the effects which may naturally be expected to result from one of them, namely, the success of the French cause, and the complete restoration of the colonial relations. In the following Section, I shall take a view of the consequences which may be expected to result from the opposite event, the total failure of France, and the establishment of an independent African community in the West Indies.

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SECTION III.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEGRO COMMONWEALTH IN THE WEST INDIES TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COLONIES WHICH REMAIN UNDER THE DOMINION OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY.

THE events which have happened in the French colonies since the revolution, have been such, as to fill every one with the utmost anxiety as to the fate of the whole colonial system. The destruction of negro slavery has been followed by its natural consequence, the complete overthrow of the European power, and the establishment of an independent African commonwealth in the noblest settlement of the new world.

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Immediately after the peace which followed the unfortunate successes of the French arms in Europe, the attention of the new government of France was turned to the colonial affairs of the Republic. Measures were taken for restoring the dominion of the Mother Country over her revolted islands; and an expedition was fitted out, of a magnitude suited to the importance of the service for which it was destined, with that promptitude and despatch

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patch which have distinguished all the operations of the Corsican Chief.

The probable consequences of this attempt have been discussed in the First Book of this Inquiry, where I was induced to bestow considerable attention upon the subject, not merely because it is peculiarly interesting at the present moment, but because I considered it as part of the general question, and intimately connected with the great topics of West Indian policy. For the same reason, I am now to discuss particularly the consequences of the French expedition proving wholly unsuccessful, and of the Africans obtaining the permanent superiority in St Domingo; not because this is an event which seems at present on the eve of being accomplished, but because it is an event which at all times may be expected, and is in fact the natural consequence of that policy, equally incautious and inhuman, by which the Antilles have been peopled with African slaves.

During the first struggles between the different colours in the French islands, it was the universal, and very natural opinion, in the neighbouring islands, that the existence of a negro commonwealth in those parts, must be immediately fatal to all the other slave colonies. But the appearance of that remarkable personage,

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age, who acquired the chief power over the new community; the singular moderation of his views, and the inoffensive conduct which he uniformly held towards all the neighbouring settlements, soon dispelled the alarm with which every one had at first been seized. To a panic much stronger than was necessary, there succeeded, as is almost always the case, a fearless confidence, not warranted by any change of circumstances. The Europeans in the West Indies appeared, during the reign of Touffaint, to have forgotten how much of their security was owing to the peculiar habits of that singular man, and to the length and horrors of the preceding conquest, sufficient to satiate even Africans with plunder and blood. It was not considered, that, from every part of his conduct and professions, the negro chief appeared to resemble his countrymen in no one particular, either of his intellects, his acquirements, or his feelings; that this very circumstance of dissimilarity was, in all probability, preparing his downfall, although his life should escape the variety of accidents by which he was surrounded; and that his successor would, to an absolute certainty, be a man differing from the rest of the negroes only in the greater ferocity of his nature, his superior cunning, and stronger limbs. Neither was it remembered, that although

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though years of bloodshed and devastation might fatigue the most savage warriors, and dispose them to enjoy an interval of repose, yet the same barbarians would sooner recover from their satiety, and pant for the former scenes of cruelty and licentiousness. We are now to consider, whether there be any room for the thoughtless confidence into which the West Indian proprietors have been lulled, beyond those accidental circumstances which gave birth to the temporary calm; the fatigue of the negroes, and the peculiar character of their chief.

The events which have already taken place in the colonies prove sufficiently, if indeed any proof was necessary, that the slavery of the Africans has had no great tendency to promote their civilization, or inspire them with a relish for the blessings of order and regular government. The oppression of their masters may have united them, and combined their efforts with those of the mulattoes to effect the extermination of the Europeans. But this end was no sooner accomplished, than the two parties attacked each other with renewed fury; and, if a short time had been allowed to the conquerors, after subduing the people of colour, there can be little doubt that they would have quarrelled among themselves, and split into a number of petty barbarous states.

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It is not in the nature of a rude people to unite in extensive political associations. All such unions presuppose the acquisition of considerable skill in the arts of government. At first, the habits of filial submission, reverence for age, and awe of superior bodily strength, retain a single family or kindred in subjection to the head of the house. The imperfect union of a few families generally springing from the same common stock, and kept in a partial submission to the oldest, or the strongest and most cunning person of the tribe, forms the next step in the progress of the social union. After conquest or treachery has extended the patriarchal government beyond the bounds of the kindred race; by an easy transition, the regular succession to the chief power becomes liable to interruptions from the same causes which have enlarged the territory of the tribe—violence and cunning. Still, the subjection of a large community to one man; the extension of his dominion over a multitude of subjects whom he seldom has within his sight; the obedience of thousands of men to the will of a single person, neither chosen by themselves, nor possessed of any superior faculties of body or mind—indicate no small proficiency in the arts of policy upon the part of the ruler, and a considerable progress upon the part of the people,

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people, in the habits of abstraction and in the peaceful arts.

After this skill has been acquired, and those habits formed, we often meet with extensive political associations of men who are still in a very rude state. But the stability of government, and the permanent duration of extent and of power, inseparably connected with the stability of a particular dynasty in the sovereignty of the state, can only result from those fixed ideas of hereditary succession, which, as they are on the one hand a great cause of progressive improvement, so, indicate on the other hand, that a very considerable progress towards refinement has already been made. Moreover, all such associations of uncivilized men have arisen from small beginnings; have been gradually enlarged by the incorporation of conquered tribes; and have been slowly consolidated, in so far as they possess any solidity, by the events that take place, and the habits that are strengthened during a succession of ages. It may safely be assumed as a general principle, that a multitude collected at random from various savage nations, and habituated to no subordination but that of domestic slavery, are totally unfit for uniting in the relations of regular government, or being suddenly moulded into one system of artificial

ificial society ; more especially after living for a series of years in a state of tumult and disorder, unnatural even to barbarians. In the most polished states, the sudden and violent dissolution of an established government has a strong tendency to produce general disunion ; and we may recollect the alarm excited in the earlier stages of the French Revolution by the terror of Federalism, which became indeed one of the common topics of accusation in the code of political crimes. In fact, the sudden formation of a political body has always been found the most arduous achievement in the art of governing. The establishment of the North American colonies, gradual as it was, is the instance in the history of mankind, where this has been accomplished in the shortest time. Yet those infant states were animated by political or religious enthusiasm ; united by a position in the midst of savage nations ; and peopled by men taken from the heart of civil society—subjects for whom the most refined politician and profound philosopher of the age was invited to legislate. *

The free negroes of St Domingo will form a turbulent and licentious assemblage of hostile tribes. A leader may now and then appear, whose

* Mr Locke.

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whose superior talents enable him to acquire a temporary ascendant over a considerable proportion of those petty states; but his death or assassination will be the period of the union, and the island will again be divided among a number of petty chiefs.

It is a most profound remark of Machiavel, that a commonwealth is much more to be depended upon by its neighbours and its subjects, than a prince: and, for precisely the same reasons, which I shall afterwards explain more at length, a large state is much more to be depended upon than a small one, under whatever form the government may be administered. The most unstable and capricious of all neighbours must, therefore, be a petty state, subject to an absolute prince. But the tribes of St Domingo will be small communities of turbulent savages, subject to the authority of despotic chiefs, whose powers perpetually vary, and who succeed each other, according to no order more regular than the caprice and violence of the human passions. It is easy to perceive, that such a government must, beyond all others, be unsteady and changeful, utterly unfit for maintaining the regular alliance, or for preventing the depredations of its own subjects.

From a community of this description, indeed, we can scarcely apprehend any very formidable

midable combination of hostilities against the other islands. The evils which some have thought probable from the restless spirit of conquest usually predominant in the infancy of states, are, I apprehend, by no means so much to be dreaded as those which must arise from the spirit of plunder. The negroes, in their state of slavery, have acquired many desires, which they will still seek to gratify at the expence of their skilful and industrious neighbours. The love of tobacco and spirituous liquors; the want of fire arms, and, in general, of the useful metals and the manufactures of Europe; nay, the want of slaves from among their brethren, will lead them to commit perpetual depredation upon the coasts of the neighbouring islands. To suppose that they will supply themselves with such commodities by cultivating their own territories, and exchanging the produce of their industry with European merchants, is to fancy, that they have been civilized in the late times of anarchy and confusion; that they have acquired habits of peaceful industry in a few years of massacre and plunder.

The position of St Domingo is particularly favourable to the occupations of a piratical commonwealth. The various commodious harbours on the south and west coasts, furnish the

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most advantageous stations for annoying the outward bound trade to Jamaica and Cuba, and the vessels homeward bound, which take the windward passage; while the south coast commands the direct communication between the windward and the two most westerly leeward islands. Our West Indian merchants well remember how severely they suffered by the privateering which the French, during the late war, carried on from the ports of Jacquemel and Les Cayés. In one year (1794-5), notwithstanding the strong naval force which we had in those parts to protect our trade, above thirty large vessels were captured and carried into Les Cayés. The negroes, too, at a subsequent period of the war, attacked the smaller vessels of the British and American traders, in armed canoes; and, after massacring the white crews, carried the ships into their harbours. *

In a predatory system of this sort, every capture must furnish the means of further acquisitions. The negroes, by their bodily strength, and their astonishing powers of enduring every sort of want, are admirably calculated for a seafaring life. They are employed for this purpose in many parts of the West Indies. In the
Bermuda

* Edwards' Postscript to his Historical Survey of St Domingo.

Bermuda Islands, they are found to make as good sailors as the whites ; * and they were of signal use, both as seamen and marines, in the privateers fitted out from that convenient station during the American war. † The prospect of immediate plunder will unite and marshal small bodies of men, whom it would be in vain to think of forming into more extensive associations by the general principles of duty, or remote views of political expediency ; and, in every quarter of the New World, men of European extraction, or adventurers from Europe, are to be found, whose desperate fortunes will league them with the freebooters of St Domingo, and supply the deficiency of nautical knowledge. The events which have happened in the West Indies, indeed, may teach us, that the negroes will probably receive a more regular assistance from men less abandoned than these. Not to mention the ready asylum which the towns of Jamaica always offered to the Buccaneers, and the ease with which those pirates found a market among fair traders, wherever they carried their stolen goods ; during the heat of the late civil war in St Domingo, the negroes were abundantly supplied with arms and

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* Burke's European Settlements, part VII. cap. 2.

† Governor Brown's Report.—Report of Committee 1788, part III.

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ammunition by North American traders, in return for the colonial produce which they were thus enabled to seize from the plantations, after murdering the proprietors. * At such kinds of traffic it is needless to repine ; and it is equally vain to expect that they shall ever cease. The genuine spirit of commercial speculation cannot exist in full force, without giving rise, at the same time, to evils like these. The same unrestrained propensity to adventure that conducted the Spaniards over unknown regions to the conquest of a new world, directed the depredations to which their successors were afterwards exposed. The temptation of high profits which opened to the Buccaneers the markets of Jamaica, led to the cultivation of the whole West Indies ; and, after covering with villas and farms the extensive plains of St Domingo, contributed at last to their devastation and ruin.

From this system of piracy, to a predatory warfare upon the coasts of Jamaica and Cuba, the transition is easy. The trade wind, blowing almost without intermission towards the leeward islands, will carry the gangs of these new Buccaneers, in a single night, across the narrow and unbroken channels that bound St Domingo on the west ; and these irruptions will be made with

* Edwards' History of St Domingo, chap. VI.

with that careless prodigality of life, and that indiscriminate thirst of destruction, which mark the military operations of barbarians. To a civilized community, indeed, established upon solid foundations, and united in one compact body for the purposes of regular defence, such an invasion would not be very formidable. But in the colonies, the enemy has a powerful auxiliary in the very heart of the settlements, against which his attacks are directed. The negroes of our colonies are already prepared for revolt, by the example of success which has attended the struggles of their countrymen on the opposite side of the Straits.

It is nugatory to talk of the depressed state and obtuse faculties of these men. They are of the same species with those whom the mulattoes of St Domingo gained over, by the promise of liberty, in spite of the rooted antipathy which had formerly divided the two classes. They are not more degraded than those who worshipped the President of the *Amis des Noirs* as their tutelary saint: nor will the establishment of a negro commonwealth in the neighbouring island so far alter their nature, as to render callous to every thing affecting the fortunes of their race, the same people who, at the beginning of the contest, had showed the liveliest anxiety about the fate of the great question of abolition—

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abolition; a question, in itself, only remotely connected with their interests.* There is, indeed, no direct communication between the people of St Domingo and the great body of field negroes in the opposite islands: But these have various opportunities of obtaining information—from their brethren who are employed as house servants, and who thus learn the state of affairs in a quarter that must always principally occupy the conversation of their masters—from the artificers in the towns, whose intercourse with the Europeans is more extensive, and who are always better informed—from the free blacks, who, as a body indeed, we shall afterwards show, cannot disturb the peace of our colonies, but who rank among their numbers many idle and dissolute persons, ready to instruct the slaves in what is going forward—and, last of all, from the negro servants who return to the West Indies, after having acquired, by their residence in Europe as free men, a large portion of information, and imbibed many of the opinions universally prevalent upon the subject of negro slavery. Without supposing, then, that the African inhabitants of St Domingo have become infected with that rage of proselytizing which

* Edwards' History of St Domingo, chap. VII.—Petition of West Indian Merchants to the House of Commons, March 1792.

which distinguished their former masters ; or that any measures have been pursued in the other islands for enlightening and exciting the negroes ; it is manifest, from the constitution of the communities of which they form a part, that they will have ample opportunities of information ; and, upon such topics, it is the same act to inform and to interest men placed in their situation. Indeed, when we consider how much of the subordination of the negroes is derived from their habitual conviction of the decided superiority of white men, and their constitutional terror of opposing them ; surely nothing can operate more immediately the destruction of those feelings, and of all the force which the negro chains derive from them, than the spectacle constantly presented to their eyes, plain and intelligible even to Africans, of their countrymen in the neighbouring island possessing the territory in full sovereignty ; clothed with the spoils, and covered with the blood of Europeans.

Thus, in all likelihood the neighbourhood of a negro state will have prepared our slaves for ideas of independence ; and the first incursions of the enemy must be the signal for revolt. We have already noticed the extent to which the plans of all the insurrections hitherto quelled appear to have spread. * This can arise

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* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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arise from nothing but the proneness of men, in the situation of the negroes, to seek for any change. However partial, then, the depredations of our new enemy may be, their effects on the slaves will extend over the whole body. The freebooters may receive exemplary punishment; but they will first have communicated to our negroes the contagion for which they have been predisposed. Nay, it is probable that no permanent footing will ever be gained by the invaders; and at any rate, that, in the beginning, their efforts will be wholly unsuccessful. But if they stir up the spirit of revolt, by liberating the negroes on a few plantations before a sufficient force can be brought against them, it signifies little to Great Britain that her largest colony should fall into the hands of the Jamaica, instead of the St Domingo Africans, or that her planters and merchants should have the consolation of being murdered by their own slaves.

The situation of Cuba is in several respects less dangerous than that of Jamaica. The cultivated parts lye on the north-west coast, and must be approached from St Domingo by the difficult navigation of the old Bahama channel. The negroes, too, though their numbers are much increased since the ordinance 1765, and though they bear a greater proportion to the whites

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whites than in any of the Spanish colonies, are yet far less numerous than those in Jamaica, and, like all the slaves of the Spanish and Portuguese colonists, are much better treated than those of any other European power. Were Cuba, then, to remain in its present state, it would offer few temptations to the incursions of the new community, and would probably attract little of their attention, until, by being consolidated in the course of time into one state, and subjected to a regular and efficient government, they might be in a situation to commence offensive operations upon enlarged views of conquest. The face of things, however, is rapidly improving in Cuba. In consequence of the more liberal system of policy begun in 1765, and extended under the administration of Galvez, that noble island, the largest in the new world, has, by the variety of its natural resources, attracted the first efforts of the mercantile spirit in Spain; and its cultivation has been so much extended, that in a few years its trade, instead of employing six vessels, as formerly, required no less than two hundred, and was capable of more than supplying the mother country with sugar. Various events which I have before enumerated, have contributed still more, of late, to accelerate the cultivation of this settlement.

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ment.* But all those improvements are intimately connected with the slave trade. They have uniformly kept pace with the removal of the restrictions upon the importation of negroes. The *Asiento*, transferred from France to Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, had been succeeded by a monopoly as strict in favour of a private company. The first symptoms of speculation appeared in Cuba, after the law of 1770 had encouraged the importation of negroes at the Havanna. In fact, as the agriculture of the islands depends upon commercial speculation, and upon the employment of stock in purchasing hands, their improvement proceeds, not according to the slow progress of population, as in other countries, but according to the amount of the stock employed, in proportion to which the population may be increased to any amount. While, therefore, the rapid importation of negroes which the improvement of Cuba requires, has been diminishing the security of the Spaniards, and while the trade which supports the improvement of the island, and the increased produce which is the consequence of the extended cultivation, invites the depredations of the tribes in St Domingo; the cultivation of Cuba will soon be extended

* Book I. Sect. III. Part II.

extended along the coasts ; and that island will be placed in the same situation of complicated dangers which we have already shewn must prove fatal to Jamaica ; with this difference, that Jamaica being most probably in the hands of the negroes, Cuba will be exposed to a double chance of destruction.


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Yet the dread of these dangers, even in the event of the negroes succeeding completely in St Domingo, will scarcely prevent the importation of slaves into Cuba. It is the character of mercantile speculation to be clear-sighted, but not far-sighted. The trader seldom considers any thing beyond the quickness and the profits with which his capital may be replaced for the two or three first times. He is not, like the agriculturist, interested in the preservation of the state, where his capital has been invested in a solid form. He views a change of speculation without great reluctance, if it is not immediate ; partly because he flatters himself with the hopes of independence in the interval, partly because the same spirit which made him change before, renders him less timid in repeating the risk. The trade of planting, though connected with the soil, is yet, from the extent of capital required in it, from the rapidity of improvement, from the large profits and the constant risk, and from the temporary residence

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residence which the proprietors make on their estates without families, while they are acquiring their fortune, much more nearly allied to commerce than to agriculture, and promoted by the spirit of mercantile adventure.

But in fact it signifies little, whether we consider that the loss of Cuba is likely to follow its extended cultivation, or that the prospect of such an event will immediately check the present active spirit of improvement. In either case, the consequences are highly injurious to the interests of Spain, stripped as she now is of her most valuable islands, and unable otherwise to continue the acquisition of that colonial wealth which alone can render her a match for the preponderating influence of France in the Gulf of Mexico, after the resources of the Republic, withdrawn from St Domingo, shall have been turned to the banks of the Mississippi.

In the same manner will the establishment of the negroes in St Domingo operate upon the safety of Porto-Rico, if the Spaniards should attempt to cultivate that very inferior island, after failing in Cuba. Porto-Rico is indeed situated to the windward of the three great Antilles. But when a community of free negroes exists to the leeward of a settlement peopled by African slaves, the advantages arising from the obstacles which the trade wind presents to the depredations

depredations of the former, are counterbalanced by the temptations and facilities which it affords to the desertion of the latter. The Spanish part of St Domingo, our own settlements in Barbadoes previous to the subjugation of the black Charaibes in St Vincents, and the acquisition of that island by the peace of Paris, the plantations of Jamaica before the expulsion of the Maroons, and those of Surinam since the treaty of 1762 acknowledged the independence of the revolted negroes, have all experienced in a great degree the manifold dangers of a neighbourhood which excites the desertion of the slaves, and leaves those who do not escape, in a state of mind ripe for insurrection.

But further—Have we any reason to believe that the French will be more successful in their Windward Islands, than in the colony from whence we are supposing them to have been expelled by the negroes?

I have before remarked, that the attention of French statesmen having been directed almost exclusively to the great Leeward colony, by the events which have lately happened there, our information with respect to the progress of cultivation in the Windward settlements is by no means extensive or correct. I have, however, detailed the various *data* which we possess, in public documents and other four-

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ces of information, for calculating the present amount of the negro population in those settlements, and the rate at which it increased during the time that the population of St Domingo was doubling. The result of these computations led us to the conclusion, that the proportions of the different races in those islands were as unequal, and that the inequality had been as rapidly increasing, as in St Domingo. *

But it is also of importance, to consider the situation of the free people of colour in the Windward Islands, since it is to them that the origin of the troubles in St Domingo may be traced. The circumstances to which the rapid multiplication of this intermediate class was owing in St Domingo, must have existed in an equal degree all over the French West Indies. In general, a much greater proportion of the proprietors resided in the French settlements, than in the British and Dutch. In the French islands nine tenths of the proprietors lived upon their plantations, or in the colonial towns; in the others not above one fifth were supposed to reside. † The lazy, dissipated lives of these men were spent in amours with negresses or mulatto women; and as the fruits of this

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

† Robinet, Dict. de l'homme d'état, Art. Colonies.

this intercourse lay under all the disadvantages of the mixed blood, the idea of marriage with the mothers was out of the question. It will always be found, where the manners of a people are in this corrupt state, that marriage, even between equals, falls into disrepute. In the British West Indies we see the consequences of concubinage with blacks and mulattoes, in the small proportion of white women, and the slow progress of the white population. In the French islands the numbers of the whites rather diminished than augmented; and the natural increase of inhabitants, which may always be expected to arise from the cheapness of good land, and the passions of a warm climate, must be looked for, not among the whites, but among the mulattoes. Accordingly, the progress of the mulatto population must be calculated, not from the numbers of the mulattoes at any particular time, but from the numbers of whites. The free negroes, on the other hand, increase according to the progressive state of the slave population. The mulattoes and free negroes, are usually included together in the class of free people of colour; and it appears, that in ten years, ending 1789, this body had, in St Domingo, much more than tripled its numbers; whilst the numbers of the whites had rather decreased. There is no reason to suppose that

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the people of colour were less numerous in the other islands in proportion. The same government and laws prevailed over the whole French West Indies; the same dissolute manners; the same want of white women; the same system of intrigue with blacks and mulattoes. In Martinico, the free people of colour bore a greater proportion to the whites, by the enumeration 1776, than in St Domingo, by the enumeration 1779. In St Lucia, and Tobago, the proportion of people of colour was double that of St Domingo. In Guadaloupe, the proportion was a great deal less. But, in all the islands, we have seen, that the cultivation and the wealth of the planters, their luxury, and the numbers of their slaves, were rapidly increasing. We may therefore infer, that the numbers, both of the free negroes and free mulattoes, were augmented in them all with great rapidity; and that, at the epoch of the revolution, this intermediate class had increased so as to bear the same proportion to the whites in the Windward Islands that it did in St Domingo.

That their grievances were the very same, we cannot entertain the smallest doubt. The colonial system of St Domingo was common to all the French islands. Even the slight differences which the establishment of separate legislatures

legislatures have produced in our islands, were unknown in those of France, where the parliaments had, as in the mother country, only the power of registering the royal edicts for the purposes of publication and authentication. They were all under the immediate superintendence of the council of commerce, and in the department of the minister of the marine: they were equally affected by the edicts which the King issued in conformity to the advice of the minister and council. The *code noire* was a general system of regulations with respect to the subordination of the inferior races in all the islands. The privileges which it conferred upon the people of colour, and the modifications which those privileges received, were the same in all. The discontent of the mulattoes must have been common to this race wherever it existed. Similarity of origin and of government must have assimilated the manners of the whites. Subordination and grievances must have universally alienated the mulattoes. Their rapid increase in all the islands armed them with power to resist; and it is probable, that the revolution alone, by emancipating the slaves, and establishing political equality among all the classes, prevented the renewal of the events which ruined St Domingo, in such of the windward settlements as remained unconquered.

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If, then, the natural advantages of the negroes should be found so far superior to all the circumstances of policy, discipline, and union, on the part of the French, as to render the establishment of an independent state in St Domingo the necessary result of the contest, what is there in the situation of the other settlements which should prevent the negroes there from following the example of their brethren to the westward? And what is there in the circumstances of the two races which should prevent the blacks from succeeding in the other islands, as we are supposing them to have done in St Domingo? The negroes of Guadaloupe have tasted of liberty; and the French have been attempting to restore the yoke. The negroes of St Domingo have lived in unbridled licentiousness: order has been re-established, and a restoration of the yoke is attempted. In Guadaloupe, insurrection is by no means unknown; but it has produced none of those effects which, in St Domingo, must tend to weaken the force, and restrain the barbarity of the negroes. It has neither glutted the fury, nor lessened the numbers of those savage men. In St Domingo, no farther danger is to be apprehended from the people of colour, at least for a considerable time: their race is at present almost extinct. In Guadaloupe, the state
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of morals, during the last ten years, has been peculiarly favourable to the increase of this race. A law has indeed proclaimed them equal with the whites ; but unless the convention possessed the power of radically altering the nature of men in the colonies, whilst at home it could not even change their political prejudices, we may be assured, that the mulattoes have continued the same degraded and oppressed race that destroyed the colony of St Domingo. The *code noire* of Lewis XIV. might have saved that island, had the power of the Great Monarch extended to the minds and the habits of his subjects. The subsequent tyrannical enactments were modified in their application, by the manners of those in whose favour they were made, and of those by whose means they were executed. The decrees of the revolutionary legislatures on colonial affairs, have not been more efficacious than those of Lewis, and have been prevented from operating the equalization of the mulattoes, by the same causes which formerly mitigated the subordination of that class.

The conquest of Martinico, St Lucia, and Tobago, has indeed prevented any insurrection in those islands, by cutting off all communication with Guadaloupe, and enforcing strict discipline, by means of a numerous army, formed

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partly of negro regiments, whose attachment to the Europeans, whether in war or in revolt, I have frequently had occasion to notice. When these islands are restored, and the negroes in Guadaloupe have been successful in their efforts to throw off their yoke, it is not difficult to foresee the termination of the French dominion in the windward colonies. A conquest uniformly weakens the power of that government which, after defeat and expulsion, regains its authority by a treaty of peace. Every change of masters is attended with a change of confidential servants and favourites; and those who profited by the old system, are seldom very friendly to the new order of things. The white inhabitants in Martinico were by no means so averse to the republican government as a few royalists represented them; and the campaign of 1793 in the West Indies, as well as in Europe, showed the justice of the maxim which Machiavel has enforced with his usual sagacity, that much confidence ought not to be placed in the reports of exiles. * It can scarcely be imagined, that

* Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, lib. II. cap. XXXI. 'Quanto sia pericoloso credere a gli sbanditi.' — 'Debbe adunque un principe' (says he) 'andare adagio a pigliare imprese sopra la relatione d'un confinato perche il più delle volte ne se resta ò con vergogna ò con danno gravissimo.'

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that the British government, after conquering Martinico in the following campaign, should treat the royalists and the republicans in its new possessions with equal favour : still less can it be supposed, that the British government should betray no partiality for the British planters, who, in considerable numbers, had made this island the place of their abode. They were enrolled in distinct corps, and entrusted with arms : they filled the most confidential places : they belonged, in short, to the conquerors ; while the other inhabitants held their property and privileges by tolerance, not by right. The restoration of the island to France, is attended, of course, with the re-establishment of the republican government, under the unmingled influence of the French inhabitants. The English and the Royalists are permitted, no doubt, if they think proper, to depart in safety. But the colony was not merely the place of their abode ; it was the scene of their speculations. They must have some attachment to that soil in which their capital is vested ; because they could not sell their property without considerable loss ; nor remove their stock, and vary the employment of it, without some risk. They will remain, therefore, to repay, by submission and oppression, the advantages which they enjoyed under a more congenial system ;

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system ; and their discontents must divide and weaken the new government, surrounded by people of colour and slaves.

Nor will the perils of such a neighbourhood tend at once to unite the different orders of the community which is exposed to them. Men are not always reconciled by community of dangers. The more immediate impulse is generally obeyed ; and sentiments of jealousy or hatred prevent the salutary operations of that wise fear which ought to be excited by the prospect of the greater, though perhaps more distant evils. The same blindness which divides nations whose circumstances imperiously dictate the necessity of making a common cause, distracts also those branches of the same society whose existence seems to depend upon a cordial and intimate union. In ancient times, that blindness enabled Rome to conquer the world, by fomenting divisions, and then subduing her allies. In more enlightened ages, it has prevented the master principle of modern policy from maintaining the independence of the European states. It opened to Cortes the gates of Mexico ; enthroned Pizarro in the temple of the Incas ; and, after subjecting to the British sceptre the peninsula of India, will most probably extend our dominion beyond the Ganges. It put into the hands

hands of Katharine the balance of the north ; and in the south annihilated the existence of a rich and naturally powerful state. It has led the tricoloured cockade over the fairest portion of Europe ; and raised up a generation of pigmy republics and kings around the common enemy of national independence. In the colonies of the great nation, the same principle took a different direction ; armed against each other those whom the fear of a common enemy ought to have bound together ; and taught each party madly to call in the aid of that body which, in the end, was sure to overwhelm both. We can scarcely be so sanguine as to expect, that the different classes of whites in the restored islands will prove exceptions to so general a rule, and unite to strengthen the hands of that government which must of necessity distribute its favours with some partiality. Yet the danger will be every thing but instantaneous. The people of colour in the Windward Islands have their passions as well as in St Domingo. They have their grievances too, and their temptations. They will disregard the certainty of defeat by the negroes, in the event of a complete change ; and, looking only to the gratification of their present feelings, will be callous to that fear which, in their circumstances, is the same with wisdom.

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The free subjects, then, of the French colonies which are restored by the peace, cannot be expected to unite in one compact body, as if no conquest had been made, or no difference of race had existed. We may indeed remember the dangers which threatened our own power in the ceded islands, particularly Grenada and Dominica, during the course of the late war, (not to mention the events of 1778 and 1779), from that animosity between the French and British subjects which twelve years submission to the same mild and equitable government had not been able to extinguish, and which the dreadful examples then exhibited in St Domingo could not restrain.

It is not therefore desponding too much, to conclude, that the French government will find it at least as difficult to retain possession of the conquered islands, as to overcome the negroes and people of colour in those which have never changed masters. Admitting, what is evidently untrue, that the example and communication of those islands which shall have become subject to the negro dominion, can produce no direct effects upon the others which shall yet remain to France; we may be assured, that, in these also, the very same causes will conspire to overthrow her dominion; and that,

that, after the extirpation of the whites has been accomplished in the more leeward of the French islands, it will be chimerical to hope for the continuance of European influence in any of the rest.

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It is now only necessary, that we cast our eyes on the map of the Carribbee islands, to be convinced of the immediate fall which, in this event, awaits the windward settlements of the other European powers. If the leeward position of St Domingo shall be supposed to have secured Porto-Rico and the leeward Charibbean islands, whilst the depredations and dominion of the new commonwealths were spreading over Cuba and Jamaica, these are now exposed to inevitable destruction from Guadeloupe and Martinico. In fact, the situation of the Carribbee islands, when exposed to such a neighbourhood, is much more critical than that of Jamaica, from three material circumstances.

In the first place, they are so small, that after an enemy has landed and ravaged the coasts, their defence, by the manœuvres and the stratagems of protracted warfare, is almost impracticable.

Secondly, they are surrounded by the enemy, upon the supposition that all the French islands have been subdued by the Africans, whereas
Jamaica

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Jamaica and Cuba had only to defend one point of attack. But,

Thirdly, and principally ; they are essentially weaker than the great Leeward island, by the constitution of their society, in which the disproportion of the colours is much greater.

In Jamaica, the negroes are to the whites as more than eight to one. The average proportion of the British Charaibbean islands (exclusive of Barbadoes) is eleven to one : and this is divided among them very unequally ; for in Antigua, within sight of Guadaloupe, the proportion is that of nearly fifteen to one ; in Dominica, placed between Guadaloupe and Martinico, it is above twelve to one ; and in Grenada, at a short distance to the leeward of Tobago, it exceeds the proportion of twenty-three to one. If, then, the issue of the present eventful contest shall be the establishment of the negro power in the French islands, what reason have we to hope for the British Windward colonies ? The whole Charaibbean chain will be overrun by the African hordes, as it formerly was by the less numerous and savage Charaibes. Barbadoes alone, from its position, from its ancient and constant establishment under the British government, but still more from its large proportion of white inhabitants (above one fourth of the negroes), may stand out for a season ; but, either
overrun

overrun by the neighbouring settlements, or deserted by its own negroes, it will, after a few years of respite, only enjoy the trifling consolation, of being the last to share the fate of those valuable possessions.

Similarity of situation, produce, commerce, and internal arrangement, have led us to consider the settlements in Guiana as forming part of the West Indian colonies. In several material points, however, they differ from the islands, and from each other. Accordingly, they may be expected to have in some respects a different fate.

Notwithstanding the attention which the French government has uniformly bestowed upon the island and neighbouring settlements of Cayenne ever since the loss of Canada, we have already seen how extremely slow the progress of these colonies has been. The number of negroes in 1770 was eight thousand, according to the Census, * which, however, is always considerably below the truth. In 1780, they were between ten and eleven thousand †; and in 1794, according to the author of the '*Crisis*,' they did not exceed fifteen thousand. ‡ The scarcity of negroes, arising from bad credit and

* Malouet, Mem. &c. II. 43.

† Neckar, Finances, tom. III. cap. 13.

‡ P. 37.

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and confined capital, has been the chief cause of the ill success which has constantly attended the efforts of France to improve this colony. This deficiency in the importation must have made the planters more careful of their stock in hand, and rendered the condition of the slaves more tolerable than in the other settlements. Accordingly we find, that their enfranchisement, in consequence of the decree of Pluviose, An. II, was attended with none of the consequences in Cayenne, which in the other colonies it was so well calculated to produce. After their emancipation, the negroes in general continued voluntarily upon the plantations of their former masters; and no irregularities whatever were committed by those men who had thus suddenly acquired their freedom. *

But besides the milder treatment of the slaves in general, and the greater proportion of the Creole to the imported negroes, another circumstance peculiar to the continental colonies, renders the situation of the whites far more secure in Cayenne than in any of the islands. The original possessors of the soil exist there in considerable numbers; and they live in the immediate vicinity of the Europeans. By an intercourse with their civilized neighbours, uniformly amicable and mutually

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. XI.

mutually serviceable, they have acquired many of those artificial wants which traffic and labour alone can satisfy. They are thus much less averse to exertions of industry, than the rest of the American Indians, whom the Spanish and Portuguese invaders never suffered to remain independent until they should become accustomed to voluntary labour. The French planters, in different parts of Guiana, have frequently supplied the want of negroes by the industry of hired Indians ; * and this resource rendered them much less dependent, than they otherwise would have been, on their slaves at the period of the revolution.

But the neighbourhood of the Indians has been attended with still more important consequences. As the French have constantly and successfully cultivated the good will of those tribes, and kept them at peace among themselves, there can be no doubt that, in the event of a rupture between the planters and their slaves, the Indians would unanimously take part with the former, to whom they have, upon all occasions, evinced a warm attachment ; and would assist them in subduing and punishing the negroes, towards whom they have, in every instance, shown a violent antipathy † ; a sentiment which, it may

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be

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. XVIII.

† Ibid.

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be presumed, the whites have been at no great pains to eradicate.

From the concurrence of all these circumstances, it has happened, that as the emancipation of the negroes in Cayenne was attended with no inconvenience, so, neither has the restoration of the yoke been productive of the slightest commotion. From the last communications of the French government upon this subject, it appears, that the slave system and the slave trade, are re-established in this colony; and that the progress of cultivation, so long retarded, has of late years begun to be accelerated; probably, in a great degree, from the new obstructions to the employment of capital in the other settlements. But, if this improvement continues, and, still more, if all the capital vested in West Indian cultivation shall be forced towards Guiana by such a catastrophe as we have been supposing in the islands, the constant effects of rapid improvement in slave culture must follow; an increased disproportion of negroes; greater carelessness and cruelty on the part of the masters; an excess in the numbers of imported over those of Creole slaves; and a rapid multiplication of the free people of colour: so that, if to these circumstances there be added the establishment of the negroes in the Caribbee islands, the ruin of Cayenne is not likely to

to be so far distant as its security during the late
tumults might at first lead us to expect.

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The probable fate of Dutch Guiana will expose Cayenne to new dangers. The Dutch, as well as the French in South America, have carefully cultivated the friendship of their Indian neighbours. But a variety of circumstances have concurred to prevent this alliance from securing the tranquillity of the Dutch settlements. The extensive capitals employed in Surinam, Berbice, &c. have (as we formerly observed) * rapidly multiplied the numbers of the slaves. In 1769, they amounted to fifty thousand; the whites to four thousand. † In 1777, the slaves had increased to seventy thousand; ‡ and, in 1789, while the whites still remained about four thousand in number, the negroes were estimated at ninety thousand ||.

The treatment of those slaves, thus numerous and thus rapidly poured into a settlement so ill stocked with whites, was infinitely more cruel in the Dutch plantations than in any other, as we have before seen: And, in their annual importation of five or six thousand, those from the Gold Coast were uniformly preferred

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* Book I. Sect. III. Part I.

† Ennery, (apud Malouet Mem. &c.) III. 190.

‡ Ibid.

|| Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. X.

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by that gainthirsty people, as the most capable of hard work, though certainly the most prone to rebellion. *

To these never failing causes of revolt and desertion, must be added, the accidental circumstance of the Maroon negroes left in the country by the English previous to their expulsion in the year 1666. This body, during the whole of the last century, was truly formidable to the Dutch settlements. On various occasions they were successful in the warfare which they perpetually waged against their civilized neighbours, in a regular and systematic manner. Their numbers being augmented by natural means, and receiving continual additions from desertion, they grew every day more formidable. The peace concluded with them in 1761, was founded so exactly on the basis of equality between the two parties, that the Dutch plenipotentiaries were obliged to ratify the treaty according to the African forms. † In 1772, a war again broke out with these dangerous neighbours; and the States sent a large force for the protection of the colony. So much was the existence of the Dutch power in America supposed to depend upon the success of the expedition

* Malouet, Mem. III. 135.

† La Richesse de la Hollande, cap. V.

pedition against the Maroons, that the intrigues of the house of Orange were anxiously directed towards obtaining a preponderance in the colonial affairs, by the adoption of one particular plan of military operations. For this purpose, an officer attached to the Orange party was sent out; the colony was divided between the contending interests; both parties, as usual, endeavoured to engage the interposition of France; and, at last, the Maroon invasions were checked by the establishment of a permanent cordon* round the whole of the side exposed to the Maroon settlements.

Whilst continual preparations for warfare have repressed and prevented the incursions of the Maroons, the grievances of the slaves, and the increase of their numbers, by the extended cultivation of the colony, have encouraged desertion, and rendered the neighbourhood of the insurgents as dangerous as before. The influx of British capital during the late war, must have increased still farther the negro population of those settlements; and the change of masters, and mixture of nations among the whites, will, as usual, be unfavourable to vigorous and secure government. The operation of the cordon must, in one quarter at least, tend to prevent

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* Malouet, IV. *passim*.

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vent all communication with the Indian nations ; and there is reason to believe, that the Maroons have found no difficulty, of late years, in uniting themselves with the natives by marriage. *

If, then, the islands should be in the possession of negroes, it is not easy to conceive a colony placed in a more critical situation than Dutch Guiana—surrounded, as it will be, on all sides by independent negro states, and peopled by a feeble and divided body of Europeans, mingled with a most disproportioned mass of slaves, who have so suddenly been collected together, chiefly from the most ferocious tribes of Africa, irritated by every species of cruelty, and treated with the extremity of rigid parsimony. The existence of the French on the other side of the river Marrowni, is evidently incompatible with the event to which such a combination of difficulties and dangers will most probably lead.

Thus will the ruin be accomplished of those fertile settlements in which the race of civilized men has been diffused, the miraculous effects of commercial spirit been displayed, and the prodigies of European arts and arms exhibited for upwards of three eventful ages.

The savage nations of Africa, renewing among themselves those horrors to which they have

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. X.

have sacrificed their masters, will spread over the fairest portions of the New World the barbarism that still covers their native deserts. And those regions where, for a while, the brightness of polished life had seemed to dawn, will relapse into a darkness, thicker, and far more full of horrors, than that which was (shall we not now say?) unhappily penetrated by the daring genius of Columbus.

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— ‘ *Nox atra cavâ circumvolat umbrâ.*

‘ *Quis cladem illius noctis, quis funera fando*

‘ *Explicit? aut possit lacrymis æquare labores?*

‘ *Urbs antiqua ruit, multos dominata per annos*

‘ *Plurima perque vias sternuntur inertia passim*

‘ *Corpora, perque domos, et religiosa deorum*

‘ *Limina Crudelis ubique*

‘ *Luctus, ubique pavor, et plurima mortis imago.*’

ÆNEIS II.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the last Book, we were occupied with the examination of the foreign relations of the members of a colonial system in general, and more particularly of the European colonies, considered as independent of the mother countries, and viewed as forming a great federal community of subordinate or secondary states, contiguous in position, and resembling each other in their origin and history.

But the mother country must always be affected by every thing that affects its colonies, so long as the colonial policy is pursued by modern states. A colony is, in fact, only a remote province of the empire; but it is not on that account less valuable either in itself, or as assisting and enriching the other parts of the state. This I have explained at great length in the First Book,

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Book.* Hence the councils of a state will always be more or less influenced by a regard to its colonial possessions. The interests of the contiguous provinces will sometimes give way to the superior interests of the colonies; as the fortunes of the latter will, in most cases, be made subservient in their turn. Not only ought the domestic policy of the state to be made subservient in many instances to that of the colonies—its foreign policy should also yield in the same manner to the policy dictated by the external relations of the colonies. This, however, has not often happened; I have before shewn† that the quarrels of the mother country alone are, in almost every instance, the causes which involve every part of the empire in wars; that the foreign relations of the colonies are almost always subservient, and postponed to those of the parent state; and that, so far from involving her in their quarrels, they suffer more than any part of the system by the proper quarrels of the metropolis. Certain circumstances may, however, occur, in which it is to be presumed, that the policy of interfering in behalf of the colonies would be allowed by all. Those circumstances are chiefly of two kinds.

In

* Sect. I. & II.

† Book I. Sect I.

In the *first* place, the colonies of a state may be directly attacked in such a manner as to shew clearly an intention of insult, or to demonstrate views of ambition in the aggressor: no nation can possibly tolerate either, without demanding immediate reparation and satisfaction. The common principles of self-preservation must impel her to defensive measures; the principles of honour must induce her to persist in opposing force by force, even although she would previously have given up the invaded colonies without any remuneration: and common feelings of justice must incline her to view such aggressions or insults, as equally injurious, whether they are made in the remote or contiguous provinces of the empire. In cases of this sort, no one can for a moment entertain a doubt that the mother country is imperiously called upon to make war upon all the parts of the aggressor's dominions with all her own forces. Doubts may be entertained as to the expediency of colonial possessions, but no hesitation can ever be shewn upon the question of war, when the colonies actually in her possession, are invaded. On this point then, I shall not insist any farther. But,

In the *second* place, a neighbouring nation may extend its colonial dominions to a dangerous degree, by the conquest of some third colony, or of some of the native powers;

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or great and sudden changes may take place in the internal structure of its colonial system, without any extension of its magnitude by conquest or usurpation; or plans may be laid for acquiring an extent of territory in other parts, not immediately belonging to the colonial community, yet ultimately fatal to its colonial neighbours in that community, if attended with success. None of these measures can, indeed, be construed into a direct aggression; still less into an insult upon the national honour. If you have not guaranteed the conquered power, or united your fortune to its fortunes by defensive treaty, you cannot be said to be immediately concerned in the affair; and those who doubt the propriety of interfering at all in such cases, will certainly deny the expediency or such guarantees and defensive alliances. On the other hand, it has uniformly been the policy of modern times to view with jealousy every such measure of a rival or neighbour, and to consider each event in the international system, as immediately affecting all its members. After all wars undertaken upon those principles, it is usual, and indeed not unnatural, for men who think war the only great national calamity, to call in question the soundness of doctrines, from which much apparent evil has proceeded, balanced only by advantages

advantages of a nature too refined or remote to be perceptible to all observers. The system of modern international policy has accordingly been called in question repeatedly, during the course of the 18th century, and at no time more vehemently arraigned, than during the eventful period in which we have lived.

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I have endeavoured, in the First Book of this Inquiry, to show, that it is a narrow policy which would consider colonies as separate and subservient appendages of the state; that they are integral parts of the empire which is happy enough to possess them; and that they ought to be considered as such in all arrangements of domestic policy. I shall now endeavour to shew, that the same principle ought to be extended to the foreign policy of the state; that in questions of this nature also, they ought to be viewed as parts of the empire; and that, accordingly, the questions of interference, balance of power, alliances, guarantees, &c. ought to be decided, with respect to colonial relations, upon the very same principles on which we may decide them with respect to the primary foreign relations of the state. I shall therefore now consider, in general, the principles upon which the modern system of international policy is founded, and shall endeavour to show that it is essential to the state of modern society. I shall at
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the same time consider the circumstances in the natural situation of colonies, which render those principles more peculiarly applicable to such establishments. As the chief purpose of this Third Book is to show what line of policy is dictated to the European powers by the present state of the French colonies, and that state into which it is probable that they will very soon relapse, even if tranquillity should for the present be restored ; moreover, as this particular inquiry is intimately connected with the general questions of interference, for the same reasons that the subjects of European policy in 1792 were connected with the same questions, it will appear clearly how necessary the general inquiry is, even for the discussion of this special question.

This Book, then, divides itself into two Sections.

In the First, I shall explain those principles upon which the modern system of foreign policy is founded in the highest reasons of necessity and expediency, and those circumstances which render it peculiarly applicable to the colonies, even if we should not consider them as integral parts of the system to which they belong.

In the Second Section, I shall consider what is the line of foreign policy recommended to the European powers, both in the colonies, and in Europe

Europe with a reference to the colonies, by the present state of colonial affairs. This Inquiry will consist chiefly of a comparison of the conclusions deduced in the last Book, with those deduced in the First Section of this Book.

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SEC-

SECTION I.

OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATES IN GENERAL AND
AS INFLUENCED BY THEIR COLONIAL RELATIONS.

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THE balance of power, and the general system of international relations that has grown up in modern Europe, have afforded to one class of politicians perpetual subject of ridicule and invective, and to another class the constant opportunity of defending or attacking every measure, of discussing, or affecting to discuss every political subject, by a reference to certain terms of art and abstract ideas, of which it is fair to suspect that they little understood the meaning and the force.

Of these reasoners or declaimers, the former sect are undoubtedly the most dangerous. The refinements of modern policy which have sprung from the progressive improvement of the human species, and have, in their turn, secured that progress, and accelerated its pace, are in no danger of being either corrupted, or brought into disrepute, by the petulance of pretended statesmen. But the sophistries and cavils which political sceptics and innovators have founded, partly on

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a misconception of the theory, and partly on a
 mistatement of the facts, tend directly to a de-
 gradation of the system in the eyes of superficial
 reasoners, and may ultimately renew a state of
 things, from which the unassisted efforts of na-
 tional heroism would be altogether unable to
 redeem any one community.

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The attacks of those men have, moreover,
 been extremely inconsistent and contradictory.
 While, at one time, they maintain, that the idea
 of a political equilibrium is pregnant with every
 species of absurdity, and would produce, if car-
 ried into the actual affairs of nations, those very
 evils which the system is extolled for prevent-
 ing : at another time, they tell us that the no-
 tion is simple and obvious ; that it arises natu-
 rally out of the passions of men ; that it is no
 refinement of modern statesmen, but has influ-
 enced the councils of princes and common-
 wealths in all ages of the world. Now—the
 balance of power is an unintelligible jargon, in-
 vented to cover every scheme ; to furnish pre-
 texts for every act of national injustice ; to lull
 the jealousy of the people in any emergency ;
 or to excite their alarms upon any occasion.
 Now—it is useless and superfluous ; an interfer-
 ence with the natural order of things ; or an
 attempt to effect that which would happen at
 any rate. Now—it is pernicious in the ex-
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treme ; the parent of war and offensive alliances ; the exciting cause of national violence ; the watchword of ambitious princes and destroying commonwealths ; a refinement only of injustice ; and a system of nothing but treachery or caprice. It is very manifest, without any argument, that the system of modern policy cannot be liable to all those accusations at once, and that the declaimers who have used such language with respect to it, must have been talking of very different things at different times. * But as the foreign policy of nations was never, at any period of modern story, so interesting as at present ; as the primary relations of states to each other are generally those which determine their external colonial policy ; and as this whole subject has never yet been treated of in a general and scientific manner, I shall proceed, in the first place, to offer a few observations upon that system, which has been so little understood either by speculative writers or practical politicians.

The national jealousy, by which at all times the European states are animated, and which ranges them on different sides in each public crisis, has been denominated, not a principle of policy, but a national emotion. Nations, it is said,

* Note I i

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said, like the individuals which compose them, are moved by caprice, and actuated by passions; excited to contention by envy and hatred; soothed to reconciliation when exhausted by the efforts of their enmity; leagued in friendship by the dictates of an interested prudence; united together by the thirst of plunder; or combined for the gratification of some common revenge. The principle (we are told) that has been pompously called the great spring of civilized policy, is perhaps nothing more than a systematic indulgence of those natural feelings which impel the savage to attack his more wealthy neighbour, or unite rival hordes in a temporary friendship, when invaded by a powerful and common enemy. The policy (it is added) which we have heard extolled as the grand *arcanum* of modern statesmen, and dignified with the title of a system, is nothing more than the natural result of a conflict between the desire of conquest and love of security, refined on by ingenious men, and spun into a regular theory.

These remarks are partly true, and partly unfounded. It is true, that nations are guided by human councils, and subject, of course, to the passions and caprices of men; but it is no less certain, that the more regularly any system of government is established, the more will men of sober minds acquire a weight in the manage-

ment of affairs ; and that the longer the art of administering the concerns of empires is practised, will prudence gain the greater ascendancy over passion. It is true, that the dictates of feelings not always amiable, and often outrageous, are frequently, more than any impulse of reason, the springs which actuate the operations of states ; but it is equally true, that in all animals, the passions themselves, even those most liable to abuse and most fatal in their effects when too strong, are implanted for the wisest of purposes ; that instinct is the principle to which more than reason the preservation of life, the population of the world, and the maintenance of order in the universe must be ascribed ; and that national councils may be operating what no foresight could combine, while they appear to be swayed only by prejudice and passion. The existence of rude states is indeed frequently preserved, and their civilization insured by the operation of principles, to assist the developement of which is the great pride of the most learned and skilful statesmen : yet, the want of this assistance in those rude times, and the want of a constant superintendence and controul which renders the popular feelings useful in one case, and harmless in another, is certainly the cause of that instability of national power, and those perpetual changes of dominion—
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those constant broils, and that state of unceasing insecurity, to which we may attribute the many revolutions in the lot of savage communities, the frequent vicissitudes of their political fortunes, and the long continuance of their barbarism.

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That the system which we are now considering has oftentimes been abused, no one can deny. What human institution can defend itself from this charge? But many of the evils which are ascribed to the principle in question, have been owing only to an erroneous conception of its nature. Many of them have arisen from failing to carry the line of policy recommended by it, to the lengths which it enjoins; and, in not a few instances, those events which have been deemed pernicious, would have proved altogether fatal, had they not been modified and controuled by its influence. We are desirous, with no small appearance of triumph, to view the history of the last century; and to mark the manifold wars which the balancing system produced; the various intrigues to which it gave rise; the destructive conquests of which it furnished the pretext; and the national catastrophes which it could not avert. But had it not been for that wholesome jealousy of rival neighbours, which modern politicians have learned to cherish, how many conquests and changes

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of dominion would have taken place, instead of wars, in which a few useless lives were lost, and some superfluous millions were squandered? How many fair portions of the globe might have been deluged in blood, instead of some hundreds of sailors fighting harmlessly on the barren plains of the ocean, and some thousands of soldiers carrying on a scientific, and regular, and quiet system of warfare, in countries set apart for the purpose, and resorted to as the *arena* where the disputes of nations may be determined? * We may indeed look to the history of the last century as the proudest æra in the annals of the species; the period most distinguished for learning, and skill, and industry; for the milder virtues, and for common sense; for refinement in government, and an equal diffusion of liberty; above all, for that perfect knowledge of the arts of administration, which has established certain general rules of conduct among nations; has prevented the overthrow of empires, and the absorption of weak states into the bodies of devouring neighbours; has set bounds to the march of conquest, and rendered the unsheathing of the sword a measure of the last adoption; whereas, in other times, it was always resorted to in the first instance.

In

* Book I. Sect. I.

In the beginning of that century, we saw the gigantic power of France humbled by a coalition of princes, each resolved to undergo immediate loss, and run a great present risk, in order to prevent the greater chance of ruin at the distance of a few years. In ancient times, the Stadtholder would have been more jealous of Britain or Austria, than of France. The Great Monarch, like Cæsar, would have found a Divitiacus in the heart of the empire. By splitting the neighbouring potentates into adverse factions, and fighting one against the other, he would in a few years have subjugated the whole. No power would then have conceived that common prudence required an immediate sacrifice of peace, in order to ward off a distant peril. All would have waited quietly till the invasion came on ; then, fighting with a desperate, but an insulated valour, all would have been conquered in detail, by the ambitious enemy of Europe ; and the story of the Roman Empire would have been renewed, when submission to foreign power, loss of liberty, and interruption of peaceful pursuits, were no longer the phantoms of vulgar terror, or the themes of idle declamation, but real, and imminent, and inevitable calamities.

In the middle of the century, we indeed saw an ancient crown despoiled of its hereditary provinces ;

provinces ; and the neighbouring states in vain attempting to crush the new-born energies of the Prussian power. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the principles of an enlightened policy would not have favoured the rise of a power, whose professed and natural object was the balancing of the Imperial House, and the protection of the smaller princes of the empire against the preponderating, and formerly absolute, sway of the Austrian monarchs. At any rate, admitting the other powers to have been actuated by no such principles, or to have viewed the policy of Prussia as tending to the destruction of the equilibrium, it is clear that the success of the Silesian usurpation must, according to those views, be attributed to the actual dereliction of the balancing system, and not to its inefficacy ; for, both in the Silesian and in the Seven-years war, * the part of Prussia was openly espoused by some of the great powers ; in the former, by France and Bavaria ; in the latter, first by England and then by Russia herself. The preservation and accurate adjustment of the balance might perhaps have required some such event as the acquisition

* It is well known that the peace of Dresden was only a truce ; that the war of 1756 owed its origin to the cause of the former contest ; and that the possession of Silesia was only secured by the peace of Hubertsburg.

tion which Prussia actually made; but if the immediate object of the system, the maintenance of the established division of power, was held to be a more important consideration, it is clear that the part of Prussia ought not to have been taken by France and Bavaria, in the one case, or by England and Russia in the other, until the usurped dominions of Austria had been restored; and then, the allies of that power ought instantly to have deserted her, if she did not remain satisfied with the fruits of their interference.

Soon after the Seven-years war was terminated, the dismemberment of an ancient European kingdom was projected, by the powers who had been most exhausted in the Silesian contest, and who wished to indemnify themselves for their losses, at the expence of the Poles. The success of this iniquitous transaction, although it only demonstrates that the modern system has not been carried to its proper length, that it is incapable of changing the nature of men, or disarming the ambition and rapacity of princes, has been always quoted by a certain set of politicians, as an irrefragable proof of the futility and inefficacy of the great principle of modern politics. That calamitous event is indeed a sufficient proof, that the statesmen of Europe had for a while forgotten

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ten their most sacred principles; and that the princes who did not interfere to prevent it, were blind to their best interests. It serves, therefore, to show us what would be the situation of the world, were the maxims of ancient times to be revived, and the salutary system of modern Europe to lose its influence over the councils of states; but, for this very reason, the partition of Poland cannot, with any truth, be said to prove the inefficacy of those principles, by acting in direct opposition to which, the great powers of Europe permitted it to take place.

If, however, the policy of the neighbouring states provided no check to the injustice of the partitioning powers, the influence of the balancing system upon the conduct of those parties themselves, was productive of the most important and beneficial effects. Had the ancient maxims of national indifference and insulation prevailed in the cabinets of princes, at the crisis of Polish affairs in 1772, the distracted state of that unhappy country would indeed have called in the interference of foreign force. But this interference would have proceeded from one quarter alone. Poland would have been overwhelmed, and its vast resources appropriated, by one only of the conterminous powers, probably by the Russian empire,

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empire, which would thus have suddenly acquired a preponderance fatal to the rest of Europe; and, without receiving any check from the proportional aggrandizement of the neighbouring states, would have been enabled to stretch its resistless arm into the very heart of the great western commonwealth. But the prevalence of that national jealousy, and anxious attention to the affairs of other states, which is the master principle of the modern system, prevented the usurpation of Russia, even at the moment when she was actually mistress of the kingdom, when she garrisoned the capital with her troops, and ruled the national councils by a viceroy, under the name of ambassador. With all these circumstances in her favour, she was not even the first proposer of the partition. Her natural enemies, Austria and Prussia, actually gained a greater share of the spoil; and, instead of being the first victims of her extended empire, as they infallibly would have been in ancient times, they have themselves acquired, at the same moment, an increase of resources, which enables them effectually to withstand the augmented force of her power.

Although, then, it is extremely absurd to adduce the partition of Poland as an instance of the balancing system, (after the manner of
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the Prussian statesmen *), it is equally ridiculous to assert, that it proves the inefficacy of that system, or to deny that the rest of Europe has been saved by the influence of those principles upon the parties in the usurpation, which should have led the other great powers of Europe to prevent it.

It is scarcely necessary to remark, that I by no means intend to assert any thing further than the injustice and impolicy of the transaction upon a great scale : at present, I only look to the effects of the balancing system in maintaining the independence of the weaker states. The case of Poland appears to be one of the very few instances which have ever occurred, of a nation being placed in such unnatural circumstances of embarrassment, turbulence, and degradation of every sort, that no change of affairs could possibly render it worse, and scarce any revolution, by domestic violence, or foreign invasion, could fail to alter it for the better. Setting apart the high-sounding phrases of patriotism and national spirit, and the feelings

* Count Hertzberg (the King's first minister in 1772), in a speculative essay on this subject, gives the partition as an apposite case of the balancing system. It was made, he says, '*selon les principes d'une balance dont les trois puissances partageantes étoient convenues entre elles.*' Mem., tom. i, p. 296.

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ings of admiration which the very natural emotions of pity have taught us to couple with the name of Poland, it is impossible for a sober-minded observer not to perceive, that ages of the most debasing servitude had utterly disqualified the Polish boors for enjoying the privileges of free subjects ; that a lifetime divided between unceasing tumult in public, and the revellings of a boisterous, barbarous hospitality, had utterly unfitted the rest of the State from co-operating in the formation of a constitution which should possess either energy or regularity ; and that the happiest event which has ever befallen the fine country of Poland, has been a dismemberment, wept over and declaimed upon by those who had no experience of its necessity, or need of its benefits. Those benefits have most undoubtedly been the pacification of that unhappy kingdom, by the only means which human fancy could have devised for accomplishing this end, without endangering the security of the other powers, namely, a fair division of the country among the neighbouring and rival powers, and a consequent communication of the inestimable blessings which their ancient subjects enjoyed under a system of peaceful government and regular police.

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The memorable events which took place at the close of the 18th century, it is almost needless to observe, were the immediate consequence of an adherence to the principles of the modern system of international policy. The internal state of France would never have alarmed the neighbouring nations in ancient times. Without anxiety, they would have seen the overthrow of all regular government, the progress of Jacobin contagion, and the development of those popular energies which armed a people, devoted exclusively to war, with resistless power to accomplish the grand object of their demagogues, the overthrow of altars and thrones, and the establishment of universal empire. Far from combining to resist the progress of the new horde, they would have split into factions, and assisted its destructive course. No efforts to check it would have been thought of, until all resistance was too late; nor would those modern Gauls have found resistance effectual to oppose them from the Manlius of any capitol in Europe. That this has not been the fate of every thing refined and valuable in Europe, is owing to the degree in which the maxims of the balancing system began to operate their usual effects at the very moment when the first changes took place in France. But, that much injury has been
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been done ; that many independent states have been humbled ; that some powers have been overwhelmed ; and that melancholy changes have been effected in the distribution of dominion, has been owing to the unprincipled ambition of certain princes, and the taint of disaffection in the people of some countries ; which have, together, prevented the modern system of external policy from being followed out, and have given to the common enemy of national independence, an advantage proportioned to the neglect of those sound and necessary principles.

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Let us hear no more, then, of the last century, as affording arguments against the balance of power. That eventful period in the history of mankind, has been marked by the formation of vast schemes, which either by their success may allure, or by their failure may warn, future statesmen to cling still closer by those maxims of conduct which are necessary to the preservation of liberty and peace.

The remarks which have been frequently made on the knowledge of the ancients in this branch of policy are for the most part just. Mr HUME, so far as I know, is the first who distinctly stated this point, in an essay, replete with accurate reference, and signal acuteness of classical illustration ; but mingled also with some injurious perversions of facts in more recent history ; and with the mistatement, in one or two points

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points of the great system itself, which he appears to treat with disrespect. * The celebrated passage in Polybius, which has so often been quoted, † is indeed a distinct statement of one general principle in that system; and the orations of Demosthenes contain some discussions of the most delicate parts of the theory—discussions which, from the events of his times, we may be assured were but imperfectly comprehended in those early ages. ‡ But the number of discoveries, or inventions, which have been suddenly made in any branch of knowledge, is small indeed. All the more important steps in the progress of the human mind, may rather be termed improvements, than inventions: they are refinements upon methods formerly known—generalizations of ideas previously conceived. By how many small and slowly following steps was the true nature of the planetary motions brought to light? By how many insensible gradations did that theory receive its explanation, from the great law of gravitation, which, constantly and universally acting, keeps each body in its place, and preserves the arrangement of the whole system? In like manner has that theory of political expediency been gradually unfolded,

* Essay on the Balance of Power.

† Polyb. lib. i. cap. 83.

‡ Particularly the famous speech for the Megalopolitans;—*passim*.

unfolded, and its parts refined, which regulates the mutual actions of the contiguous nations of Europe; subjects each to the influence of others, however remote; connects all together by a common principle; regulates the motions of the whole; and maintains the order of the great complicated system. As the newly discovered planets are found to obey the same law that keeps the rest in their orbits: so, the powers which frequently arise in the European world immediately fall into their places, and conform to the same principles that fix the positions and direct the movements of the ancient states. And as, even in this enlightened age, we have not yet succeeded in discovering the whole extent of the planetary law, or in reducing certain apparent irregularities of the system to the common principles: so, in these days of political improvement, we have not attained the utmost refinements of international policy; and have still to lament the many irregularities which continue to disturb the arrangement of the European commonwealth.

It is not, then, in the mere plan of forming offensive or defensive alliances; or in the principle of attacking a neighbour, in order to weaken his power, before he has betrayed hostile views; or in the policy of defending a rival, in order to stay, in proper time, the pro-

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gress of a common enemy—it is not in these simple maxims that the modern system consists. Those are, indeed, the elements, the great and leading parts of the theory; they are its most prominent features; they are maxims dictated by the plainest and coarsest views of political expediency: But they do not form the whole system; nor does the knowledge of them (for it cannot be pretended that ancient states were in possession of any thing beyond the speculative knowledge of them) comprehend an acquaintance with the profounder and more subtle parts of modern policy. The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing theory, is the systematic form to which it reduces those plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness over every motion in all parts of the system, which it prescribes; the subjection in which it places all national passions and antipathies to the fine and delicate views of remote expediency; the unceasing care which it dictates of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves; the general union which it has effected, of all the European powers in one connected system—obeying certain laws, and actuated in general by a common principle; in fine, as

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a consequence of the whole, the right of mutual inspection, now universally recognised among civilized states, in the rights of public envoys and residents. This is the balancing theory. It was as much unknown to Athens and Rome, as the Keplerian or Newtonian laws were concealed from Plato and Cicero, who certainly knew the general effects of gravitation upon terrestrial bodies. It has arisen, in the progress of science, out of the circumstances of modern Europe; the greater extent and nearer equality of the contiguous states; the more constant intercourse of the different nations with each other.

We have been told by historians,* that the principle of the balance of power, was a discovery of the fifteenth century, made by the Italian politicians, in consequence of the invasion of Charles VIII. Against such statements as this, it is perfectly fair to adduce the arguments of Mr Hume and others, who have traced, in ancient times, much more refined notions of policy, than any that dictated the Italian defensive league. It was, in truth, not to any such single event, that the balancing system owed either its origin, or its refinement; but to the progress of society, which placed the

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* Robertson's Charles V. vol. I.

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the whole states of Europe in the same relative situation in which the States of Italy were at that period ; and taught them not to wait for an actual invasion ; but to see a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that should manifest the least desire of change.

The circumstances of the European states have been singularly favourable to the development of those principles of easy and constant union, of which I formerly described the tendency to promote national intercourse *, and to render Europe a united whole within itself, almost separated from the rest of the world—a great federacy, acknowledging, indeed, no common chief ; but united by certain common principles, and obeying one system of international law.

It is from these natural sources, through this gradual progress, and not suddenly from any accidental occurrences in the fifteenth century, or from the cabinets of particular statesmen, that we must deduce the refined system of interference, which has regulated, for so long a time, the councils of Europe in foreign affairs : and we are to consider the union of the Italian states against the invasion of Charles, merely as a symptom of the same progressive improvement,

* Book II. Sect. III.

improvement, which has since taken place in the other parts of Europe.

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The question, of the propriety of a nation interfering with those concerns of its neighbours, which have only a remote connexion with its own interests, may be stated in two different forms ;—either as a general question applicable to any state, or in its particular reference to the situation of a nation placed in certain circumstances. Thus, many politicians, who have no hesitation in recommending the balancing system to such powers as Austria and Prussia, placed in the heart of Europe, and surrounded by many other states of various complexions and magnitudes, are yet of opinion, that the situation of Britain is very different ; that she is, by nature, insulated from the rest of Europe ; that she can defend herself against any invasion, by means of her natural barrier and internal resources ; and that she ought not to sacrifice the improvement of those resources, and the means of maintaining peace, to the vain wish of holding the European balance, and embroiling herself in the stormy politics of foreign states. To enter fully into the discussion of this great national question, would carry me much beyond my necessary limits : But I cannot avoid remarking, that, so long as Great Britain is engaged

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in a commercial intercourse with other nations ; so long as her insular situation only serves to promote and extend those commercial relations ; so long as other states possess a large portion of sea coast, engage in a wide commercial circle, and are acquiring a navy of formidable power ; so long as Britain interferes with them in other quarters of the globe, where her dominions are the most valuable and extensive ; so long, in a word, as she studiously affects the colonial system of policy ;—it is an abuse of language to talk of her being separated from the continent of Europe by the straits of Dover. The transport of an army by sea, is often more easy than the march over a considerable tract of land. The fate of a naval engagement is generally more quick, decisive, and dependent upon fortune, than the siege of barrier towns, or the forcing of mountainous passes ; and the elements may, by retaining the British fleets in Plymouth or Portsmouth, while they waft the enemy's squadrons from Brest or the Texel, destroy in a moment that bulwark to which we vainly intrusted the national defence, and render utterly useless the whole *natural force* of the country, which, after a change of weather, may display, triumphantly, its flags over every sea in Europe, while the Consular legions are revelling in the plunder

der of the bank, or burning all the dock-yards in the kingdom. To say that England may trust to her fleets, then, is to recommend a full reliance upon the chance of a single battle, or the event of a sea chase; to inculcate a silly confidence in good fortune, and to counsel, that the fate of Great Britain should be committed to the changes of the elements, the shifting of a wind, or the settling of a fog. It is to her armies, that every nation, insular or continental, must look for her sure and *natural defence*. But although it would be absurd to recommend, that the internal resources of a country should be neglected, either in order to favour its naval force, or in order to commit its defence to the movements of intrigue, and the efforts of foreign policy; yet he would be an equally dangerous counsellor, who should advise us to neglect those means of preventing war, and of rendering it harmless when it does occur, which are only to be found in a compliance with the principles of the balancing system.

When the different nations of Europe placed their whole glory in the splendour of their warlike renown, and attended only to the improvement of their military resources, every person of free rank was a soldier, and devoted his life to the profession of arms. But, as soon as the

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arts of peace acquired an ascendancy, and other fame besides that of martial deeds was sought after, war became an object of dread, as deranging the main operations of society, and exposing the national independence to unforeseen casualties and dangers. Instead of being followed for its own sake, it was now only resorted to as a necessary evil, to avoid a greater risk. The first great consequence of this change in the occupations and character of men, was the separation of the military from the civil professions; the intrusting a small class in each community with the defence of the rest; the adoption of standing armies, by far the most important improvement in the art of government, with which history has made us acquainted. As this great change has disarmed war of almost all its dangers: so, another change, equally important, has arisen out of it, rendered wars much less frequent, and confined their influence to a small portion in the centre of the Continent. The European powers have formed a species of general law, which supersedes, in most instances, an appeal to the sword, by rendering such an appeal fatal to any power that may infringe upon the code; by uniting the forces of the rest inevitably against each delinquent; by agreeing, that any project of violating a neighbour's integrity, shall

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shall be prevented or avenged, not according to the resources of this neighbour, but according to the full resources of every other member of the European community; and by constantly watching over the state of public affairs, even in profound peace. Such, at least, would be the balancing system, carried to its full extent; and such is the state of refinement towards which it is constantly tending. The division of labour, too, and the separation of the military profession, has been carried, by some of the richer nations, to a still greater extent than the mere embodying of standing armies. Those states, which are the most injured by the operations of war, are also the richest in superfluous stock. They have contrived a species of pecuniary commutation of war, similar to the commutation of military service, which paved the way for the introduction of standing armies: they have managed to turn off the battle from their gates, by paying less wealthy allies for fighting in their cause at a safe distance. The operations of war are in this manner rendered very harmless, and a foundation is laid for their gradual disuse. A few useless millions, and a few still more useless lives are sacrificed; the arts of peace continue to flourish, sometimes with increased prosperity; and the policy of preferring

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ring to purchase defeat at a distance, rather than victory at home—of paying allies for being vanquished, rather than gain the most splendid triumphs on their own ground—has been amply rewarded by the safety, increased resources, and real addition of power, which results from an enjoyment of all the substantial blessings of peace, with the only real advantages of necessary warfare. *

I have mentioned, among the circumstances which connect a country like Great Britain with the politics of the Continent, the possession of colonies. In fact, nothing can more directly contribute to give any state an interest in the concerns of all its neighbours, than the adoption of colonial policy. When a country is of moderate extent (as I before remarked), † its movements are easily planned, and its external policy is of a very simple consideration. All its interests may be perceived at one glance; they occupy a narrow space; are all in the same direction; and do not oppose each other in different quarters. The territories, being compact and situated in the neighbourhood of the government, may be easily and promptly defended, on whichever

side

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Book II. Sect. II.

side they are attacked, and however sudden the invasion may be. Offensive operations may be carried on singly from any point, without the danger of diversions and reprisals in other quarters lying at a distance and ill defended. In all these particulars, the situation of a political system, comprehending various and scattered dominions, is widely different. The mother country cannot move without considering well the position in which her colonies may be left. An aggression on a colony, in like manner, will draw the metropolis into danger. Neither, in providing for the defence of the state, is it sufficient, that the territories lying contiguous to the centre of the empire be placed in security. The more difficult task remains to be performed, of securing the colonies—those points to which, in modern times, the efforts of the chief enemy are in general directed. *

We have already seen, † how much less adapted a colonial establishment is to the operations of warfare, than a primary and independent state. An enemy may, by some sudden movement, easily make himself master of such a distant part of the empire, by arranging all

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Book II. Sect. I.

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all his own offensive operations in secret, and concealing every measure calculated to put the colonial government on its guard, until the moment that the storm is ready to burst. The only mode which is left of recovering this possession, is an attack upon all the other parts of the enemy's dominions. But several circumstances must be taken into consideration, as influencing all such operations.

In the *first* place, the power which has been despoiled of its colonies by the sudden operations of its neighbour, may be very inferior in resources to the aggressor, and may find it utterly impossible to attack him with any prospect of success. That power may, nevertheless, be quite able to maintain its independence at home, and to support its place in the European system, from the superior efficacy of primary government, and the advantages of a defensive position. Thus, it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for France to conquer Spain by a regular invasion of the European peninsula : at all times, however, she has had it in her power to seize the Spanish territories in the West Indies. If France had taken possession of Trinidad and Spanish St Domingo, or the Havannah, how could Spain have regained those valuable possessions by any attack upon France in Europe ?

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In like manner, we may now (I apprehend) admit, that the conquest of France, by the single efforts of Great Britain, is impossible. She has, however, generally had the superiority in the colonies, both of the East and West Indies: and when she avails herself, during war, of this superiority, France can never, by direct invasion of Great Britain, hope to regain her lost colonial possessions.


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In the *second* place, although the power whose colonies are liable to invasion, may be a match for any one of its neighbours, and may be fully able to recover the lost possession by diversion or direct attack, a combination of neighbours may be completely ruinous to its interests, and prevent it from attempting those reprisals which might lead to a restitution of the conquests that have been made. Thus, Portugal could by no chance whatever keep any conquest she might make from Spain in America, or from France in the East: an invasion of her territories in Europe, would shake the cabinet of Lisbon, and cause an immediate surrender of the spoil. But, should Britain unite with Portugal in Europe, to defend her against Spain, it is evident, that Spain might be despoiled of whatever colonies a sudden movement had put into the possession of her feeble neighbour.

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For these reasons ; *first*, because the state possessed of colonies may either not be a first-rate power, and unable to stand alone ; or may be unable to obtain restitution by offensive operations and reprisals, although a first-rate power and able to stand alone ; and, *secondly*, because a combination of rival powers may enable any state to extend its colonial possessions at the expence of a first-rate power, which could easily have defended or regained its colonies from any single enemy—it is absolutely necessary, that some means should be resorted to for preserving distant and exposed provinces, beyond the mere unassisted force of the mother country. The means pointed out by the policy of modern Europe, consist in the resources of foreign policy.

If a state values its colonies, and is unable at all times to defend them, or to reconquer them when lost, it may, by uniting its interests with another power placed in similar circumstances towards the common enemy, both immediately prevent its own loss of territory, and in general curb the enemy's strength. If the colonies of Spain are seized by Britain, it would be in vain for her to contend with the force of the English navy ; but she may call in the assistance of France, whose colonies and commerce are also exposed to the British power ; whose situation

tuation and pursuits render her the rival of Eng-
land. As the dominions of Portugal, too, lye
exposed to the power of Spain, and as Portu-
gal, for this very reason, is an ally of Britain,
Spain may make reprisals on Portugal, and by
increasing, or threatening to increase, her Euro-
pean territory, obtain the restoration of her co-
lonial dominions, from that fear of destroying
the European balance by which every European
power is naturally actuated. In fact, something of
this kind happened in the Seven-years war. The
finest settlement in the Spanish West Indies had
been conquered from Spain by Britain. Spain,
wholly unable to invade either the British co-
lonies or the British dominions in Europe, in-
vaded Portugal, when she found that even the
alliance of France was insufficient to save her
distant territories in that war, so uniformly glo-
rious to Great Britain. Portugal, though assist-
ed by Britain, would probably have yielded ;
but her integrity was saved by the cession of the
British conquests in America. In like manner,
the extent of the colonial conquests made from
France during the same war, both in North Ame-
rica and in the East and West Indies, and in the
German war itself, had probably, together with the
exposed state of Portugal, some share in procur-
ing for Spain the restitution of her most valuable
island ; and tended, by diverting the force of the
British

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British arms to those quarters, and preventing it from falling so heavily upon the Spanish colonies as it otherwise must have done, to save Portugal, and enable Britain to retain from the enemy whom she had most despoiled, a desirable part of the conquered territory. The conquests made from Spain were restored almost as soon as they were completed. Had the victories in Canada been gained for the defence, as they were for the conquest of a colony, their connexion with the campaigns in Germany would have furnished an equally apposite illustration of our general position. At any rate, that conquest was entirely of a subordinate nature. It was undertaken for the defence of the North American colonies; it may be reckoned almost as much a defensive measure, or a measure of reprisals, as the recapture of Gibraltar would be, or the taking of Guernsey and St Marcou. It would never have been thought of, had it not been necessary for the preservation of the colonies already in our possession; and it could not have been made without the aid of the campaigns in Europe. The interference of Great Britain in the affairs of the Continent, was here subservient to her colonial, as well as to her European interests. America was defended, rather than conquered, in Germany. France was driven, by the fate of European campaigns, from a natural part of
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of the British colonial empire, of which she had long kept possession ; and the victories on the St Laurence would in all probability have been insufficient to transfer the possession of that important territory, had France been successful in curbing the power of the King of Prussia.

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If a state is oppressed by the combination or aggressive alliance of several of its neighbours, nothing can be more natural, than that it should defend itself by the same means, and seek for the means of reconquering its colonies, by making offensive leagues against the aggressor with some power, which may in its turn be exposed to a similar injury from the same quarter. Thus, were a union between France and Britain to deprive Portugal of her natural ally, and to prevent her from making reprisals upon France in Europe, for the purpose of regaining any of her colonies which France might have conquered, it would be the manifest interest of Portugal to seek the alliance of Spain ; and she, on the other hand, being exposed to a similar danger from the new league, would unquestionably unite to force a restitution of the conquest. Austria, too, from her European policy, would be obtained as a party to the alliance, although unconnected with the colonial interests ; and Holland, both from colonial and European views, would certainly join the common cause against


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a league, equally hostile to all the colonial and all the European interests of the different powers. This policy would be imperiously dictated to Portugal and those other powers, by a regard for their colonies, admitting that the single force of each nation could resist the new confederacy at home.

But, in the *third* place, it may be for the interest of a power possessing colonies, to turn its views towards foreign policy, although no immediate danger threatens any part of its own colonial dominions. If a weak neighbour is stripped of colonies, or a weak native power is despoiled of provinces in the vicinity of your own colonial settlements, you are not, indeed, immediately injured; you are not even directly threatened; but the enemy of your neighbour may attack you next; and the conquest of that neighbour's colony has enabled him to seize your's with resistless force. To wait until the blow is levelled with this increased force, would evidently be foolish in the extreme: prevent the arm from acquiring such powers, and never trust to its using the new strength with harmless moderation. ‘*Cui plus licet quam debet, semper plus velle quam licet.*’ This holds of the foreign policy of a state which has no colonial affairs to look after: but it holds doubly of one which has such affairs. A state, which has only its own defence to

to provide for, may often trust to its internal resources, the spirit of its subjects, and the energy of its administration, for its defence against the increased power that an enemy has been suffered to accumulate. The defence of a colony or remote province is a much more difficult task. We have formerly seen, that such settlements possess few of those resources which enable a state to meet new emergencies and increased dangers with extended efforts of national strength, and that the keeping of the country in subjection is always part of the difficulty attending its defence. Its situation, then, must be full of dangers, if the colonial power of a rival has been suffered to acquire a sudden increase ; or if several of the native states have been suffered to coalesce under one government, by conquest or otherwise ; or if some of the other colonies have fallen a sacrifice to those powers ; or if the colonial system of a neighbouring power has been deranged, its relations to the mother country destroyed, and an independent community formed in its place. In proportion as colonial government and resources are always less to be depended on than those of primary states ; and in proportion as more is left to accident and fortune and sudden movements of force or manœuvre, in colonial warfare, than in the contests of independ-

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ent states : so ought the statesman, entrusted with the administration of colonies, to keep a more watchful eye over the motions of all neighbours and enemies. They have to defend a part of the empire which is naturally feeble, and is connected with the rest by a fickle tenure : they ought then to strengthen and secure it by all those subsidiary measures so necessary to prevent any crisis from endangering the weak part. The more healthy members of the body may stand alone, and struggle by their native *stamina* against any unforeseen combination of accidents ; but the feeble limbs need extraneous support, and cannot, without imminent danger, be exposed to new and critical situations. A body in those circumstances ought never, without absolute necessity, to leave that state of repose in which alone its hopes of security lie ; and nothing but a careful and vigilant attention to the affairs and plans of all its neighbours, can ever prevent the necessity of active exertions. It must not wait till the attack comes on, so full of risks and dangers ; but prevent the approach of such a crisis, by leaguings with powerful neighbours, whose assistance may render the adoption of hostile measures certainly fatal to the enemy. It must constantly interfere in behalf of the established balance of power ;
must

must prevent any change whatever from taking place in any part of the system ; and must not permit any neighbour to gain a dangerous increase of power, by swallowing up a weaker neighbour, lest this change may bring on that crisis which it has so much reason to apprehend will prove fatal, and lest the total or even partial destruction of this neighbour may prevent the acquisition of his alliance and assistance against the common enemy.

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It is almost unnecessary to give examples, or to put cases in illustration of these remarks. An acquisition of power by Prussia would certainly be dangerous to the Imperial House ; yet, provided that acquisition is not made at her expence, Austria might probably be induced, by a share of the spoil, as she was in 1774 and 1794, to connive at a change only indirectly hostile to her interests. Although sound views of policy certainly dictate the most vigilant attention to her rival's affairs, and the most unremitting care to prevent any change ; yet the effects to be apprehended from every increase of the Prussian influence, are by no means immediately ruinous to her power, or fatal to her safety. The vigour of her government may draw forth new resources to meet the new dangers ; the spirit of her people may be roused, as it was in one part of the state,

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towards Maria Theresa, by loyalty and almost superstitious attachment to that illustrious House, or by an extended portion of civil liberty being wisely communicated to the mass of the imperial subjects. The resources already in her possession may be economized by salutary reforms, or directed with more effect by wise changes in the civil and military administration. The strength which her rival has been allowed to acquire, may in this manner be resisted, and a stand may be made, until the other states have time to interfere; and Britain may then be saved by the resources of federal power, added to her own exertions of individual force.

But if any state possessed of valuable colonies, as Great Britain, has incautiously or timidly permitted a neighbour to extend his colonial resources, or a new and independent power to arise in the colonial system; if, for instance, she has allowed France to master some of the Portuguese settlements; or the French slaves or their masters to erect in any of the islands an independent commonwealth, it is evident that the British colonies cannot be saved from ruin by any of those sudden exertions which a great crisis of affairs is calculated to call forth in primary and free states. A resistance cannot be expected long enough to allow the aid of alliance or diversion to be called in.

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In the one case, the alliance of Portugal is out of the question, since Britain did not make a common cause with her in the season of her difficulties : at any rate, her power to assist has been either destroyed or greatly diminished by the events which have happened ; and in the case of a new power arising in the system, the means of making diversions, or calling in the aid of alliances, are not to be obtained, for the reasons which I have formerly explained. * It is therefore the undoubted interest of Great Britain to prevent every increase of power which her rivals in the colonies may attempt to obtain ; to prevent the establishment of any new community in that quarter, and, in general, to maintain the actual balance of the colonies.

We have hitherto considered the necessity of foreign policy to a nation possessed of colonies, in order to defend those colonies, and prevent them from being seized by an enemy. But we have frequently had occasion to observe, that total conquest is only the greatest, not the sole evil which can befall a state. † Extensive and alarming injury may be done to a nation by unsuccessful invasion ; and a colony

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* Book II. Sect. II.


† Book I. Sect. I.

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lony may be ruined to all intents and purposes by a war, which may cover the troops of the mother country with laurels, and terminate in the complete defence, or even in the extension of her colonial dominions. It is therefore of importance to take such preventive measures as may secure the colonies from invasion. It will often be in the power of a state to avert the war from its own settlements, by turning that calamity towards some part of the enemy's dominions, or to fight two neighbours against each other, one of whom might have annoyed the colonies, if unemployed. Thus, in the same manner that colonial territories are highly useful to a state, by affording a field in which war may be carried on without prejudice to the body of the nation: so, the resources of foreign policy may be called in to protect those colonies from the dangers of invasion, and to turn off the attack, or at least exhaust its fury in foreign contests. The states which possess colonial territories are those which possess most superfluous wealth, and can best afford to bribe or subsidize allies. It is for their highest advantage so to employ their resources, as to save their own territories from invasion. Next to their European territories, their colonies call for the same assistance. They are indeed much more exposed to attack from their remote position and internal

ternal weakness, as well as from the wish which every European power has to turn the dangers of war away from the metropolis, and to increase its colonial dominions. But at any rate, a state possessed of scattered territory presents more points of attack; touches in more parts the dominions of rivals or enemies; and, consequently, has more need of that policy which may enable it to avert the dangers of actual invasion, by diversions, alliances, and political intrigues.

We may conclude, then, that, in every point of view, it is still more for the interest of a nation possessing colonies, than for the interest of a nation compact and situated in one quarter of the world, to regard, with a watchful eye, every proceeding of its neighbours; to interfere in their concerns; to prevent their usurpation; to maintain the actual balance of power, by checking every attempt at usurpation or oppression; to keep down the power of rivals, by befriending the weaker states; and, by acquiring a place and footing in the general concerns of the international system, to retain the constant power of defending all its possessions in the safest manner, and preserve that tranquillity so necessary to its colonial affairs. If the state in question is an island, this conclusion still holds; for, whatever may be said of its

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its foreign relations in Europe, it is not insulated in the colonies, but forms an integral part of the colonial system, as much as if it were situated in the heart of the European Continent.

Such are the general outlines of the modern system, founded upon a constant attention to the preservation of a balance of power. The science which professes to discuss the general principles of this system, and their particular application in detail to the actual situation of the European powers, is, of consequence, next to jurisprudence and police, the most important that can occupy the attention of the statesman. It has however been alleged, that this is an inquiry reducible to no general or fixed principles; that it does not deserve the name of science; that it depends on the caprices of a few individuals, and the variations in their views or measures, occasioned by accidental occurrences. Mr HUME, in particular, at the very time when he recommends the drawing of our conclusions on subjects of domestic policy, as fine as it is possible, adds, ‘ that in these affairs, the inferences rest on the concurrence of a multitude of causes, not, as in foreign politics, upon accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few persons.’ * It may, however,

* Political Essays.

however, be observed, that the very same general arguments, so irresistibly stated by that acute and profound writer to prove that politics may be reduced to a science, † apply as well to the foreign, as to the domestic policy of a state. A few more particular remarks on this point may serve to set it in a light sufficiently striking; and to illustrate, at the same time, the general foundation of the stability and expediency of the modern system.

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i. All the governments of Europe have tended uniformly, and not very slowly, towards greater freedom and mildness, since the rise of the commercial policy of modern times, and the general diffusion of knowledge by the art of printing. Instead of a collection of despots, actuated, in all their plans of internal and external arrangement by caprice or accident, the system of European princes is now an assemblage of deputies from the different nations, which have intrusted them with certain powers and commissions for the public good. In the execution of their trust, indeed, they are not directly accountable to any human authority; but, even in the states where no constitutional controul is appointed to the power of the crown, the indirect influence of a numerous and enlightened people is uniformly strong upon the councils

† Essay III.

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councils of the monarch. It is always his interest to rule by gentle and agreeable means, and to further, by every measure in his power, the prosperity of his state. This interest, though for a while it may be concealed from his eyes, or overruled by opposite passions, can never be long hidden from him ; but must always, in the long-run, force itself upon his attention ; and be, for the most part, the guide of his conduct. The government of the most despotic princes offers constant examples of a submission to that opinion, which can there scarcely make itself heard ; and not a few instances of obedience to the voice, which, from its resistless power over divans themselves, has been emphatically called the voice of God. A check is thus provided for the violence of royal passions, and a guide or regulator for the movements of even a despot's caprice. In the free governments of modern Europe, however, the influence of public opinion is direct ; the voice of the nation is acknowledged ; and the will of the people is in general obeyed, the only doubt being as to the particular line of conduct which that voice and will directs.

2. As almost all princes rule by the advice of ministers, and must execute their decrees by the assistance of a great number of deputies ; the connexion of those men with the people at large ;

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large ; their responsibility to their country ; the odium and personal danger which attaches to a failure of any plan executed by their intervention, whether suggested by their councils or not ; must quicken their perception of every national danger ; and embolden them to withstand, in the cabinet, any pernicious measure dictated by the ignorance or caprice of their master. Where so many must thus, in some degree, concur in every act of the sovereign power, and so many are responsible, in the eyes of the country, for every abuse in the government, it is manifest that the chances of wilful misrule, through the unprincipled caprice, or rashness, or levity, or passions of a single monarch, are considerably diminished ; and that the true interests of the country, in its relations to foreign states, can only be lost sight of or thwarted, during casual intervals, when the ministers are utterly careless of popular opinion in comparison of their master's will, and the tyrant is so shortsighted and so corrupted by his unfortunate situation, as to despise his best interests and disregard his chief danger.

The actual responsibility of every minister to the country, even in governments the most unprincipled and despotic ; and the submission of the Sovereign to the will of the people, however debased, is proved by so many striking facts of common

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common notoriety, that it is scarcely necessary to state them in illustration of the foregoing remarks. ‘The Soldan of Egypt’ (says Mr HUME *) ‘or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclinations; but he must at least have led his Mamelukes or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.’ There is evidently somewhat of inconsistency between the two parts of this proposition. For, unless those Mamelukes and prætorian guards were so numerous as to command the whole state, and so separated from the rest of the commonwealth as to participate in no degree in their feelings, and to be altogether unconnected with their wrongs, it is clear, that in the long-run they must have been influenced by the national opinion. At any rate, although, in the *domestic* concerns of Egypt or Rome, the interests of the two orders might be frequently opposed to each other, and those of the people be neglected, there can be no doubt that, in the *external* relations of the state, the two classes formed but one body, and the best interests of the whole were the same. The caprice of the soldan or emperor, then, could never, for any length of time, stifle or disobey the voice of those

* Essay IV. on the Principles of Government.

those bands whom he had to guide by their good-will, and rule by their opinion ; that is, by partly yielding to, and partly directing their wishes. In the most despotic governments of the East, the fury of a mob frequently obtains a change of ministers, which is always a change of measures. The vizier who commands a vanquished army, who advises an unprosperous war, or concludes a disadvantageous peace, is generally bowstringed at the first murmurs of the mob, and his body thrown to appease them. This is a sacrifice made by the most absolute of monarchs to the will of the most enslaved people in the world. The power of the Grand Signior, which lays every Mussulman prostrate at his feet, does not extend to the enacting of any law which might add to the taxes of the empire. He may crush the proudest of his bashaws, and squeeze from the richest of his officers every particle of their accumulated wealth : he may bowstring thousands, whom ancient opinion and religious prejudice has taught to believe that their lives were made for his sport : but he dares not issue any regular ordinance for a single general impost ; or the same people, who, in the strange contradictions of this unnatural state of society, had kissed the axe that was lifted against their lives, would now raise their

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their united voice with a force powerful to shake the innermost recesses of the seraglio.

When Peter the Great of Russia wished to invert the order of succession to the Imperial throne, from an unnatural antipathy to the Tzarowitch, whose rights had formerly been in some degree acknowledged, he did not think it sufficient to issue an express edict, declaring the power of the Emperor to fix upon any successor that he chose. He began, by accustoming the minds of men to such an unsettled and arbitrary mode of inheritance, in cases of private property. He published a previous ordinance, obliging each father to bequeath his whole real property to one of his children, leaving him the choice of his heir. This singular barbarian, notwithstanding the many vices that stained his character, and the constant cruelties in which his reign was spent, had the merit of beginning the civilization of his boundless empire. He wished to raise his savage and enslaved people to the rank of men; and the ordinance which I have mentioned, is an instance of submission to their will, from a real or supposed necessity, and from a wish to bring about a change in their opinions. The succeeding Tzars have adopted a regular mode of receiving the opinions of the most respectable and enlightened part of their subjects, and of imposing a check on their own

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own authority. Upon a new and general law being drawn up, the *ukase* containing it is transmitted to each of the *governments*, and the viceroys may assemble the different *courts* to consider it. If they unanimously disapprove, they may present a *representation* against it to the senate. The law is reconsidered, and is not obligatory on the realm, until another ordinance has been issued confirming the former. * The silly passion for legislation which distinguished the Emperor Joseph II, produced many laws disagreeable to the people: and although the whole tenor of that weak monarch's reign demonstrates how little he was disposed to recognize the rights of his subjects; yet those obnoxious regulations were generally abrogated almost as soon as passed. While he was dragging the provinces of the Netherlands into a surrender of their most sacred privileges, and purposely acting in direct opposition to the wishes of his constituents in the Imperial diet, he could not obtain the acquiescence of Austria (where his power is absolute by law) in a trifling and absurd regulation prescribing the interment of dead bodies in lime-pits: and the discontent of that part of his empire obliged him to abandon this idle measure. †

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* Tooke's Russian Empire, vol. II. p. 395.

† Mirabeau, Monarchie Prussienne, tom. IV. p. 472.
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3. It must be evident to every one, that the only reason why the theory of international relations has been supposed incapable of being reduced to fixed principles, is, the apparently small number of men concerned in regulating the external policy of states. Where a great body of people are nearly interested, and take a part in each measure; where their consent, advice, or acquiescence, is necessary to the execution of every plan, it is clear that there is always a much smaller chance of capricious and irregular operations being carried through, than where one or two individuals only are concerned. It is a remark of Machiavel, distinguished by his usual acuteness and profundity, that although, in matters of general discussion, the people are often mistaken, yet, in matters reduced to particulars, they are most sensible and judicious; that the prince is much more apt to be ungrateful, both through avarice and suspicion, than the people; that the multitude is generally both wiser and more constant than the prince; and that those leagues or confederacies are most to be trusted which are made with free states, than those which are made with princes. For the demonstration of these important and curious propositions, both by reasoning and illustration, I refer my readers to the discourses

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discourses of the Florentine Secretary, * more particularly the *fifty-ninth* chapter of the *first* book, which is most in consonance with our present reasonings, and contains as strict a demonstration of the principle, as any that we meet with in geometry, making allowance for the different nature of the evidence. † As we have seen, that in all states, whether free or enslaved, the regulation of public affairs is, in some degree, influenced by public opinion, and that the most despotic princes are not free from its influence, either directly or through their subordinate agents; it may be inferred, that the principles of the Italian statesman are applicable, in some measure, to the movements of all independent communities; and that the external, as well as internal affairs of states, are the more steady, and the more reducible to certain laws, the greater the number of men is, to whose management those affairs are entrusted, and the more extensive the circle is, whose opinion or will affects that management.

4. The relative interests of different nations are affected by various circumstances, either un-
Q 2 alterable,

* Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio. Lib. I. cap. 29, 47, 58, & 59.

† Cap. lix. *Di quali confederationi ò lega altri si può più fidare, ò quella fatta con una Repubblica, ò di quella fatta con un principe.*

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alterable, or only slowly alterable, in their relative situation and domestic state. The knowledge and comparison of those circumstances, forms the foundation of the science, the principles of which we are now considering; and it is very evident that this knowledge must be of as difficult acquisition, as it is important and practically useful. For, in order to have a clear view of the foreign relations of any power, it is necessary to be acquainted with the circumstances, not only of that nation, but of all the rest which compose the European commonwealth; to learn accurately their political state; to investigate their national characters and habits; to consult minutely their statistical situation:—so intimately is the federal power (the *puissance federative* of the foreign politicians) blended with the internal force, and the relative position with the insulated state of any country. The temporary circumstances of the different powers deserve also to be considered in a practical point of view:—the court intrigues; leading characters of the military or political departments; and the distinguished men in the literary world. These make up, in the great book of politics, what may be called the chapter of accidents; and it is a chapter which perpetually sets all the inferences and calculations of the other parts at defiance. Except

cept this last head, it is obvious that every other branch of the subject is general, and reducible to fixed principles: the other circumstances which I have enumerated are of a general and invariable nature, or they vary slowly and regularly, or according to certain laws, which it is the business of the political philosopher to ascertain. The last kind of circumstances which I mentioned, are, indeed, more irregular, and their disturbing force is not denied. But, in considering the effects of the former, we must lay out of view those deranging causes, as we demonstrate (in Dynamics) the properties of the mechanical powers, without taking into view the effects of friction, or the resistance of the medium in which the powers operate. In a practical point of view, those disturbing causes must be carefully weighed; and to investigate them, is the business of the lawgiver, the prince himself, his ministers of state, with his agents in diplomatic affairs: in a word, of the practical politician or statesman; a character of distinguished rank in every country, filling at once the most dignified and difficult place which man can occupy, and very little deserving of those ill-tempered invectives which Dr SMITH has been pleased to heap upon it, in a fit of peevishness, not unnatural to one who had seen how

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very seldom this great and important character has been adequately supported. *

That such disturbing causes do exist to affect the foreign relations of every state, is no more an argument against the science of which we are treating, than the undoubted existence and effects of causes exactly similar in the domestic policy of states is a reason for denying (what no one now thinks of doubting) that the principles of government are reducible to a general and certain science. The degree of vigour inherent in any form of government—the freedom enjoyed by the people—the influence of the privileged orders upon the great engine of the state—all these are liable to be affected every moment, and are actually affected by the characters of the leaders in the different departments of the constitution. Yet no one, since the days of Aristotle, has denied, that the doctrines of a monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical government are reducible to certain general

* My readers will be amused with the little piece of ill humour which this truly great man vents upon the statesman or politician, in the passage here alluded to. He calls him ‘*an insidious and crafty animal* ;’ forgetting, surely, that Cæsar, Cato, Demosthenes, Richlieu, and many others, who have made the world tremble at their names, or revere their memory, must be ranged in this very class.—*Wealth of Nations*, Book iv. cap. 2.

general principles ; and that the nature of government, in general, is a subject of scientific inquiry.

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In fact, the foreign affairs of nations are much less apt to be influenced by accidental events, than is generally imagined. The death of a civil or military chief, who had supported the greatness of a state, by the vigour and wisdom of his councils, or the glory of his arms, is seldom, if ever, a cause of great change in the relative importance of that country. Great men rise in certain circumstances ; they are disciplined in particular schools ; they train up successors for themselves ; they are called forth by certain emergencies in public affairs. This is more particularly the case in great systems, either civil or military—in the extensive governments, or vast regular armies of modern times, all the operations of which are combined, and mutually dependent one upon another. As these can only be carried on by the united exertions of many persons of the same habits and cast of talents, their success must always depend on the union of men whose abilities and experience in their arts are extensive. If the general or the statesmen falls, his place will be filled by some of those whose talents have assisted him in subordinate branches of employment ; and the constant demand for merit, in a certain department, will generally excite men

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to apply their attention to the acquisition of the excellence so much wanted, and so splendidly rewarded. Great occasions draw into public life such men as have long been labouring to fit themselves for their station ; and new talents, new powers, frequently spring up in a man's mind, when he is placed in a situation of preeminent difficulty and splendour sufficient to call them forth. The great object of every nation should be, to remove every impediment or check that may prevent such men from rising into the stations for which their natural or acquired faculties render them fit. Under a free government, the restrictions upon the rise of real merit are much fewer than under a despotism ; and the chance of preferment is extended to a much wider circle. In those countries, then, much less consequence may be attached to the existence, or to the loss of a particular man. It is seldom that we meet with Fleurys, or Turgots, or Bernstoffs, or Haffans : But a Walpole, or a Pitt, is, happily for mankind, frequently reproduced in the course of an age. Thus, the appearance of those illustrious characters, in whose hands the fates of nations are placed, is much less regulated by accident than is generally supposed, more especially in modern times and in free states. It follows, that, even in that branch of foreign policy which I have denominated the chapter of accidents,

accidents, some principles may be traced ; and that less is to be imputed to blind hazard than most men are at first apt to imagine. May we be allowed to hope that the time is approaching, (not rapidly, or by violent changes, but slowly and quietly, like all those arrangements of nature which tend to the substantial improvement of the species), when the establishment of equal rights, and rational systems of regular government over the whole of Europe, shall diminish yet farther the consequences attached to the caprices and accidental fates of individuals, and shall reduce to complete order all the circumstances that affect the intercourse of nations ; so as to subject their whole movements to certain general and invariable laws, to reduce every eccentricity of course, and to correct all accidental inequalities or alterations in the system. *

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I have now finished the general observations that I purposed to premise, upon the nature and first principles of the science which treats of international policy. I proceed to consider some of the propositions in which the doctrine of the balance of power is contained. I have, in the foregoing statements, insisted the more at

* See the general observation which Mr Stewart has made upon Mr Hume's doctrine, in his very profound and elegant work on the '*Philosophy of the Human Mind*,' Chap. IV. sect. 8.

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at large on the possibility of reducing the external policy of nations to certain general principles; because, besides the direct negation of this proposition by Mr HUME and others, it has been very much the custom of inferior politicians, and of the common run of mankind, more particularly in Great Britain, to decry such speculations as vain and illusive; to hold them up as objects fit only for the pedantic statist of Germany and Holland; and to describe them as points that should be settled by the finical, and too often contemptible characters, who are generally the representatives of the greatest nations, and who have brought a sort of ridicule upon the very name of diplomacy. The gravest subject that can occupy the human mind (intimately connected indeed with our present inquiry, though not altogether of the same kind with it), the *law of nations*, has been exposed to a similar contempt. Montesquieu himself, lawyer and historian as he was, has, with his usual passion for an epigram, grossly misrepresented a subject as important and refined as any in his own department of municipal jurisprudence. He seriously explains ‘the foundation of international law,’ by telling us, ‘that the whole system is a set of obvious corollaries to a maxim in ethics—That in war nations should do as little injury, and in peace as much good, to each other, as is consistent with

‘ with their individual safety. ’ Without ask-
 ing whether it is possible that the author of this
 witticism should ever have heard of the insults
 of flags, the precedence of states, nay, the
 whole admitted causes of justifiable war, and
 admitting that all the parts of the system may
 be strained, so as to come under the general
 proposition ; we may be allowed to remark,
 with great deference to so high a name, that
 such observations are extremely useless and un-
 satisfactory ; that we learn from this remark
 nothing which can give the slightest hint of the
 nature of public law ; that it is as instructive
 as if one ignorant of mathematics were to say,
 ‘ the whole of this troublesome science con-
 ‘ sists of obvious corollaries from a very easy
 ‘ axiom—whatever is, is. ’ In this manner
 might all science be simplified ; and learners,
 who knew what ‘ *corollary* ’ was, might be
 charmed to hear, that they had but one pro-
 position to learn and remember, and that all
 the rest was ‘ *corollary* ’ deduced from it.

I trust that the remarks already stated, will
 suffice to evince how mistaken are all such
 views of foreign policy or international law ;
 that those sciences will appear strictly reduci-
 ble to certain general principles, and leading
 to important applications ; that those subjects
 will be found to be highly refined and delicate,
 and

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and as fully deserving of minute investigation as any within the range of the human intellect. As we proceed, farther illustrations of these remarks will occur, to set their truth in a still stronger point of view.

I. *Treaties or public pactions* are the solemn and authentic expressions of certain agreements, which the governments of friendly or neutral powers have entered into for their mutual advantages. In so far as refers to our present subject, they are chiefly of three kinds, *amicable, defensive, offensive and defensive*. The first are simple cessations of hostilities; the next are agreements of mutual assistance in case of attack from a third power; and the last are more strict unions of interest, for the accomplishment of certain objects mutually beneficial. The second are seldom pure and unmingled. Many treaties bear the name of defensive, which, by secret articles, or more commonly by mutual understanding, and not unfrequently by the express tenor of the stipulations, are strictly of the third kind; and, in general, a paction *bona fide* defensive, has a tendency to bring about one of the more intimate and effectual description.

The monopolizing and jealous spirit of mercantile policy, in modern times, has added to the

the kinds of treaties just now mentioned, a S E C T.
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fourth, known by the name of *commercial*; of which the object is, to settle a certain rate of trade between the high contracting parties; or (what comes to the same thing) to grant each other certain privileges of buying and selling, refused to other states. These treaties are in every case absurd; they are meant to restrain that which ought in its nature to be free, and to be regulated only by the unrestricted operations of private traders: they relate to subjects in which no government ought ever to concern itself: they are only tolerable when their object is the abolition of restrictions formerly imposed by foolish rulers, or gradually arising from the prejudices of the people.

All treaties have been exposed to the invectives and farcasms of those who do not duly appreciate the nature of the institution. They are bits of parchment, and may be torn; they are made by men of peace in their closets, and may be violated by soldiers in the field; they are deeds, by which states affect to bind themselves, while no court of public law exists, in which the party failing may be compelled to perform his part; they are intended to check the ambition of princes or commonwealths, but they are to be observed by those who feel the checks, and may in a moment throw them off.

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off. ' Give me, ' said Prince Eugene, in the true spirit of these reasons—' Give me, ' said the General, when he saw that his allies were slow to fulfil conventions made against their obvious interests, and refusing to gratify his ambition, against their own safety and beyond their means—' Give me a battalion of soldiers, ' they will do more than a thousand treaties. ' If all states were ruled by general officers, this sentiment would indeed be accurately true. In that case, a corporal would be a much more important personage than a publicist or an ambassador ; but he would also be more interesting than a municipal judge or juriconsult : for all municipal law, as well as all public law, would yield to the truncheon and the bayonet. The same sentiment would hold good, also, of all such treaties as those entered into about the time of Eugene, and those to which he evidently alludes—treaties evidently disadvantageous to one of the contracting parties, and wholly beneficial to the others. But it happens that, in the present state of society, Generals receive their commission to act, and their orders to desist, from men strongly interested in the preservation of pacific relations ; in the maintenance of the national faith ; in the existence of a public code, to which all parties may at all times appeal.

If,

If, by such declamatory arguments, it is meant to demonstrate, that treaties will not of themselves be sufficient to maintain peace or alliances—to preserve the independence of states—to insure success in war—we must admit the position; for certainly no one ever imagined that an ambassador's seal and subscription communicated to the skin of a dead sheep the faculty of tranquillizing, or rousing the public mind, levying armies, gaining battles, and taking towns. One would trust more to its powers in the hands of a drummer, than of a statesman, to produce those effects. But that such solemn conventions as lead to treaties, such discussions as attend them in the nations contracting, such ratifications as finish them, such ideas of pledge and form as they are uniformly supposed to convey—that all those circumstances have a most powerful influence, cannot by any one be called in question, who is acquainted with the history of man, or the nature of the human mind. Independent of the spirit, indeed, with which those conventions are made, the mere paction is but a bit of parchment. Independent of the spirit which extorted the Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus, those records of the freedom and spirit of our ancestors would be most unavailing to the liberties of the present generation. Both the one and other

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other are conventional signs—legal modes of expressing a bargain—certain solemn acts, the performance of which intimates to the world that certain intentions were perfected in the minds of the parties at the time—certain deeds, leaving a record which may refresh the memory of the parties, and to which the party fulfilling may appeal. Neither the treaties of Westphalia (now, unhappily, a matter of history), nor the Magna Charta, can be enforced directly by the mandate of any human court, superior to both parties. If the circumstances which gave rise to the latter were materially altered, it would become obsolete, as the former has already become. While no material change takes place, they stand on record before the whole world, to animate the parties contracting—to check them in their conduct on their honour and good faith—to shew the surrounding nations what compacts have been made—and to hold up to execration those that break them.

The foundation of the stability of every treaty is the mutual advantage of the parties. It is a just remark of the Florentine Secretary, that, even after the most unequal contest, no peace between nations can ever be solid, by which one nation gains much more than the other. If the one gains much real good, and the

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the other only obtains safety from total ruin, the peace will be broken; either by the former, as soon as her power is recruited sufficiently to complete the work of conquest; or by the latter, as soon as she has breathed a little, and can hope to regain her lost ground. All such foolish treaties are rather conventions of truce, than of peace. They were one great means of conquest used by the Romans: they are rendered less frequent in modern times, by the principles of the balancing system.

The observation of Machiavel may be extended to alliances in general between nations. Leagues, particularly those of a nature both offensive and defensive, have generally owed their instability to a necessary disunion of parties, arising from each possessing views radically incompatible with those of the others; views, properly speaking, secondary to the main object of the convention, but more interesting and more binding to the individual party, than any views of the common cause.

The remarks made above, apply to those subsidiary obligations, entered into by nations not strictly concerned in the stipulations, in which the acceding powers guarantee the treaty or bargain to support the party fulfilling against all infractions committed by the other. These are generally modified by the disposition

of all parties at the time when the requisition to perform is made to the parties guarantees. They are the refinement of the modern system of interference.

2. The circumstances in the relative situation of the European powers ; their proximity, their constant intercourse, their rivalry, and the uniform desire that all princes have to extend their dominions, render it absolutely necessary that no one power should view with indifference the domestic affairs of the rest, more particularly those affairs which have a reference to the increase or consolidation of national resources.

For the purpose of acquiring such information, the institution of ambassadors has been adopted, or of *privileged spies*, as they have been called by witty men, with much the same propriety of speech that would mark the personage who should be pleased to call Generals master-butchers, or Judges hangmen. From the institution of ambassadors, an essential and peculiar part of the modern system, have resulted the most important consequences—a constant intercourse between the two governments ; frequent opportunities of detecting and preventing hostile measures or artifices ; and still more frequent occasions of avoiding ruptures, by timely complaint, and explanation or redress. The
natural

natural effects of the system to which this matter has been reduced, are certainly the prevention of wars, and the systematizing of the grand art of pacification.

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The relative influence of the national changes that happen in one part of Europe, upon the proceedings of the other parts, might be illustrated by a variety of facts from modern history. That influence seems to be wholly independent of all theory or system—it is founded on natural circumstances: and I have formerly stated several of these, particularly the history of standing armies, and of the formation of the states which compose the great national community of modern Europe. *

The right of national interference (a late refinement of this right of proportional improvement) has, like all other valuable and sacred principles, been called in question. It has been denied, that the total overthrow of all regular government in the greatest nation of Europe; the abolition of every salutary restraint upon the operations of the multitude; the erection of a standard to which every thing rebellious and unprincipled might repair; the open avowal of anarchy, atheism, and oppression as a public creed:—it has been denied

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* Book II. Sect. III.

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that the existence of this grand nuisance gave the vicinage (to use Mr Burke's apposite illustration) a right to interfere. Yet it is difficult to conceive what national changes, except the introduction of the pestilence, could give a better right to the neighbourhood to reject all intercourse with so infected a mass as France then was. And if such defensive measures were absolutely necessary, it is evident that the slightest aggression on the part of this neighbour, justified that open war, which was so loudly prescribed by the slightest chance of its leading to a restoration of order. The immense acquisition of power which the French government acquired by the revolution; the general levy and arming that immediately took place—would have justified all neighbours in extending their resources, upon the common principles of the modern system. Now, if this increase of French power had taken place on the Spanish, instead of the North side of the Pyrennees; if it had been, not a sudden augmentation of internal resources, but an increase of territory and power by conquest—no one doubts the propriety of an immediate interference: nay, if this increase had only been in contemplation, no one would hesitate to consider the formation of the plan as sufficient cause for war:—So thought our forefathers at least, when

when they attacked Louis XIV. a hundred years ago. But, what difference is there, as to foreign states, whether such an augmentation of power takes place at the expence of the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, or at the cost of the other branch of that illustrious house? whether this sudden change in the aspect of one powerful rival neighbour is the consequence of her foreign conquests, or of her rapid internal changes? whether the addition is drawn from the pillaged provinces of Spain, or the overthrow of all the peaceful institutions, and the plunder of all the wealthy orders at home? When such a sudden and prodigious increase of resources takes place in one country, as can only be matched by a similar revolution developing equal powers in the neighbouring nations, those neighbours are exactly in this dilemma;—either they must wade through all manner of turbulence and danger, to the sudden possession of resources sufficient to balance this new power; or they must submit to this new power. One mode of escape only remains from alternatives equally cruel: they may unite against this common nuisance; they may interfere, and abate it. If France had conquered the kingdoms of Leon and Castile, who doubts that Britain and Austria might have attacked her, though neither of them were friends of

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Spain? But this was not absolutely necessary; for, first, they might have perhaps saved themselves by defensive alliance, and the peaceable improvement of their internal resources; or, secondly, they might certainly have acquired in Holland, or Denmark, or Spain itself, an extent of territory equal to that gained by France. But the former measure would have been dangerous; the latter both dangerous and unjust. In like manner, Britain and Austria might have met the crisis of their affairs, arising from the new and sudden acquisition of resources which France made at the revolution. First, they might have united defensively, as ancient allies, and worked all the while to improve their internal resources; or, secondly, they might have revolutionized, and followed the French example. The first, however, of those plans would have been dangerous; the latter, both dangerous and unprincipled. One alternative remained; — a union against the unheard-of nuisance.

I hesitate not, then, to lay it down as a principle applicable to this extreme case, that, whenever a sudden and great change takes place in the internal structure of a state, dangerous in a high degree to all neighbours, they have a right to attempt, by hostile interference, the restoration of an order of things which may
be

be safe to themselves ; or, at least, to counterbalance, by active aggression, the new force suddenly acquired. If a highwayman pulls out a pistol from his bosom, shall we wait till he loads and presents it, before we kill and disarm him ? Shall we not attack him with like arms, if he displays such weapons, whether he takes them from his own stores, or seizes them from some other person in our fight ? * We do not attack a neighbouring nation for plundering or conquering a third power, because we wish to avenge or redress the injury, but because we shall be ourselves affected by its consequences. Shall we be less injured by the same consequences, because the dangerous power of doing us mischief is developed from recesses within, and not forcibly snatched from without ?

That such a principle as we have now been considering, is liable to limitations, no one will deny : it is indeed only applicable to extreme cases. It would be going too far, to assert that the right of interference is applicable to the case of gradual improvement, however great, in any nation ; nor to the case of that more sudden amelioration which national resources may receive

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* The doctrine of the balance of power is deduced by Vattel, from similar grounds. *Vide Droit des Gens*, Liv. iii. chap. 3. § 44. & seqq.

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from the operation of a salutary reform, or a useful law, or a beneficial change of rulers. I only think the right competent in cases of sudden and great aggrandizement, such as that of France in 1790; and then, I maintain, that, if it endangers the safety of the neighbouring powers, no manner of importance should be attached to the nature of those circumstances from whence the danger has originated. Indeed, it may even be suspected, that the essential, though not always avowed principles of modern policy, would bear us out in a wider interpretation of the proposition. It would appear, that many of the alliances of states, formed with a view to check the growing power of a common rival, and always ending in offensive measures, have been formed without any pretext of violence having actually been committed by the dreaded power, or being apprehended from that quarter; and without any consideration whatever of the source from whence this dangerous strength has been derived, whether from external acquisitions (the most common case), or from the sudden developement of internal resources, or from the gradual increase of national strength while neighbouring states were more slowly increasing or were losing force. This increase it is—this comparative strength, which excites the salutary jealousy of modern councils towards neighbouring

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bouring powers. The pretexts, indeed, for war, have been various ; but the cause of such wars has generally been the same. The pretext has been adopted in conformity to ancient usage or prejudices, or to humour the feelings of the multitude, and cause them to take part, by working on their passions much more powerfully than if the real cause were stated. The great maxim has generally been, ‘ *Obsta principiis* ’—‘ *Venienti occurrere morbo.* ’ I recommend it as a general watchword to all nations placed in the European community ; to those, more especially, who are neighbours of Prussia and France ; above all, I recommend it to the greater powers of Europe, the natural guardians of the great commonwealth ; and to this country in particular, whose preeminent rank among them gives her a title to interfere for others, as well as for her own immediate safety. To her, I would address a language not unknown to her children in former times—the language of the balancing system :

‘ *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento ;*

‘ *Hæ tibi erunt artes ; pacisque imponere morem,*

‘ *Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.* ’

VIRG. ÆN.

3. It has been urged, as a glaring inconsistency in a system which has for its professed
object

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object the preservation of peace, that, according to its principles and technical language, certain nations are denominated *natural enemies*, and others *natural allies*. A little attention to the meaning of the proposition, in which these terms are used, will at once demonstrate the futility of the criticism, and lead us to one of the most general and fundamental doctrines of modern international policy. It is not meant by this phraseology to assert, that some nations ought always to view each other with suspicion and enmity. The intention of such a form of expression is merely to state a very general, and, unfortunately, an unquestionable fact in the history of the human species—that nations placed in certain circumstances, are uniformly found to entertain towards each other sentiments of rivalry and animosity. The balancing system prescribes the means of disarming this bad principle in our nature of its destructive tendency, by teaching us to consider other nations as our natural friends, and by making the members of each class unite, so as to act systematically with a view to the preservation of national peace. A few obvious considerations will show what those principles are, and will comprise the more general doctrines of the practical part of the balancing system.

The circumstances which are uniformly found to constitute natural enmity between nations,

tions, are threefold; *proximity* of situation, *similarity* of pursuits, and near *equality* of power. From the opposite causes arise the natural indifference or relative neutrality of states; a reasonable *distance*, *diversity* of objects, and considerable *inequality* of resources; while natural alliance results from the common enmity produced by a concurrence of the three causes first mentioned in the relations of two or more powers towards the same third power.

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But it may often happen that a state is involved in hostile relations with another of which it is not the natural enemy, either from being the accidental ally of a third power primarily the enemy of this second; or from being natural ally to this third power, in consequence of their common relations of enmity towards some fourth or fifth power. Hence, indeed, arises the intricacy, if it has any, of the balancing system; and hence the multiplied relations of each individual power with all the rest, so that no one can be permitted to remain, for a moment, an indifferent spectator of what is passing in the most remote parts of the European commonwealth. A few examples will illustrate the foregoing proposition. These illustrations contain the theory of what is called, in practice, the European balance. The utility and application of such speculations may, like their object, be temporary and local; the principles are of all times and

and places ; they are regular, fixed, and general.

In conformity to the proposition above enunciated, France is said to be the natural enemy of Great Britain. These states, separated by a narrow channel, are of sufficient relative strength to be mutually formidable ; the one, by the extent and compactness of her territory, and by her large and useful population ; the other, by her immense wealth, the defence afforded by her insular situation, and the myriads of her fleets which cover the ocean. They are both engaged in similar pursuits ; because the circumstances of their situation are similar. The island, however, is more adapted to commercial occupations, by the genius of her inhabitants, the nature of her produce, and the extent of her sea-coast ; from whence has resulted a habit of application to manufactures, navigation, and trade, and, in consequence, superior skill in the arts, and greater extent of trading capital. The other country, eminent also in those points of view, is, however, so far inferior to the island, that her attention has, for above a century, been constantly directed to emulate so valuable a superiority ; while Britain, finding herself deficient in direct power to sway the continental states of Europe, otherwise than by intrigue and gold, has returned France the compliment of attempting

attempting to beat, on her own element, the natural mistress of the European continent. From this reciprocal inferiority, and consequent emulation, has arisen that spirit of rivalry, which will, it is to be feared, permanently alienate from each other, the two nations most formed to love and esteem each other; best adapted to entertain close and profitable relations of commerce; and able, by their union, to secure the lasting peace, and sway uncontrouled the sceptre of the civilized world. Unhappily the natural passions of the people, and the ambition of their rulers, have taught both to ‘bear no brother near the throne;’ to suffer no equal in trade, in arts, or in learning; and to divide, by their irreconcilable enmity, the other powers in the system of which that enmity has become the corner stone.

Holland, from her proximity to Britain, her extensive commerce, and her splendid resources of national wealth, would have been our natural enemy, had France been out of the question. But as Holland lay still nearer to that ambitious power, with whose pursuits she interfered at least as much, not to mention the jealousy excited by her democratic government and Calvinistic religion, it became her interest to league with the enemies of her formidable neighbour. Accordingly, in all the wars of the two last centuries, Holland has been found

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found on the side of England, with only two exceptions ;—the impolitic contest of Charles II. when he was in the pay of France, and the jealous enmity of Holland in the end of the American war, as anomalous in Dutch politics, as the war of Charles had been in the history of Great Britain. After the peace of 1782, the breach was kept open, chiefly by the successes of the republican party, until the year 1787 ; when, by one of the most skilful and successful interferences in continental affairs, which the balancing system has ever accomplished, the Stadtholder's power was re-established, French influence destroyed, and the Dutch restored to their natural alliance with England.

The present alliance of the French and Batavian republics is obviously no anomalous case : it is in every respect the result of a conquest, retained, as it was made, by the force of arms and the influence of factious intrigue. The day is perhaps not distant, when even the present slight appearances of national independence will be thrown off, and the absorption of the United Provinces into the modern empire of the Franks, be (shall we say ?) the last great sacrifice to the sweeping principle of '*Arrondissement*,' one of the most signal inventions of the 18th century.

Next to France, the greatest power on the continent of Europe resides in the House of Austria,

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Austria, from the union of its hereditary dominions in Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, the frontier provinces, and the late acquisitions in Poland and the Venetian territories, with the Imperial crown, which confers an authority, chiefly of indirect influence, over the princes of the empire. The hereditary losses of this power in the late war, have on the whole been trifling; but she has lost much in the power of swaying the affairs of Italy, much of her influence in the Germanic affairs, and still more of relative force, by the astonishing increase of France, and the augmentation also of Prussia (her natural rival in Germany), to one or other of whom, or their dependants, has accrued every thing lost by Austria. After all, the Austrian power is great and formidable. It would be the greatest and most formidable in Europe, were its extensive territories somewhat more compact, so as to derive full advantage from their central position; were it to acquire a small addition of sea-coast in the Adriatic, so as to have easier vent for its numerous and costly products in the foreign markets; were its vast resources called forth and wielded by a better formed government, or a wiser race of statesmen, so as to take every advantage of the finest climates, richest mountains, most fertile valleys, and greatest variety of hardy subjects; and, more especially, were its armies, the

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the first in the world, organized upon a better plan, so as to place at their head younger leaders: Were these advantages (the most of which may be acquired) added to its immense natural resources, Austria might be deemed the first power in Europe, and dreaded by all her neighbours as resistless in the scale.

The circumstances which render Austria the natural enemy and counterpoise of France, render her also the natural ally of Britain, and the great continental support of the British influence in Europe. In proportion to the enmity between those leading powers, this natural union between Britain and Austria has always been more or less close, since the separation of the Spanish from the Austrian branch of the house. It has experienced only one remarkable intermission, and that a slight one, during the peace-loving administrations of Fleury and Walpole. In the war which succeeded the fall of Walpole's ministry, France siding with the Bavarian Emperor, England naturally took the part of the Empress-Queen, at that time almost crushed by the union of her enemies. The singular alliance of 1756, the *chef-d'œuvre* of Kaunitz, and, according to the French politicians, the greatest error France ever committed, deranged, for a while, the natural relations of the continental powers. Britain was not thrown out of amity with Austria; but

but Austria, ceasing to be the enemy of France, S E C T.
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ceased also to be the ally of Britain. Yet still, it is worthy of remark, that the assistance given by us to Prussia during the Seven-years war, in consequence of France siding against Frederic II. *, was pointed, not against Austria or Russia, his two most formidable enemies, by checking whom we could at once have saved him, but against our natural enemy alone, to our desire of opposing whom, Prussia owed the aid she received from us.

Practical statesmen, as well as speculative writers on political subjects, have been much divided in opinion upon the soundness of that policy which dictated to the French government the adoption of Kaunitz's scheme of alliance. The most enlightened politicians in the reigns of Louis XV. & XVI. have loudly decried that system, as destructive to the military, as well as the federal power of France: they have attributed to the treaty 1756, and the consequent military operations of France during the Seven-years war, not only the im-

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* *Vide* Hist. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, vol. I. cap. 1. where that Prince himself details the reasons that induced him to undertake the war. One of these was, the certainty of both England and France *not* taking the same side; whence, he could count on the assistance of one of those powers.

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mediate loss of men and money at that crisis, all for the benefit of Austria, without any good to the concerns of France ; but also the subsequent aggrandizement of the Austrian house, already too powerful, by the exhaustion of Prussia, and the valuable acquisition of territory from Poland, the natural ally of France and scene of French influence, whose destruction they have not hesitated to impute to the Austrian system. The advocates of the alliance, on the other hand, without denying the losses experienced by France during the war, and the still greater evils arising to her from the Polish catastrophe, have ascribed those consequences to the maladministration of French affairs in the Seven-years war, and during the whole interval between the peace of Hubertsburg and the Revolution. They have maintained, that the wisest policy which France could possibly have adopted, was, the securing of a long peace by an alliance with her natural enemy. They have argued this point upon much the same grounds as those chosen by the defenders of Walpole and Fleury ; and contended, that no danger whatever could have arisen to France from the alliance of 1756, if the administration of her domestic affairs had been as wise and energetic as the management of her foreign relations at that æra.

It

It appears to me (although I cannot now enter into the discussion), that the doctrine of the former class of statesmen, with a few limitations, is by far the soundest. All the benefits of repose might have been gained by France, although she had never entered into the defensive treaty of 1755, or the subsequent conventions of 1756 and 1757. The chance of France being attacked, was chimerical. By whom, but Austria or England, could she possibly be annoyed? If by the former, of course the defensive treaty was absurd: if by the latter, clearly Austria could never assist her; since the British forces would only attack by sea, or by a littoral warfare, or in the American and East Indian colonies. But Austria was liable to attack from that power which had despoiled her of her finest provinces a few years before. Besides, the object of the treaty turned out to be (according to the remarks on conventions which we formerly made), not defensive, but offensive. France was in fact to assist Austria with 24,000 men to recover Silesia, and humble the house of Brandenburg, or dismember its dominions. After the war broke out, the stipulation was forgotten; that is, the terms were changed, as is very commonly the case; and, instead of 24,000, France sent 100,000 men, to be defeated by the British and Prussian

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armies. How could she possibly gain by such an object, though completely successful in attaining it? She was fighting for Austria, conquering, without reimbursement or reward, for her profit, and, if defeated, sharing her losses. *

The vicinity of Spain to France, their distance from the rest of Europe, and the compactness of their territories, which renders them, as it were, parts of one great peninsula, might have rendered them natural enemies, had not Holland and Britain been situated in much the same predicament, with respect to France, on the north. Besides, the insulated position of Spain, joined to her great inferiority of strength from political and moral causes, makes her naturally dependent on her powerful neighbour. But, above all, the separation of the Spanish from the Imperial crown and the Austrian dominions, and the consequent disputes between the courts of Vienna and Madrid about the dominion of Italy, have thrown Spain into the arms of the natural enemy of the house of Austria. I do not enumerate, among these causes, the family compact, which so closely united the two branches of the house of Bourbon, or the blood relationship

* Note K k.

tionship which was the cause of that convention. Those circumstances may have drawn closer the natural ties of alliance between France and Spain: but, still, they are to be viewed as accidental and subordinate. If it was the evident interest of Spain to depend on France, and of France to rule over Spain, the death or marriage of one of the reigning branches, could never for a moment have prevented the union of the nations. The last-will of Charles II. indeed, set all Europe in arms, to break this formidable union. But does any one imagine, that had Alberoni succeeded in stealing this document, the other powers would have shut their eyes on the strides which Louis was making to obtain dominion over Europe by playing off Spain against Austria? Or, had the combined enemies of that ambitious prince been prudent enough to accept of the terms extorted by his humiliation, and terminated the Grand Alliance-war at Gertruydenberg; can any one suppose, that the union of the two natural allies, thus apparently broken, (for Louis' offers went to this length), would have subsisted less close and compact at the next crisis of European affairs?

To such as believe that all great events depend more on chance than principle, and de-

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spise all general reasonings on the train of human affairs, I would recommend one or two obvious considerations. Did the alliance of 1756 maintain indissoluble the unnatural union of the two powers? Or, has the dissolution, with every cruel aggravation, of the marriage which had been intended to cement that temporary alliance, prevented peace and seeming amity from subsisting between the murderers and the nearest blood relations of the ill-fated Antoinette? Has not one of the various means tried by Spain to regain that power over her feeble neighbour, which the Bragança revolution (1640) overthrew, consisted in always endeavouring to have a Spanish princess on the Portuguese throne? And yet, has that prevented her from seconding her policy by open force, and attacking the throne which she had immediately before filled with her royal offspring? Or, to come still nearer the present discussion, was not the family compact dissolved in 1793, under circumstances of complicated insult and violence to every branch of the house of Bourbon, as well as of imminent danger to the most despotic and bigotted government in the west of Europe? And have the ancient politics of the Spanish cabinet in any respect varied, in consequence of all those personal considerations, and grand occurrences? No. After a few months

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months of languid co-operation with the combined powers (from the expectation of crushing the infant republic), as soon as Spain saw that the new state could stand alone against foreign attacks, and had some chance of surviving the revolutionary storms, she instantly returned to her natural policy, and resumed her alliance with France; that is to say, she resigned all her family regards, the consequences of which had once alarmed all Europe; sacrificed much of her trade; exposed her sea-coast to the troops and fleets of England; risked and lost her fleets by fighting the battles of France; and put the very existence of her weak-handed government to the severest trial, by a free intercourse with republicans and regicides—by acknowledging and receiving into her capital a Jacobin emissary with his crew. In a word, the Spanish branch of the Bourbon line is as closely united, or rather as submissively dependent on the usurper of that throne which the sister branch once filled, as ever it was during the proudest days of the French monarchy. In return for his homage, the haughty Sovereign of the two Indies is pleased to receive for his son, from the French Chief, a crown patched up of the Italian spoils, taken from the natural enemy of Spain. The ser-

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vice performed, and the boon granted, are equally illustrative of our general principles.

The internal state of Portugal and her relative position to foreign powers are equally singular and worthy of our attention. A petty state, thinly inhabited by a lazy and uncultivated people; governed by a succession of weak princes, and in general by ministers as inefficient; subject to a constitution essentially vicious in church and state; the ark where priestcraft and hierarchical tyranny have found a shelter amidst the flood of liberal opinion that has spread over the West of Europe; ruined and depopulated at home by the most cruel and shortsighted policy which despotism and superstition combined could invent: Portugal has, for several ages, been reduced to a state of weakness which must have long ago rendered her an easy prey even to Spain, had not her situation with respect to that neighbour, and the danger she thereby incurred of being swallowed up, and augmenting the federal influence of France, rendered her the natural ally of Britain.

It is indeed worthy of remark, how exactly the foreign connexions of this power, always naturally dependant, have varied according to the circumstances of Austria and Spain, and

and their relations to France and Britain. At the revolution, which, in 1640, separated Portugal from Spain, and placed the House of Bragança on the throne, France was at war with both the branches of the House of Austria, and was accordingly the first to acknowledge the independance of Portugal, whom she defended during the first twenty years of the war of the *Acclamaçion*. When France and Spain were pacified by the treaty of the Pyrennees in 1660, and the latter turned her whole force against Portugal, the weaker power would have succumbed, had not France protected her underhand, and enabled her to make the peace of 1667. During the same war, the policy of Cromwell, his enmity to Spain as well as his alliance with France, induced him also to side with Portugal; and he obtained the treaty of 1654, the most advantageous treaty of commerce that England ever concluded. This, however, was the only time that Europe ever saw the phænomenon of Portugal in alliance with both France and England. The protector's treaty raised Colbert's mercantile jealousy. This was increased by the marriage of Charles II. with the Infanta of Spain; and the accession of Philip V. to the Spanish throne, by uniting Spain to France, and opposing her to Austria, fixed Portugal as our natural ally, and determined

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mined also her alliance with the Imperial House. In 1703, she joined in the grand alliance, and granted to Britain what has been thought by many an advantageous treaty of commerce, and was certainly considered as such at the time by both parties.* In this firm union she has ever since continued, and has been repeatedly supported by Britain in her difficulties—probably saved from entire ruin, particularly in the Grand Alliance war, the war 1762, and the late contest. The events of the last of these wars have undoubtedly affected the balance of Europe; and Portugal has been peculiarly exposed to the power and to the influence of the New Republic aided by its natural ally. How long she may be suffered to continue, even in a state of nominal independance; how long her great ally may be able to support and protect her; how long her rulers may be pleased to struggle against every disadvantage natural as well as political on this side of the Atlantic, whilst the fair and extensive dominions of South America lye open to their occupancy; it is not within my province (although it were in my power) to inquire.

I might now proceed to trace the relations between the Italian states and the Transalpine powers

* Note L I,

powers to the right and left of the Rhine; between the Porte and Russia, or the Porte and Britain or France: the connexions between the three powers furrounding the ancient and dismembered kingdom of Poland; the mutual relations of the Northern Crowns. All these juntos of states form separate assemblages, of particular interests; smaller systems, influenced internally by the same principles, and connected by the same law with the general mass of the European community. I have, however, gone through the chief points in the mutual relations of the great powers possessing American and East Indian colonies. The mutual relations of those secondary states which form the different colonial systems, depend upon similar principles, and are regulated in the same manner. It would be needless to give any particular example of those relations at present: In the next Section we shall meet with abundance.

In the mean time, I trust it will be admitted; that enough has been said to shew, that, in practice, as well as from theoretical considerations, this important subject is capable of being reduced to systematic arrangement, and to fixed, general principles. I have now only to conclude this general sketch, with repeating, in a form somewhat different, the proposition which at the outset I proposed to demonstrate.

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It appears that, by the modern system of foreign policy, the fate of nations has been rendered more certain; and the influence of chance, of the fortune of war, of the caprices of individuals upon the general affairs of men, has been greatly diminished. Nations are no longer of transient or durable existence in proportion to their internal resources, but in proportion to the place which they occupy in a vast and regular system; where the most powerful states are, for their own sakes, constantly watching over the safety of the most insignificant. A flourishing commonwealth is not liable to lose its independence or its prosperity by the fate of one battle. Many battles must be lost; many changes must concur; the whole system must be deranged, before such a catastrophe can happen. The appearance of an Epaminondas can no longer raise a petty state to power and influence over its neighbours, suddenly to be lost, with the great man's life, by some unforeseen victory at Leuctra. In the progress of freedom, knowledge, and national intercourse, this great change has been happily effected by slow degrees; it is a change which immediately realizes the advantages that every former change has gained to mankind; a step in his progress, which secures the advancement made during all his previous career; and contributes, perhaps more than

than any other revolution that has been brought
about since the invention of written language,
to the improvement and magnificence of the
species.

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Let statesmen, then, reflect on these things ;
and, in the present awful crisis of affairs, let
them often ponder upon the principles which
should direct their public conduct. Without
neglecting the increase of their internal resour-
ces, by wise regulations, and gradual improve-
ments of the civil and military constitution of
the countries entrusted to their care, let them
constantly look *from* home, and remember,
that each state, more especially if possessed of
colonial territories, forms a part of the general
system, liable to be affected by every derange-
ment which it may experience ; and, of neces-
sity, obliged to trust for its safety, and for the
maintenance of its colonial power, to a concur-
rence of other causes besides those which do-
mestic policy can controul. ‘ *Non arma neque*
‘ *thesauri regni præsidia sunt, verum amici : quos*
‘ *neque armis cogere, neque auro parare queas ;*
‘ *officio et fide pariuntur.*’ Sal. Jugurth. *

* Note M m.

SECTION II.

OF THE RELATIVE INTERESTS OF THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN POWERS AS WELL IN THEIR COLONIES AS IN OTHER QUARTERS ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR COLONIAL RELATIONS.

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HAVING, in the foregoing Section, laid down, at great length, the general principles which ought to regulate the international policy of states, with respect both to their primary and their colonial circumstances, the following Inquiry will embrace chiefly the leading points in the application of the principles to the actual state of the European colonies in the West, and to their connexion with the other parts of the world. It will consist rather of an exemplification of our general views, than a full and minute detail of all the circumstances that influence the mutual relations of the different powers in consequence of their colonial interests. I shall begin with the circumstances which are proper to the actual position of affairs in the colonial system—and shall then discuss the interests of the European powers in a colonial

colonial point of view, with regard to certain changes which may happen in European affairs. S E C T.
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P A R T I.

OF THE INTERCOLONIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS, AS INFLUENCED BY THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN AMERICA.

FROM attending to the deductions contained in the Third Section of the First Book, and to those contained in the Second Book, several practical inferences must already have forced themselves upon the reader.

In the *first* place—I endeavoured to shew, that, from the natural situation of Holland in Europe, her colonies are of infinite importance to her prosperity, of much more importance than those of any other European power; that, from the present state of things in the Spanish and Scandinavian peninsulas, the distant settlements of the nations inhabiting those vast tracts of various territory, are an object of very subordinate importance; that to both France and Britain their colonies are of great importance,
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of an importance every day increasing; but that, in almost every point of view, the colonial trade and agriculture are of much more importance to the wealth and power of France, than to the wealth and power of her natural rival.

In judging concerning the probable conduct of any nation in a given combination of circumstances, it is chiefly, and in a government perfectly free it would be almost solely, necessary * to inquire, what is the line of conduct recommended by the obvious interests of the state. Sometimes, however, more especially in countries subject to a despotic government and far behind their neighbours in political improvement, a lasting prejudice may affect the tone of public measures, and a uniformly erroneous system of policy may be long persevered in, until it has become interwoven with the character and fixed fundamental principles of the national councils. Sometimes, though more rarely, even in the freest states, a popular prejudice derived from accidental occurrences or from the ignorance and false views of less enlightened times, may retain the public councils in a course of great and obvious error. If I might be so bold as to hint at such an example, I should not scruple to give the British

* Book III. Sect. I.

British prejudice and consequent political struggles in favour of the rock of Gibraltar, as an instance of false policy persisted in by a wise government, from deference to the loud voice of a people remarkable as well for high spirit as for good sense, until it has become a point of national honour, and has for this reason acquired a real and solid importance in the mutual relations of Britain and Spain. Instances of uniform and fatal prejudice in the political systems of absolute governments, are to be found in a melancholy variety and number; most frequently in the domestic policy of those states, and sometimes in that branch of their domestic policy which forms the subject of this Inquiry. A very obvious example is furnished by the colonial history of Spain and Portugal. The large sums uniformly received from South America by the cabinets of Lisbon and Madrid, have strongly attracted the attention of all the rulers of both countries to colonial affairs, and have given the possession of America a false importance in the eyes both of the monarchs and of the people. Many years will in all probability elapse before those nations shall have brought themselves to admit even the idea of their existence separated from their rich colonial settlements; and it is not unlikely that the finest provinces of the mother countries would be sa-

crificed by the sovereigns of the Indies, with the full concurrence of their subjects, in order to preserve the distant realms from which those high-sounding titles are derived.

In judging, then, concerning the probable conduct of these powers in any colonial crisis, it is not sufficient that we should estimate the real value of their American settlements, which is unquestionably great; but we must also take into the calculation, that much higher value which they have thus acquired in the eyes of the parent states, from ancient prejudice, national spirit, and political ignorance. We cannot, because the Brazils and Peru are really of much less essential importance to Portugal and Spain, than the West Indian islands are to Britain and France, conclude, that any measures tending to endanger their colonies, would be more readily pursued by the courts of Madrid and Lisbon, than by those of London and Versailles. A crisis which should end in the universal separation of the colonies, though it would certainly injure the prosperity of those different powers in very unequal proportions, would most probably be equally dreaded by all; and the measures suggested with a view to prevent such a crisis, would be as readily adopted by those states to whose prejudices they appealed for their support, as by those whose real and solid views of policy all concurred in the recommendation.

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In comparing the situation of Britain with that of France, we find the prepossession in favour of colonial establishments equally strong, but much better founded in the former than in the latter country, inasmuch as the dismemberment of her empire would be much more fatal to her wealth and power. We may therefore conclude, that France will be the last power in Europe to relinquish the plans of colonial policy; that she will constantly and sedulously avoid all measures which have a plain tendency to destroy her colonial system; and that, unless such insane councils as those of the revolutionary times shall again sway her public affairs (a catastrophe not to be reckoned upon), she will never think of gratifying her ancient spirit of rivalry or animosity against Britain, by pursuing such steps as must far more irreparably injure herself than her neighbour. It is surely the plain interest of France, and consistent with her prejudices as well as her interest, to maintain that state of things which renders her territorial superiority over Britain as great as possible, and brings her wealth and maritime resources as nearly as possible on a level with those of her powerful and opulent rival. To abandon her colonies, because by so foolish and cruel a step she may strip Great Britain of her settlements also, would

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would be as ridiculous a piece of national spite, and as obviously ruinous, as if Britain, in order to diminish the territory of France, were to make a treaty, giving up to some third power all her dominions except the Isle of Wight, provided France gave up to some other power an equal number of square miles. It would be a sort of policy similar to that which should incline France to set her whole fleet against the fleet of Britain, with orders to engage desperately, so that ship for ship might be sunk or burnt. Such conduct in a nation is exactly analogous to those eccentric actions which mark the deranged moments of individuals. And as no one in trade, or in faction, or in private communication, squares his behaviour by the expectation that his neighbours will act like madmen (however much he may lay his account with experiencing their faithlessness and cunning), so, no state needs ever pursue measures framed with a view to counteract schemes which can result from nothing but national insanity in a rival or enemy, however much all states ought to act as if their neighbours were influenced solely by regard to their private interests. It will therefore be always a sufficient guarantee to Britain against any line of policy of which she may dread the adoption on the part of France, if it can be shown that such a line of policy will be
more

more hurtful to France than to her. We shall even have a sufficient security, in common cases, against any measures which are proved to be equally detrimental to the two powers. Such guarantees, in fact, are the best that we can possibly expect to obtain. Wherefore, if it has been shown that any system of colonial policy would bring about the separation of the French settlements, we have the most complete security against its adoption. We need only dread those schemes, which, whilst they do not materially injure our rival, are seriously detrimental to our own influence or wealth. But since measures of this description, for similar reasons, may always be expected, they ought constantly to be guarded against, as if they were hanging over our heads, and were actually in a train of preparation.

In the *second* place, I have endeavoured to shew, * that no measures can be devised more effectual for the destruction of all the colonies, than the establishment of negro independence in any one of them; that, of all the colonies, the French are most exposed to danger arising from this quarter; and that the insurrection of the British, or Spanish, or Dutch slaves, would, to an absolute

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* Book II. Sect. II, & III.

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lute certainty, bring about their supremacy in the settlements where they formerly laboured in chains. It can never be supposed then for one moment, that, in any event, France shall endeavour to overpower her colonial neighbours by the assistance of the negroes, unless she finds her colonial affairs utterly desperate; and in that case, as I before remarked, it signifies little what her conduct may be, as a much greater and more inevitable catastrophe awaits all the slave colonies, from the destruction of those whence the French shall have been expelled.

We cannot therefore admit the fairness of any view of the subject, which represents the restoration of tranquillity in the French islands, whether, by a total or partial subjection of the insurgents, as dangerous to the other colonies, from the chance that France may then invade them, and succeed through the help of insurrection. We must be satisfied that such a conquest would instantly bring on her own ruin in the West Indies; and we need not fear that she will ever adopt such expedients in order to humble her enemies, or increase for a few moments her own nominal power. It may indeed be said, that in the American war, France, contrary to her own most obvious interests, took the part of the North American colonies against Britain.

Britain. But, besides that a repetition of so acknowledged a blunder is not to be supposed, † we may remark, that the dangers of that policy were far less considerable than those of the measure which we are now supposing. For, in the first place, the colonies of France did not lye exposed to those of Britain in North America. In the next place, the dangers to be apprehended from the growth of North America as an independent state, were surely very distant and trivial, compared with those inevitable calamities which the progress of negro rebellion must ever bring along with it, and of which France has already had so bitter a taste. Had the planters of Jamaica and Barbadoes thought of rebellion, it may be imagined that they would have received little aid from either Holland, France, or Spain, so long as Surinam, St Domingo, and Cuba, were subject to the Dutch, French, and Spanish governments. Still less would they have met with a favourable reception in Amsterdam, Paris, and Madrid, had they proposed to execute their purposes by the aid of their liberated slaves. Least of all would their application for assistance have been successful, had it been made in the present day, when the massacres of Guadaloupe and St Domingo are fresh in the recollection of every European court,

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court, and are the perpetual theme of terror to all whose property or residence lies in slave colonies. It is not therefore a thing to be taken into the calculation, that the re-establishment of tranquillity, by whatever means, in the revolted islands, can affect the security of the neighbouring colonies, by enabling France to pursue offensive measures against them, with the assistance either of free negro subjects, or of negro insurrection.

3. It has been proved, * that any measures which can be devised for the restoration of tranquillity in the revolted islands, however successful, must leave the colonial resources of France so exhausted, and her power there so unstable, as to render the slightest movement, even of regular warfare, most pregnant with dangers. Nothing, then, but absolute necessity can ever tempt her to sacrifice a state of peace, in which her only chance of existence lies, for all the dangers and uncertainties of West Indian warfare. Her resources, too, are little adapted in that quarter for new efforts, admitting that she should be fearless of the result; and it may be presumed that the mother country is herself somewhat exhausted by the late contest, expensive and bloody in an unexampled degree. What better security for pacific

* Book II. Sect. II.

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fic conduct can any states possibly have, than that their natural enemy or rival is in a situation of weakness and exhaustion, which must render all attempts to conquer or plunder abortive, and in a state of internal confusion or half-quelled tumult, which must render every such aggression a step to absolute ruin? I demand, if the possession of her treasures, and armories, and dock-yards, would furnish stronger pledges of pacific conduct, or greater security against any effects of a rupture?

4. I have shown * that a colony is, in all circumstances, a less formidable neighbour than a primary and independent community; that, of all colonies, those in the West Indies are the weakest and least formidable neighbours; that they are the colonies which would be most improved in strength by a separation from the parent states; and that, of all the West Indian colonies, the French are not only the weakest, but are the settlements which would be most improved in resources by being separated, in whatever way, from the mother country. Since the relation of colonial dependence, then, is a cause of weakness, its continuance is always to be favoured by each power belonging to the system, and the independence of any one member of that system is uniformly to be dreaded as fatal, both

* Book II. Sect. I. & II.

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to the dependence of the rest, and to their safety from hostile aggression. In general, therefore, we may conclude, that it is the interest of every power possessing colonies, to league with whatever parent state may be annoyed by colonial rebellion, and to assist its colonial neighbours, even if they should be its natural rivals or allies, in crushing all revolt, and preventing the independence of the colonial insurgents. No assistance in troops, or treasure, or ships, can be thrown away, that is directed to prevent such a catastrophe. The principles of modern policy evidently require, that every exertion should be used to prevent a change immediately fatal to the security of the national or colonial system. If a colony is less dangerous to the security of its neighbours than a primary state, the independence of that colony is an event as much to be dreaded, and as vigorously to be resisted by those neighbours, as the conquest of any of the petty powers in the European commonwealth. The motive to resist the change is the same in both cases. If France conquers Bavaria, she becomes a more dangerous neighbour to Austria and Prussia, than France and Bavaria were when separate. Austria and Prussia, then, to prevent this, will forget their mutual animosities, and defend Bavaria; nay, Prussia will defend Bavaria, although that power is the ally, or rather the dependant of Austria.

Austria. In like manner, if a free state in St Domingo is more dangerous to the British islands than a colonial establishment in that island, Britain is called upon, if she values her colonial interests, to assist France in preventing the rise of such a free state. She thus assists her natural enemy, but she does not make the situation of that enemy better than before: she only prevents a change hurtful to both.

This inference is evidently of a very general nature; it is applicable to all colonial systems, and to revolts of every kind. But it applies much more forcibly to the situation of the West Indian colonies, which are more liable than any others that have ever been planted, to be affected by a change of government, and by being separated from their parent states; most of all does it apply to the mutual relations of the French colonies and the other settlements, from the peculiar circumstances which I have fully explained in the civil and political situation of the former. While, then, the circumstances of those islands preclude all possibility of their being dangerous as colonies after tranquillity shall be restored, the same circumstances would render them most formidable neighbours as independent states. The other powers of Europe, therefore, but more especially Holland and Britain, are imperiously called

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called upon to assist France in all her measures for restoring the colonial structure of her settlements. Without abating any thing of that national jealousy with which those two powers ought always to view their great rival—nay, in consequence of the very principles which recommend this jealousy in European affairs, they ought, without any hesitation, to unite with her to prevent all revolt and all establishment of new powers in the West Indies, if they value the balance of the colonial system and the possession of their own colonies, incompatible with any change which shall emancipate the rich settlements of the French Republic.

5. Although all such changes in the colonial relations of the different members which compose the West Indian system, must be dangerous to the others which remain dependent, and must destroy the colonial balance, I have endeavoured to show, that some changes of this kind would be infinitely more hazardous than others. By tracing the probable consequences of the negro independence in any of the islands, more particularly in the French settlements, where that calamity seems most to be apprehended, I attempted to demonstrate, in the Third Section of the Second Book, that the establishment of a free negro commonwealth in any

any part of the system, would be the most dangerous event that could possibly happen to the other islands, and would inevitably and speedily be followed by the extirpation of all the white colonists—the universal dominion of the Africans over the West Indian settlements. The negroes, then, are the enemy most to be dreaded in America by all Europeans; they are the natural foes of those white men who are distinguished from them by indelible marks in body, and by marks almost indelible in mind. The hostility has originated in every species of cruelty and oppression on the part of the most civilized but least numerous class; it has been cemented by length and variety of injuries; it has been occasionally inflamed by reciprocal ferocity, and barbarous revenge, on the part of the savages; it is rendered perpetual by all those events and habits of animosity, and by those essential marks of natural distinction. With such a power as the New Black Republic, no European colony can form a league against any other European colony, or any other negro state. The negroes are alike hostile to all who have been masters of Africans; to all who are civilized and white. In opposing them as enemies, after their independence has once been acknowledged, the Europeans have almost every disadvantage to contend with; and all idea of a peace with such men must be chimerical—a mere

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mere truce with the wild leaders of savage tribes, whose numbers surround and overwhelm the handful of their weak and polished enemies. If any power, then, deserves the name of a natural enemy, it is the negro commonwealth; a state with which no other power can live in amity, or form an alliance; a state equally hostile, and radically hostile, to all its neighbours. If any crisis can call for vigorous measures of prevention, it is that which may terminate in the establishment of such a power—a power which, if once suffered to breathe alone and independent, must overwhelm every thing within its grasp. If the European powers value their colonial possessions, it becomes them to unite against this tremendous enemy; to forget all rivalry, and join in opposing the progress of this inevitable calamity; to interfere, at all events, and abate this unexampled nuisance.*

6. Hitherto we have only considered the effects of the changes which we have been supposing to take place, upon the interests of the European powers, in a colonial point of view. Some of the changes that may be imagined, can indeed affect those colonial interests alone. The extension of any one colony at the expence of its weaker neighbours, and the emancipation

* Book III. Sect. I. (Vol. II. p. 262.)

emancipation of any colonial establishment from its dependence on the mother country by the efforts of the European colonists, can only affect the power of the other parent states over their colonies, by bringing about the conquest or emancipation of the other colonies. The only termination of such a crisis, will be the universal independence of the colonies, or a great extension of power—the acquisition of universal colonial sovereignty to one or to a few of the European powers. Of both these catastrophes, I have already explained the probable consequences to the commercial relations of the states, formerly supreme over the emancipated or the conquered settlements. * A mutual trade will still subsist, in the one case, nearly as before; in the other, modified by the colonial policy of the conquering power. But effects, widely different indeed, will attend the more formidable catastrophe of negro supremacy being established over the West Indian Archipelago. It is manifest, that all commerce with those rich and fertile settlements will now be at an end. All the capital vested in the West Indian trade will be instantly thrown out of employment, and that which is similar in colonial property will of course be buried for ever: all the cash employed in colonial loans will be either lost, or suddenly forced back

* Book I. Sect. I. & Sect. II. Part I.

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back upon the European market : all the losses of the planters will be immediately shared by their European creditors and correspondents : all circulation of population and wealth to those parts of the world will at once be terminated :— not to mention the less important consideration of private distress ; less important, only because it is of a less lasting nature. An universal earthquake or deluge, which should at once blot out those fertile regions from the face of the physical globe, is not so much to be deprecated as the lamentable catastrophe which should absorb them in negro dominion, and destroy their existence as a civilized quarter of the globe.

It is needless to add, that the total loss of those settlements as colonies, or their complete subjugation by any one European power, are blessings to every party concerned—blessings surely to the very Africans themselves, compared with the annihilation of the European name in the Charaibbean Sea. Admitting, what I have demonstrated to be false, that all the dangers are real which some speculative men have apprehended from the restoration of the French colonial power ; admitting, what is evidently chimerical, that the assistance, so strongly recommended to be afforded the French government in the West Indies, would strengthen its hands at our own expence ; and, to put the matter

matter in its strongest light, admitting that every aid which Britain lends to her, is an expence and a danger embraced in order to strengthen our natural enemy, ruin our whole colonial system, and establish the universal sovereignty of France over the West Indies :—what is all this, in a political, a commercial, or a moral point of view, but wisely and humanely choosing the least of two evils, and giving up what we can do without, in order to prevent a shock, from which, although all feelings of humanity should be laid aside, it is difficult to conceive that the mercantile resources of Great Britain herself could recover? France would, indeed, be more affected than even Britain by such a shock; in other words, we should have little to fear during our adversity from the direct attacks of the French government. But, besides the dangers to be apprehended from other powers unconnected with America, and from those colonial powers so much less involved in the calamity than the two nations hitherto the arbiters of European affairs—are there no dangers in domestic confusion; no chances of ruin and revolution in commercial failure; no evils in national bankruptcy, which may render the political independence of France and of Britain, little worth maintaining, and which either of those great states would feel but little alleviated by the melan-

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choly reflection, that they were common to both?

It is natural that the prejudice should be strong in this country against any close alliance, and much more against any active assistance to an enemy whose power in Europe we have had such reason to dread, and of late years to lament. However clear the reasons may appear in favour of the system of policy proposed, and however definite the line between aiding France in the colonial system, and favouring her pretensions to universal power in the European commonwealth, it is easy to perceive, that he who shall argue the question upon the grounds above exposed, and recommend the practical conclusions to which the reasonings in the last and in the present Book of this Inquiry appear to lead, will have a great weight of popular prejudice to combat, and a variety of powerful declamatory topics to resist, from many respectable quarters. It is by no means my intention to propose any thing but the utmost vigilance towards our natural enemy in every part wherein the two countries are contiguous, and may interfere. In the colonial, as in the European system, her boundless and constant ambition may be fatal to the balance. Let us endeavour, by every precaution which jealousy and political foresight can suggest, to keep her influence

influence within due bounds, in that as in every other part of her extensive empire. But let all those precautions be regulated by circumspection, as well as prompted by alacrity, lest the measures adopted for the purpose of avoiding a danger on one side, may throw the sum of affairs into much greater and more irreparable disorder on the other. Let a union against French aggression be cultivated with all the European powers who can maintain the relations of amity, and bind themselves by the faith of treaties. But let not the very first principles of modern policy be violated, by permitting the colonial power of any European state, even of France herself, to be annihilated, and annihilated too by the common enemy of all Europeans.

And surely, if it is necessary to use such arguments, popular topics may well be found in the state of colonial affairs, to strengthen the conclusions which plainer and more valid deductions have established, and to convince those whose passions must be inflamed before they can listen to the voice of reason. Admitting every thing that can be urged against the policy of assisting France, and thus enabling her to retain her American dominions, do the lives and properties of thousands of our countrymen in those parts claim no regard, that we should for a moment entertain the idea of sacrificing them to

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a mean desire of needlessly ruining our rivals in a quarter where they cannot materially hurt us, merely because the catastrophe will injure ourselves in a somewhat smaller degree? 'It is the sinfulness thing in the world,' (says an author not very blameable for excess of tender feelings) 'to forsake or destitute a plantation once in forwardness; for, besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of the blood of many commiserable persons.' *

It is indeed no common fate to which the European settlements in the Charaibbean Sea will be left, if their parent states desert them by suffering the French negroes to triumph in St Domingo. It is not to the peaceable yoke of some civilized nation, nor the quiet transference of dominion by treaty or conquest; nor the miseries of long contested invasion by regular troops, nor the hardships of blockade and famine, nor even to the anarchy of Jacobin law. The worst of these calamities, which may be dreaded from the preponderance of France in the colonial system, is nothing compared with the warfare of the African labourers. Hordes of blood-thirsty savages, intimately acquainted with every corner of the planter's house, every retreat into which his family may be driven, every crevice in the whole country; mad with unnatural rage against all that deviates from the fable hue

* Bacon's Essays, p. 164. edit. 1800.

hue of their own ferocious brethren ; pouring over each spot where European life exists ; scattering on all sides, not destruction, for that would be mildness, but every exquisite form of ingenious torment ; only stopping, in moments of satiety to lay aside the sword for the torch, and, in the intervals of mercy alone, exchanging torture for murder ; marching against the parent with the transfixed body of his butchered infant as a standard ; sacrificing the weaker sex to their brutal lust, amidst the expiring bodies of husbands and kinsmen ; and enacting other deeds of such complicated horror, that it is not permitted to the pen of a European to describe or to name them—these are a few features of the picture which wretched eye-witnesses have given us of negro warfare ; and it is to scenes like these that we shall inevitably expose thousands of our countrymen, if we sacrifice the security of the Europeans to gratify either a foolish jealousy of our rivals in the West Indian commonwealth, or a still less excusable tenderness for the barbarians who have unhappily been poured into the French islands.*

With the greatest sympathy, then, for the unmerited sufferings of the unfortunate negroes ; with unmingled detestation of the odious traffic to which they owe all their wrongs,

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* Edwards' History of St Domingo, chap. VII.

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and the West Indian colonies their chief dangers; the consistent friend of humanity may be permitted to feel some tenderness for his European brethren, although they are white and civilized, and to deprecate that inconsistent spirit of canting philanthropy, which in Europe is only excited by the injuries or miseries of the poor and the profligate, and, on the other side of the Atlantic, is never warmed but towards the savage, the mulatto, and the slave.

It appears, therefore, on the one hand, that the greatest of dangers to the West Indian community lies in the success of the negroes, and that the reestablishment of the old system in the French islands can alone insure the permanent superiority of the Europeans, either there or in the other colonies. Nothing but the subdivision of the negroes, and their subjection to the power of masters armed with absolute authority, can prevent them from acquiring that ascendancy to which divided superiority in numbers and strength naturally and invariably leads. On the other hand, I have endeavoured to shew that the complete success of the French West Indian policy, while it removes for the present all the dangers of our situation, can never arm the republican government with power to overthrow the colonial balance. But, even if such a derangement of the system was the necessary consequence of the restoration; we may fairly assert,

sert, that the welfare of all the European colonies, and of the parent states so far as their interests depend on colonial affairs, is intimately connected with the success of the republican arms, unless it shall be said, that a total extirpation, or expulsion, or subjugation of the white inhabitants is a less awful catastrophe than the universal establishment of colonial supremacy by any one European power. The interests of all the whites in the West Indies are one and the same. The negroes are truly the Jacobins of the West: They are the anarchists; the terrorists; the domestic enemy: Against them it becomes rival nations to combine, and hostile governments to coalesce. If, according to the principles formerly detailed, † Prussia and Austria felt their existence to depend on a union against the republican arms in Europe, (and who does not lament that their coalition was not more firm and enlightened?) a closer alliance is imperiously recommended to France, and Britain, and Spain, and Holland, against the common enemy of civilized society, the destroyer of the European name in the New World. If, according to the obvious consequences of the same principles, as formerly deduced, all neighbouring nations are justified in providing for their self-preservation, by interfering in the internal affairs of any one member

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of

 † Book III. Sect. I.

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of the great national community who may establish a state of things hostile to their domestic peace and independence; by the same rule, would the neighbours of any large colonial establishment, where the negroes should be suddenly let loose and permitted to raise an independent state, be justified in uniting to attack both masters and emancipated slaves, until the intolerable nuisance was abated, and the ancient order of things restored. *

In the actual case, however, this interference is not called for. The French government of the present day, different from that of 1792, is neither hostile to the domestic tranquillity of the neighbouring states, nor to the security of their colonies, however dangerous the power of the republic may be in Europe. In the first stage of the revolution, it belonged to their peace in the West Indies as well as in Europe, to step forward and take part with one faction against another in the management of the domestic affairs of France—with the planters against the insane councils of the republican government in the colonies, as with the royalists against the anarchical principles of the Jacobins in the mother country. At present, the powers which compose the West Indian system, are only required to assist the strenuous efforts of the French government in the revolted islands, as they would be called upon in Europe

* Book III. Sect. I.

Europe to aid the regular government of France, were the Jacobins once more to spread themselves over the country, and to threaten an immediate restoration of the reign of terror.

Let us then at once adopt that system which our common interests clearly point out. Let us not startle at a sound, and shrink back from the name of a French alliance, at least in the West Indies. Let us remember, that we are in those parts exposed to a common enemy, whose yoke would be incomparably more severe than the dominion of Jacobinism itself; whose strength is more to be dreaded than the boasted army of England or the Grand Monarch of the seventeenth century in the plenitude of his power. And as the aggrandizement of Russia would drive us, however unwilling, into an alliance with France, even in Europe: so, let us make a common cause with her where she cannot endanger our security, where we are threatened with a foe more terrible than Tartars and Cossacks. It is to be hoped that the French troops may themselves succeed in the great enterprize committed to their charge, because, in that case, their conquest will be more easily retained. But if they shall stand in need of our assistance, let us recollect, that in subsidizing the colonial treasury of France, we are preserving that trade which supplies our fleets with seamen, and pours millions into our exchequer; that the troops which may be sent to assist the government of
St

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 St Domingo are fighting the battles of our own colonies, and defending from the ineffable horrors of negro warfare, one of the fairest portions of the habitable globe.

P A R T II.

OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
 POWERS IN DIFFERENT QUARTERS AS INFLUENCED
 BY THEIR COLONIAL INTERESTS.

WHEN a state possessed of colonial establishments is drawn into any quarrel with its neighbours, every part of its territories may become the theatre of warlike operations, and all the branches of the empire must necessarily take part in the contest, whatever may be the origin of the dispute. We have already seen how much more frequently the colonies are exposed to the evils of warfare than the mother country, although they are very seldom the cause of the rupture. * If, however, a war should be undertaken on account of the remote provinces, the contiguous districts must of course bear their share of its burdens, and the mother countries may thus, on account of their colonial interests, be

* Book I. Sect. I.

be engaged in war with each other, in Europe and in the colonies at the same time. This is one of the necessary consequences of extensive and remote possessions, and forms an essential part of the very idea of a political union.

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It will indeed happen, in the great majority of cases, that the interests of the colonies are made subservient to those of the other provinces, which are generally more extensive, and always more valuable. Thus, while the whole empire will inevitably be plunged into an obstinate war for the advantage or honour of the metropolis, the colonies may often sustain injuries, or receive insults, of which a slight explanation or acknowledgement will be admitted as a sufficient reparation. Accordingly, I have already * shown how very small a share the colonial interests have had in producing those contests which constantly recur to divide the European powers, after a short interval of peace recruits their forces and treasures. It does indeed almost always happen, as I have formerly observed, † that when any necessity for reparation of injuries, or any change in the balance of power, is attended with a transference of dominion in consequence of a decisive war, the territories given up as indemnities obtained by right of conquest, are taken from the colonial establishments

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Book II. Sect. II.

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ments of the humbled nation, because every state naturally wishes to retain, first of all, its contiguous provinces, and to make both the calamities and the effects of war fall as much as possible on those remote districts, which, from their distance, are too much undervalued. It would, however, be extremely erroneous to conclude from thence, that the acquisition of those dominions was the object of the war on the one side, or their defence the motive of resistance on the other. While the campaigns of Germany or Egypt may have led to no other change in the relative position of the belligerent powers, than the transference of some island in America or some factory in the East Indies, it neither follows that the maintenance or the change of the colonial balance was the object of the war, nor that the change or the preservation of colonial dominion is the only purpose to which the success of the hostile operations has been subservient. If the party whose distant territory has been defended, had not insured success by carrying on the war in every quarter, new aggressions in the nearer parts of the empire would have been the consequence. If the state whose victories, in various regions, have procured an enlargement of colonial dominion, had failed from confining the war to the colonies alone, its honour would not have been preserved

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ed or raised ; its name and influence in the system, always proportioned to the total, rather than to the partial success of a war, would not have been extended ; it would not have thus far diminished the power of a natural rival ; and, on the next rupture, it would have wanted all those means of intimidating the enemy, which are acquired by exhibiting proofs of military greatness in whatever quarter of the world.

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But although the colonial interests of a state are thus secondary and subservient, it will frequently happen, that the situation of affairs in those systems where the distant territories are situated, may call for a sacrifice on the part of the mother country, and a temporary submission of her own interests to those of the colonies. I have already pointed out * those general cases where such an appeal to the principles of modern policy is consistent with strict prudence, and have illustrated this position by a reference † to the present state of affairs in America. The safety of valuable possessions, as well as the honour of the nation, may often call for active measures of precaution, or of vengeance on the spot, altogether dictated by colonial views. The same views may sometimes be extended so far as to prescribe the most vigorous interference with

* Book II. Introd.

† Ibid. Sect. II. Part I.

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with the conduct of foreign states, if it tends immediately to operate the destruction of the colonial balance, and affect the security of our own possessions or those of our allies.

Those nations which possess no colonies of any value (Sweden and Denmark for example), can never be called upon by any danger, even by the direct violation of their colonial property, to plunge their contiguous provinces into a state of war, for the purpose of preserving the benefits derived from such inconsiderable settlements. The whole value of the territory lost by any sudden aggression of a neighbour, will not be sufficient to compensate the expence and danger of recovering the possession, and revenging the insult. Yet, even those colonial dominions can never be given up to the forcible attack of an enemy, without such an injury to the honour and name of the mother country, as must diminish her influence at home, injure the spirit of her people in all future negotiations, and weaken her federal power in all future European wars. That cession then of a useless territory (admitting the colonies to be in any case useless), which ought not to be deemed any evil in a commercial or financial point of view, should uniformly be refused to forcible aggression; although, after the honour of the nation is saved by

by retaliation, and after some equivalent is procured, it will never be wise for the government to adjust matters very scrupulously, by nicely comparing the revenge with the insult, or the indemnity with the loss sustained.

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But the name and honour of a nation cannot be immediately affected by such changes as only tend indirectly to endanger the safety of its distant settlements, or ultimately to shake the colonial balance. Those states, therefore, which possess colonies of inconsiderable value, can never be called upon, by the principles of sound policy, to interfere in the affairs of their European neighbours, for the purpose of preventing the adoption of any line of conduct only remotely dangerous to the colonial system in which they have so trifling an interest. Thus, although the supremacy of France in the West Indies would be highly dangerous to every other power possessed of colonial territory; and although that supremacy would be a very natural consequence of a compact between Britain and France transferring to the latter Jamaica and Barbadoes; what could be more ridiculous than that Sweden and Denmark should endeavour to unite Russia with them in order to prevent or annul the bargain? It would clearly be nothing more than common prudence in Sweden and Denmark to assist France (as we have

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have already seen) in quelling the insurrection of her slaves, because the danger arising from successful negro rebellion is immediate to every white colony. It would be equally necessary for those states to arm in all parts, and to avail themselves of the resources of federal power, if unjustly attacked in the colonies, because their honour and name would demand this, and because the certainty of retaliation in every quarter is the great check to such aggressions in a system which, like that of the colonies, is not properly balanced of itself. But if nothing short of war could prevent the projected change, it would never lessen the name, or stain the honour of either Denmark or Sweden, to allow France peaceably to acquire the decided superiority in a quarter where their power is at any rate so trifling, and to trust for their defence in the last resort to their subsequent exertions when attacked, and to the resources of foreign policy—even although in the end those struggles and alliances should fail to save the colonies, or to obtain exact reparations and indemnities. Still less reasonable would it be for powers thus circumstanced, to hamper their European policy with colonial considerations in matters more remotely connected with colonial interests, such as those which I shall immediately point out; or to suffer the circumstances of their trifling settlements,

ments, however nearly affected, to stand in the way of any amicable arrangements subservient to the prosperous management of their foreign affairs in the great national system. The peculiar difference between a remote and contiguous province consists in this—that whereas the latter, however trifling in itself, must at all events be retained as a part of the empire directly necessary to keep the whole together, the former is disjoined from the rest, and although a component part in every other respect, yet is only indirectly subservient to the existence of the whole body ; and may therefore be sacrificed in such emergencies as would otherwise endanger the contiguous members of the system. The case of Sweden and Denmark, with respect to colonial affairs, is one in which the trifling value of the distant settlements will always render the probable sacrifice preferable to the losses and dangers of hostilities undertaken from motives of extreme precaution, and dictated by the view of preventing changes only ultimately dangerous to the colonial balance.

But widely different is the situation of those powers which possess colonies of great intrinsic value as important parts of their dominions and rich mines of commercial wealth. In various points of view, their conduct must be regulated by a regard to their distant, as well as to their contiguous provinces. An invasion of

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their colonial territory is, next to an invasion of their European dominions, the event most to be dreaded, even although unsuccessful, and, if possible, to be averted by all the resources of federal power. The attack, when made, is to be repulsed and revenged, not merely from a regard to national honour, but from a consideration of the real value of the possession which is at stake. All the means which the cautious and longfighted views of modern policy can suggest, must be put in practice to remove every danger that may arise in any quarter to the colonial balance ; because such risks, though indifferent to the name and honour of a state, lead to a catastrophe substantially hurtful, perhaps ruinous—the loss of an important branch of the national territory, the dismemberment of the empire. To prevent changes only ultimately dangerous to the colonial system, or even to obviate the effects of arrangements that may lead to such changes, the whole influence of the mother country should be called forth ; that influence which her internal resources and her colonial possessions have conspired in bestowing, and which will no longer be her's, even in affairs strictly European, if she shall be so blind to her best interests as to neglect all the measures necessary for keeping her scattered empire together.

It is easy to imagine a variety of cases, in which changes may be effected, of the nature which I have just now described. By amicable contract between two powers naturally allied, a transference of colonial dominion may take place. Such was the compact by which France sold to Sweden the only island which she possesses in the West Indies. Had this island been of great importance, and had the transaction been reversed, so dangerous an increase of colonial power to the French dominions would have called for the determined interference of the neighbouring states, as much as if a similar compact had transferred to France a part of the European continent.

By a treaty of peace, terminating either a general or a partial European warfare, a similar transference of colonial territory may be effected. In the one case, all the powers possessing colonies will be consulted, as having an immediate interest both in the pacification and in the colonial system. In the case of a partial treaty, such as that which consolidated the whole of St Domingo under the French dominion, it becomes the other powers to interfere, according to the principles of modern policy.* If the matters at stake in Europe be not more important than the colonial interests, it becomes all parties to join against the new stipulation,


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* Book III. Sect. I.

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pulation, regardless of the sides which they had espoused in the previous part of the contest. If, on the other hand, as was the case at the peace of Basle, the fate of colonial affairs is of less moment than the European interests staked on the contest, the colonial powers are called upon, by the partial treaty which has taken place, to defer their opposition until the end of the European dispute, and then to introduce the consideration of the change that has happened, into the discussion of the general pacification ; or if the fortune of war has unhappily confined their influence, as has been but too much the case in the instance which we are contemplating, their colonial interests require that they should defer their opposition to a more favourable opportunity, when their strength shall be recruited, and the eyes of the powers, whose desertion from the common cause has produced all the evil, shall be opened to their real honour and advantage. Such ought to be the conduct of the powers possessing West-Indian colonies, in the present state of affairs. The great increase of territory which France has acquired in the islands, is indeed rendered less dangerous than it otherwise would have been by the augmentation of the British dominions in the neighbourhood ; and the change has attracted less attention than it ought to have done, from the distracted state of the whole

whole French colonies in those parts. But as S E C T.
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it is for the evident advantage of the other colonies, nay essential to their existence, that the French settlements should be reduced to a state of order; and as, in the event of their pacification, the vast force of the newly acquired dominion will far more than counterbalance the increased power of Great Britain, it certainly becomes the other powers to aid her in attempting to restore the colonial balance, before the complete subjugation of St Domingo and its augmented cultivation shall have rendered it a formidable neighbour. I have already * stated the greater probability of St Domingo becoming soon independent of the mother country, in its present united state, than in its former state of division. This circumstance, and still more the restoration of Louisiana to France, forms an additional reason for an interference, in which the United States would most probably bear an important part. And it surely deserves some consideration, that Spain, engaged only as a secondary party in the great European contest, should not only have paid so great a share at home, but should have entirely furnished the equivalents in the West Indies. The same remark applies to Holland in the East: So that,

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in the colonies, as well as in Europe, the same melancholy reflection must strike every one who contemplates the events of the late memorable contest. The great powers who began the war, and who were the principals in it from beginning to end, received all their indemnities, and equivalents, and *douceurs*, from those lesser powers who had only an indirect concern in the origin of the contest, and were dragged into it unwillingly. The defeats, both of Austria and Prussia, were paid for by Venice and the German princes. The victories of France were, in Europe, recompensed by the spoils of Germany and Italy. In the colonies, Spain and Holland alone were stripped of their finest territories, in order to reward the successes of the French and British arms. The time is certainly not yet arrived, in which the balance of Europe and of the colonies can be readjusted, and the violation of public equity repaired. Unfortunately, the spoil has been shared by almost all the great powers of Europe; and those who have received an inadequate portion, will not, it is probable, be inclined to make restoration, until the sacrifice is found necessary, as a preliminary to the measures that may be prescribed by the wish to strip those whose share has been dangerously great.

Nor

Nor can we expect that the colonial power of France will receive no farther augmentation at the expence of her vassal allies, if her preponderance in European affairs shall remain as formidable as it now is. If the other powers of Europe shall continue as blind to their interests as they have hitherto been, and shall suffer the New Republic, recruited during the present interruption of hostilities, to domineer over so large a portion of the continent under the name of protecting and befriending it; what security is there to those states which retain their independence and possess valuable colonies, that new gifts and cessions of colonial territory shall not follow those which we have been considering, and pave the way for the immediate acquisition of supreme power? In Europe, it may be enough for France to sway the continental balance, by the assistance of the subordinate powers whom she uses as tools, while she allows them to retain their separate names and fictitious independence, without running the risk of the internal disunion and the opposition from without, which always attend the establishment of unwieldy empires. She gains as much real power as she can retain over the destinies of the world, by ruling Holland, and Italy, and Switzerland, and Spain, through the medium of their own governments. But in order to turn the Dutch and

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Spanish colonies to her own use, the actual possession of them must be transferred. This is the only way in which the advantages, whether political or mercantile, peculiar to colonial establishments, can be usurped; and we can scarcely doubt, that the temptations held out by territories so rich in natural and acquired resources as those of Holland and Spain both in the East and West, will be a sufficient inducement to the ambition and the national avarice of France to restore her colonial prosperity in America; to extend her influence in the Indian ocean; to recruit her exhausted treasury; and to revive her commerce and her navy—all at the expence of an ally who has more territory than she can cultivate, and a vassal who dare not murmur, although her capital were to be sacked by the republican troops.

It is only by interfering in the immediate concerns of France, Holland and Spain, that Britain and Portugal can prevent a catastrophe so ruinous to their interests immediately in the colonies, and ultimately also in Europe. By subsidizing other powers less directly concerned in such arrangements, and by reviving that salutary jealousy of the French power in general, which has for some years been lulled or terrified into a state of rest, a check may be given to such measures as must in the mean time destroy the

the whole balance of the colonial system, and in the end complete the supremacy of the great republic over the European commonwealth.

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The states which possess territories in the East Indies, are certainly exposed to fewer dangers from the side of Europe, than from the operations of the native powers. Yet, even from Europe, some danger may be apprehended. The extension of Russia towards the south and east, and the feeble state of the princes to the north of Indostan, seem to have filled the ambitious mind of Katharine II. with plans for accomplishing her darling object, the extension of the Russian commerce, by an invasion of the rich provinces that now form the great eastern wing of the British empire. To those who reflect upon the feeble tenure by which, at the peace of Kainardgi, the British dominions in India were held, the bare mention of such a scheme as that attributed to Katharine, will not suggest any contemptuous ideas. Since the convention with Russia put an end, at least for the present, to all fears from that quarter, the fortunes of the British arms in the East have no doubt placed our dominion in a very different situation, by the extinction of our great natural enemy in the peninsula. But still, many of the native powers possess a force, which, if united, might prove dangerous in the extreme. They all retain their jealousy of England;

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England ; and, upon half enlightened politicians, it would not be difficult for European councils to prevail, even if their real interests were not (as they unquestionably are) inimical to the existence of the British name in the East. From France and her allies, they have no prospect of assistance, at least according to the present distribution of colonial force. From the wealthy and populous state on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, they may expect the most cordial co-operation. The same salutary jealousy of Europeans, which has steadily prevented them from intruding into the Burman territories, and dictated to the natives a line of policy that might do honour to more enlightened statesmen, would certainly induce that prudent people to co-operate in checking the progress of a nation, from whose increase nothing but destruction can arise to all the Indian states. A Russian invasion, then, would be most probably seconded by the Eastern powers, to whom the ruin of the British interests, though effected by the introduction of a new European tribe, would still be highly advantageous.

Besides, it should be remembered that Russia is by no means so far removed from those scenes, as to render the efforts of her own individual force contemptible, or the plan of conquering India by direct and separate invasion, chimerical,

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cal. From Astracan to the northern frontier of Indostan, the distance is not greater than from St Petersburg to those plains where Suwaroff defeated one of the finest armies in Europe; and the affairs of government in Siberia and Kamtchatka are managed by communication with the metropolis, although the distance is nearly twice as great as that of Calcutta from the Gulf of Finland, and the route incomparably more difficult. If the British empire in the East has been acquired by all manner of intrigues, rather than by force, and supported partly by the same means, partly by armies sent from an immense distance; will it be impossible for Russia to dispute the prize, partly by the aid of those states whose passions and interests conspire to alienate them from the first great intruders, and whose jealousy must now be increased, and their union cemented, since the defeat of their chief ally; partly by the force of those armies who may in so short a time march from Astracan, a station peculiarly adapted to become the depôt of an armament, from its maritime situation, its own importance, and its easy communication with the heart of the empire? Is it then a chimerical fear that makes us tremble at the consequences of that systematic ambition, which may pour into the peninsula a well equipped army of a hundred thousand men, singularly adapted

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apted to Eastern warfare, and shake the British power in provinces remote from the seat of empire, peopled by a disunited mass of inhabitants, retained in subjection, as they were conquered, by the force and cunning of a handful of men; surrounded by powerful states, ready to promote any change that may weaken the Europeans, and give them the chance of freeing the great Indian commonwealth from those formidable intruders who have so long revelled in its spoils? An invasion, although unsuccessful on the part of Russia, might have the most fatal consequences to the British power all over Indostan. Such an attempt must be viewed as a calamity which it becomes Britain to avert by every exertion. Her naval power; her influence in continental affairs; the force of her treasures; her interest with allies; in short, all the resources of modern policy must be exerted in Europe, to prevent the great northern power from attempting a blow, of which the ultimate success and failure are almost indifferent to the fate of our Eastern empire, provided it is levelled with a force at all adequate to the magnitude of the occasion. * In the mean time, an equal jealousy should be entertained of any encroachments which Russia may

* Note N n.

may attempt on the south. She lately added to her dominion, if common fame may be credited, a considerable province of the Persian empire; and her encroachments on the Turkish dominions deserve unremitting attention, as well on account of their ultimate consequences to the colonial system, as on account of their immediate effects upon the adjustment of the European balance.

I shall now take an example of a remote cause, which may, by a less obvious and apparent process, operate the destruction of the colonial system in the West, and affect more immediately, though not so dangerously, the colonial dominions situated in the East Indies.

During the last years of the eighteenth century, by far the most eventful period in the history of the human species, a scheme was put in execution, by the revolutionary rulers of France, which appears to have been frequently in the contemplation of the ancient Government. When the colonial power of the republic in America had been almost extinguished, the foundation of a new and invaluable colony was laid by the sudden conquest of Egypt. The unparalleled achievements of the British arms, towards the end of the war, reconquered to it the Turkish empire. But it is almost needless to observe, that for many years before the French

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French expedition, the Porte had ceased to have any real power over this fine province ; * that the unexpected victories of the last campaign have not in any degree reformed its domestic administration ; that it lies as much exposed as before to the armaments which France may again fit out from her Mediterranean coast ; and that a convention between the Porte and the Republic, dictated by alarm or obtained by the promise of assistance against two powers the natural enemies of both, may peaceably transfer a possession almost totally useless to its present masters. It is of some importance to consider the natural consequences of an event so extremely probable, to the interests, first of the Asiatic, and then of the American colonial systems.

I. The most obvious danger, but, I apprehend, by far the least formidable that can arise from the establishment of any European colony in Egypt, is the risk of invasion to which the East Indian settlements may be exposed. As France is the power most likely to attempt the establishment of a colony in Egypt, and as she is undoubtedly the most able to derive advantage from this acquisition, we shall, in general, take for an example the case of Egypt becoming a French colony ; a case already for nearly three years fully realized.

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* Note O o.

S E C T.

II.

I. In attacking from this quarter the British settlements on the Malabar coast, France will possess many very obvious advantages, from the near neighbourhood of her new colony. The communication between Alexandria and Marseilles is much easier and shorter than that between the capital and the frontier provinces of some European states; between St Petersburg, for instance, and the Russian provinces on the Black Sea. The average passage to Alexandria is fifteen or twenty days; and from thence to Suez is only a journey of a week. It is possible, with favourable winds, to despatch a courier from Paris, who shall pass through Egypt; deliver his instructions to the colonial government established at Cairo; carry on advices to the expedition fitting out at Suez or Coffeir on the Red Sea, and proceed with despatches to part of the armament arrived at Surat on the Malabar coast, in fifty days.* But admitting the average to be ten weeks, how much shorter is this than the time taken by a quick-sailing vessel to reach Bombay from Britain?

It must, however, be remarked, that the route, though short, is almost entirely by sea.
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* Maillet, (Ed. de Mascrier), Part. III. p. 200.—Ricard, III. 43.—Niebuhr, Voyages, I. 205, 228, 248, & 356. (French edit. in 4to.)

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So long as Britain retains the decided naval superiority in Europe, the communication between France and her new colony is commanded by British cruisers. The same remark applies still more strongly to the communication between Egypt and India. A powerful fleet, stationed on the Malabar coast, may always cruise off the Straights of Babelmandel, or in the Channel itself, or in the Red Sea, of which the navigation must be still more dangerous to a large fleet of transports than to a squadron of the line. Besides, the vessels necessary for the expedition must be constructed in the colony, where for many years ship-building cannot be expected to flourish; or they must be brought round by the Cape, and consequently exposed to the British fleets. The navigation of the Red Sea, too, in every part extremely bad, is impracticable for large vessels within eighty leagues from Suez. * It must also be remembered that no part of the world is more subject to regular and strong monsoons than the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea; and, what cannot fail to hamper any expedition fitted out from Egypt with very great difficulties, the direction of the wind varies in different parts of the passage at the same time. Thus, during the six months of northerly monsoon

* Econ. Polit. et Diplom. (Encyc. Method.) II. 254.—
Note P p.

soon in the Red Sea, the southerly monsoon prevails in the Indian Ocean. *

S E C T.
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After the dangers of the first coup de main, therefore, are over, (and in modern times such sudden shocks have seldom or never any effect), the Bombay government, assisted by the squadron which the neighbourhood of Egypt will constantly render necessary in the Indian Ocean, may be expected to provide sufficiently for the defence of that settlement.

2. There can be no doubt, that, from its astonishing fertility, and advantageous position, Egypt, under a colonial government, will soon acquire immense wealth; and that the extensive population which it actually maintains, and the still larger number of inhabitants which it may easily support, added to its other resources, must render it a formidable neighbour to the settlements on the Malabar coast, the most inconsiderable of all the British colonies in the East. But the dangers to be apprehended from this improvement of Egypt, are far from being immediate. To mention only one circumstance—The population of the country, though much greater than that of the Bombay establishment, is made up of so many

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* Capper on Winds and Monsoons, p. 68. 72.—Bruce, I. 431.—Note Q q.

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different nations, in such a low state of civilization, so refractory and disunited, that for many years the colony will be very ill adapted to encounter the risks of a state of war; and, at any rate, must trust for its defence and government entirely to the troops of the mother country. It can only, then, serve as a point from whence India may be attacked, by serving as a dépôt or passage for French troops, while it offers every where the most vulnerable points to attract an effectual diversion from the enemy. When, on the other hand, the resources of the colony have been augmented and its inhabitants disciplined and enlightened by the progress of civilization, it will become, as an ultimate object, an invaluable possession. Its strength and prosperity being derived from commerce, its inhabitants will naturally be averse to war, and more particularly to war with some of their best customers. If the mother country should force it on to hostilities, she will probably meet with resistance; and the amicable intercourse may thus be continued between Egypt and Indostan, to their mutual advantage, in spite of the mother country's ambition.

3. The shortness of the passage between the Malabar coast and Suez, has often induced speculative politicians to imagine that the ancient

cient communication between Europe and India might be revived with advantage, not only for the purpose of conveying intelligence, but also for the purposes of commerce. It has therefore been imagined, that the nation possessed of Egypt may deprive Great Britain of her East Indian trade, and monopolize the wealth of the East, by joining the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, or by making Egypt an entrepôt for the Asiatic merchandize.

Upon this point it may be remarked, in the *first* place, that the communication between the Indian ocean and the Mediterranean, even admitting the possibility of joining the Red Sea with the Nile or the Mediterranean by means of a canal, would be extremely tedious and inconvenient for the course of mercantile transactions. A swift sailing vessel, of small bulk, fit for beating to windward and for avoiding rocks and shallows, might easily carry despatches down the Red Sea, at times when no fleet of merchantmen could encounter the monsoons. The messenger intrusted with them could, without difficulty, perform his journey through Egypt in a week, either by the Nile and the canal, or by land carriage, while repeated difficulties would necessarily occur to retard the progress of laden boats and caravans. I speak not of the dangers which valuable merchandize must

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run, in the present unsettled state of the country, from the various tribes of banditti that infest both the river and the deserts; or of the many difficulties and vexations arising from the positive institutions supported by the Porte and the Beys, for the purposes of legal plunder.* Admitting that all these impediments to the communication shall be abolished, as some of them certainly must cease with the present order of things, there are still various physical obstacles to the projected communication, which must for ever diminish, perhaps destroy, the superiority of this route in point of shortness. The same vessels which navigate the Mediterranean cannot ascend the Nile, and cross the desert in the canal. The goods must therefore be all unloaded at Alexandria. The canal and river boats can never encounter the tempests and swell of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Another loading will therefore be necessary at Suez, although the river boats should be able to navigate the canal. Hence the loss and expence of two additional loadings and unloadings must be deducted from the profits of the cargo; and the delay occasioned thereby must be added to the total length of the passage. Moreover, unless

* Note R. r.

less a prodigious number of vessels are employed in this trade, the goods must often pay for two vessels instead of one; since it will frequently happen, that the empty vessels cannot immediately receive a new freight. The profits, too, of the consignees in Egypt must be taken into account; or, if the goods are accompanied by supercargoes, their wages come to diminish the total gains. Lastly, however short the voyage may be, it cannot be undertaken at all times, on account of the monsoons. Niebuhr says that a skilful voyager may go from Suez to India and back again in a year, by taking advantage of the half-yearly wind.* But if the winds blow half-yearly, it is clear that two voyages may be made in thirteen months. Still it will not be possible, after making every allowance, to perform the voyage from Europe to India oftener than twice in the course of eighteen months. This will clearly appear from the following statement.

The most advantageous time of sailing from Marseilles, will be the middle of June. Suppose that the average time taken in transporting goods from thence to Suez is six weeks (it cannot possibly be rated lower, when we consider

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* Descript. de l'Arabie, p. 303.

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the double loading and unloading): The merchandise is shipped at Suez in the beginning of August, and is immediately carried down the Red Sea by the northerly monsoon. In a month it arrives at the Malabar coast, and is unshipped: A new cargo, we shall suppose, is taken in, and ready to return with the first southerly monsoon; it arrives at Suez in the beginning of November, and at Marseilles about the middle of December. Now, in however short a time a new cargo may be shipped, it cannot sail sooner than the middle of February, otherwise it would have to wait at Suez for the northerly monsoon, which begins in April. The vessel will arrive at Bombay in May, and must wait there till October for the southerly monsoon. It will therefore not return to Marseilles until the middle of December, which is just eighteen months from the sailing of the first cargo.

The expence of these two voyages will undoubtedly be somewhat smaller than that of the Cape voyages, which might be performed in the same time. But the expences of loading, the canal and river expences, the commission or supercargo's wages, the extraordinary tear and wear of vessels in the Red Sea and Straits of Babelmandel, together with the inutility of those ships during the months when they are not

not employed, and the idleness of the crews during the greater part of that time, may be considered as almost sufficient to balance so trifling an advantage.

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But it is not by any means probable that the communication between the Mediterranean and Red Seas will be so easy as we have supposed. The junction of the Nile with the Gulf of Suez by a canal, has been frequently projected; and we are even told that in ancient times it was effected. That it was more than once attempted, there can be no doubt; but the impracticability of such a scheme is now almost placed beyond a doubt. This arises, not so much from the old opinion, of the level being higher in the Red Sea than in the Mediterranean, as from the nature of the ground through which the cut must necessarily pass. The distance between Cairo and Suez is above one hundred and five English miles by the caravan track, according to Niebuhr; * according to others, one hundred and fifty miles; † it is above seventy miles in a straight line. The canal cut must certainly be one hundred at the very least; and the whole of this route is a sandy desert, where the soil is perpetually shifting with

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* Voyages, tom. I. p. 175.

† Econ. Polit. et Dipl. (Encyc. Method.) II. 254.

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the wind, and where no foundation can be obtained for constructing works of any kind. † Besides, although the natural level of the Red Sea and Mediterranean may be the same, the effect of a wind of uncommon violence, that is, the half year's monsoon, or, as some have called it, the nine months monsoon, blowing all the waters of the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Babelmandel, must be to raise their level, and drive an irresistible current through the Gulf of Suez. This, of itself, would render the canal impracticable, even although the experiment should be tried, as it once was, by cutting from Suez due north, so as to join the Red Sea with a small river that runs into the Nile a few miles below Cairo, or by cutting straight through the Isthmus. The manifold inconveniences, too, of an inland navigation through a desert, deserve to be considered, admitting the possibility of forming the cut. All these inconveniences would either be of such a nature as to damage the goods transported, or to increase the expence of carriage, by the repairs necessary for the canal, and the distance from whence it would be necessary to transport every article of consumption required for the persons

† Econ. Polit. et Dipl. (Encyc. Method.) II, 254.—
Volney's Egypt and Syria, I. 210.

persons and cattle employed on its banks, or in the boats. We may therefore conclude, that the communication between Europe and India through Egypt, cannot be facilitated by any internal navigation ; and that, in addition to all the expence and delay formerly enumerated as the necessary attendants of such a scheme, there must be reckoned the cost and time required for a new loading and unloading at Cairo, together with the consignee's profits, and the risks and charges of a journey across the desert. From all that has been said, I am inclined to infer the impossibility of gaining any important advantage, in point of easy and expeditious mercantile communication with the East, by the possession of Egypt.

It may farther be observed, that the statements above detailed with respect to the winds, clearly prove the absurdity of supposing that such a communication would be shorter or easier to France than to any other maritime country. The only difference between the navigation of the *Marseilloise* and the *Newcastle* vessels is, that the former would be a few weeks in the year longer at rest than the latter. They would both make the same number of voyages in the year ; and, consequently, if a free trade were allowed to India through Egypt, the distant nation would be able to derive as much advantage

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vantage from it as the nation possessed of the colony, and situated in its immediate vicinity.

But, in the *second* place, admitting the certainty of all the advantages which have been expected from the communication with India by the Isthmus of Suez; and admitting that France, in possession of Egypt, shall monopolize the carriage of East Indian commodities; it is evident that this change must be as beneficial to Great Britain, to the other consumers of Asiatic produce, and to the colonies themselves, as to France. The superior cheapness and shortness of the new route will be the cause of the preference given to the French carriers; and, like any of those natural or acquired advantages which confer upon particular nations superior skill in one branch of trade or manufacture, the possession of Egypt will be a benefit, not only to the French, but to their customers. The advantages derived from it will thus be mutual, like the advantages which once rendered the Dutch the carriers and brokers of Europe, and those which render the English the chief manufacturers. The goods of East Indian growth or fabric will be transported cheaper and better to England and Holland, though not in English and Dutch vessels; the agriculture and manufactures of the colonies will therefore be promoted; and the capital formerly

formerly employed in carrying the colonial merchandize to the mother country will be employed either in supplying the new demands of the colonies, occasioned by the improved communication, or in preparing manufactures to meet the demands of the French market, extended by the increased wealth of the country, and deprived of a ready supply by the quantity of stock withdrawn to the carrying trade.

A similar observation may be applied to that view of the subject which would lead us to apprehend danger from our natural enemy becoming master of the wealth and strength of Egypt, in so far as its resources are likely to be augmented by its mercantile connexion with the East. There cannot indeed be any doubt that the position of Egypt is extremely favourable to all the branches of commerce, as its soil and climate are admirably adapted to the raising of raw produce; that it will soon become the most valuable colony in the world; and that one of the branches of trade which will contribute essentially to its wealth, is the traffic with India. In itself, therefore, this splendid acquisition will be of incalculable advantage to France; and, from its situation in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe, as well as from its influence upon the relative power of the mother country, it is a change well calculated to rouse the jealousy

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ously of all the other states. But, at present, we are only contemplating the probable effects of the acquisition upon the colonial systems; and, however much Egypt immediately, or France consequentially, may gain by the commerce of the East, the advantage must necessarily be exactly equal to the Indian states or the colonies with which the trade may be carried on, and consequently to the European states possessing those Asiatic colonies.

Were the East Indian commerce of Britain and Holland laid open to the whole capital which could be drawn into it, the neighbourhood of such a colony as Egypt must soon become, under the government of France, would be, of all changes that could happen, the most beneficial, both to the Indian colonies, and to the mercantile interests of the parent states as connected with those colonies.

From its position, Egypt will be the natural entrepôt of the Indian merchandize; from its wealth, it will offer, in itself, a most extensive market for every thing which is raised or manufactured in Asia. From the nature of its produce (as we shall immediately see), it will interfere so very little with the commodities raised in the East, that no great or sudden shifting of colonial capital or industry will be the consequence of Egypt being improved to the uttermost;

uttermost ; and from the peculiar fertility of this country in all sorts of grain, it will afford a sure resource to the natives of the peninsula, so often liable to the miseries of extensive famine. To the colonies, then, and in like manner, to the consumers of colonial produce, the neighbourhood of this great entrepôt for Eastern merchandize, will be as advantageous as the corn-merchant is to the farmer and consumer of grain, or the retail dealer to the manufacturer and user of wrought goods, or the merchant importer in the mother country to the colonies and consumers of colonial produce ; while the market and the supplies which so rich and populous a country will afford, cannot fail incalculably to promote the wealth of the colonies in the first instance, and ultimately to augment the riches of the mother country also.

There is indeed no doubt, that some of the stock formerly employed in carrying East Indian goods, must now be shifted to another occupation. Part of that stock, instead of bringing them round the Cape, with a slow return of profits, will now bring them from India to Egypt, and from Egypt to Europe, with a much quicker return. The competition of Egyptian and French capital will unquestionably throw out another part of the capital formerly vested in the Indian trade. But this is only

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only a consequence of the free commerce which we are supposing to be established, and which would produce the very same effects on the traffic, as is at present carried on by the Cape. It is unnecessary to prove that this shifting of capital, slowly effected, can produce only good consequences to the mother country, and confer upon the colonies the same benefits as if a vast capital were gradually poured into their agriculture, manufactures, and commerce.

If it be supposed that the present systems of monopoly shall continue in the Asiatic colonies, the colonies and the parent states will have to lament all that additional loss to which they will now be subjected, comparatively speaking, by being excluded from a share in the vast additional benefits so likely to flow from a free trade with their new neighbours. But this neighbourhood will not on that account occasion any real loss, either to the colony or the mother country. Things will remain actually in the same state as before the establishment of the colony in Egypt. If, however, the absurd policy of the other states possessing East Indian territories, shall drive the new rulers of the colony to seek for settlements among the native powers on the coasts of the peninsula, or among the islands of the Indian ocean, or to attempt, by treaty with those powers, the extension of the settlements already

already obtained, or to extend their commercial relations with the Asiatics, whose pursuits may in no small degree be new-modelled by the intercourse of the merchants belonging to the new colony; then, the support of the present East Indian monopolies will be a matter of much greater difficulty than it hitherto has been. In spite of England and Holland, the merchants of the French colony will obtain abundance of East Indian goods, and will be able greatly to undersell the East India Companies in every market, although those bodies should reform their gross abuses, trade as economically as individuals, and be contented to take the lowest, instead of the monopoly profits. Thus, besides the great difficulty of preventing a contraband trade, mutually lucrative, from being carried on between Egypt and their settlements in India, the companies will have to struggle against the still greater difficulty of preventing a contraband trade equally gainful from being carried on in Europe. In order to support the exclusive privileges of those corporations, the legislatures of the respective countries will be obliged to new-model all their restrictive laws; and it may probably be found that a new code of custom-house law will be inadequate to check such a system of smuggling as must be engendered both in Asia and Europe, by the temptations

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tions of astonishing profits, and to maintain the exclusive privileges of the trading corporations for any profitable purpose. The contraband trade in Swedish teas carried on some years ago, notwithstanding all the efforts of the English East India Company to check it, must be fresh in the memory of every one ; yet, compared with the new contraband, of which we are now speaking, that traffic was trifling indeed. In short, it is scarcely possible to figure the continuance of such trading companies, after the Egyptian colony shall have been firmly established. The influence of those bodies will probably prevail, so far as to obtain the support of their respective governments, until the evil becomes too great for any legislative remedies. The end of such commercial nuisances will then be allowed to approach, when no efforts of state can prevent the catastrophe ; and, according to a feature but too common in the character of human councils, the nations which have been so essentially injured by those destructive systems of monopoly, will at last be forced to relieve themselves from the evil, in consequence of external events beyond the sphere of their controul. It is not easy to avoid wishing for any change, even a change favourable to the power of France, which may gradually but effectually blot out from the colonial

colonial policy of Europe all remains of commercial monopoly and company government. * S E C T.
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In a mercantile point of view, then, the powers possessing East Indian colonies have nothing to apprehend, but much to hope for their distant settlements, from the improvement of Egypt and its subjection to a regular and efficient government. In a political point of view, those colonies have little to dread from such a change. A little more vigilance will be required, a larger fleet and a higher establishment of land forces will be necessary in time of war; but no real danger can ever arise from this quarter, to the present system of colonial power in the peninsula and Asiatic islands. Still less need any apprehensions of this nature be entertained from the establishment of an independent and primary government in Egypt, supposing such an event to be at all possible in the present circumstances of that country. The new power will never regard India as a scene of conquest, whilst Arabia, Syria, and the Archipelago remain unsubdued. It is only the relations which subsist between France and the parent states of the Indian colonies, that could ever render the project of invading the peninsula a matter of serious consideration. In a commercial point of view, it will not make any difference whether the improvement of Egypt

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is effected by foreign conquest, or by the efforts of an independent and civilized government established upon the ruins of the Ottoman and Mameluc power. In either case the consequences must be equally beneficial to the colonial interests of all the European powers possessed of Asiatic dominions.

II. I come now to consider that view of the subject which is apparently very remote and fanciful, but in reality presents to our attention the most important and serious considerations—the probable effects of the subjection and improvement of Egypt upon the West Indian colonies of the European powers. There can remain no doubt whatever in the mind of any person who examines the natural resources of Egypt, that the cultivation of this noble province, by an industrious race of men, will be attended with the immediate desolation of the whole Charaibean islands, from Cuba to Trinidad, and of the continental possessions of the Europeans along the West Indian coast of South America.

I. Let us attend, in the *first* place, to the prodigious extent of fertile land which has all been at different times, in a state of high and easy cultivation in Egypt, and let us compare this with

with the whole cleared and cultivated West Indian territory.

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The Delta and the fertile parts of the country adjoining it on the Canopic and Tanitic branches of the Nile, form a vast plain, of a figure somewhat triangular, or rather a sector of a circle, whose arch extends from Tana to Alexandria, and whose radius is a line drawn from Cairo to Cape Berelos. As the chord is about one hundred and forty English miles, and the radius about one hundred and ten, the whole area cannot contain fewer than eight thousand seven hundred square miles. The lakes Abufiche and Menzale are indeed included in this space, as well as a small portion of desert to the west of the canal Bahre: But this is nearly balanced by the cultivated land belonging to Lower Egypt, and not comprehended in the portion which we have been considering. However, we shall suppose that all these deductions, together with the space occupied by the river, amount to about a twelfth part of the whole, and we shall estimate the fertile part of Lower Egypt at eight thousand square miles, or five million one hundred and twenty thousand acres.

Upper Egypt, or the Said, contains, in proportion to its extent, but a small district of fertile soil. It is, in fact, one vast desert, through which the Nile runs in a winding valley of no great breadth. This valley is the only fertile

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part of the whole territory ; and its extent cannot be computed with any tolerable degree of precision. We may however observe, that the length of a straight line drawn between the two extremities of the valley Assuan, and Cairo, is about five hundred and fifteen English miles, or, allowing for windings, six hundred miles. The greatest breadth is about twenty-five, near Benisuef ; and it grows gradually narrower and narrower to its southern extremity at Assuan, where it is only seven or eight miles broad. If we call the average breadth seventeen miles, we shall certainly keep much within the truth ; and this hypothesis gives ten thousand two hundred square miles for the superficies. But to this must be added the rich district of Faioum, by far the most fruitful part of the whole country. Besides several other fertile spots not comprehended in the valley, Faioum contains, of itself, between five and six hundred square miles. So that, altogether, the cultivated part of the Said cannot possibly be rated at less than eleven thousand square miles, or seven millions forty thousand acres ; and the whole fertile territory of Egypt must of consequence be above twelve millions of acres, at the very lowest computation. *

Let

* Savary, tom. I. let. 1. tom. II. let. 3.—Ricard, III. 433.—Danville & Niebuhr's maps.

Let us compare this with the extent of territory at present cultivated in the West Indies, in order to supply the demands of the European market.

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The number of acres in cultivation in the island of Jamaica, in 1787, was one million fifty-nine thousand; and the exports from thence were valued at two million one hundred and thirty-six thousand four hundred and forty-two pounds. As the total exports from the British West Indies during the same year were stated at five millions two hundred and sixty-five thousand one hundred and two pounds, and as many of the islands contain far more fruitful soil than Jamaica, we may safely conclude, that not above two millions six hundred and nine thousand eight hundred and forty-five acres were in cultivation. The reports of the French Chambers of Commerce to M. Neckar, give the exports for the year 1788 considerably lower, *viz.* four millions one hundred and fifty-seven thousand five hundred pounds: so that, according to this estimate, the cultivated land would only amount to about two millions of acres; but we shall take the highest computation.

The number of cultivated acres in the French islands was four millions twenty-four thousand six hundred and sixty, according

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to the average of Jamaica produce, which, for almost all those fine territories, is a great deal too low. In the Spanish islands, the number of cultivated acres was seven hundred and forty-five thousand eight hundred and eighty-three; and in the Dutch colonies of Guiana, about eight hundred and fifty thousand, according to the same very low average: so that we may compute the whole cultivated land in the West Indies at eight millions two hundred and thirty thousand three hundred and eighteen; or, allowing for the trifling settlements of Sweden and Denmark (the last of which has only seventy thousand acres measured out for cultivating), we may call the total eight millions three hundred thousand acres, supposing all the land to be of the same indifferent quality with that of Jamaica. *

Thus it appears that there is in Egypt nearly half as much more of fertile land as there is in all the parts of the West Indies which the demand for colonial produce has caused to be cleared, even if we should suppose
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* Edwards' West Indies, vol. I. p. 185—230. & II. 385.—Barré de St Venant, Colonies Modernes, I. chap. X.—La Richeffe de la Hollande, tom. I. p. 334.—Ricard, III. 676.—Catteau, Tableau des états Danois, tom. II. p. 320.—See also Book I. Sect. III. of this Inquiry.

as much of the West Indian soil to have been used for raising this produce, as would be necessary were the whole territory of an inferior degree of fertility. Let us now see to what uses the Egyptian soil may be turned.

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2. The wonderful fertility of Egypt in all sorts of grain, is too well known to require any description. The only remark which it is necessary to make, is a correction of the vulgar exaggerations that have been grafted upon the real account of its fruitfulness. Instead of one, two, and three hundred fold, the common return is twenty-five and thirty, and sometimes as much as fifty for one. But these crops are the produce of the most careless husbandry in the world. The indolent Copt scarcely takes the pains to scratch the rich earth on which he listlessly spills his seed-corn; and in four months his harvest is reaped. Another succeeds in the same year; and in some favoured districts, particularly of the Delta, where abundance of water can be procured, the soil yields no less than three crops to those lazy and unskilful cultivators. The ancient cultivation of Egypt, indeed, when it was the granary of the Roman empire, or the country in which Ptolemy Philadelphus amassed a treasure of one hundred and ninety millions, or the

conquest from which the Arabs drew a revenue of three hundred millions of crowns, cannot now be perceived. Those innumerable canals by means of which the precious supplies of the river were distributed, and those reservoirs which assisted the industrious natives in economizing that treasure, have for the most part been neglected since the decline of the state under the Saracen dominion. But, though choked up and ruinous, the works may without much difficulty be repaired. The soil still presents the same soft substance to the spade, and the same materials for the kiln, that formerly enabled the Ptolemies to excavate the entire channel of the river, and raise the stupendous mountains of architecture which alone, of all human works, seem capable of resisting the injuries of time. The sand that in many places lightly covers the surface of the country, scarcely conceals the ancient furrows over which it has been permitted to spread; and all Egypt offers to the cultivator those tempting prospects of excessive returns which have allured Europeans to clear the thick forests of the New World, with this striking difference, that its finest soil is every year renewed, enjoying the perpetual advantages of the virgin state which only once belong to the American plains, while the labour of the cultivator

tivator who first sows a field, is no greater than that of his successors who repeat the same operation. *

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The quantity of grain at present raised in this favoured territory cannot be ascertained with precision. But it is enough to observe, that bad as the Egyptian husbandry is, the very small part of the community, who may be rather said to reap the spontaneous fruits of the river and soil than to till the ground, abundantly supply the whole population of nearly four millions of persons, feeding chiefly on grain and vegetables, besides exporting a great part of the grain required by the inhabitants of Constantinople, and the whole of what is consumed in Arabia. It may easily be imagined, then, with what ease a small part of the twelve millions of acres which according to our computation form the fertile territory of Egypt, may be appropriated to raising the supply of grain required for the subsistence of the community, while

* Suetonius in Vespasiano.—Plutarch. in Antonio.—History of East Indian Trade, apud Harris's Collection, Vol. I. p. 419.—Maillet, (Edit. Mascrier) Part. I. p. 14.—Ricard, tom. III. p. 433. & 443.—Sonnini, Voyages en Egypte, chap. XXVI. & XLVIII.—Savary, tom. I. Let. 1. ; tom. II. Let. 3. 18. ; tom. III. Let. 2.—Volney's Egypt, vol. I. p. 55, 67.—Eton's Survey of the Turkish Empire, chap. VII.

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while the part now employed in raising grain for exportation, and the still greater portion laid waste by absolute neglect, is devoted to the raising of more valuable commodities.

We have thus found our provision grounds and pens, to use the language of the West Indian agriculture, and in an abundance so great as to preclude the necessity of importation, under which almost all the American colonies labour. Let us see if we cannot discover also the plantations.

3. From the narratives of various authors, ancient and modern, more particularly of those travellers who have visited Egypt, and given us a description of their route, with no other view than to gratify their own or their reader's curiosity about the antiquities of the place, we may gather, that every article of West Indian produce, except coffee, flourishes with peculiar felicity on the banks of the Nile.

The great West Indian staple, the sugar cane, appears to be indigenous in Egypt. It has been raised there in all ages, sometimes in very considerable quantities, and always from seed. Its culture is attended with no difficulty, and trifling expence. In Faioum, more especially, it grows in abundance, and almost spontaneously. Although the natives are but little acquainted

acquainted with the culture of the plant, or the subsequent preparation of the commodity, they manufacture a considerable quantity. All the sugar used in the seraglio at Constantinople is made in Egypt; and the peculiar excellence of its quality is a sufficient proof that the cultivation of the cane might be there carried to any degree of perfection. It is in fact to all appearance natural to the spot; whereas in the West Indies there is every reason to believe that it is exotic. We must remember, too, that the sugar lands in Egypt would produce exactly twice as much as those in the American islands, although the soil were in itself only equally fertile: for in the West Indies the cane pieces must be allowed to lye fallow every alternate year, whereas the soil of Egypt is annually renewed. But, for this very reason, the ground in Egypt must be incalculably more productive, and must have, for sugar culture, and the other branches of planting, as well as common husbandry, the perpetual advantages which belong to a virgin soil.

Flax and cotton are articles of Egyptian growth; and only require a little care and skill to render them equal to what they anciently were, when the linen and cotton cloths of Egypt were proverbially noted for delicacy and durability. The exquisite dyes which are brought to

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to such perfection by European industry and art in the new world, need scarcely be looked for among the Copts and Turks. So much of the value both of cochineal and indigo is owing to the mode of preparation, that we may consider them as the growth rather of a certain state of society than of a particular soil. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that both the insect which furnishes the materials of the one fabric, and the plant which produces the other by the intervention of one of the most delicate and uncertain processes in the whole circle of the arts, are to be found in their natural state in Egypt; and are even used by the natives as dyes, after a rude and inefficacious preparation.

Several of the most valuable spices and perfumes, not to be found in the West Indies, as cassia, myrrh, gums, frankincense, &c. are indigenous in Egypt; the pimento and others might without doubt be easily introduced; and no country is so favourable to the growth of the silk-worm.

Coffee, we are told by some authors, has never been cultivated with success in Egypt, although repeatedly tried. Others, however, have positively denied this; and have argued, with great appearance of probability, that a plant by no means delicate, requiring very little care, and flourishing in the worst of those soils which
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produce the other West Indian staples, may be expected to thrive in a country so very favourable to all those articles ; more especially as, in the neighbouring territory of Arabia, the finest coffee in the world is raised in prodigious abundance : and in Syria, which closely resembles Egypt in its physical character, coffee can be raised to a degree of perfection that rivals the famous produce of Arabia. A country perfectly flat, is not indeed favourable to the growth of this valuable fruit. In the Delta, therefore, we can scarcely expect its culture to succeed ; but in the Said, on the sides of those hills between which the valley of the Nile lies, we can hardly doubt the possibility of bringing this branch of planting to as great perfection as that which attends the scanty exertions of the cultivators on the other side of the Red Sea. It has in general been remarked of the Egyptian soil, that it is not favourable to exotics, unless their culture is introduced gradually and carefully. We may be allowed to suspect, then, that the experiments, upon the failure of which Maillet and others have asserted the impossibility of raising coffee in Egypt, were not fairly tried.

If, however, all the other articles of value which I have enumerated, shall be raised in such abundance by the colonists of Egypt, it signifies

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signifies little whether or not this one remains an exception. The neighbourhood of Arabia will amply supply the deficiency; the coffee planting of that rich territory will be promoted and reduced to a system by the demands of the new colony; and if the European traders resort to Egypt for all the other commodities which they formerly received from the West Indies, they will also use the colonists as middlemen in the coffee trade, while Egypt will be as much benefited by becoming the emporium of this produce, as by raising and selling her own staples. At this day, the Mocha coffee, so much prized all over the world, bears a much higher price than it ought, in consequence of the various taxes raised upon the transport, and the restrictions laid on the exportation, by the governments of the countries where it is produced and of those through which it must be carried; so that the article which at Mocha costs only from fourpence to sixpence per pound, costs at Cairo no less than from one shilling and threepence to one shilling and tenpence, or even two shillings and a penny, and at Marseilles about half a crown. *

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* Bruce's Travels, vol. I. p. 81.—Volney's Egypt and Syria, vol. I. p. 220. & 229.; and vol. II. p. 318.—Maillet (edit. Mascrier), Second Part, p. 15.—Savary, tom. I. Let.

4. For the manufacture and transport of all the articles which have been enumerated, Egypt possesses natural conveniences by no means enjoyed by the West Indian colonies. Abundance of cedar and palm trees are to be had, of a nature admirably fitted for the tool. It has however been found so much more profitable to use the soil for other purposes, in the best times of this province, that timber has generally been imported. As the cultivated country all lies near the river, of which the navigation is easy, and as various streams intersect the valley to join it, the use of machinery, and the transport of goods by water carriage to the ports of shipping, where the hill joins the sea, must of course afford inestimable conveniences to the planter and manufacturer. Besides, the level nature of the whole territory and the astonishing fecundity of all the domestic animals are circumstances equally favourable at once to the easy communication between the different districts, and to the erection of machinery wrought by wind or draught. Here are produced, too, in unrivalled

Let. 1. & 5.; tom. II. Let. 3.; and tom. III. Let. 4.—Sonnini, *Voyages en Egypte*, chap. XXXI. & XLVIII.—Niebuhr, *Voyages*, tom. I. p. 116. 117. id.—Desc. de l'Arab. p. 127.—Commerce (*Encyc. Method.*) tom. III. p. 790. Ricard, tom. III. p. 439. Eton's Survey, Appendix, Art. I.

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led abundance, some articles of signal subordinate use in various branches of manufacture, particularly natron, saltpetre, and sal ammoniac. I have already noticed the adaptation of the soil, both for easy excavation, and for the manufacture of bricks and earthen ware.

5. The climate of Egypt has been supposed by many to be as unfavourable to animal life, as it is genial to the productions of the soil; and one author, remarkable for a general and unmeaning system of invective, has declaimed against it as the worst under which the human species has been permitted to live. * There is however, every reason to believe that these prejudices are wholly unfounded, and that we should come much nearer the truth, were we to bestow upon the climate of this country praises equal to those which all mankind have agreed to heap upon its soil.

The extraordinary fecundity of all animals on the banks of the Nile, has been repeatedly described, both by ancient and modern writers. This circumstance, of itself, forms a strong presumption, if not a sufficient argument, in favour of the wholesomeness of the air. The prejudice against Egypt on account of the frequent diseases

* Pauw sur les Chinois & les Egyptiens, *passim*.

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eases of the eyes to which its inhabitants are subject, has of late years been removed by the satisfactory explanations of the most intelligent travellers ; and it now appears that this malady, so long a reproach to the climate, owes its origin in fact to the customs of the people, their constant use of hot-baths, the weight of clothes which they wear round their heads, and their fondness for the practice of sleeping in the open air, exposed to the chilling dews of night, after the heats of the day have opened all their pores.

The plague, too, has been supposed by many * to be indigenous in Egypt. Yet nothing can be more certain, than that in ancient times it was unknown to the industrious cultivators and merchants of this province ; and there is no doubt that it has often been confounded with other maladies. The true cause of those putrid diseases which sometimes prevail on the banks of the Nile, must be sought for in the habitual uncleanness of the inhabitants respecting every thing but their bodies ; the dirty clothes which they always wear, even after steeping themselves for hours in boiling water ; the uncommon filthiness of their streets at all seasons of the year ; the innumerable pools of stagnant water which they never think of draining or filling up. As for the plague, it is now proved

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* Eton's Survey, chap. VII.

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beyond a doubt, that this disease is always of foreign growth ; and has never, except after a famine, been hatched even in Cairo itself, where nine hundred thousand inhabitants are heaped together in a dirty, confined, and mouldering city. But, notwithstanding its constant prevalence in some parts of the Ottoman empire, and generally at Constantinople, the communication between Alexandria and those infected quarters is never for one moment stopt. No regimen or system of health laws is adopted. Indeed, in the whole extent of the Grand Signior's dominions, there never was a single act of quarantine performed. The universal belief of the Turks in predestination, and their utter ignorance of medicine, both prevent any means from being pursued to check the progress of infection, and preclude all chance of a cure being effected, or the disease being eradicated, until the natural course of the seasons brings relief. How absurd, then, is it to accuse the climate of engendering a malady which seems to be courted by all the efforts of the people, with the entire concurrence of their rulers ?

No situation in fact can be more salubrious than that of Egypt ; a level plain exposed to the sea breeze, with no forests or hills to obstruct the freest circulation of air ; a perpetual vegetation of the plants most adapted to purify it ; and a constant flow of water through all parts of the country

country increasing the motion and coolness of the atmosphere. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the encomiums bestowed on the salubrity of the Egyptian climate by all the ancient authors, are in themselves just, and perfectly applicable to the present circumstances of the country. In no part of the world do we meet with fewer prevailing diseases; in no state have the numbers of mankind multiplied more rapidly, and kept pace more exactly with their industrious exertions, than in Egypt during the better days of its government and manners. The natives are not affected by the most violent heats of the sun, scarcely even by exposure to the effluvia of their stagnant pools, or to the Khamfin wind, which occasionally blows during six or seven weeks of the year, and is the only unfavourable attendant of the Egyptian climate. The most violent efforts of bodily fatigue are borne with ease and safety. Even the culture of rice, which in every other country is the most unwholesome of all occupations, is in Egypt attended with no manner of inconvenience or injury to the health. *

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* Volney's Egypt and Syria, I. 67. 202. 244. & 255. —Savary, tom. III. Let. 1.—Maillet, (edit. Mascrier) Part. I. p. 14.—Sonnini, Voyage en Egypte, chap. XXVI. XXXI.

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It is evident, then, that the climate of the new settlement will be found as far superior to the climate of the West Indian colonies, as the fertility of the soil and the facility of cultivation. But, even if the difference in point of climate were wholly in favour of the old colonies, it is not certain that this circumstance would occasion any obstruction to the improvement of the least wholesome territory. On the contrary, we see constant examples of health being sacrificed, without hesitation, to the prospect of wealth; and the most deadly climates in the world have not been able seriously to retard the cultivation of those regions which present to the adventurer the irresistible temptations of cheap and rich land. It is worthy of remark, that the greatest population and wealth which can be found in any European state of equal extent, are collected in a district labouring under the most unwholesome of the European climates; and that the colonies which have accumulated the most splendid treasures in proportion to their extent, have been those of the Dutch in Java and Guiana, subject to the most pestilential atmosphere that is breathed by men on the whole surface of the earth: So feeble an influence have the greatest of all dangers on the minds of men, if placed at a little distance, and set in opposition to the strong passions of avarice or ambition!

We

We have seen how favourable the ordinary state of the climate in Egypt is to animal as well as vegetable life. It enjoys another very essential advantage, in being free from those destructive hurricanes and earthquakes which so often prove destructive both to the wealth and the lives of the West Indian planters.* This circumstance gives the new settlement a decided superiority over the old colonies in point of capacity for improvement; a superiority which cannot be compensated, like the common advantages of a wholesome atmosphere, by the daring spirit of adventure so constantly displayed in those remote scenes of industry and fortitude.

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Indeed, the general circumstances of climate affect (though much less considerably) the riches as well as the comforts of any settlement, by their influence upon the progress of population; but of this we are to speak in the sequel.

6. The situation of Egypt gives it as decided a superiority over the American colonies, as its great fertility, its favourable climate, and terraqueous distribution. It is placed almost in the immediate neighbourhood of the market which its various and plentiful produce is adapted to supply.

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supply.

* Volney, I, 262.

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supply. The distance between Alexandria and Marseilles, is not greater than that between the Baltic and the northern ports of France. Italy is not so far from the Egyptian coast, as the south of England from Bourdeaux. The Turkish empire is scattered round this fine province; Constantinople itself not being more than five days sail from Alexandria. The navigation of the Mediterranean is in general easy and safe, except at the equinoxes, when stormy weather prevails in the western parts of the sea. The run is almost clear from Italy, France and Spain; it may be made at any season. *

The harbours on the coast of Lower Egypt are not now very good; but they were once the finest in the world. The port of Alexandria, for example, is almost choked up by the mud which the river brings down, and by the ballast which all vessels have for many ages been allowed to discharge into the water. As this change, however, is entirely owing to the indolence of the government and inattention of the police, the activity and skill of Europeans will easily restore things to their former state, and open once more the great harbour of Egypt to the commerce of the world. The other ports on the

* Capper on Winds and Monsoons, p. 78.—Ricard, III. 438.

the coast are by no means in such a state of dis-
repair ; and some of them are excellent. †

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It is evident, then, how much more advantageously than the West Indies, Egypt is situated in point of distance for the transport of its produce. Instead of a six or eight weeks voyage, the Egyptian commodities will only have to pay for a voyage of two or three ; a voyage not liable to the dangers of the tropical hurricanes, the delays of regular winds, and the numerous risks of foul channels and narrow straights. This advantage alone, even if the price of the goods at the ports of shipping were the same, would be sufficient to drive out of the European market every article of West Indian growth which could be raised in Egypt. It deserves also to be noticed, that the trade may be carried on at almost any time of the year to and from Egypt, both from the state of the population and the distribution of professions, as we shall immediately see, and from the variety of seasons in different quarters at one time. The harvests being retarded or accelerated according to the situation of the land with respect to the water, which is the universal spring of fertility, a succession of crops may be procured by the disposition of the canals and sluices—a succession which is indeed in some respects natural to the country, without any

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† Ricard, III. 436.—Volney, I. 7.

contrivance, from the various position of the grounds.

7. The last, but in every respect by far the most important advantage, which the new settlement will possess over the American colonies, yet remains to be considered—the structure of the society.

The population of Egypt has indeed been gradually decreasing since the Saracen conquest. With the reign of Omar began that dynasty, which, during a course of ages, was employed in desolating the conquered territory, and in spreading the same devastation over the provinces that yet remained free. The Ottoman power, which succeeded the Caliphat, carried still farther every principle of intolerance and barbarity in government and in religion, adding, in all its operations, to those bad qualities that marked the Saracen rulers, the feature of extreme and infectious ignorance. Under the complicated miseries which Egypt has for centuries been doomed to suffer from conquest, insurrection and civil war, almost naturalized in those fruitful regions, it is no wonder that the traces of her ancient glory should be almost worn away, and the numbers of her inhabitants greatly reduced. It is no small proof of her various capacity and natural

natural resources, that she still can reckon for many as four millions of souls. * S E C T.
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This large population is indeed of a mixed and impure constitution. The most numerous class are the Arabs; men not remarkable for their industrious habits; but, in general, described as bearing a most respectable character †. I speak not of the Bedouins, who belong properly to the desert, nor of the Fellahs or Arabs of the villages on the river. Both of those classes are inconsiderable, compared with the Arabs who are employed in an imperfect sort of agriculture. The Bedouins, engaged rather in the occupations of shepherds, are, like all tribes devoted to the pastoral state, not the innocent Arcadians sung by poets and canted over by philanthropists, but robbers and butchers. The Fellahs are for the most part pirates or thieves. The agricultural Arabs, on the other hand, are generally a people of simple lives, remarkable for honesty and good faith, for obedience to their patriarchal chief, and valour in defence of his cause. It must be admitted, that these qualities are at least the rudiments of a good national character; and if the dissensions which have so long torn the country to pieces, with the total want of all but military law,

* Note T t.

† Savary, tom. III. let. 2.

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law, have divided those tribes naturally peaceful, armed them against each other, and cramped their habits of industry, it is surely no great concession to allow that the pacification of the country, the establishment of a regular and vigorous government, the accurate allotment of land, and the introduction of those new wants which are natural to polished society, will revive the more quiet and natural industry of the Arabs, reclaim them from habits of military exertion, and afford to the state the full benefit of their characteristic good qualities. I do not maintain that such an improvement will take place as suddenly as the new government may issue ordinances, or even as rapidly as the establishments so decreed can be instituted : But I contend, that the improvement of the Arabs may be expected to proceed with no common degree of celerity ; that men in their situation will be easily restored to orderly habits ; and that the first fruits of the political change will be an increased industry on the part of the people. They are not, they never have been slaves, never even in a political relation to the government, much less in domestic bondage to the authority of a master.

They have not, then, those principles and habits to acquire which are wanting in men born to slavery, and broken down or eradicated in men made slaves by capture. They are in a very different

different situation from the negroes, of whose character and powers we have elsewhere treated. Their labour is indeed desultory, or rather languid; but it is voluntary—it is industry. The political changes which a new order of things must introduce, will be sufficiently powerful to operate a speedy extension and confirmation of those habits already acquired, and to develop more fully principles whose existence is unquestioned.

After the Arabs, who form two thirds of the whole population, the Copts deserve to be considered. They are the proper Egyptians; descendants of the subjects over whom the Ptolemies and Cleopatra once reigned. The character of these men, too, is represented as respectable; and one circumstance of no small importance distinguishes them from the Arabs, to whom, in some other respects, they are inferior—they are all Christians. The defects to which their political circumstances have rendered them liable, flowing from the same causes, are similar to those which I have noticed in the habits of the Arabs, with this difference, that the Copts have not the martial qualities so characteristic of the other people. They are more accustomed to peace, and more subjected to the controul of oppressive and barbarous rulers. They are probably more industrious

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dustrious than the Arabs ; and they are said to have at bottom a great natural fire of character.* Such are the materials of which the new community is fundamentally to be constructed. The handful of Turks and Mamelucs deserve no attention : they will probably be exterminated in the struggle which may precede a conquest of the country ; if not, they must be sunk in the common mass.

From these particulars it may be inferred, that the general qualities or capacities of the materials of civil society, just now described, are favourable to the plan of government which a European dynasty will certainly adopt ; and that a sufficient number of cultivators, that is, of day-labourers, will not be wanting to perform the simple and easy operations of Egyptian agriculture, in the new form which it must immediately assume ; while the stewards, overseers, upper servants, teachers, clerks, and most of the mechanics, will be brought over from the mother country.

It is not, then, by slaves brought from a distant country, and scarcely resembling their masters in any one particular, that the new colony will be cultivated. A numerous body of

* Volney, I. 202.—Savary, tom. III. let. 2.

of hardy and active peasantry will soon be formed, enjoying the freedom granted by the mild forms of European government, working for the maintenance of their families, and rewarded by the enjoyment of pleasures, comforts, and political privileges. The African slave trade, it is most fervently to be hoped, will never find admittance into this promising system, from the temptations which very low prices and abundant supply of negroes hold out. The government which we are supposing to obtain the rich possession, will surely remember the fates of the French slave-masters in America, abolish at once the trifling commerce in men, which at present subsists in Egypt *, and prefer a struggle with some small additional inconvenience or delay, to the contemptible and transient advantages that may be obtained at the risk of ultimate ruin.

We may conclude, then, that the structure of the new colony will be firm and pure ; as well adapted to sustain all the shocks to which it may be exposed, as any colonial establishment can possibly be ; closely united to the mother country, both by commercial or casual intercourse of inhabitants, interchange of population, and respectable public character ; and more especially connected with it by the proximity of its situation.

* Sonnini, chap. XXXVI.

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situation. In all these essential particulars, it will have a manifest advantage over every American colony ; and they are circumstances affecting the wealth, as well as the political importance and relations of a remote province. But, above all, Egypt will be cultivated by a numerous body of free and hardy men ; labour will bear its ordinary price ; the produce will be raised at an expence trifling indeed when compared with that of the West Indian negroes * ; and it will be manufactured into its most refined forms, with the same facility as in Europe, since labour will be nearly as cheap. This free peasantry will cultivate the most fertile region on the face of the earth, with every convenience for manufacturing their raw produce and transporting their wrought goods ; with a constant facility of selling their commodities at home,

* We may remark the important consequences of employing hired labour, in the prices of Asiatic sugars, which are raised entirely by free hands. In Cochin, the great sugar market of the south of Asia, the finest sugar is sold for less than a penny the pound, (De Poivre, Voyage d'un Philosophe, p. 89.) Although the truth of this fact is no manner of argument in favour of the emancipation of the negroes, or the culture of the West Indian colonies by free hands ; a purpose to which some zealous and worthy men have attempted to apply it, (Clarkson's Essay, part II. chap. I. § 3.—De Poivre, p. 90.) ; yet it proves clearly how much cheaper Egyptian produce will be raised by free men, under a favourable climate, and in an excellent soil.

home, and with a constant demand for them from Europe and Asia. The goods thus raised in the most frugal manner and in the most luxuriant abundance, will be collected into depôts by the wholesale merchant and manufacturer; a class of men who will not be wanting in the new colony, as they are in the defective society of the West Indies. They will be transportable at all seasons, subject only to the additional expence of a short, safe, and easy voyage to the consumer.—And those are the commodities with which the West Indian planters have to support a competition! Is it fanciful to assert, that every cane-piece which is holed in Egypt, must necessarily lay waste two in the Antilles? and that the tropical colonies of the New World must be desolated, by the rapid operation of irresistible powers, exactly in proportion to the revival of industry and skill in the most ancient theatre of human exertion? The cultivation, that is, the conquest of Egypt by a European state, or its improvement by an enlightened and independent government, must be as inevitably fatal to the existence of the European name in the Charaibean Sea, as the establishment of a negro commonwealth; with this difference, that the latter catastrophe will, in all human probability, work its effects by force and slaughter, while the former event will desolate the West Indies by

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a peaceful though sudden operation. The one is the violent, the other the natural death—the true *euthanasia* of the old colonial system.

Such appear to be the consequences, first to the Asiatic, and next to the American colonies of the European powers, which must necessarily flow from the improvement and cultivation of Egypt, in whatever manner that event shall be brought about. It remains to take a cursory view of the policy dictated by the colonial interests of the different states, with respect to the combinations which may accelerate such consequences as those that have just now been passed under review.

We have seen, that to the Asiatic colonies nothing but good can arise from the improvement of Egypt, whether under an independent government, or under the colonial dominion of any one European power. But the Asiatic colonies are of much less importance to the parent states than their American settlements. The absurdity, then, of sacrificing the existence of the latter, to the partial improvement of the former, is abundantly obvious: and we have seen, that nothing less than the annihilation of the West Indian colonies, by far the most important part of the American system, can result from the improvement of Egypt, whether it is effected by an independent or by a colonial

nial regimen. It appears manifest, then, and at first sight altogether unquestionable, that the improvement of Egypt is an event to be deprecated, and if possible prevented by all the European states which possess colonies in the West Indies. But a little farther attention to the subject, may perhaps lead us to modify this conclusion in several important particulars.

A great distinction must be made between the improvement of Egypt as a colony of some European power, and its improvement as an independent state. Let us, in the *first* place, consider the general consequences of the desolation of the West Indies, whether caused by the establishment of an independent government in Egypt, or by the efforts of some power unconnected with the European community, or by the victories of some European power.

The improvement of Egypt can only destroy the West Indian system, by enabling a new set of planters and merchants greatly to undersell those of the West Indies. All the consumers of West Indian produce, therefore, must be great gainers by the change. Those only can lose who are immediately concerned in the plantation trade, who have removed to the West Indies for the purpose of selling their labour dear, who have invested their stock in the purchase of land, or who have lent their capital to persons engaged in the West Indian agriculture.

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agriculture. All these classes of men will be ruined by the change; the labourers will be forced to remove elsewhere, the proprietors will lose all their stock, and the creditors all that part of their capital which they had lent to the proprietors. But the merchants-importers of colonial produce will gain by the new arrangement. They will trade to Egypt instead of the West Indies. The returns of their capital will be quicker, though their profits will be a little less; the risk will be considerably diminished; and the cheapness of the Egyptian produce will increase the demand for it. The manufacturer of goods formerly used in the colonies, will also gain by the change, inasmuch as the new market will be much more extensive than the old.

The general interests of manufacture and trade will gain in like manner; for a portion of the capital formerly employed in the more expensive traffic will now be set free by the diminution of the prices; and the cheaper the consumer purchases that produce, the more money will he have left to purchase other articles. The general interests, then, both of the mercantile and consuming part of the community, will reap great and solid advantage from this new distribution of colonial property, whether that shall be effected by France, Spain, or Holland,

land, or by some independent government established in Egypt, or by some power unconnected with Europe.

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On the other hand, the interests of the West Indian colonists, and of those concerned in the agriculture of the islands, will be ruined; the mother countries will lose all the advantages, political and commercial, which they formerly derived from pursuing the system of colonial policy, and which I endeavoured to point out in the First Book of this Inquiry. All the capital embarked in colonial speculations and loans will of course be sunk; but the new capital constantly accumulated, which would naturally have sought for employment in the West Indies, will now be employed either in the remaining colonies, or in the new community. Different nations will evidently suffer in very different degrees by the change. Holland, whose colonial policy is of most importance to her, and whose West Indian colonies bear a greater proportion to her whole colonial dominions than those of any other power, will be most of all injured. France will probably suffer next, admitting that she is not mistress of Egypt; after her Britain; and then Spain, whose interests will be very little affected: while Portugal can scarcely suffer at all by the change. It happens, however, that all the powers which possess West Indian ter-

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ritories of considerable importance, possess also other colonies both in Asia and America, except Holland, whose remaining colonies lye in Asia and Africa. The scene of their colonial prosperity will therefore be changed by the new arrangement; and instead of cultivating the West Indian islands, they will improve North and South America, Africa and Asia, after adopting those reforms, and introducing that liberal system of provincial policy, which the loss of their finest settlements must strongly recommend.

It is not easy to form any comparative estimate of the advantages and disadvantages likely to arise from any event, so as to balance the one against the other, when the benefits are altogether of a commercial, and the injuries are both of a commercial and political nature. All the benefits which can result to the states of Europe from the improvement of Egypt, are of a nature strictly commercial or œconomical; they end in the saving or the increase of the national capital. The losses to which this event will unquestionably subject the states possessing West Indian colonies, are partly commercial, and partly political. It may be possible to compare the commercial losses with the gains likely to result from the change; and there can be little doubt that we shall be inclined to strike a balance favourable to the change

change in this respect, if we take into the account the vast extent of the consumption of colonial produce, now reckoned amongst the prime necessities of civilized life; the small amount of the capital employed in raising that produce, compared with the capital employed in circulating and in purchasing it for consumption; and the vent which remaining colonies will still afford to the future accumulations of stock. On the other hand, admitting that an overplus remains in favour of the new arrangement considered as a mercantile benefit, this balance, consisting entirely of commercial profit, cannot be compared with the remaining loss attendant upon the event, and composed entirely of political inconvenience or injury. The wealth of France and Britain, for example, may, upon the whole, be increased by the change which shall deprive them of their West Indian colonies. But those colonies, considered as an integral part of the French and British dominions, are productive of various advantages to the other parts, besides contributing to augment the national capital. These have been enumerated in a former part of this Inquiry, * and they cannot properly be compared with any pecuniary considerations. They therefore remain to induce an opposition on the part of Britain and France to any plan which may improve Egypt at

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* Book I. Sect. I.

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the expence of the West Indies. Perhaps, too, the total clear gain in point of wealth which is to be expected from the improvement of Egypt, may receive a great diminution from the suddenness of the change. The shock which the credit of the mother country is likely to experience from such an event as the rapid destruction of the West Indian colonies, and the injury which the whole system must receive from a sudden change in the employment of part of the trading stock, are evils of a serious nature in all communities of modern structure. Joined to the political inconveniences and injuries before mentioned, these circumstances will probably be deemed, by all the European powers, to afford sufficient reasons for deprecating, and if possible preventing the improvement of Egypt, in whatever way that event may be brought about.

But let us consider, in the *second* place, the relative consequences which may be apprehended from the loss of the West Indian colonies, if it is accompanied with the establishment of a European power in Egypt. There is, in this case, no difficulty whatever. A single glance must convince us, that this mode of improving Egypt is in the highest degree hostile to the interests, political as well as commercial, of every other European power besides the one to whose lot Egypt may

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may fall. It is evidently hostile to the commercial interests of Europe, inasmuch as the possession of the colony puts the whole produce under the power of one trading nation. Admitting that, for the purpose of more rapid improvement, a free trade shall be allowed at first, then the West Indian islands are laid waste, and a monopoly continues in the hands of the power possessing Egypt; the colonial produce will therefore be subjected to imports, taxes, duties, and all the regimen of the fiscal system, excited by the jealousy of rival traders and hostile governments. But the possession of the new settlement is still more dangerous to the neighbours of the mother country, from the immense addition which it must suddenly bestow on her resources. Whilst all her neighbours have lost their West Indian colonies, she alone has acquired one of importance equal to the whole colonial system, placed almost in the vicinity of her contiguous provinces, and immensely valuable, not only as a substitute for all the West Indian settlements, but as an emporium of East Indian and of European trade.

This noble province will unite all the advantages of a colony, in a higher degree than they have ever existed elsewhere, with most of the benefits arising from a great extension of the proper boundaries of the parent state. The possession of

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Egypt must of necessity derange the European balance. After destroying the colonial system of the West, the keys of the Nile will probably bestow the decided superiority in the arbitration of European affairs upon the nation which shall be permitted to keep them, as they anciently threw the supreme power over the destinies of the Roman empire into the hands of the first pretender who was happy enough to seize them.

It is unnecessary to point out more explicitly the conduct which these considerations dictate to every European state, but more especially to those possessing American colonies. In a merely colonial view, it appears that the possession of Egypt by any enlightened power, however beneficial to the Asiatic colonies, is ruinous to those of the West Indies, and that the colonial interests of all the other powers are opposed to such a revolution. In a more general point of view, such a revolution is to be deprecated as fatal to the European system; and the dread of it will be esteemed at all times a sufficient reason for vigorous coalition against the state whose views may be directed towards this quarter, so long as the different members of the great commonwealth retain that spirit, equally prudent and honourable, which has so often saved the whole system from destruction.

Let

Let us apply these remarks more particularly to the event which was in fact accomplished during the late war—the conquest of Egypt by France.

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The difficulty and expence in which the French West Indian administration has for some years been involved, appear to some more than a match for the whole benefits of the colonial policy. It is even thought that such complicated disadvantages cannot long be borne, and that the negroes must soon obtain the supreme power in the French islands. I have endeavoured to shew * that this conclusion is not warranted by the circumstances of those settlements; but it has all along been admitted that the struggle by which the colonial existence of the republic must be maintained is one of no common difficulty and hazard. If, then, the possession of Egypt shall transfer all the benefits of the West Indian system to a Mediterranean colony, with various additional advantages which the old settlements never possessed, it is fair to conclude, that the West Indies will be abandoned by France at the very moment of her obtaining a quiet footing in the new province. Long before an independent government could so far improve the Egyptian territory

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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tory as to underfell and lay waste the West Indian colonies, the establishment of negro superiority in the French islands will desolate the whole settlements in the Archipelago. The catastrophe, then, which we have been contemplating †, will be most suddenly accomplished by the establishment of the French yoke in Egypt. This is, in every respect, the mode of improving that country most hostile to the colonial interests of the European powers.

In like manner we may, from this point of view, easily perceive new inducements to assist France in her struggle against the West Indian slaves. If her affairs in that quarter grow desperate, she has only one way of retrieving her colonial existence ;—she must stake her commercial prosperity on the acquisition of Egypt, and prepare for making a strong effort in that quarter with the remains of her colonial troops and treasure, and the flower of her European forces ; she will of course abandon her West Indian possessions at the outset of the struggle, both in order to save the continued expence of the war and government, and also in order to make a diversion by means of the revolted negroes, who will now be fighting her battles as effectually as they before supported their own cause.

In

† Book II. Sect. III.

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In every point of view, therefore, two inferences may be drawn from all that has been said. We may with certainty conclude, that the colonial interests of the European powers dictate the necessity of aiding France in the West Indies, and vigorously keeping her out of Egypt; and that the European interests of those states dictate the necessity of pursuing the same conduct in the West Indies, as well as in Egypt. The acquisition of Egypt is directly hostile to the European system, and indirectly destructive of the colonial system. The continuance of the French power in the West Indies, is directly essential to the colonial system, and indirectly favourable to the balance of Europe, from its tendency to prevent the strong efforts which otherwise must be made against Egypt.

The success of the French arms during the late war, and the blindness of some European powers to their best interests, render it not impossible that France may succeed in the attempt which we are now conceiving her to make. May not some measures be pursued with the view of continuing a kind of balance suited to the new order of colonial policy which must in the supposed event be introduced? May not Britain, for example, obtain a similar share of the Turkish empire? The rich and extensive

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extensive province of Syria, in little more than in name a part of the Turkish empire, is in many respects a more valuable acquisition than Egypt itself. The position is not altogether so convenient, nor the territory so well distributed, nor the soil so inexhaustible in consequence of perpetual renovation: But the fertile territory is twice as extensive; the harbours are more convenient and numerous; the climate is still more variegated and salubrious; the growth of animals wild and domestic more abundant; and the fertility of the land in vegetable productions if possible more rich and various. Besides affording every species of useful grain in prodigious plenty, the climate and soil of Syria are admirably fitted for the culture of the sugar cane, the cotton and tobacco plants, the indigo and coffee trees, the vine and the olive, not to mention the cochineal insect and silkworm, which thrive in great perfection and abundance. Even under the worst conceivable system of administration, almost all of those valuable articles are at present raised in great quantities, without any thing more than the most contemptible exertions of industry and skill. In its ruined and desolated state, Syria produces a revenue of nearly one million three hundred thousand pounds Sterling; and its population,

pulation, rapidly diminished by a long succession of execrable measures in every department of government and police, is still reckoned at two millions three hundred and five thousand by Volney, whose estimates are in other instances greatly under the truth. †

If this rich and delightful region were added to the British empire, the acquisition of Egypt by France would be in every respect harmless, and in many points of view advantageous. The Asiatic colonies would be saved from every chance of annoyance, whilst all the advantages formerly pointed out as likely to result from the improvement of Egypt, would now in a manifold proportion attend the joint cultivation of Egypt and Syria. The general interests of the European powers, and of Britain as well as France, would be promoted by the abundant production of colonial produce in its cheapest form. The West Indian system would indeed be overturned; but on its ruins there would be raised a more solid and valuable colonial structure, a new system, in which France and England

† Volney's Egypt & Syria, vol. II. p. 318. 359. 363. & 364.—Ricard, III. 421.—Geographie (Encyc. Method.) III. 318.—Econ. Polit. & Diplom. (ibid.) IV. 297.—Commerce (ibid.) III. 784.—Eton's Survey, p. 292.—Harris's Collection, II. 841. *et seqq.*

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land would be mutually poised. The dangers that might so fairly be apprehended to the European balance from the conquest of either province by one power, would now be rendered nugatory by the equal and opposite acquisitions of the two great natural enemies whose quarrels divide the European system. The Turkish empire would, indeed, apparently be dismembered; and a certain description of politicians would lament the fates of the Ottomans, as they once wept over the destinies of the Poles. But surely no such change could render the Syrians, Copts and Arabs, less happy than they at present are in their political circumstances; whilst any beginning of enlightened government must be the dawn of national improvement, civilization and civil enjoyment to all those unfortunate tribes of men. The lovers of humanity, too, might justly rejoice in the execution of the project here sketched, as the dawn of a happier day to a vast portion of the human species. The downfall of the odious traffic which has always been intimately connected with the West Indian system, is the necessary consequence of the proposed partition; and if there were no farther argument from general topics of philanthropy, this surely would deserve our attention, that it is not easy to close our ears against any scheme, of which the necessary consequence must be, the

the instantaneous abolition of the African slave trade. S E C T.
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I do not here enter at greater length into these speculations. The subject is in its nature very much mingled with conjecture and hypothesis. I have stated the most material facts, and attempted to point out, both the probable consequences of the events which are so confidently expected by many politicians, and the peculiar difficulties which attend the different branches of this Inquiry. Some of the conclusions which I have now drawn, appear to follow with sufficient certainty from a comparison of those facts with the principles formerly established. The rest, together with other inferences which may be pursued on this subject, I leave to the discernment of the reader.

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BOOK IV.

OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS
IN THEIR COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the First Book of this Inquiry, I explained the relations between colonies and their mother countries ; that is, the internal structure of the system composed of colonies and a parent state. In the Second Book, I proceeded to describe the relations between different colonies ; that is, the structure of the system composed of various colonial establishments situated in the same part of the world. In the Third Book, I considered the relation between different powers as influenced by their colonial interests ; that is, the effects produced by colonial relations upon the structure of the great national system which we denominate the European Commonwealth. I now proceed to the last object of Inquiry, the

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Domestic or Internal Colonial Policy of the European powers ; that is, the arrangements of colonial administration contrived with a view to promote the happiness of the settlements, and to preserve their dependence upon the mother country.

As the great objects of all domestic policy are the preservation of domestic tranquillity, the repulsion of foreign invasion, and the promotion of national wealth (which is in many respects also the foundation of the two former objects) : so, the great ends of the internal administration of colonial affairs are the increase of wealth, and the security both of the colonial government and the power of the mother country from all the efforts of external and internal violence. This branch of the Inquiry, therefore, divides itself into two general heads, the commercial and the political administration of the colonies. Under the former head, are comprehended all laws relating to trade, agriculture and manufactures, in so far as those may be modified by the subordinate predicament in which the settlements are placed. Under the latter head, are comprehended all laws relating to the secondary government established in the colonies, their military as well as civil affairs, and their dependence upon the parent state.

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This is the general classification which is suggested by the circumstances common to all colonies whatever ; but the peculiar structure of society in the American settlements is of such a nature, as to present a separate and preliminary object of speculation. The slave system has now become so radically incorporated with the colonial system, as to form an essential part of it, and to affect immediately and powerfully every branch of internal administration, whether commercial or political. Before we can proceed to discuss a single measure connected either with the wealth, the government, or the defence of the American colonies, it is absolutely necessary to examine the grand feature which distinguishes those settlements from every other, and extends its influence so widely over the whole system, that no arrangement of policy can be adopted without a constant reference to the peculiar constitution of the colonial society. This subject, then, is in itself complete, and is by far the most important that can occupy our attention in considering the great western branch of the modern colonial system.

The domestic policy of the Asiatic provinces being adapted entirely to the state of conquered countries, does not properly fall within the plan of this work. The detail of the internal administration of the American colonies presents so wide a field of discussion, that I do not

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intend at present to enter into it, farther than is necessary for the discussion of the preliminary subject. The domestic policy of colonial establishments is indeed the part of our general subject which is the least intricate and the most completely understood. The principles of national policy upon which such inquiries rest, are sufficiently comprehended by all inquirers in modern times. The only difficulty which incumbers the discussion, arises from the structure of the colonial society in America, and from several particulars hitherto misunderstood in the general system of colonial policy. Those errors I have attempted to remove in the First Book of this Inquiry; and, after I shall have finished the consideration of the Negro Slavery, which forms the subject of this Book, the remaining part of the Inquiry, which I propose to omit, can present no material difficulty. It will consist of a few easy corollaries from the principles laid down in the three first Books, and from those which I am now about to explain.

The complicated iniquities and the manifold disadvantages of the slave system, have for several years called the attention of European statesmen to the correction of abuses so flagrant, and the remedy of evils so pregnant with danger to the sum of colonial affairs. Various expedients have been proposed during
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the wide discussion which those momentous questions have excited. Some zealots have contended, with an inexcusable thoughtlessness, that the crimes of those whose avarice has transferred the population of Africa to the West Indies can only be expiated by immediate emancipation of the slaves. The councils of such fanatics have unhappily been adopted and carried into effect by one of the most enlightened nations in the world; and we have frequently had occasion to view the consequences of those insane measures in the course of this Inquiry.

Others have proposed an abolition of the traffic which has been the original cause of the evil. But they have differed among themselves as to the time and mode of effecting this object.

The abolition of the slave trade, however, does not seem, in the opinion of many, to be a sufficient remedy for the dangers of our colonial system at the present day. Several schemes have therefore been brought forward with a view to provide such remedies as the urgency of the occasion appears to call for. Of the plans sketched out with this view, the most important are those which recommend an amelioration of the condition of the negroes, and a gradual change in their hard lot. It has been suggested by many, that settlements not yet cultivated may be peopled by free negroes; and the most sanguine hopes have been entertained of the salutary consequences

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of such a scheme. The possession of a great extent of waste lands, highly fitted for the purposes of West Indian agriculture, strongly recommends to every trading nation any project which may facilitate the clearing and peopling of the desert, without the danger and expence attendant upon the old system. Any plan, too, which comprehends the idea of free negroes, or includes the word, is peculiarly adapted to accord with the feelings of those worthy persons who are so keenly alive to the sufferings of the Africans in a state of bondage. It is natural, therefore, that the schemes to which I allude should be well received, and even eagerly embraced, before a sufficient interval is allowed for sober examination. The topic has been lately renewed by some ingenious and virtuous men of this country. It is said to have found a favourable reception amongst a certain class of practical politicians, and, if common fame may be trusted, it has for some time occupied the attention of men high in the public confidence. It has at various times, too, been canvassed, both by the speculative inquirers, and by the statesmen of other nations. It appears to have been a favourite idea of the virtuous and philosophical Turgot, as well as of others connected with him in affairs; and a project was completely prepared about the time of his memorable administration, for conducting the cultivation

tivation of French Guiana upon the principles of the free negro system. *

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The projects to which I am here alluding, are dangerous in the extreme. They have all the dangers and defects of puny half-measures; they offer no remedy to the great evil; they lull the attention of men during those critical moments when a real cure might be effected by bolder steps. They give the interested advocates of the present order of things a plausible pretence for affecting to concede on their part, and claiming reciprocal concessions from the other party. They afford the false friends of the abolition an opportunity of deserting a strong hold which they do not wish to see defended, and of occupying a middle ground safe only to themselves. In politics, the bold and decisive measure is generally the safest in the end; though it requires stronger nerves to attempt it, and a more capacious mind to perceive its superior wisdom. In the present great question, the bold and decisive line of conduct is either immediate abolition, or a steady perseverance in the system now established. Paltry and timid minds would shudder at the thought of mere inactivity, as cowardly troops would tremble at the idea of calmly waiting for the enemy's approach. Both the one and the other hasten their fate by restlessness and foolish movements, instead of boldly advancing

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vancing to the charge, or firmly awaiting the onset.

I purpose, therefore, in the *first* place, to examine this very interesting question; to prove, from the most simple and obvious considerations, the inefficacy and impossibility of the plans proposed; and to shew, that the dangers of the new order of things intended to be established by such schemes would be so great, as to render their utter impracticability a real blessing. This will form the subject of the First Section. In the Second Section, I shall proceed to consider the means of ameliorating the structure of society in the slave colonies, and of averting the dangers which impend over the whole fabric, from the preponderance of the inferior classes, their low degree of civilization, and the successes that have, in some of the colonies, attended their efforts to revenge themselves upon their superiors.

The discussion of these topics will complete the general and preliminary view of West Indian policy, which alone I purpose, at present, to embrace in this Book, and will comprehend the examination of all those questions connected with the slave system, which have not been considered in the foregoing Books. An investigation of the remaining subjects that fall under the title of Domestic Colonial Policy must be deferred to a future opportunity.

S E C.

SECTION I.

OF THE FREE NEGRO SYSTEM, OR THE POLICY OF
CULTIVATING THE COLONIES BY MEANS OF FREE
NEGROES.

It has been remarked a thousand times, that the desires and wants of man in a rude state are few and easily gratified. The chief exertion to which necessity impels him, is the procuring of food; and his hunger is no sooner satisfied than he sinks into the luxury of repose. When the natural fertility of the soil affords him spontaneously a regular, though simple and perhaps scanty supply, and the unvaried serenity of the climate precludes the necessity of covering or shelter; the powers of his mind become languid and feeble; his corporeal strength decays; and he regards as the greatest of all evils any occupation that calls for mental exertion, or is attended with bodily fatigue; while this indolence in its turn enables him to subsist on a much smaller portion of food, than is required to support a life of activity and labour.

Thus, the original inhabitants of America were astonished at the voracity of the Spaniards,

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Spaniards, who, probably from the same causes, are the most temperate people in Europe: and while the necessaries of life were so easily procured, the conquerors found it utterly impossible to overcome the constitutional repugnance to labour of every kind, which they perceived in their new subjects. Before they had recourse to an expedient which they knew must in the end prove ruinous, the system of *repartimientos*, every trial was made to call forth voluntary industry: But they soon discovered that men, who had no desires to gratify, would not submit to work; and that no fear of distant evil, nothing but the lash of a master, could conquer the rooted aversion with which habit had taught the Indian to view every pursuit that required active exertion. Even after the plan, so fatal to the inhabitants of the New World, had been adopted, the humane zeal of Las Casas brought its impolicy and injustice repeatedly under the review both of Ferdinand and Charles. The subject was investigated by Ximenes, with his usual boldness and ability; the minister was overcome by the arguments of the ‘Friend of the Indians:’ commissioners of the most undoubted integrity and talents were appointed to investigate on the spot, the whole merits of this great question, with powers suitable to the importance of their office; but the result of their

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all their inquiries led to the same conclusion, that the emancipation of the natives must be the signal for an universal cessation of industry; and the Spanish government had not sufficient virtue to embrace this alternative. Towards the latter part of Charles's reign, the consequences of the system were fatally experienced in the rapid extermination of the Indians. Anxious if possible to preserve so large a portion of his American subjects, the Emperor, with that quickness of decision which too often marked his councils, proclaimed their immediate and unconditional emancipation. Still it was found that their industry and freedom were incompatible. The alarm was instantly spread over the whole Spanish colonies: Peru, for a while lost to the monarchy, was only restored by the repeal of the obnoxious law: the quiet of New Spain was preserved, by a combination of the Governor and the subjects to suspend its execution: and all that the power of the Spanish government has hitherto been able to effect, consistently with the profitable cultivation of its American possessions, is the establishment of certain humane regulations, tending to mitigate the necessary servitude of the Indians.

The negroes, though in a less degree, are nearly in the same circumstances with that unhappy race, to whose bondage and toils they

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they have been doomed to succeed. Born in a less genial climate, and compelled to procure their sustenance by somewhat greater exertions, they are not content with so small a portion of food, and view with less horror the labour of providing it. But beyond this their industry does not extend. Like all savages, they are incited to exertion only by immediate necessity. If you talk to them of conveniences, and comforts, and the delights of activity, you speak a language which they have not yet learnt to comprehend; and the idea of a pleasure which must be purchased by toil, presents to their minds a contradiction in terms. Were they, indeed, allowed to remain in their own country, the influence of those desires which spring from local attachment, the ties of kindred, and the intercourse of more civilized men, might by slow degrees awaken those appetites, and create those artificial wants, which alone can excite regular and effective industry. But if suddenly removed to a milder climate and a more plentiful soil, with their original repugnance to exert more labour than necessity prescribes, it is not to be imagined that any thing except the power of a master can prevent them from sinking into the state of listless inactivity, which seemed to be the natural condition of the Indians. *

Accordingly,

* Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa, Chap. XXIV.—Wimpffen's Letters, No. XV,

Accordingly, the negroes who have been transported to America, are uniformly found to be totally deficient in active industry. That those who continue in a state of slavery should exhibit the appearance of an indolence which nothing but the immediate terror of the lash can overcome, is perhaps more the consequence of their degraded condition, than of their uncivilized state. But the want of activity is not confined to the slaves. The free negroes in the West Indies are, with a very few exceptions, chiefly in the Spanish and Portuguese settlements, equally averse to all sorts of labour which do not contribute to the supply of their immediate and most urgent wants. Improvident and careless of the future, they are not actuated by that principle which inclines more civilized men to equalize their exertions at all times, and to work after the necessities of the day have been procured, in order to make up the possible deficiencies of the morrow: nor has their intercourse with the whites taught them to consider any gratification as worth obtaining, which cannot be procured by a slight exertion of a desultory and capricious industry.

The slaves, indeed, who are forced to labour during the whole week for their masters, shew some symptoms of application in cultivating their own provision-grounds on the holidays

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holidays allowed them. But the most indolent of men, if pushed into activity for the advantage of others, will naturally continue their exertions, at least for a short time, when they are themselves to reap the fruits of the additional toil ; and the voluntary labour for their own profit, during the little interval of liberty, may become tolerable, by forming a contrast to the unrepaid and compulsory fatigues, in which by far the greater part of their days are spent. In fact, even under these favourable circumstances, the slaves in our West Indian islands allot but a very small proportion of their free time to the work for which they are with certainty to be recompensed, by gains that no master ever interferes with. Out of the six days per month (besides accidental holidays) which are allowed them in Jamaica, for the cultivation of their grounds, the more industrious do not allot above sixteen hours to this employment. *

But from the accounts which have been received of the free negroes, it appears that their industry is still more sparing. Of their invincible repugnance to all sorts of labour, the most ample evidence is produced in the Report of the Committee of Privy Council in 1788. The witnesses examined upon Queries 37. & 38. from all the British islands, con-

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* Edwards' West Indies, Book IV. chap. 5. [note.]

cur in this statement. It will be sufficient to refer more particularly to the evidence from Jamaica and Barbadoes. In the former settlements, Messrs Fuller Long & Chisholme state, that free negroes were never known to work for hire; and that they have all the vices of the slaves. The Committee of Council of the island, besides corroborating this assertion, add, that the free negroes are averse to work for themselves, except when compelled by immediate necessity. Mr Brathwaite, the agent for Barbadoes, affirms, that if the slaves in that island were offered their freedom on condition of working for themselves, not one tenth of them would accept of it. Governor Parry states, that the free negroes are utterly destitute of industry; and the Council of the island adds, that from their confirmed habits of idleness they are the pests of society. *

The accounts which foreigners have given us of the same class of men in almost all the other colonies, agree most accurately with the statements collected by the Committee of Privy Council. M. Malouet, who bore a special commission from the French government to examine the character and habits of the Maroons in Dutch Guiana, and to determine whether or not they were adapted to become hired labourers, informs us, that they will only work one

* Report 1788, part III.

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one day in the week, which they find abundantly sufficient, in the fertile soil and genial climate of the New World, to supply all the wants that they have yet learnt to feel. The rest of their time is spent in absolute indolence and sloth. ‘*Le repos,*’ (says he) ‘*l’oisiveté sont devenus dans leur état social leur unique passion.*’ * He gives the very same description of the free negroes in the French colonies. † Although many of them possess land and slaves, the spectacle, he tells us, was never yet exhibited of a free negro supporting his family by the culture of his little property. ‡ All other authors agree in giving the same description of free negroes in the British, French, and Dutch colonies, by whatever denomination they may be distinguished, whether Maroons, Charaibes, Free blacks, or Fugitive slaves. The Abbé Raynal himself, with all his ridiculous fondness for savages, cannot, in the present instance, so far twist the facts according to his fancies and feelings, as to give a favourable portrait of this degraded race.

Such are the men by whose voluntary labour it is proposed to clear the thick forests of the New World, and to cover its boundless savannahs with plantations and pens. Nor does it seem to be of much consequence, in this view of

* Mem. sur les Colonies, V. 121.

† Ibid IV. 141.

‡ Ibid V. 127.

of the matter, whether the new stock of negroes is imported at once from Africa, or purchased in a state of slavery from our old settlements. Those who had been slaves, either in the European plantations, or the kingdoms of Africa (especially the former), would from habit be more prepared for labour, and more skilful in performing work, than free men in a rude state, who had never experienced the hardships of fatigue. The Whydah negroes, in their own country, are for the most part in a state of bondage, and their lands are in much better cultivation than those of the other tribes. Accordingly, in the West Indies, they are uniformly preferred to all others for docility, quietness, and submission to the master.* The Koro-mantees unite to greater bodily strength a more fierce and untameable disposition: but such of them as have been slaves in Africa, are observed to apply with greater alacrity and effect to field labour,† and are on this account preferred by the Dutch planters to all others.‡ These habits of industry, however, have been formed by the constant dread of punishment; no principle less powerful can maintain them; and they must cease with the master's authority to which they owed their existence.

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* Edwards, b. IV. c. 3.

† Edwards, *ibid.*

‡ Book. 1. Sect. III. Part I.

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This has been clearly established by the view which has already been taken of the free negroes in our old sugar colonies. But still more chimerical would be the expectation of any voluntary exertion of industry in Africans newly imported from a state of freedom in their own country. Is it to be supposed that those men, carried directly from their native sands and deserts to the New World, will at once feel wants and acquire habits to which they were formerly strangers? In our old colonies, it is found necessary to teach the newly imported slave the difficult lesson of industry by slow degrees, by the example of others to whose care he is committed for instruction, and by the constant application of the driver's lash. In the Portuguese settlements, this course of discipline is still more sedulously attended to; and, that it may begin sooner, the slave ships are partly manned with Brazil negroes. But, in the West Indies, the same uncivilized men are suddenly to become diligent and quiet labourers, eager for employment and ready to be taught, able to shake off with their ship irons all their ancient habits of listless indolence, and anxious to divert their thoughts from brooding over their misfortunes, by submitting to a life of active exertion, with that cheerful resignation which is the most valuable growth of a refined and philosophic age. I greatly fear that these projectors

projectors trust a little too much to the effects of the middle passage upon those unfortunate men. I must be allowed to suspect, that, in order to people Trinidad and the other unsettled colonies with negroes who will work for hire, they must discover a new race of Africans industrious in their own country, or invent some method of operating instantaneously upon the tribes already known, an enlargement of desires and a change of habits, which, in the natural progress of human society, is the slow produce of many succeeding ages.

Voluntary labour for hire, that exertion which we denominate industry, however simple it may appear to us who are accustomed to it, is nevertheless a refinement wholly unknown among the savage tribes of Africa. All travellers agree in this statement of the fact. The numbers who are either born or made slaves in that continent, are said to exceed those of the free inhabitants in a threefold proportion. There, as in the West Indies, the bondsmen form the labouring part of every community. In Africa, as in our colonies, that unnatural state of society exists in full perfection, which separates the toil from the enjoyment of its fruits. No such thing as a man working for another, from the inducement of hire or reward, or from any voluntary bargain, was ever heard of in that continent. Nothing, then, but compulsion can there effect

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that division of labour and reward which is so repugnant to natural justice. Those who have no slaves, work just long enough to supply their necessary wants, or hire the slaves of others if they can afford it: those who have slaves of their own, never think of labouring themselves.*

It would appear then, that, with respect to the habits and qualities of the negroes, the most hopeless of the two schemes for extending the West Indian cultivation, is that which consists in direct importation. But besides the objections already urged against the more circuitous method of procuring negroes, there are others so insuperable as of themselves to render its adoption impossible.

After a residence in our islands sufficient to train and season the negroes, they must have formed local attachments strong enough to make transportation in a high degree painful. Accordingly, in the penal code of the slave laws, banishment occupies the next place to death. Still more cruel would such an exchange be to the Creole negroes, for whom, as most valuable, the demand would be greatest. And as the place of all who are exported must be supplied by fresh importations from Africa, a double cruelty and injustice would thus be committed.

* Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa, chap. XXI. & XXII.

committed. Besides, the security of the old colonies would be manifestly injured by such constant drains of their seasoned hands, and so great an influx of new and unbroken slaves; while the inhabitants of the new settlements would have their profits, already much less than those of slave proprietors, still more diminished by being forced to buy their negroes, not at the African price, nor yet at that which new slaves fetch in the West Indian market, but at the still higher rate which the old planters must demand for slaves already trained to work. This additional expence, first, from the double passage, next, from the difference between the labour of the negroes seasoned in the islands, and the labour of those first seasoned and then transported, and, lastly, from the extra profits of the West Indian planter, would operate at the very period of cultivation, already sufficiently encumbered with cost and difficulty, and would effectually disable the planter, who should adopt the new system, from entering into competition with his brethren in the old colonies: not to mention the impossibility of preventing a contraband trade with the coast of Africa, where the temptation would be so strong, and the means of concealment so easy; in extensive countries abounding in harbours, and thinly peopled with men more or less engaged in planting, and in-

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interested in conniving at abuses of this sort. Suppose it were required to people Trinidad in this way, the foreign settlements in the West Indies and America would be at least as unfit to supply the demand as our own, except perhaps Brazil, which is favourably situated, and is enabled, by the extent of the Portuguese possessions in Africa and the shortness of the middle passage, to import slaves at a much cheaper rate than any other colony; but, then, the Portuguese laws strictly prohibit re-exportation, doubtless, in order to keep up the proportion of Creole negroes; and as, in various instances, they watch over the rights of slaves, it is evident that goods of this description would be of all others the most difficult and expensive to smuggle.

We may conclude, therefore, that the only practicable method of transporting a population of negroes to Trinidad, or the other uncultivated colonies, is the direct importation from Africa, while, unfortunately, the people thus procured, are least of any adapted to the situation of free labourers, which they are required to fill.

But, admitting for a moment that capitalists acquainted with the nature of the business could be induced to speculate in the way recommended, let us consider the probable consequences of the

the plan succeeding, and see whether the very same dangers might not result from filling the settlements with emancipated exiles, that are so justly to be apprehended, from the more practicable and scarcely less humane scheme of allowing the slave trade to be introduced in its full extent.

In the *first* place, as it is granted on all hands that the cultivation by free negroes will, for some years at least, be more expensive than the old method, both from the price of their labour in addition to their purchase-money, and from the inferior efficacy of their voluntary industry; some compensation for this difference must be given, and a strong temptation held out to induce planters to employ their capital in a speculation against which so many violent prejudices may be expected at first to prevail. If any allurements can be found sufficient to counteract these; if, for example, as has been proposed, * government shall freely grant the crown lands to cultivators; and if the inducement of saving the original purchase-money shall be strong enough to outweigh the considerations of subsequent expence and risk; it is most probable that the balance will only need to be turned, in order to preponderate as much the other way.

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* Crisis of the Sugar Colonies, let. IV.

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way. The spirit of adventure delights in sudden movements, and when once excited, generally runs into extremes. In the New World, at least, it has always been of an infectious nature; and a speculator who is led astray by its flattering influence, seldom wants companions either to partake of his success or to share his ruin. If the general effects of large capital, and the character of British traders, left us any room to doubt that they are as susceptible of these impulses as the first invaders of America; the whole history of our sugar islands, but still more the eagerness with which British capital was poured into the Dutch colonies during the late war, might convince us of what we have to expect, should any means be adopted for opening a passage to the rich and virgin soil of Trinidad. The instant that the obstructions to the new scheme are removed, we may rest assured, that no bounds will be set to the enterprising spirit of monied men. If the engine is once put in motion, its velocity will be prodigious. The arguments which convince, or the prospects which allure one planter, will spread their influence to many; and in a very short time the few white inhabitants of the island will be surrounded with multitudes of free negroes, far more suddenly collected, and probably in greater numbers, than the slaves who cultivate

tivate the most populous of our ancient possessions. S E C T.
I.

Now these swarms of barbarians, thus rapidly introduced, are indeed to be all free.

Before examining what, in their situation, must be the meaning of this word (whose sound seems to have strangely misled so many writers and orators on the colonial question), let us consider under what circumstances the importation is made. So great and sudden an increase in the demand for negroes, must produce extraordinary exertions on the part of the African slave merchant and his providers. The stock of those who possess slaves will soon be exhausted; the number of those condemned for crimes will remain nearly the same as before; the deficiency must be supported by an increase of the only other means of procuring negroes, war and pillage.* It is easy to perceive, that the tract of country whose inhabitants are most fierce and contentious, will be necessarily resorted to. The peaceful natives of Whydah will furnish but a small part of the additional supply. The ferocious inhabitants of the Gold Coast, easily roused to

* In the language of most of the African nations, what we call war is distinguished by the name of the '*Great Pillage*;' a metaphor (shall we call it?) peculiarly descriptive of the hostilities of those people, and not altogether inexpressive of the contentions carried on in some other parts of the world.

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to hostilities congenial to their dispositions, will recruit the holds of our slave ships, and form a large proportion of the quickly increasing population of the new settlements. Can it be imagined, that tribes of savages thus torn from their native country, suddenly deprived of that unrestrained freedom which was the pride of their roaming lives, loaded with chains, and crowded into a nauseous dungeon, transported to a distant region by a strange race of men, known to them only by their cruel rapacity—Can it be imagined, that immediately on the words of emancipation being pronounced, they will become peaceful subjects of their oppressors, and voluntarily submit to an authority unsupported by force?

We know, that in all colonies where the strict subordination of slavery exists, the newly imported negroes are carefully distributed among those whom time has habituated to the yoke; and any rapid increase of numbers is dreaded as the forerunner of rebellion. In almost all negro insurrections, the new slaves have been the chief instigators*; and those from the Gold Coast have generally been found the most difficult to tame, and most prone to rebellion.† Yet our islands have been slowly peopled;

* Long's Hist. of Jamaica, vol. II. p. 444.

† Edwards' West Indies, b. IV. c. 3.

peopled ; and time has always been given for
uniting the unbroken negroes with the general
mass. In the beginning of the last century, the
average imports from the British West Indies a-
mounted to seven hundred thousand pounds. In
the middle of that century, this average had on-
ly increased to a million and a half ; and at the
end of the century, it was under five millions,
including the produce of Trinidad and the
islands ceded by the peace of Paris, and not-
withstanding the diminished supply occasioned
by the state of the French West Indies, and the
diversion of capital from North America in
consequence of the war. The increase of the
whites, too, bore some proportion to the import-
ation of slaves. In 1734, the negroes of Ja-
maica amounted to upwards of eighty-six thou-
sand ; the whites to seven thousand six hundred
only. In 1768, the former had increased to a-
bout a hundred and sixty-seven thousand ; the
latter to seventeen thousand : And in 1791,
the negroes amounted to two hundred and fifty
thousand, while the whites had increased to
thirty thousand, of whom eight thousand eight
hundred were seamen, and six thousand three
hundred bore arms in the militia. The vast
importations into St Domingo during the ten
years previous to the contentions between the
whites

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whites and the people of colour, facilitated in all probability the designs of those who excited the negroes to insurrection. While the numbers of the whites had rather decreased, * the stock of negroes had risen from two hundred and fifty thousand to four hundred and eighty thousand, including those employed in domestic service and town occupations, who were of course as numerous in 1779 as in 1789, that is, about forty-six thousand. The field negroes, then, were considerably more than doubled. † Yet even in St Domingo, there was a large population of slaves born in the island, with whom those newly arrived might incorporate. In Trinidad and the other new settlements, there is not even this foundation to build upon. Every thing must be begun anew. Swarms of negroes must be poured in, with only the few proprietors of plantations to keep them in subjection, and to stand between them and plunder.

But the *freedom* of these unfortunate men is, according to the principles upon which the project appears to have been formed, sufficient to disarm them of all designs hostile to the security of the whites. - Let us for a moment consider the situation in which this freedom will place them.

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* Necker, Administ. des Finances, tom. I. chap. 13.

† Rapport à l'Assemblée Legislative 1792.

It is proposed that the planter shall have a preferable right to purchase the labour of the negroes whom he imports, and this right of preemption is described as an additional encouragement to speculation. But it is manifest that this is not merely a gratuitous encouragement; it is a necessary part of the plan. No man could ever be found foolish enough to buy or import negroes, if, upon their landing, another might reap the profit of the speculation, by hiring them for his own use. It is therefore not an arbitrary regulation added for the farther encouragement of cultivation, but an essential ingredient of the system, that the importer or purchaser of a negro shall have the sole right to his labour for a term of years, at a rate of wages fixed by law. This is called by the projectors, particularly by the author of the *Crisis*, 'the known relation of indented servant;' and the fancied analogy seems at first to give the scheme a more feasible aspect. But it should be remembered, that indented servants in the North American colonies were always men accustomed at home to labour for hire; driven from their country by want of employment, or the prospect of greater wealth, and eager to find work in the new world. They were, therefore, exactly in the situation from which the greatest exertions of industry might be expected, whether for profit or for hire; and

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and there was no occasion for coercion to prevent them from being idle. The free negroes, on the other hand, must be forced to work; and accordingly, it is farther admitted, that masters should have the power of inflicting moderate chastisement. It is very clear, that the two modes of exciting industry, punishment and hire, are utterly incompatible. They appeal to different principles, and give rise to opposite habits. Besides, it is not easy to conceive a system of regulations which shall prevent this power, necessarily entrusted to the planter over his servant, from degenerating into the tyranny of the master over his slave.

But, at any rate, admitting the possibility of drawing a line between the two relations, it is evident that two orders of men will be formed in the settlements: the Whites, possessing all the land, entrusted with the whole civil power, clothed with domestic authority: and the Blacks, whose lives are spent in poverty and subjection; toiling for masters whom they consider as a different race of beings, and in whom they recognize the enemies that tore them from their country. Between these two orders there can exist no bond of union but that of force; they are the oppressors and the oppressed. Similarity of complexion and situation will constantly unite the one against the other; and there will be no intermediate class,
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at least for a series of years, to soften the transition, to hold the balance, or to connect the two classes together. The White will always view the Black as a being of an inferior order, bought with his money, depending on him for support, and born for his use. In all the colonies of the Europeans in the New World, the colour is made the standard of distinction; and by its different shades the approaches to a state of equality with the whites are regulated. * Nor is it of much consequence, whether we consider the disadvantages attached to negro blood, as having originally been the cause, or the result of the contempt which the difference of colour excites. The present race of planters, who are to found the free negro system, labour under the prejudice, from whatever cause it may have arisen; and he who shall superintend the establishment, may possibly find it somewhat difficult to change the nature of these men. Nay, should he succeed in finding, or creating a new generation of white proprietors, half the work would still remain. The Africans, too, must undergo a radical change: they must be enlightened with the ideas of abstract philanthropy, and inspired with the sense of general expediency, and the love of order. In such circumstances, it is idle to talk of laws and regulations. Men must first be found ready to obey,

* Wimpffen's Letters, p. 63.

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obey, and to conform. Manners and circumstances are independent of positive institutions. They prescribe bounds to the decrees of despotism, and give laws to the legislator in the plenitude of his power. It will be vain to think of securing the privileges of the negro vassal, so long as the hand of nature has distinguished him from his lord, and the circumstances of his situation have given his brethren the superiority in numbers as well as strength. The magistrate, however appointed, will generally be inclined towards the cause of his fellow Christian; and should he even be impartial, how is the negro to adduce his evidence? The mere circumstance of slavery, is not the only reason for rejecting the testimony of the Blacks against the Europeans, in the American colonies. The distinction of race; the radical difference of manners and character; the perpetual opposition of interests, as well as prejudices; the inefficacy of oaths in the mind tempted by passion, uninfluenced by religious impression, and a stranger to the dictates of honour,—these are the circumstances which render a negro's testimony utterly inadmissible against a white man; and they would mark the situation of the vassal as decisively as they now do that of the slave. We must therefore expect that abuses, beyond the knowledge of any constituted

constituted authority, would soon assimilate the villenage of Trinidad, &c. to the slavery of our old possessions ; and that there would result from the new system, a state of society tainted by radical evils, beyond the reach even of parliamentary legislation. The modifications of slavery established by law in favour of the negroes, would, without rendering their situation much more tolerable, give them far greater opportunities to disturb the peace of the colony. Actuated by the same *esprit de corps*, which even under the whip of the driver has so often broken out into revolt, and given rise to plans concerted with wonderful prudence and unanimity, in spite of all the regulations by which, in the organization of the old colonies, they are separated from each other ; the vassal of Trinidad would be free from many of those obstacles which the slave system throws in the way of insurrection. The laws, for instance, which prevent slaves from possessing horses, fire-arms, and ammunition ; those which restrict their powers of locomotion, and those which prohibit them from meeting for the purposes of recreation, are utterly inapplicable to the condition in which it has been proposed to place the negroes of the new settlements, if it is intended that there should be more than a nominal difference between the projected system and the one at present established.



It is easy, then, to see the result of all this. The planters, knowing that by law their vassals have certain rights, will use their power over them with far less moderation than if they lay wholly at their mercy. The negroes, on their part, finding how nugatory their constitutional privileges become, in the particulars most essential to their happiness, and united by every tie which can induce men to make a common cause, will avail themselves of the few advantages of which their superiors cannot deprive them, and will at once revenge the injuries of their race. From every view of the subject, therefore, we are led to the same conclusion, that, admitting the plan to be practicable, its consequences must be so inevitably fatal, that we are easily reconciled to the prospect of the various difficulties which cannot fail to prevent its adoption.

But, it will be said, the magnitude of the change produced upon negroes by their emancipation, has been proved by the example of the free negroes in all the European colonies; and more particularly by the unshaken fidelity of those slaves who have been taken from field work, and entrusted with arms, sometimes in the midst of rebellion. The universal prejudice of our colonists against such troops will be overlooked; and the history

tory of the revolts in Surinam, of our own black corps, and in general of the free negroes in the different colonies, will be appealed to as proofs, that the dangers of our situation arise from the bondage in which the bulk of this unhappy class of men are kept. These facts it is by no means my intention to dispute; but I apprehend that a little reflection will shew how imprudent it would be to draw from them any inference in favour of the scheme now under consideration.

There is perhaps no principle more universal in its influence over the mind of man, or more conspicuous in its effects on his conduct, than the desire of being distinguished among his fellows. The eagerness of individuals to better their condition, is indeed one of the most powerful of the springs by which the great machine of society is moved. But the love of distinction seems to be the most universal criterion, by which they judge of the comparative advantages of different situations; more especially in a rude state, where comforts and luxuries are little prized. This desire, it is evident, directs itself in relation to the class to which we ourselves naturally belong, and at which our envy or jealousy is always pointed. The fortunes of those who are removed to a great distance, either above or below us,

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have no power to raise such emotions. All our ideas centre in our own order. Thus, it is not among the polished strangers who visit his coast, but among his kindred tribes, that the savage warrior pants to signalize himself; and where the principles of policy are so imperfectly understood, the aid of the foreigner is cheerfully accepted against a rival horde.

This is the very principle that attaches the free negroes in the West Indies to the party of the Europeans. A slave, born or trained to servitude, courts the favour of his master, because it distinguishes him from his fellow slaves. After he has obtained this mark of distinction, he naturally takes the side of his master, partly because his comrades view him with distrust, and partly because his relative importance is connected with his master's safety. In like manner, the slave who has obtained his liberty, views this honourable distinction, not with a reference to other freed men whom he resembles in every thing, or to Europeans whom he scarcely resembles at all, but to the great body of slaves by whom he is surrounded, and to whose class he once belonged. The free negroes form in each settlement a small body naturally related to the bulk of the inhabitants, but proud of the distinguishing circumstance which raises them above the common level.

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They are as it were the privileged order in the African community. As the nobles in the European monarchies have for the most part rallied round the throne, since the commonalty became an order independent of their authority: so, the free negroes have generally joined the whites, in their resistance to the great body of enslaved blacks. They are as much interested in preventing a universal emancipation, as the aristocracy of a well regulated kingdom would be, in opposing a system of levelling, or a plan for conferring on the lower orders all the privileges of nobility.

So long, then, as the free negroes bear a very small proportion, both to the Europeans and slaves, the former may always count upon having their assistance against the latter. This is happily the situation of all our West Indian possessions, and of those parts of the United States where slavery is tolerated. In Barbadoes, they are not much more than the twentieth of the whites, and scarcely the sixty-eighth part of the slaves. In Jamaica and Dominica, where they are most numerous, their proportion (including the large body of free people of colour) to the whites in 1790, was that of one to three, and to the slaves that of one to twenty-five; and those negroes who have at different junctures been armed, both in our own and in the Dutch colonies, bore a

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still smaller proportion to the body of the people.

If, however, we suppose that the numbers of the free negroes are so much increased as to equal those of the whites, the case is materially altered. By degrees they will consider themselves as on a level with those who were once their masters. Being always less industrious and wealthy, they will view the European proprietor with envy. Idleness, discontent and indigence will give birth to projects of plunder; and the state of degradation in which they have been held by the whites, will add a mixture of revenge. Accustomed now to regard the European more than the slave, and sufficiently strong to fancy that they can manage the latter, and keep their ground against either, they may possibly form the dangerous scheme of attacking the whites, and of calling in the assistance of the enslaved negroes.

Unhappily this is no longer a matter of speculation. The devastation of the finest colony in the world was produced by these very means. The rebellion in St Domingo was begun by the free people of colour, who were nearly equal to the whites in number, and kept by them in the same state of inferiority and oppression in which the free negroes are all over the West Indies. It should seem, then, that some danger is to be apprehended from

from the free negroes, even in the islands where the bulk of the community are enslaved. Accordingly, the policy of our colonies has watched over this intermediate order of men with a jealous eye. Various laws have been made to prevent too great an increase of their numbers, to enforce their submission to the whites, and to limit their influence in the community. In Antigua, * St Vincent, † and the Virgin Isles, ‡ they are obliged to chuse a white man for their patron. Unless they have landed property, they cannot become freeholders, and are incapacitated from possessing more than eight acres of land. If they strike the meanest white servant, they are to be summarily and severely whipped; whilst a white who strikes a free negro or mulatto is only to be bound over to the next sessions, and punished at the discretion of the justices. In the Bahamas, || there is a heavy tax upon all free negroes or mulattoes who come thither; and in Barbadoes ¶, the evidence of a slave is received against them. In what light they are viewed by the colonial jurisprudence of France, we may gather from the following passage of the *Code Noire*; a system of laws distinguished for nothing so much as its extreme mildness towards the negroes. ‘ *D’ailleurs, les*

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‘ *negres*

* Act 1702.

† Act 1767.

‡ Act 1783.

|| Act 1784.

¶ Act 1739.

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‘ *negres en general sont des hommes dangereux ;
 ‘ presque pas un de ceux auxquels vous avez ren-
 ‘ du la liberté qui n’en ait abusé, et qui ne soit
 ‘ porté à des excès dangereux pour la société.*’ *

But if such are the dangers to be apprehended from a body of free creole negroes, gradually formed in old established colonies, where the whites and slaves are numerous ; what must be the situation of the new communities, when, in consequence of the plan now proposed, they shall, in the space of a few years, be peopled with freed and imported negroes, in numbers and strength far exceeding the whites, bound to them by no desire of distinguishing themselves from a surrounding multitude of slaves, or of uniting against an enemy equally formidable to both ?

In St Domingo, the influence of manners softened the rigour of the laws against the free people of colour ; they were connected with the whites by the ties of blood ; and the property which they possessed defended them still farther from oppression. In the new colonies, the manners will be still more severe than the laws upon the free negroes quite unconnected with their oppressors ; and, long before they can acquire the protection of property, matters will have come to a crisis. In St Domingo, the slaves
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* Edit. 1762, 31 Mars & 5 Avril.

formed a third party, to whom indeed the mulattoes appealed, but whose assistance could not be procured without much difficult management, and whose subjection to the whites afforded them an opportunity of moderating, in many parts of the island, the violence of the combined attack. In the new colonies, the vassal negroes will have no such steps to take; the contagion will spread at once; and the Whites have no auxiliaries to whom they can appeal.* The position of St Domingo to the leeward of the other French colonies, enabled the vigorous government which was established there to throw in very seasonable succours. Admitting (to take the instance of our own colonial affairs) that our island establishments could afford relief to Trinidad, the catastrophe will probably be over before a single transport can reach the Gulf of Paria. After the French in St Domingo

* It is, indeed, proposed that government should take into its pay a certain number of the imported negroes; and the author of the '*Crisis*' more particularly remarks, that they will be faithful from their gratitude to the power that has delivered them from slavery, and will delight in the honours of a military life. But, in the *first* place, government, so far from emancipating them, has only carried them off from their own country to a West Indian garrison; and, *secondly*, when slavery is abolished, we find that military service is a severe punishment to field negroes.—*Vide* Toussaint's Proclamation.

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go had been subdued, the two great classes of men whom common enmity had united, instantly turned their arms against each other, with a rage still more exterminating than that which had marked their combination. Both parties, now, pretended authority from the Republic, and in both armies the Whites acquired some influence. An opportunity was thus given them to undermine their enemies, to reconcile the conquering party, and to put in motion all the powers of intrigue, by which ill cemented alliances of half-civilized men may be quickly dissolved. But in Trinidad and the other settlements organized upon the same plan, our vassals will form one united band, bent on the extermination of the European name, unfit for any union or compromise by which the whites may retain a footing, and, after having expelled the planters, capable only of renewing, in the most favoured quarters of the New World, those scenes of savage life to which their forced intercourse with Europeans will rather have increased their attachment. Then will Trinidad, more particularly, be to all the Carribbee islands that windward fire which we have before proved that the Leeward settlements would experience in the negro commonwealth of St Domingo ; with this only difference, that its inhabitants, less civilized and totally unacquainted with the arts of peace, will devote themselves

themselves to the extirpation of the Europeans in those seas. S E C T.
I.

*‘ Suspecta majoribus nostris fuere ingenia servorum, etiam cum in agris, aut domibus iisdem, nascerentur, caritatemque dominorum statim acciperent. Postquam verò nationes in familiis habemus, quibus diversi ritus, externa sacra, aut nulla sunt, colluviem is tam non nisi metu coercueris.’ **

I have thus rapidly attempted to sketch a few features of the picture which the experience of the past holds up for the instruction of those who may be inclined to sport with negro emancipation. And if the examples already furnished in that quarter of the globe which is to be the theatre of the new experiment, are not in all their details applicable to the case which may arise from the prosecution of the proposed scheme, we may conclude, that these instances fall infinitely short of the dangers with which it is fraught. But when the various insurmountable difficulties attending this new and untried system are fully considered, we can entertain no serious apprehensions of its being carried into effect. The old, and impolitic, and iniquitous, but practicable, and, I really believe, less dangerous mode of colonization, will probably be resorted to.

• Tacitus, Annal. lib. XIV. cap. 44.

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to. The dominion of the cart-whip re-established over the ancient settlements of the western Archipelago, will be extended to the more serene regions of the Oroonoco and the Mississippi, where the traffic of human flesh will be interrupted by no avenging storms, and the avarice of Europeans may for yet a few generations wallow in the blood-stained spoils of African labour; until, in the fulness of time, the great event, which has for ages been slowly preparing, shall be accomplished; and the African warriors, gradually civilized in the fruitful islands of America, shall obtain quiet, and, may we not add, rightful possession, of those plains which have been cultivated by the toils and sufferings of their fathers.

SECT.

SECTION II.

OF THE NEGRO SLAVE SYSTEM, OR THE PRESENT
STATE OF SOCIETY IN THE SLAVE COLONIES, AND
THE MEANS OF IMPROVING IT.

The remarks which have been made upon the character and habits of the negroes, both in the last Section, and in the former Parts of this Inquiry, seem to suggest certain conclusions of a very positive and definite nature with respect to the internal structure of the slave colonies.

S E C T.
II.

It may be observed, in the *first* place, that all attempts speedily to change the state of society in those settlements by legislative enactments, are if possible still more ridiculous, and, if attended with any material consequences, still more dangerous than similar endeavours made suddenly to new-model communities of the ordinary texture.

In the *second* place, we may remark, that however deficient in civilization, the negroes are evidently capable of acquiring those wants and desires which are the feeds of industry; that they are endowed with powers, not only of body but of mind, sufficient to render their improvement

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ment and high refinement a matter of absolute certainty under a proper system of management ; and that there is nothing in their nature peculiar or distinguishing, which renders them a separate class, or places them beyond the influence of the passions and principles common to all the rest of mankind in certain stages of society, Through the whole of this Inquiry, I have argued every question relating to the negroes, upon the same general grounds which are used to investigate the history, or determine the probable fates, of other rude nations. All the facts with which we are acquainted, concur to justify a mode of reasoning pointed out by the clearest analogies ; and the greatest errors have been committed by politicians, both in speculation and in practical arrangements, from the fundamental and vulgar prejudice of considering the Africans as a peculiar race, to whom general views do not apply. The Africans, in fact, as closely resemble every other rude people in their characters and habits, as in their circumstances. When enslaved their characters and habits are modified by the change of situation ; and they become similar to all rude tribes placed in a state of bondage. When wise and liberal regulations mitigate the hardships of their lot, a door is opened for their gradual improvement and progress in civilization, according to that general

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ral principle of advancement which seems to be an essential part of the human character, and which always works its effects in the most obvious manner, unless when stifled by absurd or wicked institutions.

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We may remark, in the *third* place, that the mixed breed of mulattoes in the slave colonies does not render the structure of the society anomalous. On the contrary, these men are subservient to many useful purposes. They are in some respects superior to the negroes; as, in civilization and mental endowments. In bodily strength and adaptation to the circumstances of the tropical climate, they are almost on a level with the pure African breed. They are uniformly attached to the Whites, in those colonies where cruel rigour on the part of the government has not alienated them, or their numbers rendered them formidable. They form, together with the free negroes, an intermediate class of men, connecting the other two, however imperfect the link or however sudden the gradation may be, compared with those uniting principles which knit and mould the more curiously arranged fabrics of European and Asiatic society. It is entirely from the influence of manners, and of positive institutions, that the people of colour have uniformly been held in a state of degradation, and even classed with the free negroes.

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The existence of slavery is the great cause of those manners and institutions. The free mulattoes are tinged with a hue which is almost the characteristic of degradation and bondage in the eyes of West Indians. They are related by blood to the vilest portion of the society; they are of the same race with many who yet obey the cart-whip: while no white man can name a brother in chains. They are, moreover, from the state of morals among the Whites (the immediate effect of the slave system), almost universally the fruits of illicit and vulgar amours; they owe nothing to their mother but life; and are, in their turn, sacrificed to the brutal passions of the common tyrants. It is evident that these circumstances which distinguish the mixed race in the colonial society, are altogether the consequences of the slave system, and of the state of manners which that system has produced. They present, therefore, no formidable obstacle to the legislator who would, by gradual and prudent measures, reform the corrupted mass, and lay the foundations of a more natural arrangement in the social union, by cautiously but firmly applying the axe to the root of the evil, and undermining the institutions that have grown up in defiance of all justice and policy.

The same remarks apply with equal precision to the free negroes, who indeed resemble

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semble the mulattoes in their moral and political circumstances. And as the state of society among the Whites themselves is evidently affected in the most material degree by the same system of institutions which so peculiarly distinguishes the tropical colonies of America *, we may with confidence conclude, that the whole fabric of colonial society has naturally arisen out of the circumstances in which legislative enactments originally placed those provinces ; that it presents no insuperable difficulties to the wisdom of enlightened reformers ; that it may receive complete and radical amelioration from the gradual abolition of the noxious and artificial establishments which have been formed by the measures of former statesmen.

In the *fourth* place, there can be no doubt that the climate of the West Indies renders the labour of negroes essential to the cultivation of the soil. It is only in their corporeal qualities that those men are fundamentally distinguished from the rest of the human species. They excel all the other races of mankind in hardiness, agility, and strength of limbs ; in the capacity of sustaining the most galling fatigue and pain ; in the faculty of enduring labour under every

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* Book I. Sect. I.

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fort of privation, and all kinds of annoyance ; above all, in that quality which chiefly distinguishes the human body from the bodies of the lower animals, the power of submitting with ease to every change of season, and adapting the corporeal habitudes and functions, with safety and alacrity, to all the varieties of climate. From the first discovery of America to the present time, the experience of every day in those sultry though splendid regions, has proved, that neither Europeans nor their descendants are capable of enduring fatigue in the burning climates of the southern colonies. To the negro, all climates and soils are the same. He thrives as well in those marshes whence the heat of the vertical sun exhales every noxious vapour, and engenders all the multifarious forms of animal and vegetable poison, as in the happiest vallies of the old world, where the breeze, the shade, and the stream, temper the genial warmth of the most serene and fragrant air. As long, therefore, as the colonies are cultivated, the population must consist of a mixed and variegated tribe. The great object of the legislator is the improvement of that state of society, and that system of manners, which have arisen from the necessary introduction of distinct races of men, differing from each other in civilization, in bodily qualities, and

and in political privileges. The only plan which can be admitted into our thoughts must proceed upon the principle of new-modelling the present structure of society, and retaining at the same time all the parts of which it is composed. I have endeavoured to illustrate, by a few general observations, the possibility of accomplishing both these ends. I shall now attend more particularly to the means which are suggested for the attainment of this purpose, by the nature of the principal evils which in the present situation of things call so loudly for correction.

I. The first and the greatest of those evils, the radical vice of the whole West Indian system, is, beyond all doubt, the oppressive treatment of the negro slaves. It requires very little argument to prove, that the quantity of work which may be obtained from a labourer or drudge, is liable to be affected as much by the injurious treatment that he receives, as by the idleness in which he may be permitted to indulge. Where this drudge is a slave, no motive but fear can operate upon his diligence and attention. A constant inspection is therefore absolutely necessary, and a perpetual terror of the lash is the only preventive of indolence. But there are certain bounds prescribed even to

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the power of the lash. It may force the unhappy victim to move, because the line of distinction between motion and rest, action and repose, is definite; but no punishment can compel the labourer to strenuous exertion, because there is no measure nor standard of activity. A state of despair, not of industry, is the never-failing consequence of severe chastisement; and the constant repetition of the torture only serves to blunt the sensibility of the nerves, and disarm the punishment of its terrors. The body is injured, and the mind becomes as little willing, as the limbs are able to exert. Bad food, scanty support of every kind, constant exposure to the extremities of the weather, must weaken the strength and exhaust the constitution even of a Creole negro. Want of rest, which those men can bear, or appear to bear, with miraculous indifference, must ere long wear them out. Both their bodies and their minds must sooner become incapable of labour than those of voluntary workmen, who have constantly before them the strongest possible motives to activity; and whilst complicated ill usage is rapidly destroying the lives of the sufferers, it must evidently diminish the productive powers of the exertions which the survivors continue to make.

It

It may therefore appear somewhat singular, that the melancholy history of the American colonies should present so unvaried a picture of cruelty and oppressions, when nothing can be more manifest than the immediate and gross impolicy of such conduct. Those who are always confident in mens honesty as long as their direct and specific interests draw them to the paths of integrity, may find some reason, in the annals of West Indian cultivation, to believe that the caprice and folly of human nature is scarcely inferior to its depravity; and that, instead of following the dictates of humane feelings or conscientious principles, in opposition to the temptations of self-love, there seems to be some rooted predilection for vice and cruelty so strongly implanted in the human breast, as to predominate altogether over the united temptations of virtue and interest. Certain it is, that the masters of slaves have in all ages indulged their worst appetites and most useless caprices, at the expence of those very interests, to further which the slaves were purchased; and that, in order to gratify those momentary gusts of passion, they have systematically given up the best and easiest means of pursuing the great objects of their whole lives.

The facts which have repeatedly been laid before the world, prove to a demonstration the

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truth of these remarks. It is established beyond all doubt, that the most unprofitable plantations are not always those of which the soil is unfruitful or incommodiously situated, but uniformly those which are cultivated by negroes subjected to a cruel and stingy system of management; that the most laborious duty is performed by the best fed and most indulged slaves; that the more nearly the negro is permitted to approach the condition of freedom in his enjoyments, his privileges and his habits, the more alacrity does he shew in performing the task assigned to him. Yet, in spite of this uniform experience, so few experiments have been tried of the mild and profitable system of management, that those plantations into which it has been introduced are pointed out as remarkable. The exception to the general rule is not found in that estate, of which the proprietor prefers the commission of cruelty and injustice, to the pursuit of his evident advantage; but in that estate, of which the owner pursues the easiest and most profitable system of management, notwithstanding its moral rectitude. There appear, then, to be certain bad principles inherent in the human heart, certain blind passions and movements of caprice, which constantly impel men, in certain circumstances, to a line

line of conduct as obviously inconsistent with their interests as repugnant to their duty.

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The ill treatment of the negroes is as unfavourable to the manners of the colonial society, as it is prejudicial to the wealth of the settlements. The negroes are deprived of all opportunities of individual improvement; all chance of gaining a part of that civilization, in the midst of which they are placed; all possibility of acquiring industrious habits, so incompatible with the constant exertion of cruelty and unjust oppression. Where they are allowed certain indulgences, and gradually made to feel their own importance and reap the rewards of voluntary labour, by receiving certain privileges connected with property, and being permitted to work for the increase of their own *peculium*, we may expect the foundation to be laid of those industrious principles which are the great cause of human improvement, and form the bond of civilized society. The more cruelly and unjustly any dependent order of men are treated by their superiors, the more debased will all their sentiments become. Where fear is the only motive of action, or the great and predominant feeling in the mind, it soon absorbs every other principle, and moulds all the habits of thought to its own degrading form. Where caprice is min-

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gled with tyranny, the principle of implicit obedience becomes still more corrupting. No general rules of conduct can be followed. The body of the wretched slave becomes a mere machine, actuated in all its movements by a power placed at a distance from it. The bad passions of the master too, pollute, by the mere force of example, the slave who is subject to them and can estimate their full extent. It is partly from this cause that the servant or the beast of a slave, is of all animated beings the most wretched.

The oppressive treatment of the negroes is equally prejudicial to the manners of the whites themselves. We have formerly had occasion to trace this effect of the negro system in its state of abuse; and to remark the injuries arising from thence to the extent and value, as well as to the character of the white population. *

But the most fatal of all the consequences which result from the corruptions of the slave system, are those that immediately affect the security of the colonies. We have often had an opportunity of contemplating the effects of cruel treatment upon the fidelity of the negroes in the different settlements. In strict conformity to those general principles which the best writers upon the human character have
fo

* Book I. Sect. I.

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so successfully explained, and in broad defiance of all the absurd assertions, so confidently made by the apologists of the West Indian policy, it has been proved, by the united testimony of all the authors whose opportunities of information are most extensive, that the proneness of the negroes to revolt, is in precise proportion to the cruelty and parsimony of their masters. The history of the Dutch colonies, contrasted with that of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements,* and (I fear we may add) the history of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements, contrasted with that of all the others, furnishes abundant proofs of this statement, in itself so extremely probable, that it requires scarcely any support from experience to gain belief. In all rebellions, the plantations where the slaves were treated with most indulgence, have suffered the least from the fury of insurrection; and, on the contrary, those estates have generally been the hotbeds of the rebellion, or the first objects of its attack, where the overseer was cruel, and the master avaricious or needy; where, of consequence, the slaves were hard-worked, scantily provided with necessaries, and severely or unjustly punished.

The

* Book I. Sect. II. parts I. II. & III.

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The inefficacy of mild treatment, in spite of all these facts, has been asserted with a degree of confidence, more perhaps the result of mercantile prudence, than of entire conviction on the part of those whose interests have led them to support the slave system. As a specimen of the manner in which this important branch of the subject has been discussed, by persons of the description just now mentioned, I shall state the argument of Mr Edwards, adduced in his History of St Domingo ; a work certainly containing much valuable information, but conceived in a temper of mind very different from that in which the most dignified species of composition ought to be undertaken ; and apparently written more with the intention of making an appeal to popular feelings against the cause of the abolition, than with the design of impartially recording the most interesting series of events that has been displayed in the annals of the negro race. I shall quote the argument in Mr Edwards's own words. It is introduced under the form of an anecdote, after a variety of insinuations urged in the same imposing disguise.

‘ The largest sugar plantation on the plain,
 ‘ (says our author, in his description of the
 ‘ first insurrection at the Cape, *) was that of
 ‘ Mons. Gallifet, situated about eight miles
 ‘ from

* Chapter VI.

‘ from the town, the negroes belonging to
‘ which had always been treated with such
‘ kindness and liberality, and possessed so many
‘ advantages, that it became a proverbial ex-
‘ pression among the lower white people, in
‘ speaking of any man’s good fortune, to say,
‘ *il est heureux comme un negre de Gallifet,*’ (he
‘ is as happy as one of Gallifet’s negroes). M.
‘ Odeluc, the attorney or agent for this plan-
‘ tation, was a member of the General As-
‘ sembly; and being fully persuaded that the
‘ negroes belonging to it would remain firm
‘ in their obedience, determined to repair
‘ thither, to encourage them in opposing the
‘ insurgents; to which end he desired the as-
‘ sistance of a few soldiers from the town-
‘ guard, which was granted him. He pro-
‘ ceeded accordingly; but on approaching the
‘ estate, to his grief and surprise, he found all
‘ the negroes in arms on the side of the re-
‘ bels; and (horrid to tell!) *their standard*
‘ *was the body of a white infant, which they*
‘ *had recently impaled on a stake.* M. Odeluc
‘ had advanced too far to retreat undiscover-
‘ ed; and both he and a friend that accom-
‘ panied him, with most of the soldiers, were
‘ killed without mercy. Two or three only of
‘ the patrolle escaped by flight, and conveyed
‘ the

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‘ the dreadful tidings to the inhabitants of the
‘ town. ’

The following extract from Mr Clarkson’s
‘ *Essay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade,* ’ *
will probably furnish, in the first place, a satis-
factory explanation of the statement thus con-
fidently given by Mr Edwards ; and in the next
place, a commentary upon the general fidelity
of the latter gentleman’s narrative. ‘ In the
‘ island of St Domingo is an estate which has
‘ experienced a similar change. The owner
‘ considered himself as the father of his slaves ;
‘ he never harassed them with excessive labour ;
‘ he fed and treated them so well, and so
‘ mild and gentle was his government, that it
‘ became a proverb, “ As happy as a slave of
“ Gallifet. ” Thus treated, their increase was
‘ rapid. About fifteen years ago he died. The
‘ present proprietor has since adopted a differ-
‘ ent system. His slaves continually decrease,
‘ and he loses by the change of management. ’

It may be observed, that this narrative of
Mr Clarkson, published in 1788, long before
the rebellion, is introduced among twenty-five
other facts collected, as we are told in the pre-
face, from authentic information obtained by di-
rect communication with St Domingo. † The ob-
ject

* Part II. chap. I. sect. I.

† Page 1.

ject of those statements is entirely different from the purpose for which I have used the authority, as will appear to any one who reads the above quotation. It is in every respect highly probable, that the statement of the total change of management is correct. Now, Mr Edwards did not publish the first edition of his work on St Domingo till eight years after this narrative had been given to the world by Mr Clarkson. I am very much mistaken if he does not mention Mr Clarkson's writings in the course of his work ; at any rate, it is absurd to suppose that he could be ignorant of them ; and as the passage which I have extracted is among the arguments urged by the reverend author upon the most important branch of the whole subject—the possibility of keeping up the slave stocks without importation—it is to be feared that Mr Edwards could scarcely have omitted to peruse it. But whether he did so or not, the charge which I am under the necessity of grounding upon the collated passages, is equally fatal to the credit of Mr Edwards's general statements. Of the narrative given by Mr Clarkson, the truth is beyond a doubt ; and it is difficult to say whether the rashness of Mr Edwards's assertions, admitting him to have been ignorant of the real fact, or his want of fidelity, supposing him to have read the other account, throws the greatest stain upon

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upon his character as an historian. After the easy explanation which the real statement of the transaction affords, it would be credulity indeed to trust the other anecdotes of a similar stamp, which Mr Edwards has paraded in his rapidly composed and ill-digested performance. What conclusion, for instance, can we draw, with any degree of safety, from the story of the postilion, who, in the rebellion, was the first to attack and butcher a master that had treated him with marked kindness? * Possibly here, as in the former instance, a true narrative of this affair, reconciling the whole to the common order of occurrences, may have been published eight years before Mr Edwards wrote his book. Still less dare we follow our author in drawing such general conclusions against the efficacy of gentle treatment, as are contained in the beginning of the anecdote in page 100. (edit. 1801.) He does not scruple to insinuate, that this solitary instance of fidelity and attachment forms an exception to the whole conduct of the negroes during revolts. †

Such is the rash or uncandid mode of argument adopted by those who would prove, what nothing but the strongest evidence can ever establish—that the negroes are in their nature diametrically

* Chap. VI.

† Note V v.

metrically opposite to all the rest of mankind; that kindness and compassion for their misfortunes meets with no return of fidelity from their stubborn hearts; that those acts of gratuitous beneficence which attach all other races of men to their superiors, only serve to alienate the savage African, in whom favours and indulgences produce nothing but the blackest ingratitude and perfidy. No one can entertain the slightest doubt upon this subject, after casting his eye over the statements which I have given in the Third Section of the First Book, borrowed chiefly from writers whose antipathy to the negroes is extreme, and whose works abound in the most absurd allegations against the character of that race. It is sufficient to mention the testimony of M. Malouet, who, with all his attachment to the slave system, and all his violent prejudices against the negroes, * has laid down, in the most unqualified terms, the very proposition which I have been maintaining, and supported his general opinion by a variety of facts that came within his personal knowledge. † ‘ *Quelle jouissance,*’ (says he, after describing the good treatment experienced by the slaves on some estates in Surinam) ‘ *pour un maitre sensé et humain*

* Mem. sur les Col. tom. V. *passim*.

† Ibid. V. 152. III. 116.

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‘ *humain de se procurer ainsi la recompense de sa*
 ‘ *justice : car les habitans dont je parle ont dans*
 ‘ *leurs ateliers une population nombreuse, sont*
 ‘ *cheris de leurs esclaves, et n’éprouvent jamais*
 ‘ *les desordres du marronage : leurs propres ne-*
 ‘ *gres exterminent les Marrons quand ils vien-*
 ‘ *nent chez eux.*’ This fact, it must be re-
 membered, is stated with regard to the colony
 which of all others has suffered most constantly
 from negro rebellion and desertion, and which
 has been, more than any other, the scene of do-
 mestic cruelty and oppression.

We may conclude, then, that the maltreat-
 ment of the negroes directly and uniformly pro-
 motes the spirit of insurrection, and that gentle
 treatment of that unhappy race is as essentially
 necessary to the security as to the opulence of
 the slave colonies.

II. Next to the bad treatment of the ne-
 groes, the greatest defect in the West Indian
 system, is the large proportion which the im-
 ported Africans bear to the whole black popu-
 lation.

It requires no argument to prove that the
 newly imported slaves must be infinitely more
 dangerous to the peace of the community than
 those who have been born in the islands. Whe-
 ther the Africans, partly stolen, partly pur-
 chased

chafed (if there can be such a thing as buying human beings with a price), were originally free or enslaved in their own country, it is manifest that the forcible transportation of those men is a misery not easily described, and their exile an affliction which must embitter the rest of their lives; and surely the difference of climate, and the exchange of a life of indolence for one of most severe labour, is a sufficient grievance in itself to inspire them with the utmost aversion for their new situation, even if their banishment had been voluntary. Although we should admit every absurd assertion which has been made with respect to the entire felicity of the slaves in the West Indies, we must be convinced that this picture of happiness can only apply to the lot of Creoles; for the bliss of a state of Paradise or Elysium forced upon a sentient being against his will, amounts exactly to a contradiction in terms.

Accordingly, what we might expect has uniformly happened; the imported negroes have been the first to promote rebellion, and at all times the most refractory and discontented slaves. To keep them in order, as well as to teach them work, all the resources of the cruelty that forms the main spring of the slave system, have been exhausted. And even this severity of itself is insufficient; for it has been found necessary to incorporate the newly arrived Africans with

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the old stock by degrees; never filling a plantation with too great a number of the former, and dispersing them carefully among the latter, for security and discipline. Notwithstanding all these precautions, the spirit of adventure has always proved sufficiently strong to increase very rapidly the numbers of the new hands. In proportion as the facilities of the African trade have been great, and the capital turned to the colonial agriculture extensive, the islands have been filled with hordes of native Africans, until, in some cases, the numbers of bad subjects were so much and so quickly augmented, while the necessary proportion of the Creoles was of course decreasing, that extensive and fatal rebellion has been the lamentable consequence. As the large stocks, small profits, and pecuniary incumbrances of the Dutch planters, have rendered their slaves remarkable for bad treatment, and continual though partial insurrection or desertion, the unexampled rapidity with which the French colonies were peopled during the ten years previous to the Revolution, produced, in all the finest parts of those settlements, so fatal a disproportion between the two kinds of negroes, as has shaken the whole West Indian system from its foundation, and rendered its existence a matter which many enlightened men rather wish for than expect. The history of the French colonies furnishes as fatal a lesson of

of the evils arising from the disproportion of Creoles to imported slaves, as the history of the Dutch settlements exhibits a picture of the evils arising from the habitual severity and oppression of the masters.

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The effects of the rapid importation are certainly more extensively fatal to the security of the community which is thus peopled, than the consequences of cruel treatment. But I have mentioned the latter as the greater imperfection of the two, from its prejudicial tendency to the wealth as well as to the safety of the colonies. The disproportion of Creoles cannot be said to injure the opulence of the planters. The work performed by new slaves, is no doubt much less considerable than that which is performed by Creoles or seasoned slaves: their numbers, too, are more rapidly thinned, both from the necessary ill usage they receive, from the change of climate, and from the influence of mental distress, as well as unusual bodily fatigue. But those losses are only comparative; they only prevent the total amount or produce of servile labour from being so great as it would be were the negro population equally extensive, and all composed of natives. The rapid importation of slaves, with all its dangers to the security of the colonies, is, on the whole, beneficial to their wealth, by enabling all the

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capital of the planters to find an immediate and profitable employment, although, certainly, the profit would be greater were it possible to employ the same capital in purchasing a stock of Creoles. It may, however, be observed, that, in the long-run, the security of the islands must furnish the surest measure of their opulence, and that, in a considerable number of years, the causes which most endanger the internal peace of the community, may be reckoned the most detrimental even to the wealth of the proprietors. In the mean time, the security of the system is of so much more consequence to both the mother country and the body of the colonies, in comparison with the increase of wealth (however disproportionate those considerations may be in the estimation of individuals), that the commercial benefits arising from the rapid importation of new slaves, can in no sense of the word compensate for the grand evils which flow directly from the same source. And we may confidently state this as one of the chief defects in the structure of West Indian society.

Such, then, are the two great flaws in the present structure of the American colonies. And to any one who shall consider the matter with tolerable impartiality, it must appear manifest, that both of these evils have their origin
in

in the power which the West Indian planters enjoy, of increasing to any amount, and in any given time, their stock of hands. S E C T.
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The cruel treatment of the negroes arises evidently from the ease with which the stock can be kept up by purchase. If a man cannot buy cattle, either from want of money, or from the dearth or want of the article, he will breed. Although this plan must immediately diminish his profits, he will also be careful of the lives and health of those beasts which he already possesses. This change will be effected in the ordinary œconomy of live stock, by the failure of cash, or the shutting up of the market. But a much greater change will be produced by the same circumstances, upon that sort of management, if management it can be called, which consists in working out certain kinds of cattle, by scanty feeding and hard labour; upon the plan, for example, which certain postmasters adopt, of purchasing old horses, and replacing the price with a tolerable profit, by feeding the wretched animals as cheaply as possible, and forcing them to run as long and as often as their limbs can support them. The want of a market must either instantly put a stop to this iniquitous trade, or reduce its extent to a very narrow compass. And such is precisely the trade of the negro

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proprietors in the European colonies! We are informed, that so long as a slave market exists, men find their profit in working out a certain number of their slaves, and supplying the blank by purchase, rather than by breeding. If this detestable crime (I will not insult Liverpool, Bristol, and London by calling it a trade) is really attended with gain, as it certainly is but too congenial to the passions and habits of slave-drivers, we can never expect to see its termination, while the possibility of perpetrating it subsists. But it signifies little to our general argument, whether this iniquity is really gainful or not; nay, whether it exists or not. The general cruel treatment of the negroes cannot be denied. Even they who have most zealously defended the slave system, have admitted, that the oppressions of the negroes call for redress, however much these men may have differed from their antagonists upon the nature of the remedy.


This cruelty of usage, then, is an undeniable evil in the structure of the colonial society, and produces all those consequences which we have lately been contemplating. Nor can it ever be expected to disappear, while the passions of men remain as blind as they hitherto have been; while their present interests, or the gratification of their caprices, prevents them from pursuing their
real

real advantage; and while they retain the means of gratifying their passions or whims by throwing away a little money.

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The evils of the oppressions, too common all over the colonies, are no doubt felt by those very men who are guilty of them. The evils of the sudden importations, so dangerous to the safety of the system, are also such as must in the long-run fall upon the importers. But although both those lines of conduct affect the security of the colonies, and although the former affects also the wealth of the individual planters, it is evident that, according to a principle too extensive in its operations upon the conduct of men, the apparent and immediate is preferred to the real and substantial good; and often the indulgence of such bad passions as do not in the moment of excitement seem to be expensive, is pursued at the risk of destruction, and with the certainty of future loss. It is unnecessary to offer proofs that such is the natural frailty of man; a frailty from which few of his plans are exempt, and which all moralists and divines have united in deploring. It is in vain to believe that the interest alone of West Indian planters will ever lead them to that line of conduct which is really the most advantageous. It is absurd to expect that men will ever be so much reformed as to seek

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the path to enjoyment or wealth which is most circuitous, because it is most easy and beneficial in the long-run. But it is truly ridiculous to affect a belief, that this improvement will begin upon the spot where the evil has first originated, and has been confirmed by habit, and to twist our necks into grotesque and fantastic postures, by way of looking towards the West Indian plantations for this visionary reformation of the human character. 'Where it is
' mens interest to act in a certain manner, we
' may be assured they will follow that interest.'
True—but it must be a near, a distinct prospect of interest in which we should confide. If the view is either dimmed by distance, or obscured by passion, let us not reject the policy which enjoins that nothing should be left to the acute vision and prudent choice of the perverse and short-sighted animal we have to deal with. In the case of the West Indian slave-market, to recommend that things should be left to their natural course; to maintain, that restrictive laws are unnecessary for inducing men to pursue their own real good; and that interfering with their private plans may be detrimental to the public good, is a gross and intolerable perversion of the most liberal and enlightened principle in modern policy. It is as contemptible a sophism as the argument of
any

any enthusiast who should insist upon the annihilation of all criminal jurisprudence, and recommend the method of reforming the world, by leaving every man to discover that his truest happiness lies in the paths of virtue. Such arguments are surely as ridiculous, when applied to support the freedom of negro importation in the West Indies, as if they were used to bring the decalogue or the gallows into dispute.

The only effectual method of preventing the cruel treatment of slaves, and destroying the dangerous mixture of imported Africans, consists in cutting off that source which truly feeds the passions, and caprices, and short-sighted wishes of the planters. A constant check must be found out, which shall at every instant arrest the arm of the tormentor, by setting before his face, in distinct and near prospect, the immediate and irreparable destruction of his stock, as the necessary consequence of cruel treatment. An arrangement must be contrived, which shall habitually lead the slave-driver to reflect, that not the eventual, but the certain and instantaneous desolation of his estate, must be the consequence of oppressive and cruel deportment towards the sole supporters of his wealth. The planter's habits of thinking may thus be, by some sure means, moulded

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moulded into a steady form, and his conduct adapted to the interests, now rendered immediate, of his estate and live stock. Nothing must be entrusted to that fear of insurrection, so natural to all the colonists, but so much divided and frittered down by being shared with the whole community, as to exert no perceptible influence on the actions of the individual, when opposed by passion, or caprice, or tempting views of personal advantage. The disproportionate admixture of imported Africans must be prevented, by the only means which can prevent or in the least degree check it, the positive and definite measure of cutting off the supplies of slaves, and thus forcibly restraining the avarice as well as the cruelty of slave-holders. The only plan, then, which can prevent the effects of the slave system,—the only method which can be devised for stopping the cruelties that irritate the negroes to rebellion, stunt the growth of colonial opulence, and taint the body of colonial society,—the only resource which can be appealed to, for securing the advances already made in cultivating the West Indies, and for preventing the increase of the most fatal malady that ever threatened any political system with sudden dissolution,—the measure formerly pointed out by every consideration of sound policy, and now enforced by the most obvious demands

demands of a menacing and awful necessity, is the Total Abolition of the Slave Trade. Every consideration of sound policy, every view of expediency, every call of urgent necessity, now concur in this recommendation.

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The question of abolition, though one of the most momentous that ever occupied the attention of men, is extremely short and simple. The whole argument is confined to a very narrow compass. If we look to the nature of the traffic, its *unnecessary* enormities are sufficient to make us forget the first great and essential objection which may be urged, that it is not a trade, but a crime. We find that it is a crime of the worst nature, radically planted in the depths of injustice, branching out into various new forms of guilt, prone to entwine with manifold accessory pollutions not inherent in the seed, terminating in every species of noxious produce which can blast the surrounding regions, and taint the winds of heaven. The men, then, who would persuade us to cherish so monstrous a production, because they have given it a name borne by the most salutary and nutritious branches of the social system, are surely guilty of a mockery to our common sense, still more intolerable than any insult to our feelings. We can never stop to argue with them, or to hear the preposterous applications which they make of principles peculiar

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culiar to things of a nature essentially different from this. We cannot allow so great an outrage upon the common forms of speech, as the defence of a glaring iniquity, by an appeal to views that belong to the great source of wealth and virtue—the commercial intercourse of mankind.

The arguments which have been engrafted on this most false view of the great question, are if possible still more absurd. Many of them consist in gross mistatements of facts, either completely proved by the evidence adduced on the side of the abolition, or so thoroughly well known, that no evidence of their existence was deemed necessary by the enemies of the slave system. Some of those topics are drawn from the narrowest views of mercantile policy, and the most insulting appeals to the bad passions of mankind. Others are deduced from absurd ideas of natural law or revealed religion, and supported by allegations which were instantaneously proved to be false. To enter into any analysis of these arguments, or of the short and satisfactory answers which they have received, would be very unnecessary, after the short and simple process of reasoning by which we have been led to conclude in favour of the abolition. Such a discussion of the question is now no longer requisite. All views of the expediency

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pediency of the measure have yielded to the strong and unanswerable conviction of its necessity, with which the events of the last ten years have inspired every impartial statesman. It is upon this high ground that I wish to rest the final discussion of the question ; without, however, presuming to insinuate that any reasons whatever can be paramount to those plain notions of justice (humanity is not an appropriate term), which must in all the councils of a great and honourable nation, be of themselves the ruling principle of decision. The argument of necessity is only introduced to supply the place of the arguments formerly drawn from expediency. That which I must be bold to call the fundamental point, the solid and resistless argument, is the appeal to the common principles of justice.

Although, however, I do not mean to enter into the discussions which formerly occupied mens minds upon this question, before the test of experience had furnished us with unanswerable arguments ; yet may it not be ungrateful to record a very few of the assertions made by the supporters of the slave system, as a specimen, for the information of those who are not accustomed to wade through the mass of ephemeral matter, in which the discussion is to be found.

1. For

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I. For the most outrageous violation of moderation in this argument, the most ludicrous and hyperbolical extravagance in defence of the slave system, we must look to the writings of the French colonists. They have actually maintained, that the negro trade is the only means of civilizing the interior of the great African continent; that the natural constitution of the negroes is utterly repugnant to the climate in which they are born; that they must be transplanted to the milder regions of the new world, and civilized by main force. The illustration or analogy by which this truly singular argument is elaborately supported, presents us with an absurdity if possible more flagrant. It is maintained, that if the Mexicans (who it seems were also born in a climate incompatible with their constitutions) had enjoyed the advantages of transplantation like the happy negroes, we should not have witnessed the total extinction of their numerous race: and this is called the evidence of experience in favour of the slave trade. I am confident that every reader will be astonished, when he observes the name of Barré St Venant cited as the author of such arguments. The above statement is almost a literal translation from his words; and although M. Malouet disapproves of the extent to which the argument is pushed, his approbation of the general principles of M. Barré is unqualified, and

and he explicitly supports the other congenial S E C T.
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 theme of his countryman, the only part of this
 argument which has found its way into Great
 Britain, that the negroes in the West Indies are
 much happier than the European peasantry. *
 But will the reader believe that a still more fla-
 grant insult has been offered to the common
 sense of mankind in pursuing the same topics?
 Will it be conceived, without actually refer-
 ring to M. Barré's words, † that he imputes the
 origin of the slave trade among the Spaniards,
 entirely to their liberal views of benefiting man-
 kind, their rational plans of promoting the hap-
 piness and civilization of Africa!

*‘ On auroit de la peine ’ (says he) ‘ à croire
 ‘ aujourd’hui, que ce fut par un motif d’huma-
 ‘ nité que les Espagnols allèrent, les premiers
 ‘ en 1503, chercher des negres à la côte d’A-
 ‘ frique, pour supplier les foibles Mexicains dans
 ‘ le travail des colonies. Voyant que les peuples
 ‘ conquis étoient trop foibles pour supporter le
 ‘ travail dans leur pays natal—Voyant ensuite
 ‘ que les negres, placés sous un ciel brulant, reside-
 ‘ roient mieux sous un climat temperé—Voyant
 ‘ enfin que, de tems immemorial, l’esclavage existoit
 ‘ en Afrique avec des caracteres plus hideux que
 ‘ dans*

* Barré St Venant, Col. Mod. chap. V. VI. & VII.
 —Malouet, Mem. sur les Colonies, tom. IV. p. 77. & 84.
 See also ‘ Memoire sur l’esclavage des Negres, ’ in tom. V.

† P. 40.

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‘ dans aucune autre contrée, ils crurent leur rendre
 ‘ un bon service de les retirer de leurs repaires,
 ‘ pour en faire des laboureurs.’

After this, we are not surprised to find our author express a sort of regret that France was so long of following this glorious example, and then exultingly enumerate the blessings of the slave trade.

‘ Ce n’est que cent vingt ans après que les
 ‘ François les imiterent.

‘ Cette tentative a fertilisé une partie du nou-
 ‘ veau monde ; elle a donné de nouvelles jouissances
 ‘ à l’ancien ; bien conduite elle auroit agrandi la
 ‘ prospérité des deux hemispheres.’ *

He may doubtless derive some consolation to his patriotic feelings of regret, from the consideration that his countrymen, though late, have been such strenuous and successful imitators of the Spanish philanthropy. †

2. The same men who have asserted that the negroes are happier in the West Indies than in their own country, and enjoy more of the comforts of life than the peasantry of Europe, might well be expected to deny all the allegations of bad treatment which have been so often brought against the planters, as well as the slave-traders.

* P. 40.

† Note W w.

traders. In Britain, where this question underwent the most solemn and ample discussion, the friends of the slave system had every opportunity of bringing forward all their proofs. The first debates which took place were introduced by the slave-carrying bill; and the most remarkable circumstance attending this discussion, was the gross prevarication of the witnesses brought forward by the opponents of the measure. The slave trade abolition bill was opposed with equal zeal; and the difficulties under which its advocates laboured in adducing their proof, must be evident to every one who reflects that, from the very nature of the case, almost all the witnesses had necessarily an interest in concealing, or modifying, or perverting the truth, in so far as it was unfavourable to the planters and slave-traders, while almost every one of the witnesses brought forward in exculpation, were immediately concerned in the charges, being in fact the very parties accused. Notwithstanding this, any person who studies with tolerable attention that invaluable mass of information which the Committee of 1789 have collected in their Report, must be convinced, as the House of Commons were, that the whole case of the petitioners was clearly made out. As a specimen of the manner in which their opponents attempted to vindicate the planters from all charge of cruelty,

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I shall transcribe a passage from Sir William Young's Tour to the Windward Islands. This tour appears to have been undertaken during the greatest heats of the negro questions ; and the account of it published by the traveller (who was one of the chief opposers of the abolition) seems to be given to the world, with the precise view of biasing the public mind, in favour of the gentle treatment of the West Indian slaves. It is published in the same volume with Mr Edwards's History of St Domingo, and to all appearance for the same purpose.

The very first day that the tourist lands in the West Indies, he delivers the result of his observations upon the state of the slaves ; denies that they appear to be abject and humble ; ascribes to them the greatest pride and self-importance ; compares their manners and wit to those of the Roman slaves, nay to those of the slaves portrayed by the Roman dramatists, who were of course much more refined in their characters and conversation than the originals in real life *. Such accounts, to say the least of them, surely prove a great deal too much ; and the same remark might have been applied to the following passage, had we not possessed a more positive contradiction of the

* Young's Tour, *apud* Edwards's West Indies, vol. III. p. 262.

the conclusion drawn from the facts contained in it. S E C T.
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‘ I particularly noticed every negro whom I met or overtook on the road. Of these I counted eleven who were dressed as field negroes, with only trowsers on ; and adverting to the evidence on the slave trade, I particularly remarked that not one of the eleven had a single mark or scar of the whip. We met or overtook a great many other negroes, but they were dressed. Passing through Mr Greathead’s large estate, I observed in the gang one well-looking negro woman, who had two or three wheals on her shoulders, which seemed the effect of an old punishment.’ * But even this solitary exception to the general good usage of the slaves our tourist explains away ; for he afterwards says, †

‘ Never passing a slave without observing his back, either in the field, or on the road, or wench washing in the rivers, I have seen not one back marked besides that of the woman observed before on Mr Greathead’s estate (in whom I may be mistaken as to the cause), and one new negro unfold at Kingston, who

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‘ found

* Young’s Tour, *apud* Edwards’s West Indies, vol. III. p. 267.

† Ibid. p. 280.

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‘ found means to explain to me that he was
‘ *fumfumm’d* (flogged) by the surgeon of the
‘ ship, and he seemed to have had two or three
‘ strokes with a cat.’

Now, unfortunately for all this induction of facts, we meet with the following note by Mr Edwards, upon the passage first quoted.*

‘ In the West Indies, the punishment of
‘ whipping is commonly inflicted, not on the
‘ backs of negroes (as practised in the discipline
‘ of the British soldiers), but more humanely,
‘ and with much less danger, on *partes poste-*
‘ *riores*. It is therefore no proof that the ne-
‘ groes whom Sir William Young inspected had
‘ escaped flagellation because their shoulders bore
‘ no impression of the whip. This acknowledge-
‘ ment I owe to truth and candour.’

The praise of candour we cannot award to this note, because Mr Edwards was the first publisher of this tract, and because every man who knew any thing about a West Indian plantation, would of himself have instantly perceived the unfairness of the inference from the facts—an inference which, on Sir William’s part, may only have been ignorance, but on the part of Mr Edwards must have been falsehood. It is scarcely necessary to add,

* Young’s Tour, *apud* Edwards’s West Indies, vol. III, p. 267.

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add, that the favourable account of the negro punishment in this note, is as false as the allusion to British military discipline is insidious. But the substance of the note is valuable, because it furnishes an authentic refutation of the Essay upon negro happiness, which runs through Sir William's whole narrative. What trust shall we repose in the portraits of this artist, when he paints to us the wit, honour, pride, contentment, gambols, mirth and comforts of the slaves, after we have found him so superficially acquainted with the œconomy of West Indian property? Nay, what confidence can we place in the negative evidence of the other great West Indians, when we find one of the most wealthy, intelligent, and respectable members of this body, so ill informed, or so duped by his subordinate agents? It may farther be remarked as a singular circumstance, that Sir William Young should not have added some retraction of his general assertions in the last edition (1801) from which I quote. He is himself the editor after the death of Mr Edwards; and he publishes the text with his friend's notes, exactly as he had written it at a time when, it is to be hoped, he was utterly ignorant of the mistatement he was giving to the world.

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3. It is scarcely credible, that men should have been found absurd enough to defend the system of negro slavery upon abstract principles. I have, however, given one specimen of this mode of argument from the writings of the French planters. The British planters and their agents have fallen considerably short of their foreign brethren in this line of absurdity : but something of the very same nature may be met with in the tenor of their reasonings. They have maintained, that in all ages slavery has existed ; that a worse kind than that of the negroes was known to the most celebrated nations of antiquity ; and that Christianity itself approves of the institution. If Parliamentary Reports may be trusted, those arguments were brought forward in a very elaborate speech, delivered by the agent for Jamaica in the House of Commons, when the abolition was first debated. To all such appeals it may be answered, that they are partly nugatory, partly false, and partly impious. The defence of negro slavery, by a reference to its antiquity, is nugatory ; for what antiquity can justify a crime ? The assertion, that the lot of the enslaved negroes is less hard than that of the Roman and Greek slaves, is completely false. The appeal to the Gospel in its behalf, is, I devoutly believe, most unauthorized by any *dictum* in that blessed dispensation. But
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if such a *dictum* should be found in the Sacred Writings, its total repugnance to the whole spirit of the system, is a sufficient proof of its being interpolated. If, on the other hand, its interpolation be denied, I hesitate not to declare, that there is an end of all rational faith in Christianity; for what can more decisively disprove the divine origin of any system of belief, than its inculcating or sanctioning the slavery of the West Indies?

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4. The ground which the advocates of the slave trade occupied, in order to meet the arguments of expediency, was in many respects as extravagantly high as that upon which they built their defence of its humanity and justice. A traffic, which at the utmost never employs more than five thousand seamen, has been called the pillar of the British navy. A traffic which destroys more sailors in one year, than all the other branches of trade put together destroy in two; a traffic which is in fact the grave of our ablest seamen, has been extolled as their best nursery. A commerce, in which a million and a half Sterling was never employed at any time, and which is, beyond any other, subject to vast risk and unavoidable slowness of returns, has been described as the grand pillar of the British commerce. The most extravagant falsehoods have

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been blazoned forth to support those allegations. But for a full refutation of them, I refer my reader to the Report of the Committee 1788, if indeed any answer is necessary; for, admitting all that can be said in favour of the traffic, either as a nursery of seamen or a source of mercantile opulence, if the immediate consequence of continuing the trade must be the loss of the colonies, or their total derangement as a valuable possession, surely every argument of this nature, in favour of the slave trade, turns with increased force against the end for which it was advanced, inasmuch as the loss of the African trade will fall with redoubled and fatal effect upon the national prosperity, when, by a short delay, the traffic has grown in importance, and has drawn along with it another branch of commerce infinitely more valuable and extensive. Although the abolition were not to prevent our total destruction in the West Indies, it is evidently advantageous if it only divides the loss, and prevents the shock from being felt all at once. The capital employed in the slave trade, will easily find other employment in the trade of African commodities, or, if that opening is insufficient, in the other branches of foreign trade. It is a capital returned more slowly than any other, and with greater risk: it is, therefore, peculiarly adapted to find its way into the distant

distant branches of commerce, as, for instance, the East Indian trade, which we may be allowed to hope will ere long be opened. If the slave trade were to be abolished only with the downfall of the colonial system, (admitting that to be inevitable which would most probably be prevented by the immediate abolition), then two capitals would at once be thrown out of employment instead of one, and a much greater shock given to the national credit. It is unnecessary to observe, that when a nation loses any branch of commerce or manufacture, in which it has long been engaged, the necessity of shifting all the capital so employed, is only dangerous in proportion to the suddenness of its occurrence.

But we are told, that if the British were to abolish the slave trade, the French and Dutch would take it up. This is indeed a contemptible sophism ; and such I will call it in spite of the high names which have sanctioned it. For, in the *first* place, if Britain substantially abolishes the trade, she must prevent the importation of slaves into her colonies from whatever quarter. The share of the British slave trade, then, which can fall to France and Holland, will only be that part which Britain formerly carried on for the supply of the French and Dutch settlements ; a part of no considerable magnitude, and liable every

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every day to be diminished by the increase of commerce, or the alteration of trade-laws in France and Holland. But, in the *next* place, may not the same argument be used in France and Holland to oppose the abolition? It has in fact been employed by the French and Dutch colonists exactly in the same terms: * So that a trade of iniquity and shame is to be supported to all eternity, because each of the parties engaged in it may say, that the others might continue it! The use of the same argument at the same time by all the parties, is a complete demonstration of its absurdity. Surely in the season of peace, some communication might be opened between the different powers engaged in colonial affairs, and union of views effected upon so important a subject.

We may also remark, that if the African traders of Britain were to give it up, and if part of the capital employed in other countries were to flow towards the blank space left by Britain, as much of the British-capital, transferred from the trade, would find immediate employment in supplying the demands of those other countries, as could fill the blank occasioned there by the new arrangement. But all fears of our standing alone in this great measure are groundless. We have been the chief traders, I mean, the

* Malouet, Barré St Venant, &c. &c.

the ringleaders in the crime. Let us be the first to repent, and set an example of reformation. It becomes the dignity of Great Britain to take the lead, and to trust that her example will be followed. No great reform has ever taken place in one part of the international and intercolonial systems, without a similar change being soon effected in all the other parts; * and the measure which is adopted in order to prevent the ruin of the British colonies, will surely be imitated by the other states, whose colonies are exposed to still more imminent dangers from the same quarter.

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5. The last view of the question, to which I shall allude is, that of the consequences apprehended to the West Indies from the abolition. It is said, that the negro population cannot be kept up without importation. A full refutation of this assertion may be found in various parts of the preceding pages. But the matter rests on plain and undeniable facts. The official Reports from the different islands, have clearly proved the possibility of breeding a sufficient number to supply all the blanks occasioned by deaths, and even to increase the stock in the natural way. † And he who would see

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* Book II. Sect. III. & Book III. Sect. I.

† Report 1789.—Resolutions laid before the House of Commons 1791.

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a complete view of all this argument, founded upon facts of infinite variety, and unquestionable authenticity, may consult the very distinct and comprehensive statement of Mr Clarkson, in his '*Essay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade*;' a work replete with sound sense, distinguished by temperate views of a question seldom discussed in so calm a spirit, and abounding with ample information upon the whole details of this extensive subject. *

Let us, then, consider to what the arguments of commercial expediency amount, admitting that the continuance of the traffic is not inconsistent with the existence of the West Indian system. The only classes of men who can be affected by the measure, are the African traders in the mother country, and the proprietors of plantations which have been purchased with the view of extending their cultivation. The European traders may easily find employment, in the other branches of domestic and foreign commerce, for that capital which the

* It is unfortunate that we have no full account of the splendid oration delivered by Mr PITT, upon the great discussion of the slave trade. If we may judge from the specimens published of that performance, it must have been one of the most masterly efforts of his unrivalled genius, distinguished at once by the highest perfection of eloquence, and by a clearness of reasoning amounting to the precision and rigour of geometrical investigation.

the ordinary traffic with Africa does not absorb. At any rate, their number and importance deserves little consideration ; and the idea of indemnification to them for the loss, would be as absurd as if all the merchants of a country were to demand public aid, because the public measures of justifiable hostility excluded them from foreign markets ; or all the monopolists of a certain branch of traffic, were to require a compensation for the loss of that commerce which the wisdom of the Legislature should lay open to all.

The other class of persons injured, are only subjected to the want of what they might otherwise have gained, or at the utmost to a trifling inconvenience. They still possess an equivalent for their purchase-money. If they are not satisfied with the slow accumulation by means of natural increase, they may sell again, and remove their stock to another channel. They cannot now fulfil their expectations of acquiring a rapid fortune by clearing the land, because the price of negroes will rise, or rather, for some years, there will be no possibility of purchasing slaves. But this is no real or absolute loss which can justify their demands of an equivalent. Suppose that the British Cabinet were disposed to annul the Methuen treaty ; would it be necessary first to consult all those merchants who, on the
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faith of it, had removed to Portugal, or settled a correspondence with that country, or vested their stock in French wines, or bought woollens to supply the market of Lisbon? Or, suppose that the East Indian monopoly were abolished, would the holders of India stock have a claim for indemnification; or would the capitalists, who had laid out their money in shares of East India vessels, or in loans to captains and traders, have a right to demand compensation? But these cases are much more favourable to such claims than the one which we are considering. Suppose that a number of capitalists have vested their stock in the three *per cents.* at the end of a long war, from the full confidence that the value of the funded property will in a few months rise twenty or thirty *per cent.*; if the national honour is insulted, must all those stockholders be indemnified for their probable disappointment, before a war can be proclaimed? Or must the King's crown be endangered, his people despised, his flag buffeted, his ambassadors spit upon in every court or Jacobin *coterie* throughout Europe, because the proclamation of a just and necessary war would prevent the stockholders from realizing all their golden dreams, founded upon the last treaty of peace? And can any stain be so deep on the honour and the character

character of the country, as the supporting of a traffic founded in treachery and blood? Can any measure attended with partial loss or disappointment, be in its essence more just and necessary than the immediate wiping out of so foul a pollution? Can any policy be more contemptible than that which would refuse its sanction to such a measure, for fear of disappointing those men who had arranged their plans with the hopes of fattening upon the plunder of the public character and virtue? — ‘*Habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum, quod contrà singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur.*’ *

We have already seen how necessary for the preservation, as well as the improvement of the American colonies, the great measure of abolition is proved to be by the whole history of the West Indies, and more particularly by the events of the last twelve years. But the immediate advantages, in point of wealth, which must flow from that measure to the proprietors of slaves, deserve also to be noticed. They form a sufficient counterpoise to the disappointment, which those planters may experience from being deprived of the power to extend their cultivation at pleasure. The value of every slave already

* Tacitus, Annal. XIV. cap. 44.

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already in the islands will of course rise incalculably, as soon as the line is drawn and the farther supply stopped. The abolition of the African trade will produce the same augmentation in the value of the stock on hand, that the destruction of the Golconda mines would upon the value of the diamonds already in the European market. This will be the natural recompense to the planters for the inconvenience arising from a limitation of the supply. Particularly, it will be favourable to those islands or plantations which have for some time ceased to import, and have wisely kept up their stock by breeding.

Such are the chief arguments that have been brought forward by the advocates of the slave system, and such are the answers to which they easily yield. I must repeat once more, that the plea of necessity is now the strongest support of the measure, next to the paramount consideration of its justice. The arguments above detailed and answered, only deserve our attention as tending if possible to strengthen conclusions to which we have been led by a more short and easy process. They furnish, too, a curious specimen of the fundamental weakness of the cause which they are employed to uphold; while the success of such reasonings, in such a cause, evinces how lamentably easy it is to persuade mankind, by the most ridiculous and extravagant

gant topics, of propositions the most outrageous to every natural feeling of humanity and justice, when those propositions are connected with an apparent interest.

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From this unsatisfactory view, let us turn to a more pleasing prospect, and figure to ourselves the probable consequences of that great measure which so many reasons of justice, of expediency, of overruling necessity, concur in prescribing to the European powers. The landscape it is true exists but in fancy ; yet is it not ungrateful sometimes to refresh the mind by the relief of contemplating those pictures which depart from nature only in the too favourable colouring of the human figures, and the Arcadian beauties of the scene wherein they are pourtrayed. Before indulging in this view, let us stop for a little to consider in what manner the fundamental change of colonial policy must be effected.

It appears very manifest that the mother country alone is competent to effect the abolition of the slave trade. No assembly composed of planters, and sitting in a slave colony, will ever, to the end of time, think for one moment of abolishing the trade. Can we expect it? Can we blame the persons composing such bodies for their obstinate adherence to that system which ancient habits and prejudices, and the

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zeal of some worthy but intemperate men in attacking them, and the conduct of others signalized by a mad and unprincipled love of change, have all conspired to render venerable in the eyes of every West Indian? We might as reasonably hope to see the poor-laws of England amended by a parish vestry, or a profitable war terminated by a board of commissaries and general officers, as to obtain the abolition of the slave trade from the colonial assemblies. If every sound reason did not concur to teach us the folly of entertaining such hopes, we might be at once convinced by a single consideration. How many independent legislatures are there in the West Indies? Let it be admitted that a few colonies relinquish the trade; can it be supposed that every other will join them, when the partial abolition in one quarter renders the continuance of it more profitable to the rest? Yet if any one refuse to concur, the same doctrines of colonial supremacy must render the forcing of the measure upon that one, as unjustifiable as the universal violation of the colonial rights. In fact, the colonial assemblies and the planters have spoken very plainly upon these matters, and given us a full view of what may be expected from their deliberations on the abolition. To go no farther back than the year 1799, the petitions of the British West Indian islands to Parliament,

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Parliament, contain the most open and explicit avowal of the rooted determination of the planters and assemblies to support the slave trade for ever, as an integral part of the colonial system. The tenor of these addresses, whilst it shews the duplicity of many previous declarations and arguments, at once evinces the absurdity of trusting the most trivial branch of the discussion to the colonies; and, that any one should have been found thoughtless enough, after those declarations, to propose leaving the whole matter to the decision of the planters, would be astonishing, upon any other question than the present.

It is not my intention at present to touch the subject of colonial government. But, to those who maintain the rights of colonies in such questions as that of abolition, let it be a sufficient answer to state the essential subordination of all colonial establishments in the discussion of the most important imperial affairs. We have formerly noticed this distinguishing feature in the constitution of all separate and distant provinces *. Does the slave trade interest the colonies more than the question of peace and war, which so often recurs? and is any colony ever consulted on such a discussion? When we hear the friends of the slave trade maintain that the

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* Book II. Sect. I.

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abolition can only be determined by the colonists, and then recommend to the colonial governments this measure which they opposed at home, we plainly perceive a gross inconsistency. They do not confine their opposition in the mother country to a denial of her jurisdiction ; they oppose the abolition upon the merits of the case : yet, in the colonies, they affect to support the measure also upon the merits. * This is a fair acknowledgement that they are insincere, either in their defence of the system at home, or in their defence of the abolition in America. When we consider that they are themselves colonists, it is not difficult to determine from which of their speeches their real opinions and wishes must be taken. They do not wish to succeed in their defence of the abolition ; they do not expect it. The composition of the colonial assemblies is a sufficient security to them against all the effects of their mock efforts. They are only opposing the whole measure of abolition in a roundabout, uncandid, and treacherous manner.

1. The abolition of the slave trade must, as we have already seen, greatly ameliorate the structure of society in the West Indian colonies. Every man may now be left to pursue his own interest

* Edwards, vol. II. & Hist. of War in St Domingo : Conclusion.

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interest in his own way. Few will continue so insane as to maltreat and work out their stock, when they can no longer fill up the blanks occasioned by their cruelty, or their inhuman and short-sighted policy. A great increase of wealth, and a rapid augmentation of the negro population, will be the consequence of this milder system; for every proprietor of slaves will attend to the breeding, as the only method by which his stock can be recruited, or his cultivation extended. The fecundity of the negroes may be gathered, not only from their history in Africa, but still more strikingly from the estimates given in the Report of 1787, by which it appears, that, under all sorts of bad treatment, their numbers were kept up naturally in almost all the islands. * The effects of a milder treatment may easily be supposed; and if facts are necessary to describe those effects, we may refer to the statements of Mr Jefferson, in his celebrated work on Virginia. The experience of the United States has distinctly proved that the rapid multiplication of the Blacks in a natural way, will inevitably be occasioned by prohibiting their importation. †

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* See a succinct statement of this fact in the Resolutions of 1791.

† Notes on Virginia, Query 8.

In a very few years, all the negroes in America will be Creoles, and all the masters will treat them with kind indulgence for their own sakes. The two great dangers arising from bad spirits will be removed; the labour of the negroes will be more productive, and will resemble in some degree the industry of free men; the negro character will be improved; the manners of the other classes will also be ameliorated; the non-residence, so much to be lamented at present, and the want of women, so fatal to the colonial character, will gradually wear out; the structure of West Indian society will more and more resemble that of the compact, firm, and respectable communities which compose the North American states.

2. It will now only be necessary that the legislature should farther interfere with the plans and actions of the people, in so far as certain topical irregularities may still arise from the bad passions of individuals, and in so far as indirect encouragement may be given to operations or schemes evidently beneficial to the whole society.

All those subordinate arrangements are better left to the colonial legislatures. After the government of the mother country has abolished the African trade, they are fully competent to take all the steps that may be necessary for improving

proving the system. They are precisely in the situation which insures the adoption of wise measures; they are composed of men immediately interested in the pursuit of that very conduct which the good of the system requires. All the individuals who form the assemblies, are concerned in the preservation and increase of the negro stock; in the improvement of the whole colonial society; in the gradual reformation of the general system. They are separated from their brother colonists only by that election which confers upon them the power of watching over the common good, and imposes on them the duty of investigating the means whereby it may best be attained. For the same reason that it would be in vain to expect from such men the great measure of abolition, it would be foolish to despair of obtaining from them every assistance, in promoting those subordinate schemes, which may conduce to the amelioration of the colonial policy. Of their superior ability to devise and execute such measures, we cannot entertain the smallest doubt. They are men intimately acquainted with every minute branch of colonial affairs, and accustomed, from their earliest years, to meditate upon no other subjects. They reside in the heart of the system for which their plans are to be laid, and on which the success of every experiment is to be tried.

The general question of abolition may easily be examined at a distance. All the information that is necessary for the full discussion of it has already been procured by the mother countries of the different European colonies. Its connexion with various interests not colonial, renders the provincial governments incompetent to examine it, even if their interests and prejudices left them at liberty to enter upon a fair investigation.

But the details of the slave laws require more minute and accurate acquaintance with an infinite variety of particulars, which can only be known to those who reside upon the spot. To revise the domestic codes of the colonies, would be a task which no European government could undertake, for want of information, and for want of time. Any Parliament, Council, or Senate, which should begin such a work, would find it necessary to give up legislating for the mother country, in order partly to mar, and partly to neglect the legislation of the colonies. Let this branch of the imperial administration, then, be left to the care of those who are themselves most immediately interested in the good order and government of the distant provinces, and whose knowledge of local circumstances, of those things which cannot be written down in reports, nor told by witnesses, is more full and practical.

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The question of abolition is one, and simple ; it is answered by a yea or a nay ; its solution requires no exercise of invention. The questions of regulation are many and complex ; they are stated by a ‘ *quomodo* ; ’ they lead to the discovery of means, and the comparison of measures proposed. Without pretending to dispute the supremacy of the mother country, we may be allowed to doubt her omniscience ; and the colonial history of modern Europe may well change our doubts into disbelief. Without standing up for the privileges of the colonies, we may suggest their more intimate acquaintance with the details of the question, and maintain, that the interest both of the mother country and of the colonies, requires a subdivision of the labour of legislation ; a delegation of certain duties and inquiries to those who are most nearly connected with the result, and situated within the reach of the materials. When the abolition shall have rendered all the planters more careful of their stock, and more disposed to encourage breeding, the only task for the colonial governments will be, to regulate the relative rights of the two classes, to prepare the civilization of the subordinate race, and to check those cruelties which may still appear in a few instances of individual inhumanity and impolicy.

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3. The great object of the colonial governments as a body, and of their members as individuals, will be the encouragement of something like voluntary industry. The humane treatment of the slave; the granting him considerable latitude of indulgence by slow degrees; and, above all, the encouragement of breeding, will probably effect this great object. With the rearing of a family may be coupled some of those liberties which the prosperity of the children requires, and which the strength of parental feeling renders safe. The admission of the slave to certain privileges of property, has produced the happiest effects in our colonies, even under the ancient policy. But I have already pointed out the effects of the rigorous slave system, in preventing many of the good consequences which would otherwise result from this customary indulgence, equally politic and humane. Little voluntary labour is in fact performed by the slaves during their days of rest, even on their own grounds, in consequence of the hard treatment which they experience all the rest of the week in working for their drivers. * But the new system will draw from this, and other sources, the most salutary consequences. In order to appreciate the probable effects of the great and fundamental measure

* Book IV. Sect. I.

sure in this point of view, let us for a moment
cast our eyes over the ancient history of that
quarter of the world in which we live, and con-
template the origin of that society which is now
settled in such a compact, regular, and beautiful
fabric.

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In ancient times, a great part of the population of the most polished states was the personal property of the rest. Those slaves were chiefly captives taken directly in war, or purchased from other warlike nations who had obtained them in this way. The constant hostilities which at that time divided the people of all countries, rendered this a very fruitful source of supply. During the rise of Athens and Rome, accordingly, when many foreign nations were by rapid steps conquered, and when others, still unsubdued, could sell the persons of their weaker neighbours, there was never any scarcity of men in the great slave markets. The cruelty of the treatment which those unhappy men experienced, was proportioned to the ease with which they were procured; and we have already remarked how intolerable their lot was among the very people who called every foreigner a Barbarian. As war became less common, and the arts of peace were more cultivated, this supply of slaves of course decreased; and when the Roman empire, tottering under its own weight, could think of nothing less than new conquests, there

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there was an end of importing slaves. Accordingly, with the progress of real civilization, but still more with the diminution of wars and conquests, was introduced a milder system of domestic government, a greater humanity towards the slaves, and a more careful attention to breeding, when the stock could neither be kept up nor increased by other means. The laws added their sanction to this salutary change, which no laws could of themselves have wrought. The rights of slaves came to be recognized, the conduct of the master to be watched, and the practice of emancipation to be encouraged. By degrees, the slaves were incorporated with their masters, and formed part of the great free population, which was rather mixed with, than subdued by, the Goths.

The conquests of the great ancient states, and the purchases which they made from petty tribes always at war, may be compared with the slave trade carried on by the modern states of Europe: and the pacification of the Greek and Roman commonwealths—their inability either to conquer or buy—may be compared with the abolition of the African trade; or (if such a thing were possible without the abolition) with the civilization of the great theatre upon which this trade is carried on. Making allowance for the difference of race, the consequences of the abolition

abolition upon the manners of the planters and condition of the slaves, aided by the regulations which the colonial legislatures will adopt, but which they never either would or could effect without the abolition, will form exactly the counterpart of the change introduced, by the cessation of conquests, into the domestic manners and œconomy of the ancients, assisted and enforced by the alterations of their positive laws.

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To the slavery of the ancients succeeded the bondage and villenage of their Gothic conquerors. But the difference between the two was marked and important. The Greek and Roman slaves were imported; the Gothic slaves were the peasantry of the country, and born on the spot, unless during the wars which accompanied the first inroads of the northern tribes. Accordingly, we find no parallel between the rigour of the ancient and of the modern slave system; and a foundation was laid in this essential difference, for a much more rapid improvement of the whole society than took place in Greece or Rome, notwithstanding the superior refinements of the classic times. The slave first became attached to his master, not as his personal property, but as part of his stock, and attached to the soil, to use the language of the feudal ages. By degrees, the mutual interests of the lord and his villeins, in the progress of national

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national improvement, operated that important change in the state of manners, out of which the modern division of ranks, and the privileges of the lower orders, have arisen in the civilized quarters of the European community. First, the villein obtained the use of the land to which he had been annexed, and of the stock in which he had been comprehended, on condition that a certain proportion (generally one half) of the produce should belong to the lord of the land and proprietor of the stock. This great change, one of the most signal of those events which have laid the foundation of human improvement by degrees too slow for the observation of historians, was owing entirely to the master discovering how much his interest was connected with the comfort of his slaves; how necessary it was to treat well that race whose toils supported the community in ease, and whose loss could not be repaired; how much more profitable it was to divide with the vassal the fruits of his free and strenuous exertions, than to monopolize the scanty produce of his compulsory toil. As soon as the right of property, and the secure enjoyment of the fruits of labour were extended to the vassals, the progress of improvement became constant and visible. The proportion of the fruits paid to the lord was diminished according to an indefinite standard; the
peasant,

peasant, having been permitted to acquire property, provided his own stock, and obtained the power of changing his residence, and commuting the nature of his services. By degrees, the rent came to be paid in money, according to the number of competitors for a farm; and they who could not farm land themselves, sold their labour to others for a certain price or maintenance. Lastly, the legislature secured the lease of the farmer with the same certainty that it secured the property of the landlord, and recognized the one as well as the other for useful and independent subjects.

A similar progress will most probably be the result of that abolition, in the supposition of which we are indulging. That this idea is not chimerical, the consideration of a few facts, very little known, in the history of America, may convince us.

The peculiar circumstances in the situation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of South America, have already partially operated some of those happy effects which we may expect from the abolition of the slave trade. The high price of the negroes in the Spanish settlements, partly from absurd regulations of trade, partly from the deficiency of the Spaniards in the practice of commerce and naval affairs, causes that want of hands which would prevail in its full extent, were the African trade

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trade stopt. Both in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, the great proportion of the Indians to the whole population, has inculcated (as we have already seen *) the policy of gaining over the negroes, by all means, to the White cause, in case of any struggle with the more powerful class. From these circumstances, and partly no doubt from the peculiarly indolent character of the colonists in those parts, there has arisen a much better system of treatment than any other European colony can boast of. The first consequence of this state of things has been, the constant security of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements from all risks of negro rebellion. Other views of interest have conspired to confirm and extend this system of mildness and equity towards the slaves; and the Legislature has not failed, by every prudent interference, to assist the inferior race in the acquisition of rights and privileges.

Thus we meet with many very singular analogies between the history of the negroes in South America, and that of the villeins or bondsmen of Europe, in the earlier feudal times. All the gold and jewels in Brazil have, for many years, been collected according to the same plan that the feudal lords adopted for the purpose of quickening the industry of their vassals.

* Book I. Sect. III.

vassals. The master supplies the slave daily with a certain quantity of provisions and tools, and the slave is obliged to return a certain quantity of gold or jewels, according to the nature of the ground. Every thing that remains over this ration, the negro keeps to himself, were the balance to be millions. The gold mines of Popayan and Choco in Spanish America, are wrought in the very same way. The finest pearl fisheries in South America, those of Panama for example, are in the hands of negro tenants as it were. These are bound to give a certain number of pearls every week. The negroes in the towns are allowed to hire themselves out to services of different kinds, on condition of returning to their masters a certain portion of their wages: the rest they may spend or hoard up for their own use. The profligate avarice of the Spanish women, in some parts of the continent, has imitated this species of trade. The negresses are permitted to prostitute themselves, and acquire money from their paramours or keepers, provided they pay to their mistresses a certain part of their infamous gains, for having the use of their own bodies. *

After a slave has in any of these various ways acquired property, he endeavours to purchase

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* We are told that the same disgraceful practice prevailed also in the French islands.—Wimpffen, Let. XXX.

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his freedom. If the master is exorbitant in his demands, he may apply to a magistrate, who appoints sworn appraisers to fix the price at which the slave shall be allowed to buy his freedom. Even during his slavery the behaviour of the master towards him is strictly watched: he may complain to the magistrate, and obtain redress, which generally consists in a decree, obliging the master to sell him at a certain rate. The consequences of all these laws and customs are extremely beneficial to the Spanish and Portuguese power in America. While the slaves are faithful and laborious, the free negroes are numerous, and in general much more quiet, useful, and industrious, than in the other colonies. Most of the artificers are of this class; and some of the best troops in the New World are composed entirely of negroes, who by their own labour and frugality have acquired their liberty.*

It is hardly necessary to remark the striking analogy between the state of the Spanish and Portuguese negroes, and that of the European bondsmen, at a certain period of their progress towards liberty. We find the same gentleness

* Report of Committee 1789, part VI.—Townsend's Travels, vol. II. p. 382.—Ricard, III. 635.—History of Brazil, *apud* Harris's Collection, vol. I.—Campomanes, Educación Popular. tom. II. p. 172. & note.—Raynal, Hist. Philos. III. 270.—D'Ulloa's Voyages, tom. I. p. 31. & 129.

tleness of treatment, the same protection from
 the laws, the same acknowledgement of rights,
 the same power of acquiring property, granted
 to the American slave, which prepared the com-
 plete emancipation of the European vassal. In
 some particulars we observe another step of the
 same progress ; for in many parts the negroes are
 precisely in the situation of the *coloni partiarum*, or
metayers, of the feudal times. In one respect the
 negro is even in a more favourable situation :
 his *reddendo*, (if I may use the expression), is
 fixed and definite : all the overplus of his in-
 dustry belongs to himself. The metayer was
 bound to divide every gain with his lord. The
 former, then, has a much stronger incentive to
 industry than the latter had. As this difference,
 however, arises, not from the progress of so-
 ciety, but from the nature of the returns them-
 selves, easily concealed, and with difficulty pro-
 cured : so, in some other respects the negro is
 not in such favourable circumstances. But the
 great steps of the process of improvement are
 materially the same in both cases. Both have,
 in common, the great points of a bargain be-
 tween the master and slave ; privileges possessed
 by the slave, independent of, nay in opposition
 to his master ; the rights of property enjoyed
 by the slave, and the power of purchasing his
 freedom at a just price. This resemblance, in

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circumstances so important, may fairly be expected to render the progress of the two orders also similar. In the negro, as in the feudal system, we may look for the consequences of those great improvements in voluntary industry, more productive labour, and the mitigation and final abolition of slavery, when the slave shall have been gradually prepared to become a free subject.

Some of the good effects that have flowed from the national character, and peculiar circumstances of the Spanish and Portuguese, have been produced also in Dutch America, by that great competition of capitals, and those complicated difficulties, which lay the Dutch colonists under the necessity of attending to the smallest savings. If from this source, combined with the facility of importation, has arisen a cruelty unknown in other colonies, it may be doubted whether a compensation for the evil is not afforded by another effect of the same circumstances, the general introduction of task-work, which the keen-sighted spirit of a necessary avarice, has taught the planter of Dutch Guiana to view as the most profitable manner of working his slaves.* Nothing, indeed, can conduce more immediately to the excitement of industry than the introduction of task-work. It seems the natural and easy transition from labour to industry; it forms in the mind of the slave those habits which are
necessary

* Malouet, Mem. sur les Col. III. 133.

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necessary for character of the free man : it thus prepares him for enjoying, by a gradual change, those rights and privileges which belong to freedom. But this manner of employing the negroes must be coupled with mildness of treatment, and with the entire abolition of all other labour, in order to produce its good effects. Task-work is known in the windward islands of France and Britain, without bringing any relief or improvement whatever. The toil of grass-picking is, indeed, the most intolerable nuisance to which those unhappy men are subjected. But that is a work imposed upon them in addition to all their other toils, during the intervals of the field work : it is made to interfere with their hours of rest and relaxation. In the Dutch colonies, the cruelty of the slave system prevents even the complete adoption of task-work from producing all its natural consequences ; for the toil imposed, and the punishments with which the neglect is attended, are infinitely too severe. The odious plan of working out the negroes, prevails both in the islands and on the continent ; and while a supply of slaves is easily procured, the good effects produced by the system of management peculiar to Peru and Brazil, can never be expected to take place in the colonies of France, Britain, and Holland—until either the manners of the nations shall be changed, so as to

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resemble those of the indolent Spaniards and Portuguese, or the views of the planters shall be so enlightened, as to impress them with a conviction that humane treatment is the most beneficial to their interests. Such a change of character is not to be wished, and such an enlargement of views is surely not to be expected.

We are, therefore, again led to the same conclusion, in which every view of this large subject ends—that the only means of improving the negro system is the abolition of the slave trade. This great measure, assisted by subordinate arrangements, similar to those adopted in the ancient states, in the feudal kingdoms, and in the South American colonies, will most undoubtedly alter the whole face of things in the New World. The negroes, placed in almost the same circumstances with the bondsmen of ancient Europe, and the slaves of the classic times, will begin the same career of improvement. The society of the West Indies will no longer be that anomalous, defective, and disgusting monster of political existence, which we have so often been forced to contemplate in the course of this Inquiry. The foundation of rapid improvement will be securely laid, both for the Whites, the Negroes, and the mixed race, out of the materials which force and cruelty and fraud have collected.

A strong and compact political structure will arise, under the influence of a mild, civilized, and enlightened system. The vast continent of Africa will keep pace with the quick improvement of the world which she has peopled; and in those regions where, as yet, only the warhoop, the lash, and the cries of misery, have divided with the beasts the silence of the desert, our children, and the children of our slaves, may enjoy the delightful prospect of that benign and splendid reign, which is exercised by the Arts, the Sciences, and the Virtues of modern Europe.

That this view of the future is altogether visionary, I am ready to admit; but it is visionary, only because there is little chance of that great measure being adopted, which every argument of necessity, and every temptation of expediency concurs to enforce. All considerations of justice being kept out of view, it might be thought that the evident dangers of the present system, as exhibited to us, first in Dutch, and afterwards in French America, would awaken men to a right feeling upon their critical situation; that the melancholy example of a noble province, sacrificed to the risks which every other slave colony runs, almost within the visible horizon of the remaining settlements, would inspire the European powers with an anxiety to search for that internal dis-

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order which is rapidly working the dissolution of the colonial system, and a distrust of those rash or interested counsellors, whose advice has in other countries been attended with ruin.

*‘ Multa sunt occulta reipublicæ vulnera, multa nefariorum civium pernicioſa conſilia : nullum externum periculum eſt, non rex, non gens ulla, non natio pertimeſcenda eſt : incluſum malum, inteſtinum ac domeſticum eſt. huic pro ſe quiſque noſtrum mederi, atque hoc omnes ſanare velle debemus. ’ **

But it ſeems to be the lot of nations to derive inſtruction from experience, rather than example; and however acutely they may diſcern the conſequences of folly in the conduct of their neighbours, no ſooner has the caſe become their own, than indolence, or timidity, or a ſenſeleſs confidence in good fortune, blinds them to the moſt obvious applications of the leſſons before their eyes; diſcourages all ideas of reformation; and gives birth to the ſame ſtrange deluſion, ſo often fatal to individuals, that the circumſtances and the conduct which have ruined others, may prove harmleſs or beneficial to themſelves.

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* Cicero, Orat. I. de Lege Agraria.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A a. p. 22.

THE tenor of the two laws last referred to in the text, is sufficiently singular to deserve more minute attention.

The ordinance of Valentinus and Valens is conceived in the following terms :

‘ Universi fiduciam gerant, ut, si quis eorum ab actore
‘ rerum privatarum nostrarum, five à procuratore vexatus
‘ fuerit injuriis, super ejus contumeliis vel deprædationibus
‘ deferri quærimoniam sinceritati tuæ, vel rectori provinciæ,
‘ non dubitet, et ad publicæ sententiam vindictæ sine ali-
‘ quâ trepidatione convolare : quæ res cum fuerit certis pro-
‘ bationibus declarata, sancimus, et edicimus, ut si in pro-
‘ vincialem hanc audaciam quisquam moliri ausus fuerit,
‘ publice vivus concremetur.’ *Cod. lib. III. tit. 26. leg. 9.*

I would here take the liberty of suggesting an emendation of the last clause. Instead of ‘ *in provincialem hanc audaciam,*’ I would submit the following reading : ‘ *in provinciâ talem hanc audaciam.*’ The preamble is so general, that we cannot by any means conceive the reason for the restraining enactment in the end. Why should the provincial subjects alone have the benefit of this law ? Is it probable that the Roman citizens, resident in the provinces, would have less regard paid to the violation of their privileges ? But whichever reading we may adopt, the spirit of the enactment is equally plain and decisive. The edict of Constantine is as follows :

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‘ Præsides provinciarum oportet, si quis potentiorum extiterit insolentior, et ipsi vindicare non possunt, aut examinare, aut pronuntiare nequeunt; de ejus nomine ad nos, aut certe ad Prætorianæ Præfecturæ scientiam referre: quo provideatur, qualiter publicæ disciplinæ, et læsis tenuioribus consulatur. ’ *Cod. lib. I. tit. XL. leg. 2.*

These two laws present us with a striking illustration of the wide difference between the skill, or the taste, of the ancients and moderns, in the great arts of administration. The sanguinary punishment awarded to so high an officer as the Emperor's representative, for an offence extremely common in all the provinces of the Roman dominion, would never have been thought of in the present times, although enormities much greater called for vengeance: and the open, direct, and plain terms in which the edict of Constantine prescribes the performance of what is always a matter of much nicety—the restraining of personal influence—clearly prove how little the most enlightened states of antiquity knew or valued the grand secrets of administration, particularly the method of ruling by influence, so much and so justly valued in modern times.

NOTE B b. p. 36.

ONUPHRIUS PANVINIUS has given a very elaborate enumeration of all the Italian colonies. It is to be found in *Grævii Thesaurus, tom. I.* The *Treatise of Robortellus* on the Roman provinces deserves also to be consulted.

The number of the colonies planted in Italy, amounted to one hundred and sixty-four; while those planted in all the provinces were only one hundred and ninety-nine.—*Onuph. Panv. cap. XXI.* It appears from this consideration alone, that the Italian colonies were materially different, in their constitution and uses, from the colonies of the provinces.

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The first foreign colony which the Romans planted was in Carthage, A. U. C. 710, when Julius Cæsar formed the plan of restoring that deserted city by means of a colonial establishment. The first colony planted in Italy was that of Cænnia, A. U. C. 4.—*Dion. Cass. lib. XLIII. cap. 50.* NOTES
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The practice of sending Roman colonies to the provinces (where they did not enjoy all the privileges of the Italian colonists, *Onuph. Panvin. cap. I.*), was very common after the experiment of Julius Cæsar. He himself transplanted eighty thousand citizens in this manner, *Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. cap. XLII.* After the time of Augustus, who planted twenty-eight colonies in Italy (*Sueton. in Octav. cap. XLVI.*) the custom of planting Italian colonies seems to have been abandoned. His successors did not plant so many as twenty; and preferred forming those settlements beyond seas. Livy does not once mention a transmarine or transalpine colony; although he constantly relates the foundation of those in Italy.

Dacia and Britain, the most difficult and insecure of the Roman conquests, had only, the former four, the latter five Roman colonies. Africa (the most peaceable of all the Roman possessions long before the downfall of the Commonwealth) received, after the usurpation of Julius Cæsar, no less than fifty-seven colonies, exclusive of Egypt.

We may therefore conclude, that the Italian establishments were founded with different views, and in a different age of the Roman history, from the settlements in the provinces.

NOTE C c. p. 52.

THE plan of removing the seat of the Portuguese government from Europe to South America, is not altogether imaginary.

NOTES ginary. It has on several occasions (I believe as recently as
AND during the late war) been entertained by the regency of
ILLUST. Lisbon; *Dumouriez, Etat present de Portugal, liv. II. c. 6.*

— The Portuguese character and habits are peculiarly favourable to the conception and execution of such a project. Placed in a corner of Europe in which their political importance is extremely trifling, they are fond of contemplating the magnitude and natural wealth of their foreign dominions. Distinguished by their manners and turn of mind, as well as by their blood, from all the other European nations, they have little intercourse with, or knowledge, of foreign countries, and seem to regard the affairs of Asia and America with more interest than those of France and Germany. *Murphy's Travels in Portugal, p. 206. 4to—Murphy's State of Portugal, chap. XXIV.*

In mentioning the weakness of Portugal, as she is situated with respect to Spain, I have not alluded to the advantages which she derived from the unaccountable weakness of the Spanish generals, and the bad condition of the troops during the war 1762; because, at that period, the armies of Portugal were in a condition still more wretched, and as little provided for the operations of the field as in the war of the 'Acclamação.' Soon after the invasion of 1762, the military talents of La Lippe, and the bold political genius of Pombal, reformed a multitude of abuses in all the departments of government, and greatly augmented the resources of the nation—its army, navy, and revenues. But such improvements, in a comparative view of two European nations, placed in the relative situations of Portugal and Spain, may almost always be disregarded; for, unless circumstances exist in the one state essentially different from those of the other, any material augmentation in the force of the one will be attended with a proportionate increase in that of the other. Accordingly, during the period of which we are speaking, Spain did not fit an idle spectator of
of

of the salutary measures pursued in Portugal. The various NOTES domestic improvements, the freedom of the colonial trade, AND and the increase of the navy, are proofs of this position. ILLUSTR. The number of guns in the Spanish line in 1776 was only  three thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight; in 1788, it had increased to five thousand four hundred and ten.—*Townsend's Trav. II. 397.*

Where some extraordinary event, indeed, places one nation in circumstances which another cannot emulate, we may argue from the superiority which this difference will confer; as, for instance, the emancipation of a colony, a sudden revolution in the mother country, or the transference of a seat of empire. But even these events tend generally to operate some change on neighbouring states, and they are commonly attended with such a change, even if they do not influence it; because, as we have seen elsewhere, (Book III. Sect. I.) in nations forming one community, like the European kingdoms, or the American colonies, the same circumstances which predispose to extraordinary events in any one member of the body, tend to operate some similar effect in all the neighbouring parts.

In estimating the relative strength of Spain and Portugal in South America, we ought always to recollect, that the province of Chili has never been completely subdued, and that the natives would be ready to join any foreign power against the Spaniards; that Portugal possesses the coast next to Europe, commands the navigation of the Amazons, and may easily seize the keys also of the Plata; and that Peru is separated from the Atlantic by a vast ridge of mountains, and an extensive tract of country, level indeed, but neither drained of its morasses nor cleared of its forests.

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The authority which I have cited for this fact is indeed anonymous, and the work is, in this country, very little known. But, besides that a similar circumstance has occurred in other instances which might be enumerated, great confidence may be reposed in the statements of the two travellers. Their work abounds in plain and sober narrative, delivered with a minuteness bordering upon prolixity. The information contained in it is full, various, and explicit, even to tediousness. Of its accuracy in all particulars, I am inclined to form the most favourable opinion, from finding it completely so in those parts which I have had an opportunity of verifying by personal observation. The title of the book is, *Voyage de deux François au nord de l'Europe*, 1791 & 1792. The route lay through Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Poland, Austria, and part of the north of Germany.

NOTE E e. p. 71.

No small diversity of opinion exists among the authors who have expressly written upon, or only occasionally referred to the subject of the Attican population. As the inquiry is curious, and as some errors seem to have prevailed in the writings of those who are in general most correct upon classical subjects, I shall offer a few statements, which may perhaps set the matter in a true light.

Mr Hume, in his admirable essay on the populousness of ancient nations, (a rare specimen of a branch of science almost wholly new—the application of philosophy to classical antiquities),

quities), has stated that Athenæus gives the population of Athens at twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves, (*Essays, vol. I. p. 416. edit. 1793.*) He then proceeds to argue against this statement, as if Athenæus meant to enumerate only the population of the city. The strongest of his reasons proceed upon the idea that this was the author's sense; and it must be acknowledged that they are sufficiently conclusive. But afterwards he infers, rather inconsistently, that Athenæus must have meant to give the population of all Attica. 'Be-
'sides,' says he, 'we are to consider that the number assigned by Athenæus, whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of Attica, as well as those of Athens,' (*p. 419.*) His opinion, upon the whole, then, is, that Athenæus must be understood to speak of Attica; but that, even for Attica, the number is too great; and Mr Hume supposes the error of one cypher.

Now, in the *first* place, let us attend to the words of Athenæus, which Mr Hume appears not to have examined with his usual accuracy.

Αθηνησιν εξετασμον γενεσθαι απο Δημετρις τε φαλερις των κατοικωντων την Αττικην· και ευρεθηναι Αθηναις μεν δυσμυρις πρὸ τοις χιλιοις, μετοικης δε μυρις, οικετων δε μυριαδας τεσσαρακοντα.—*Deipnosophist. lib. VI. cap. 20. edit. Casaubon. Lugdun. 1657.*

This passage is precisely a statement of that which Mr Hume infers from circumstances to be the author's meaning. It is a statement of the whole *Attican* population, while Mr Hume's arguments apply chiefly, if not entirely to the position, never made by Athenæus, that the *Athenian* slave population was four hundred thousand. The term Αθηναις, is evidently introduced to denote free and native citizens, in opposition to foreigners and slaves; the statement obviously applies to the word Αττικην used immediately before.

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Such, accordingly, is the interpretation of it given not only by Casaubon and the best editors, but by the Abbé Barthelemy, in his *Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis*, tom. II. p. 97. edit. 12mo. Deux-ponts, 1791.

Mr Millar adopts the error of Mr Hume, *Distinction of Ranks*, Part V. Sect. IV. second edit.

We may observe, in the *second* place, that the emendation suggested by Mr Hume is not satisfactory. How the error of a cypher should have crept into a Greek text, where the Arabic numerals were not used, it does not seem easy to conceive. Neither is it fair to conclude, that the number of slaves fit to bear arms is alone meant to be stated in this enumeration. The term *Ἀθηναῖος* obviously applies to the number of citizens fit to bear arms, and it is probable that the word *μετοίκης* means the strangers fit to bear arms. So far Mr Hume's arguments must be admitted. But why, after reducing the four hundred thousand slaves to forty thousand, should he conceive that this forty thousand means slaves capable of bearing arms? It is evident that all enumerations of ancient population had but two objects in view, the wealth and force of the community. The statement of free males come to the years of puberty, affords a criterion of the one: the statement of all the slaves (the labouring part of the people) captured or purchased, and saleable, is necessary to furnish a measure of the other.

We may conclude, that the enumeration of Demetrius, as given by Athenæus, made the free males of ripe years amount to thirty-one thousand, and the whole slaves to forty thousand. The total population of Attica, then, was one hundred and twenty-four thousand free inhabitants, and four hundred thousand slaves. This is surely neither so great a proportion of slaves to free people, nor of inhabitants to extent of territory, as to render the plain statement of the ancient author incredible.

Mr

Mr Hume, it may be added, seems again to mistake Athenæus in talking of Corinth. He tells us, that the account of the city of Corinth having four hundred and sixty thousand slaves, is entirely absurd and impossible, (*Essays*, I. 419.) Athenæus says that the Corinthian cities had altogether forty-six myriads of slaves.

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NOTE F f. p. 92.

THE recital of the many commercial privileges which have been extorted by force, or obtained by diplomatic address, or procured in exchange for temporary aids of various sorts, from the trading nations of modern times, would occupy a large space in the annals of mercantile policy. The history of the Dutch trade, and that of the Hans Towns, afford many of the most remarkable instances of this species of national munificence.

The readiness of Prussia and Russia to accept of such boons as those which the new West Indian state could easily offer, scarcely requires any proof. Perhaps, however, it is not generally known how near those two powers have sometimes been brought to the accomplishment of their commercial schemes, by the acquisition of distant territories. Not to mention the various voyages of discovery projected, and the respectable number actually fitted out by Russia, during the last half century, we know that the acquiring of territory in the Mediterranean has always been a favourite object with the Cabinet of St Petersburg. Besides different schemes more immediately connected with views of conquest, we have obtained undoubted information, since the death of Katharine, that a project had actually been conceived, of a nature entirely commercial, and not the least singular, of the various plans which diversified the noble and dignified ambition of that renowned Prin-

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cess. It was in contemplation of the Empress, at the suggestion of Prince Polemkin, to purchase from a private proprietor the small islands of Lampedosa and Linosa, situated on the African coast, and to obtain the sovereignty from the Court of Naples. The reader may see a copy of the Prince's project in the Appendix to *Eton's Survey of the Turkish Empire*, p. 505. The proposed regulations are minute, and conceived with considerable skill.

The Cabinet of Versailles in 1756 endeavoured to engage Frederic II. in an alliance against the Elector of Hanover, by making him an offer of the island of Tobago. The Duke de Nivernois was entrusted with the management of this intrigue; and it is worth while to observe the terms in which Frederic speaks of it. He begins by calling this offer, '*l'argument le plus fort qu'employa le Duc de Nivernois.*' He then mentions some circumstances which opposed obstacles to its being accepted. He adds, that it appeared '*trop singuliere pour etre recue.*' He then condescends to tell us, that he was pleasant upon the occasion, and that he compared the proposed accession of territory to the island of Barataria. But he adds a very material reason for all his coyness and pleasantry. The treaty with London, which was the means of preserving his existence, had been signed some weeks before these overtures came from Versailles; and he lays down, with much precision, the reasons which induced him to prefer the British to the French alliance; (*Hist. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, chap. II. Oeuv. tom. III. p. 69. edit. Berlin, 1788.*) In arguing from this fact to the probable views of a Berlin cabinet, if placed in similar temptations at the present day, we should remember that the intrigue alluded to was planned by France, then in a state of extreme weakness, against the interests of Britain, at that time the undisputed arbiters of Europe, and rejected by Prussia, when her European existence was at stake.

NOTE

THE opinion of Dr Smith upon the subject of the French and English slaves, appears to have been rashly adopted by him, in order to support a theory more plausible than consistent with the facts, that slaves under despotic governments are necessarily more protected by the laws than those of free states; because the protection of a slave is an interference with private property.—*Wealth of Nations*, vol. II. p. 395. edit. 1799. If this reason is of any weight, it must be confined to the pure despotisms of the East, or of savage communities where the right of property is not regarded. It cannot surely apply to such governments as that of France before the Revolution—a government as remarkable for sacred regard to the property of individuals as the British constitution itself. To suppose any such difference between the effects of the French and those of the British forms of government, is in the highest degree chimerical. M. Laborie has eagerly laid hold of Dr Smith's admission, and given it as an indisputable testimony in favour of his countrymen.—*Appendix to the Coffee-Planter of St Domingo*, Art. IV.

Baron Wimpffen tells us, that in St Domingo the women are peculiarly cruel mistresses; a circumstance which generally takes place where the treatment of the slaves is upon the whole cruel, as in the Dutch settlements both of Asia and America.—*Lett. XXXI*. The same author states, that even reputable mistresses hire out their negresses to prostitution, and share their gains. A similar accusation has never been brought against our countrywomen in the West Indies.—*Lett. XXX*. It is well known that the regulations of the *Code Noire*, so humane towards the negroes, were altogether prevented from being executed, or even thought of, by the determined opposition of the constituted authorities, and still

NOTES more by their incongruity with the state of manners.—*Wimpfen, Lett. VII. ; Edwards's St Domingo, chap. I.*

AND
ILLUST.  The privileges of the inferior classes, which in all the other colonies have been gradually on the increase, were continually diminishing in the French islands previous to the Revolution. Thus, until 1674, all Mulattoes were free at the age of twenty-four, by the common law of the islands. In that year an edict was made, introducing the maxim of the Roman law, ‘*Partus sequitur ventrem.*’ The edict of 1776 abridged many of the most important privileges which the *Code Noire* had nominally secured to the people of colour.

The evidence contained in the Report of the Committee 1798, proves clearly that the treatment of the negroes in the French islands was such as to render their mortality greater than in the British settlements.—*Part V.*

NOTE H h. p. 101.

OUR information with respect to the progress of the importation and of the population in the French West Indies, is by no means very full or correct. Even the history of St Domingo, in this point of view, does not begin to be satisfactory, until a short time before the Revolution. We are, however, furnished with sufficient *data* upon these subjects, to authorise a very positive conclusion, that the treatment of slaves must have been bad; and that, among the various causes of the revolt, ill treatment deserves to be mentioned.

The authors of the *Encyclopedie Methodique* estimate the negro population of St Domingo in 1775 at three hundred thousand, after making allowance for the falsity of the returns, which were only two hundred and forty thousand

thousand and ninety-five.—*Econ. Polit. et Diplom. tom. II.* p. 140. NOTES
AND

The whole of the article of St Domingo is to be found in *Ricard, Traite du Commerce, tom. III. p. 692*; so that either he is the author mentioned in the *Encyc. Method.* or he has borrowed from that author, or from the *Encyclopedie*. ILLUST.

Jeffreys, in his *West Indian Atlas*, gives the negro population in 1764 at two hundred and six thousand.

Malouet states the numbers in 1775 at three hundred thousand. *Mem. sur les Colonies, IV. 117.*; evidently making allowance for concealments.

Neckar states the number in 1779 at two hundred and forty-nine thousand and ninety-eight. *Finances, tom. III. chap. 13.*

It is fair to conclude, from these authorities, that in 1775 the official returns of negroes in St Domingo made the number amount to two hundred and fifty thousand. It was about four or five years after this period that the great importation began, which continued till the Revolution.

According to the official returns, the importation for the year 1787 was thirty thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine; and in 1788 twenty-nine thousand five hundred and six.—*Rapport à l'Assemblée Legislative, 1790*; and *Edwards's St Domingo, Appendix*.

The average export from Africa in French vessels, about the same time, was reckoned at twenty thousand.—*Edwards's West Indies, Book IV. chap. 2*; *Report of Com. 1789, Part IV*. But the French state themselves, that of the forty thousand exported from Africa by Britain, only thirteen thousand three hundred are retained in the British West Indies.—*Report of Com. 1789, Part VI*. If this is accurate, the greater part of the remaining twenty-six thousand seven hundred must go to the French islands.

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Malouet states the annual importation of negroes into St Domingo in French vessels at above eighteen thousand; and the importation by the British traders at twelve hundred and fifty. This statement was written in 1775, and re-published in 1802; but no alteration appears to have been made on this passage.—*Mem. sur les Col. IV. 150.* The average export of France from Africa, is given at thirty thousand for 1786, 1787, and 1788, by Arnould.—*Balance de Commerce, Part II. Sect. III.* And Barré St Venant gives the importation between 1788 and 1791 (that is, in two years) at sixty thousand.—*Colonies Modernes, p. 81.*

If, then, we consider the period from 1775 to 1790 as divided into two periods, one ending 1780, and the other ending 1790, we may reckon the average importation of the first period at fifteen thousand, on the lowest computation, and the average importation of the second period at about twenty-six thousand. The numbers in 1784 had only increased to two hundred and ninety-seven thousand and seventy-nine, according to the official return.—*Laborie, Coffee-planter, Appendix, Art. IV.* The returns for 1789 give this number at four hundred and thirty-four thousand four hundred and twenty-nine. But this is fairly ascribed by Laborie to the alterations in the mode of obtaining these. It is utterly impossible to conceive that there could have been in five years an increase of a hundred and forty thousand. Yet some have rashly asserted, that the numbers of the St Domingo negroes were increased by a hundred and fifty thousand during the five years ending 1790, evidently comparing the loose returns of 1784 and 1785 with the more accurate enumerations of 1789 and 1790.—*Wimpffen, Let. XXVII.*

Let us, however, in the first place, admit this inspection of the returns to be always an equally fair criterion. The returns for 1790 give four hundred and fifty-five thousand as the total number of the slaves.—*Laborie, Appen.; Wimpffen, Let. XXVIII.; Edwards's*

St Domingo, Appen. and chap. I. ; Barré St Venant, Col. Mod. NOTES
p. 102. ; Malouet, &c. &c. Morfe has indeed (*American* AND
Geography) stated this number at six hundred thousand, and ILLUSTR.
 Laborie at five hundred thousand ; but these statements pro-
 ceed upon rough calculation of the numbers probably omit-
 ted even in the most accurate returns ; and that of Morfe
 is in all probability much exaggerated. We are therefore
 to confine ourselves entirely to the official number of four
 hundred and fifty-five thousand, and to compare this with
 the official number, two hundred and fifty thousand, of the
 year 1775.

We have here, then, a total increase of two hundred and
 five thousand negroes in sixteen years. But according to the
 progress of the importation, and the natural progress of the po-
 pulation, the natural and forced increase combined ought to
 have been much greater. Suppose that, by the natural mode,
 no increase ought to have taken place, and that the propaga-
 tion only balanced the mortality, both in the original stock
 of 1775, and in every subsequent increase by importation ;
 the total increase of the first six years, admitting that there
 were two males to every female imported, and that no ac-
 count of the odd males is to be kept, should have been
 sixty thousand ; and of the second period, (ten years), on
 the same suppositions, about a hundred and seventy-four
 thousand ; and the whole increase should have been about
 two hundred and thirty-four thousand, or above twenty-nine
 thousand more than the actual increase.

But this difference is evidently much less than the truth ;
 for no account has been taken of five thousand male ne-
 groes annually imported during the first six years, and eight
 thousand six hundred and sixty-four during the last ten. In
 order to correct the calculation, we shall suppose that one
 death in twenty of the population is a fair estimate for the
 West Indian climate, being much more than in the worst
 climates of Europe. It may easily be computed, that at the

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end of the sixteen years, there would remain, of the odd males imported during that period, above eighty thousand. Besides, no account has been taken of the superior accuracy with which the returns were made at the end of the period under consideration. This circumstance must evidently increase the difference still farther. For we find, that during nine years ending 1784, the total numbers had only increased from two hundred and fifty thousand to two hundred and ninety-seven thousand: whereas, supposing the propagation only to have kept up the stock, the importation during that period should have produced an augmentation of a hundred and twelve thousand at least. Instead, therefore, of a difference of a hundred and nine thousand, in the whole period of sixteen years, we may safely conclude, that there was a difference of nearly a hundred and forty, or that the common good treatment experienced by the lower orders of the most unhealthy countries in the world would have produced on the population of St Domingo an increase greater, in the proportion of seven to four, than the increase which actually took place during the sixteen years of great importation.

The nature of the treatment experienced by the negroes in that island, may from this statement easily be estimated. But several calculations have been presented to us, directly confirming the same position, and demonstrating, that the cruelty or hard usage of the French colonists was extreme. I have mentioned, in the text, the general statements of the Report of 1789 upon the treatment experienced by the slaves in all the French islands. I shall now add the particular testimony of two able men, who drew their observations from personal knowledge. Baron Wimpffen (*Lettres, No. XXV.*) states, that of the negroes imported into St Domingo, twenty *per cent.* die during the first year, while only five *per cent.* are born; and of these five, one infant dies of the tetanus in the first fortnight. M. Malouet says that it requires from
four

four to five thousand births, besides the annual importation of eighteen thousand slaves to keep up the stock ; and that the only total addition is the contraband with the English islands.—*Essai sur St Domingue*, p. 148. & seqq. Thus, according to Wimpffen, the deaths among the imported negroes are above five times more numerous than among the people of any other country, and the births five times less numerous ; and according to Malouet, the mortality of the whole stock is between two and three times greater than that of the natives of any other country on earth—a sufficient commentary upon the boasted humanity of the planters in the French islands, and a useful lesson upon the profits of the slave system.

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NOTE I i. p. 194.

As a specimen of the inconsistencies and misrepresentations which distinguish the cavillers upon this subject, I shall advert to the remarks of a very celebrated author, whose truly philosophical speculations have done much to introduce plain and sound sense into political inquiries, and to assist us in forming large and extensive views of the history of nations. After taking notice of the policy which induced Vortigern king of the Britons to call in the assistance of the Saxons against the Romans, Mr Millar observes, that this measure has been universally blamed as weak and foolish ; and he adds, that Vortigern acted exactly upon the principles of the balancing system.—*Historical View of the English Government*, p. 25, 4to edit. Now, it must be evident to every one, that this conduct of Vortigern was not justified by the principles of the balancing system ; for, of all events, that system holds an invasion to be the least desirable ; and, instead of demanding the aid of allies on your own ground, it prescribes

NOTES prescribes the granting of aid to allies upon their ground, in
 AND order to prevent invasion. In fact, nothing could be less
 ILLUSTR. politic than Vortigern's conduct, upon the plainest principles
 of common sense. He actually called in a conqueror, whom he armed with the power of destroying his kingdom. He imitated exactly the policy of the horse in the fable. The reader will find many good ideas upon the general subject of the European community, mingled with several obvious misconceptions and puerilities, in Voltaire's '*Histoire de la Guerre de 1740*,' Part I. chap. 1.

NOTE K k. p. 276.

THE subject of the Austrian alliance was one of the most interesting discussions, in the politics of the eighteenth century previous to the French revolution, and perhaps not a little connected with that great and deplorable event. Those who wish to study this question of foreign policy, may consult, in the first place, the very interesting collection of state papers, published in two volumes octavo by the French government soon after the King's flight, and republished lately in three volumes, with some additions and notes by M. Segur, a gentleman well known in the diplomatic circles of the Continent, as the able negotiator who concluded the commercial treaty between France and Russia. This publication consists, chiefly, of a '*Tableau speculatif*,' or '*Raisonne*' of the foreign relations of France, drawn up by the Sieur Favier, under the direction, and with the assistance of the ministry. The object of the treatise is evidently to decry the Austrian alliance, as the cause of every calamity that befel France during the remainder of Louis XV.'s reign. The notes of M. Segur contain the chief arguments on the other side of the question. While Favier ascribes every

every evil to the Austrian system, Segur, without denying NOTES
the calamitous state of affairs subsequent to 1756, both in AND
Poland and Germany, attributes all to the mal-administra- ILLUST.
tion of French affairs in the Seven-years war, and during {
the whole interval between the peace of Hubertsburgh and
the Revolution. He argues the question rather upon speci-
alties; Favier adopts the more general views of the subject,
which his antagonist condemns as unsound. As Favier per-
petually recurs to the same text, endeavouring, like most
theorists, to reduce every thing under one head, and twist-
ing all facts to humour his main position: so, the new edi-
tor follows him through his whole course, and, under the
head of each power whose relations to France are discussed
by Favier in the text, we meet with a separate argument in
Segur's notes, tending either to modify or overthrow the
favourite conclusions of the former politician. In general,
Favier, though a practical statesman, and writing for a spe-
cial purpose, seems to be an advocate for those enlarged spe-
culations which I have attempted to defend in the Second
Section of the Third Book. Segur is very decidedly an ad-
vocate for the minute and detailed views of foreign policy
into which diplomatists so naturally fall. His talents in this
line are, however, unquestioned; and it affords no small
proof of his liberality in political matters, that he whose
fame in the diplomatic world rests on the negotiation of a
commercial treaty, should be the loudest in condemning all
such conventions as absurd and impolitic.

The historical writings of Frederic II, by far the most
valuable of all that lively and clever Prince's works, afford
much instruction upon the subject of this controversy, be-
sides exhibiting to us a concise and connected view of the
relative positions of different powers at the most important
periods of his reign. He has left us, in the '*Histoire de la*
'*Guerre de Sept-ans*,' a very valuable, and apparently a ve-
ry authentic narrative of that most important contest, which

was

NOTES was the first fruit of the new alliance. This treatise is, indeed, a model of composition in the branch of history to which it belongs—the mere detail of military transactions. AND It is full and minute, without being tedious ; it is sufficiently professional and even deep, without any obscurity or dryness ; it is written by one who could really say, ‘ *pars magna fui* : ’ yet in the whole course of the performance, we are never offended with the slightest violation of modesty or coolness, while we read the tale of the hero with all the interest natural to so rare an occasion. Lastly, as the ‘ *Histoire* ’ is composed by one who was a statesman, as well as a general and an author, although politics bear a very subordinate part in this book, the narrative is so drawn up, as to throw a full and satisfactory light upon the whole political transactions of the day, and, as it were, to fit any history which shall comprehend the politics, in the same manner that it embraces the military affairs of the war.

The introduction to this work contains some general remarks upon the study of history, and the importance of rightly using collections of facts. These opinions of the Royal author countenance many of the speculations in which I have indulged in the text, and are well worthy of the attention of those men of detail who laugh at all general views of policy, as the effusions of theorists, and productions of the closet. For it can hardly be asserted that the King of Prussia was, what Austria and Poland would indeed have wished he had been, a visionary and speculative man.

Some anecdotes and interesting facts with respect to the secret history of the Austrian alliance, may be found in Soulavie’s Memoirs of the reign of Louis XVI., and may tend to complete the knowledge of the subject which the reader has acquired from Favier, Segur, and Frederic II. I am confident, that the result of the whole inquiry will lead him to adopt the opinion which I have cursorily stated upon this affair in the text.

THE Methuen Treaty has been held up by all French writers, down to the Abbé Raynal (who affects to write upon political as well as sentimental topics), as the *chef-d'œuvre* of British policy, and the pitch of Portuguese dependence. Most of our English statesmen were of the same opinion before the days of Smith and Hume. The former of these celebrated writers has fully discussed the subject, and endeavoured to shew that this treaty was highly disadvantageous to England, even upon the principles of the mercantile system. In his general reasonings against all such treaties, it would be impossible to find any weakness or difficulty; but he seems to have misapprehended the state of things which led to the Methuen Treaty; and his arguments against it, on this special view, are not satisfactory. In fact, it must strike every one who sees his statement, that it proves too much; for surely, if the stipulations of the contract are so leonine as he describes them, it is impossible to suppose that any man of common understanding, I mean any person endowed with the faculty of counting his ten fingers, could for one moment have mistaken the nature of the bargain.

The statements of Dr Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, Book IV. chap. VI.) are the more imposing, that he prefaces them with a literal translation of the treaty, the stipulations of which are short and simple. He then proceeds to observe, that, by this bargain, English woollens are admitted on no better terms than before the prohibition which is thus repealed; but that they are admitted on no better terms than that of other nations, while the Portuguese wines are admitted into England with a great preference. ‘So far, therefore,’ (says he) ‘the treaty is evidently advantageous to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great Britain.’ — Vol. II. p. 327. edit. 1799.

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This statement, however, is fundamentally erroneous, inasmuch as it omits to consider the extent and nature of the prohibition repealed in the treaty. In 1644, (the jealous spirit of the French cabinet having a short time before prohibited Brazil goods), Portugal prohibited the entry of all French goods. The hands of the nation were, during the remainder of the seventeenth century, turned to manufactures, particularly those of wool; and with so much success, that in 1684 the government under Erricira's administration prohibited all importation, either of the raw material or of woollen goods. This occasioned great murmurs, chiefly on account of the diminution sustained by the revenue; and at the same time Britain was endeavouring to supplant the French wines in her home market, by the introduction of the Portuguese. Both governments, therefore, were soon disposed to conclude a bargain, which should again open the Portuguese market to British woollens, and should promote in Britain the use of Portuguese wines. This gave rise to the arrangements which terminated in the Methuen treaty. The pacton, then, is short and simple; it is, that Portugal shall repeal the law of 1684, in favour of Britain, and that Britain, in return, shall admit Portuguese wines at two thirds of the duties paid by French wines. The preference is mutual. The prohibition of 1644 against French goods remains in full force: the prohibition of 1684 remains also in full force against French and all other woollens, except British woollens. British woollens alone are admitted; all others excluded. Here, then, is a monopoly of the Portuguese market granted to British goods, in return for a preference given to Portuguese wines over those of France. Wherefore, the advantage granted to British woollens is much more general than that given to Portuguese wines. Dr Smith's objection proceeds entirely from confining his view to the terms of the treaty, which do not expressly say that the laws of 1644 and 1684 are to remain

main in force, unless in so far as the latter is repealed by **NOTES**
the treaty. **AND**

I shall only add, that the French wines having be- **ILLUST.**
fore the treaty been heavily loaded in England, and the **NOTES**
Portuguese wines encouraged, the Methuen treaty pro- **AND**
duced a very trifling effect in favour of Portugal; not **ILLUST.**
much above a thirty-second part being for some years add-
ed to the former importation by the diminution of duty;
while the repeal of the law 1684, in favour of England,
gave her woollens an immediate monopoly of the Portu-
guese importation market, from which they had been totally
excluded since that law was enacted. Whatever truth, then,
there may be in all Dr Smith's reasonings against commer-
cial treaties, (and no one can for one moment doubt their
accuracy), we must admit, that by the Methuen treaty
Britain gains more than Portugal; that the mutual advan-
tages are exactly of the kind proposed by the lovers of the
mercantile system; and that the bargain, upon the princi-
ples of those men, is mutually advantageous, but more so to
Britain than to Portugal. The law of 1644 might indeed
have been repealed next year (in 1704), and that of 1684
might have been repealed in favour of France, or any other
country. But this would evidently have annulled the Meth-
uen treaty, as much as if a preference had been granted to
French wines by Britain, in direct violation of the com-
pact; or as if Portugal had instantly renewed the exclusion
of British goods.

Although, therefore, the letter of the treaty is certainly
a little defective from extreme conciseness, the spirit and in-
tention of it is clear, and, on the principles of the mercan-
tile system, unexceptionable.

NOTE

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. THE substance of the general reasonings and views detailed in this Section, was published in the Second Number of a periodical work, conducted by a society of Literary Gentlemen in Edinburgh, entitled the '*Edinburgh Review*.'

NOTE N n. p. 295.

THE confidence with which I have termed the conduct of France, during the American war, a blunder, is fully justified by the addition of '*acknowledged*,' which we are entitled to make, from attending to the sentiments uniformly expressed by the ablest statesmen of France, both at the time and since the American revolution. Such views are extremely interesting in discussing the American colonial politics of the present day; because they shew us clearly what would have been the advice of those enlightened men upon the great subjects of West Indian policy. To us who have, on many points of the subject, the benefit of twenty-seven years experience, the errors of such men are no less instructive than their happiest conjectures. They may teach us what measure of modesty is becoming in political discussions, and guard us against rashly founding our practical deductions upon the most plausible general theories.

M. de Vergennes having, about the beginning of the American troubles, laid before the cabinet a memorial upon the conduct suggested to France and Spain, by the state of the colonial affairs of England, M. Turgôt drew up a long memorial upon this subject. The original paper of Vergennes is lost; but the memorial of Turgôt was found among

among Lewis XVI.'s papers ; and several long extracts from it are inserted in the publication formerly referred to, '*Po-
litique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe.*' The excellence and importance of these specimens leave the greatest room to lament, that the whole of this interesting state paper was not laid before the public.

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The first extract contains the conclusion of the whole essay ; in which the author recapitulates, with his usual accuracy, the inferences deduced from all the former parts ; and probably adds new force to his previous arguments, by again placing the results before his reader in a varied arrangement and more luminous concentration.

The general opinion to which all M. Turgôt's reasonings lead him, is, that the success of England in her colonial struggles, would be the issue most advantageous both to France and Spain. Some of the views upon which this just and philosophical conclusion is founded, seem not to be marked with the liberality that formed so distinguishing a feature in almost all the opinions of this enlightened statesman. Thus, he says, (*Vol. II. p. 395. edit. 1793.*) that if the colonies are not reduced without a severe effort, it is so much the better for France ; because the struggle will leave them completely exhausted, and in no condition to assist the wealth and power of the mother country for many years ; and if the struggle is short, the flourishing state in which it leaves America must be a sufficient diversion to the force of England. The latter view is analogous to those positions which I attempted to lay down in the Second Book of this Inquiry. The former view is in some respects illiberal and inaccurate. The commercial advantage of England, whether derived from her colonies, or the other branches of her dominion, or her foreign trade, is evidently an advantage to the commerce of France also ; and this benefit reaped by France must improve her resources,

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ces, while the direct advantages of the colonial trade are promoting those of Britain.

M. Turgôt expresses himself in a tone of considerable confidence with respect to the event of the American war, then only begun. ‘ La supposition de la separation absolue des colonies de la metropole, me paroît infiniment probable. ’—*p.* 395. He then states his opinion upon the general question—‘ Je crois fermement que toutes les metropoles seront forcées d’abandonner tout empire sur leur colonies. ’—*p.* 396. The views which lead him to form this and other similar conclusions, are apparently dictated, in some degree, by his confidence in the principles of national progressive improvement, which he deems to be connected with the abolition of colonial relations, in the true spirit of the æconomists, a sect whose tenets he appears greatly to have favoured.—See, particularly, *p.* 396.

In the rest of the first extract, we meet with many forcible arguments against the interference of either France or Spain in the affairs of North America. He also observes, that a reunion of England with America, if prompt and sudden, might menace France and Spain with danger.—*p.* 397.

In another extract from the same memorial, we meet with the following singular opinion, introduced at the end of an invective somewhat declamatory against colonies in general, formerly quoted (*Book I. Sect. I.*) ‘ Il n’est pas vraisemblable que les Anglois soient les premiers à quitter des prejugués qu’ils ont long-tems regardés comme la source de leur grandeur. En ce cas, *il n’est pas possible de douter que leur obstination n’entraîne l’union de leurs colonies à sucre avec celles du continent septentrional.* ’—*p.* 415.

The opinion of Vergennes appears to have been in all material respects the same with that of Turgôt, upon the conduct which France should pursue with regard to American affairs. His memorial is lost ; but reference is constantly

ly made to it by Turgôt. Malouet, an author well versed in colonial affairs, was of the same way of thinking; and drew up two memorials in support of this opinion, at the desire of Sartine, then minister of the marine and colonies. Sartine was decidedly against the interference, and wished to lay the arguments forcibly before the King, who yielded with great difficulty to weaker counsels.—*Mem. sur les Col. tom. III.*

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NOTE N n. p. 332. *

THE plan of an invasion, such as we have been considering, was actually entertained at one time by the late Empress of Russia. At the period of the dreaded rupture with England on account of Oczacow, a plan was presented to her Majesty by Prince Nassau, minutely detailing all the particulars of the route by which a Russian force might pass through Bochara to Cashmir, and thence to Bengal. The avowed object of the expedition was to be the re-establishment of the Mogul; a trick by which the good will of the Bocharians was expected to be gained. But as little could be apprehended from that weak and disunited people, we are naturally disposed to look upon the invention as a very ignorant one; for it would ensure the enmity of the much more powerful Mahometan princes in the Peninsula. Be this as it may, the Empress highly approved of the plan; and counted on the junction of the discontented from all parts with her forces in the north of India. Potemkin turned the scheme into ridicule; and the pacification that

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* The letter N n is repeated in this reference by an error of the press.

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immediately followed prevented any farther steps from being taken.—*Eton's Survey*, p. 501. (*Appendix*.)

The direct attack of India seems not to be the only mode of annoying the English power which the Russian court has thought of. Plans appear to have been entertained hostile to Japan, and even to China, for many years.—*Ibidem*, p. 504. (*Appendix*.)

NOTE O o. p. 334.

It is ridiculous to think that the late exertions which have been made, and the new exertions which it is to be feared may soon be necessary against France in Egypt, are at all connected with the interests of Turkey. To that weak power it signifies indeed little how many of her nominal provinces she ceases to call her own. That Egypt was of no manner of use to Turkey, for many years before the French invasion, is an undeniable fact. So long ago as when Norden travelled there, the Bashaw ruled, or rather obtained the tribute only by intrigue.—*Norden's Travels*, I. 63. But in the subsequent part of the century, the dependence of the Beys and their subjects was reduced still lower.—*Irwine's Travels up the Red Sea*, p. 340-392. 4^{to} edit.—*Brown's Travels*, chap. V. We are informed by Bruce, that at one time there have been in Cairo alone four hundred persons possessing absolute power, and dependent only on the Beys, unless when one of them usurped the chief dominion.—*Travels*, vol. I. p. 27.—a clear proof of the anarchy which subsisted there at that time, and of the little power which the Porte could exercise over the province by any means. At a still later period, the very acknowledgment of subjection was almost withheld, the Pacha's authority

authority openly denied, and the tribute sent or refused at pleasure, until it became a mock ceremony, consisting in the annual departure of mules supposed to be laden with money for the Porte, but in reality carrying rice bags, or stones.—*Eton's Survey*, p. 287. 8vo edit.

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NOTE P p. p. 336.

SOME authors have alleged that the navigation of the Red Sea is only dangerous to the unskilful seamen who at present frequent its coasts in badly constructed vessels.—*Ricard, Traité de Commerce*, tom. III. p. 439. M. Niebuhr, too, in every respect a better authority, tells us, that though the east coast is very dangerous (on account of shoals) for coasting, yet it is studded with good harbours; and that clear sailing is as easily performed from Djidda to Suez, as from Djidda to the Straights of Babelmandeb; a run which Europeans make without a pilot.—*Descript. de l'Arabie*, p. 303.

If, however, we may credit the accounts of various other persons, particularly of Mr Bruce, (*Travels*, vol. I. *passim*), there are in the Red Sea natural impediments to a tolerably safe navigation. Not to mention the violent storms and the currents (particularly in the Straights) which all authors admit, and the shifting sands produced by those currents and storms, it appears that this channel, perhaps more than any other, is studded with sunken rocks; and, what is almost as bad, with solitary rocks in every quarter; in such a manner that, to use the language of Mr Bruce, the stem of the vessel may be striking, while the stern is in good anchorage, or in a hundred fathoms of water. In such a sea it is vain to think of safety even from the best

NOTES charts ; at least, to a person unacquainted with practical navigation, it must appear very strange, if the most accurate AND delineation of those rocks could enable the most skilful seaman ILLUSTR. to avoid them, when we know how wide an approximation is given by all the operations of the compass and quadrant.

The force of the currents and winds appears to be constantly driving sand up the Red Sea, so that vessels of some bulk cannot now approach so near Suez as formerly.—*Niebuhr's Voyage, I. 175.*

NOTE Q q. p. 337.

MR CAPPER, in his work on winds and monsoons, (a work much more valuable for the number of facts which it contains, than for the illustrations afforded by these to his general theory), seems, from the flat contradiction which one page gives to another in several instances, to have fallen into some material errors. In p. 45. & 68. we are informed, that the S. W. monsoon blows on the Malabar coast from April to November ; and the N. E. from November to April. In page 72. Mr Capper tells us, on the authority of M. D'Après, that the southerly monsoons blow in the Red Sea from the end of August to the middle or end of May ; and the northerly monsoons the rest of the year. In the very next page he says, that the southerly monsoon blows from the Straights to Yambo, at the same season that it blows in the Gulf of Said, (commonly called the Indian Sea), or, he adds, from April to September ; and that, from the middle of May to August, the southerly monsoon extends from Yambo to Suez. Here are two flat contradictions ; first, in the duration of the Malabar monsoon ; and next, in the time of the Red Sea monsoon. Our confidence in Mr C.'s

C. s accuracy is certainly somewhat shaken by such a circumstance ; and perhaps its effect may be somewhat increased by the manifest instances of carelessness or error which one is surprised to meet with upon other matters.

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In Mr C.'s very strange dissertation (p. 217-222.) upon the omnipresence of the Tartars, (if I may use the expression), we find a comparison between the Persic and Saxon languages introduced as decisive of the author's hypothesis—not that the Persians and Saxons were radically the same people, but that the Tartars and Saxons were one nation. The final and strongest instance of similarity is taken from the famous word Wittenagamote, (*Wittenagemote*), ‘ a compound word (says Mr C.) of high political import, that has the same sound both in Persic and Saxon. In the former, it is derived from *Wetten*, a native country, and *Gemmaiet*, an assembly.—According to Blackstone and Hume, it is the assembly of of Wise men ; but in both languages it literally means ‘ the National Assembly ’—p. 221. Now, not to mention that the similarity is entirely confined to the latter part of the compound word, by the author's virtual admission, it is a little singular that he should have quoted the two terms, *Wetten* and *Gemmaiet*, as *Persic*, when they are in fact precisely *Arabic*. In like manner we find him, in one page, carefully inserting vocables in the Oriental characters, and in another so completely misspelling Eastern names, of known etymology, as to make us suspect his accuracy, if not his proficiency in those languages ; for instance, *Irang* and *Turang*, for *Irany* and *Turany* ; *Guardafui*, for *Gardefan* ; *Babelmandel*, for *Babelmandeb*.—pages 218. 41. & 73. For such reasons as these, I have been inclined to question Mr Capper's general accuracy in minute particulars, and to prefer the authority of other writers upon the subject of the monsoons, where he happens to differ from them in his statements.

NOTES AND ILLUSTR. ALMOST all the authors who have discussed the subject of a communication with India by Egypt, have founded their reasonings rather upon the political than the physical obstacles to such an intercourse. Thus Maillet, who discusses this point, contents himself with mentioning, that under Colbert's administration the scheme failed, from the prejudice of the natives and of the Turkish government, which he describes.—*Edit. de Mascrier, part. II. p. 200.* Niebuhr only disputes the advantages which France would derive from a commerce with India, through Egypt, by enumerating the various difficulties arising from the political circumstances of the country, as the taxes, extortions, and delays imposed by the Arabians, the Porte, and the Beys.—*Voyage, tom. I. p. 225. & tom. II. p. 10.*

NOTE S s. p. 353.

IN the observations which I have been led to make upon the connexion between the Asiatic colonies, and the improvement of Egypt, I have never expressed any doubt upon the advantages which would result both to the colonies and the mother countries, from the abolition of the company trade and government at present established; nor have I taken at all into the consideration of this subject the injurious consequences of such an event, to the persons interested in the actual system. It may, however, be observed, that any sudden destruction, even of so ruinous a plan as the Asiatic administration, would be attended with considerable inconvenience, and even with some danger to the credit of the mother country.

‘ Such, ’

‘ Such,’ as Dr Smith well observes, ‘ are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system! They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders.’—*Wealth of Nations*, vol. II. p. 427. edit. 1799.

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It is not, however, to be supposed, that the cultivation of Egypt can at once ruin the present system of colonial government in the East. Ample time will be given for making those arrangements which may be requisite to withstand the shock, and when the downfall of the companies has been prepared, it will produce, to the whole commercial interests of each mother country, advantages amply sufficient to counterbalance, even in the very beginning of the new arrangement, any inconvenience resulting from the change. See also Book I. Sect. III. Part II. at the end.

In a political point of view, the same remark may be made. The trifling assistance received by the government from the companies, will be nothing compared with the vast increase of resources which the free trade and reformed colonial government will place within reach of the state. The naval force of the nations possessing East Indian territory, is indeed closely connected with the resources of their Indian Companies. Thus, we have seen how very powerful the Dutch East India Company was in former times; and the East India Company of England is, I suppose, one of the first maritime powers in Europe—probably the third; that is to say, it could fit out a greater and better fleet of men of war than any power, except England and France. But this force would certainly not be lost to the nation. The government, if occasion required, would, after a few years, have the use of almost as many large ships from the open trade, as formerly from the Company. Large vessels must always, as we have already seen, (Book I. Sect. II.

Part

NOTES Part I.) be employed in the very distant branches of traffic ;
 AND and the best way to multiply those, is surely to extend that
 ILLUSTR. traffic which requires them.

NOTE T t. p. 377.

THERE is a considerable variation in the statement of different authors upon the subject of the Egyptian population. That the reader may judge of the grounds on which I have supposed it to be four millions, I shall lay before him the different statements, after premising that the falsehoods which have at different times been related about every thing connected with Egypt, and more particularly about the numbers of its inhabitants, seem to have made M. Volney wish rather to avoid exaggeration, by running into the opposite extreme ; and that the accuracy of M. Savary is in general acknowledged by all writers—by none more than by M. Volney.

Maillet, after stating the ancient population of Egypt at seven millions five hundred thousand, and remarking that the Arabian writers call it twenty millions, allows its present amount to be four millions, and that of Cairo to be five hundred thousand.—*Edit. de Mascrier, Part. I. p. 24.* Ricard, in one part of his work, says, ‘ On y compte cinq ou six millions d’habitans. ’—*III. 434.* ; and in another part he adds (after estimating the population of Cairo at seven or eight hundred thousand), ‘ On ne craint pas de s’écarter beaucoup de la vérité en supposant à l’Egypte six ou sept millions d’habitans. ’—*Ibid. p. 443.*

The treatise on Commerce in the *Encyclopedie Methodique*, mentions the number of towns to have been anciently twenty thousand ; and adds, that at present there are nine thousand towns and twelve hundred villages.—*Tom. II. p. 790.*

Savary

Savary gives nine hundred thousand for the population of Cairo, and four millions for that of all Egypt. The former sum appears to be exaggerated.—*Tom. III. Let. I. & II.* NOTES
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According to Volney, the population of Cairo is only two hundred and fifty thousand, and that of all Egypt two millions three hundred thousand.—*Egypt and Syria, vol. I. p. 238.* Eton follows him in his account of the latter, and confirms that of the former by a private interlineation.—*Survey, chap. VII.* And as Browne has given nearly the numbers mentioned by Volney, viz. three hundred thousand, and two millions five hundred thousand, it is probable he follows him too; but he speaks with evident uncertainty.—*Travels in Africa, Egypt, and Syria, chap. V.*

It may be observed, that Volney founds his conclusion on a very rough estimate, from the number of towns and villages, which he says is only two thousand three hundred, and the average of inhabitants only a thousand to each, including the capital and Alexandria.

NOTE U u. p. 407.

THE valuable work of M. Malouet contains pretty full information upon this scheme (in the preparation of which he was employed) for introducing the free-negro system into Guiana. The reader will particularly find this matter discussed in the second section of the Memorial, (in vol. V.) entitled, ‘*Nouvelles Observations.*’ He will also find in this, and in other parts of the collection, notices of the experiment actually tried (it is needless to say without any success) for cultivating Guiana by a colony of peasants from Alsace and Lorrain; an experiment never exceeded in costly absurdity, except perhaps in the Spanish colony of the Sierra Morena.

NOTES AND ILLUSTR. Morena. M. Malouet (*p. 114. et seqq.*) argues, though without much of his usual acuteness, against the general plan of cultivation by free negroes. His reasonings are applicable to a variety of plans, which appear at different times to have been proposed by speculative men, for the abolition of the slave system, by providing substitutes in the colonial cultivation. This branch of his argument was written very lately; but in other parts of his collection we meet with similar topics urged against plans of a like nature, which appear to have found advocates among French statesmen at the beginning of Lewis XVI.'s reign.—*Vol. IV.*

In this country, various crude and ill-digested schemes have been proposed at different times for the cultivation of the West Indian territories. The system of free blacks has been urged more lately, and with much greater ability, in a pamphlet entitled the '*Crisis of the Sugar Colonies*,' published about a year ago, by a gentleman who has not chosen to give his name to the public. Widely as the opinions contained in this Inquiry differ from many of those delivered in the '*Crisis*,' it is impossible not to admit the merits, and to praise the motives of this performance, which, though very hasty, and written apparently under the warm impressions of the moment, displays sufficient talents and acquaintance with the subject, to make us regret that professional avocations have prevented the author from fully discussing the interesting topics of negro slavery.

NOTE V v. *p. 462.*

OTHER instances are not wanting in Mr Edwards's writings, more particularly in his History of St Domingo, which prove how very rashly he was inclined to admit, upon the most suspicious testimony, facts favourable to his opinions,

or rather his interests, as a slave proprietor. The same rashness, however, appears to have directed his belief, in other instances where he had not even that excuse.

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In the first edition (1796), he published, among a variety of facts obtained from 'personal conversation with a gentleman of St Domingo, on whose veracity and honour he could place the fullest dependence,' a charge of unparalleled atrocity, against a very worthy and respectable French planter, son of the celebrated Count de Grasse. This gentleman was stated, in the most positive terms, to have been present at the destruction of the Cape, and to have warmly assisted the negro insurgents in their diabolical work of massacre and devastation.

During four years was the character of this unfortunate gentleman ruined in the eyes of all Mr Edwards's readers. And, in the next edition of 1800, appears a certificate from twenty respectable persons, that M. de Grasse had, during the whole time of the insurrection, acted with the utmost vigour and fidelity, as Adjutant-General of the forces against the rebels, and that no part of his conduct had ever furnished the slightest grounds for a murmur of suspicion against him, from the time of his arrival in St Domingo to the moment of his expulsion, when, after various miseries, he shared in the universal ruin of his countrymen, and was driven penniless from his home. In publishing this *reparation* of M. de Grasse's injured character, Mr Edwards states, that experience has convinced him that no great dependence can be placed on the accusations raised 'by men against their fellow citizens in times of civil commotion, and amidst the tumult of conflicting passions.'—*p. 19. edit. 1801.* and he omits the recital which he had published in 1796 against M. de Grasse: yet, strange to tell, so enamoured is he of every bit of private information he can scrape together, that he republishes every other fact in the list of those which he had received from the same quarter; and repeats his attestation

NOTES AND ILLUSTR. testimony of the honour and veracity of the gentleman from whom these facts, together with the foul calumny against M. de Grasse, were received!—p. 147.

The ‘*Testament de Mort d’Ogé*,’ is also inserted in both editions of this work.

This document is the foundation of a black charge against the Council of the Cape, and all the military chiefs of the colony under the ancient *regime*. They are indeed convicted, if this paper be authentic, of having been in league with the people of colour, and of having actually caused every one of the dreadful scenes which have, since the revolution, overwhelmed St Domingo in countless horrors. Now this paper was received by the author from an emigrant, to whom he acknowledges his obligations for the chief part of his information through the whole work. This gentleman had belonged to the revolutionary government; had been arrested, persecuted, and sent over to France in chains; but had been captured by the English, and saved. At the time of publication he had returned to St Domingo to look after his property: he had again fallen into the hands of his enemies; and the last act of his liberty was to transmit the document in question to Mr Edwards, with other valuable papers—p. 13. & 14.

Now, two circumstances should have unquestionably prevented Mr Edwards from giving credit or place to this testimony, even if we should omit the previous and general consideration of the high improbability of the charge.

In the *first* place, the anonymous informer did not communicate the document to Mr Edwards, when he saw him in England, and received from him many obligations, (p. 140.); but he sent it after his return to St Domingo; Governor Blanchelande and all his associates implicated in the charge, being then dead.

But, *secondly*, it is evident that the anonymous informer was a person of most suspicious credibility. He was of the party

party diametrically opposite to the men whom he accuses, and held a high office. He was one of the numerous colonists and partizans who believed, and firmly believed, that the counter-revolutionists were as much their enemies as the *amis des noirs*, and who hesitated not to impute, partly to their weak, and partly to their treacherous counsels, all the miseries of the rebellion. If the furious disputes of those dismal times could inspire the contending factions with schemes so mad as an appeal to the inferior races, any accusation brought by one party against the other, should be received with the most scrupulous caution.

Although Mr Edwards did not receive the copy of Ogé's '*Testament de Mort*' until the year 1795, (p. 242.) the accusation founded upon it was brought forward against Governor Blanchelande and the rest of the ancient administration, nine months after Ogé's death, and before the fall of the persons accused, (p. 72.) It had therefore an evident and important purpose to serve. It was meant to hasten the fate which soon afterwards overtook those unhappy men. The spirit of the remarks made by the anonymous gentleman, in his letter to Mr Edwards sent along with the paper, and inserted in page 242. (edit. 1801), ought surely to have impressed Mr Edwards with some suspicions of his partiality and rancour.

The rashness of admitting this document as evidence, is greatly increased by the anecdote which I first related, concerning the avowed error into which a similar credulity in another instance led our author. It will be difficult, I apprehend, to prove that any circumstances could prevent Mr Edwards's own observation upon the little faith due to accounts of partizans, from applying to the testimony of the anonymous informant.

In chapter V. we meet with a new and signal instance of rashness in our *historian*. He says, after relating the mutiny of Colonel Mauduit's regiment (1791), that this unhappy man,

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NOTES AND ILLUSTR. man, on being desired to make unworthy concessions to his soldiers, ' started back with indignation, and offered his bosom to their swords : it was pierced with a hundred swords, ' all of them inflicted by his own men, while not a single ' hand was lifted up in his defence. '—*p. 81. edit. 1801.*

In a note (*p. 254.*) to this passage, we are informed that the circumstance of Mauduit falling undefended, is perfectly false ; for that, after the preceding passage was printed, a detail of the whole transaction was sent him from St Domingo. This account, indeed, differs widely from the narrative given in the text. It reduces the hundred wounds to a single sabre-cut, and decapitation. It substitutes for the shocking description of unnatural excess upon the remains of Mauduit, given in page 82, the more ordinary proceedings of fixing his head on a bayonet, and dragging his body through the street ; and it relates the generous efforts which were made to save his life, partly by his own officers, and partly by the citizens whom he had most harassed.

It may perhaps be thought that Mr Edwards, after receiving this information, should have been at the expence of cancelling pages 81. & 82. and reprinting a correct narrative from the authentic materials. But, at any rate, it is evident that this method of proceeding was clearly prescribed to him when called upon to revise his work for a new edition. Instead of altering his account, according to the authentic materials, he republishes the original story, with all its exaggerations and falsehoods, so positively contradicted in the note. If any effect is to be produced by the continuance of the narrative, it must be the effect of deceiving ; and if any one person reads the text, without turning to the notes, (as may easily happen to many readers), Mr E. has been guilty of misleading and imposing upon this person, as completely as if the note had not been published.

The

The rashness of Mr Edwards in admitting facts, is not greater than his rashness in adopting opinions. What shall we say of the judgement of a man well versed in West Indian politics, who could account for the unnatural horrors of negro warfare by so extravagant an hypothesis as the following, which he says is incontrovertibly proved by the statements contained in his work?

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‘ The rebellion of the negroes in St Domingo, and the
‘ insurrection of the mulattoes, to whom Ogé was sent as
‘ ambassador, had one and the same origin. It was not the
‘ strong and irresistible impulse of human nature groaning
‘ under oppression, that excited either of those classes to
‘ plunge their daggers into the bosoms of unoffending wo-
‘ men and helpless infants. They were driven into those
‘ excesses, reluctantly driven, by the vile machinations of
‘ men calling themselves philosophers (the proselytes and
‘ imitators in France of the Old-Jewry associates in Lon-
‘ don), whose pretences to philanthropy were as gross a
‘ mockery of human reason, as their conduct was an out-
‘ rage on all the feelings of our nature, and the ties which
‘ hold society together.’ p. 16. (*Edit.* 1801.)

It must surely be no common measure of prejudice which can induce any one to go farther than the nature of untamed savages, in order to find out reasons for their bloody proceedings. It is no ordinary degree of thoughtless violence which can so far blind this author, as to make him forget his constant topic of declamation against the civilized friends of the negroes, and ascribe to their machinations, and not to the ferocious passions of the slaves, all the horrors of the insurrection, after declaiming so often against their proceedings, merely because they tended to awaken those very passions in the negroes. In one page, the unnatural cruelty of the rebels are accounted for, by imputing them to the instigation of their European abettors; in another, those abettors are accused of blind imprudence, for letting loose

NOTES uncivilized men, whose habits rendered such enormities inevitable.

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I have judged it necessary to enter into these details, that the reader may be master of the grounds upon which I venture to call in question so respectable an authority as the very popular writer of the History of the West Indies. I trust, that the circumstances mentioned in the text, with those contained in this note, will sufficiently justify the caution which I have uniformly displayed in receiving his statements, upon subjects immediately connected with the negro questions. When a work has for some time been known to the world under the name of a history, it is sometimes not useless to examine its pretensions to this important title—whether they are derived from right, or only admitted by courtesy. And when the subject of the performance is interesting to a variety of passions and feelings; when, in short, it forms one of the leading topics in the politics of the day, it is prudent to inquire, whether this history is the mature and deliberate work of a sober-minded and impartial writer, or the effusion of a partizan, who, if his subject had been less extensive, and the size of his tract consequently smaller, would have ranked, not among the historians, but the pamphleteers of the day.

The anecdote of Mr Edwards, with respect to Gallifet's slaves, which I have alluded to in the text, is not, so far as I know, related by any other writer in favour of the negro system, except by M. Laborie, an author in many points guilty of considerable unfairness in his statements. His work, however, was not published till after Mr Edwards's first edition (from which I quoted that anecdote) had appeared; and, at any rate, he differs materially from that author. He imputes the rebellion of Gallifet's slaves, not to the wise and indulgent treatment which they met with, but to the excessive laxity of their discipline, and their extravagant wealth. Some of them were possessed of above 300l. currency;

currency; almost all of them had excellent clothes, furniture, plate, &c. The plantation, according to Laborie, was a perpetual scene of feasting and merriment. If we should take this as the whole account of the fact, it would be sufficient to account for the prevalence of licentiousness, riot, and a rebellious spirit among Gallifet's slaves; for surely the possession of so much property, perhaps the enjoyment of so great indulgence, is inconsistent with the condition of bondage. When considerable wealth is acquired by slaves, some provision ought always to be made for the purchase of their freedom; otherwise they are placed in a situation which, if it continues, must lead to licentiousness and indiscipline, or, if checked, must produce insurrection. But the material circumstance mentioned by Mr Clarkson, and omitted by Laborie, who most probably knows it, is the change of management which had been introduced into Gallifet's plantation for some years previous to the revolution. This had the effect of rendering a supply of new and unseasoned hands necessary, and at the same time must have irritated to the highest pitch those who remained, and felt the effects of the new regimen. If M. Laborie's account be combined with the statement of Mr Clarkson, (although it is very possible that the latter statement may be complete in itself, and that Laborie's addition may contain an exaggerated picture), we shall have ample grounds upon which to explain the circumstance so unfairly stated by Mr Edwards: for what materials could the wit of man have devised more prone to explosion, than a mixture of new and unbroken slaves with wealthy and licentious creoles, who have been suddenly subjected to a vigorous system of management, after a life of ease and indulgence?

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 NOTE Ww. p. 480:


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ONE argument has been repeatedly urged in favour of the slave trade, certainly too absurd to merit a serious analysis or refutation, had not many very respectable persons lent it the sanction of their names. It has been said, that the African slave market is supplied almost entirely by the wars which distract that continent, and by the execution of certain judicial sentences prescribing slavery for some offences, as witchcraft and adultery. It is well known, that no man, according to the customs of most African nations, can sell his home-born slave, unless in the case of famine. I shall for the present admit, that the slave market on the coast never furnishes any temptations sufficiently powerful to induce the breach of this African law; and I shall suppose that no slaves are ever brought to the traders, who have not been either taken in war, or sold in consequence of their crimes. It is evident that the argument for the traffic gains much by these gratuitous concessions; yet, in what state do they leave it? If the slaves captured in war, and the criminals condemned for witchcraft, are sold at a good price, is it not obvious that a premium is held out for the encouragement of wars, and of futile accusations? It is said, that if the slave market were shut up for ever, the same wars and accusations would continue; with this difference, that captives would be butchered, and criminals put to death.

No doubt, the abolition of the slave trade would neither eradicate war, nor false accusations from the states of Africa. To a certain degree, both of these evils would continue in that barbarous quarter of the globe, because both

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of them are produced by other causes, as well as by the NOTES
 slave trade ; by other passions, as well as by avarice. It may, AND
 however, fairly be estimated, that more of the wars and ILLUST,
 false accusations which keep Africa in a state of discord 
 and barbarism, are engendered by the temptations of the
 slave market, than by any other cause. Does any one de-
 ny, that the common receivers of stolen goods encourage,
 beyond any other cause, the commission of robberies and
 thefts ? Yet the expulsion of every common receiver from
 a country (were such a thing possible), would not abolish
 either of those crimes. But surely nothing could be more
 absurd, than to dispute the propriety of taking all possible
 steps for rooting out such pests of society, merely because
 a complete cure of the evil would not be effected by this
 remedy.

As to the argument, that massacres and executions would
 be the consequence of the abolition, we may be sure that,
 for a few campaigns of African warfare, or a few terms of
 the African courts, victories and convictions would end in
 the death of some men, who would otherwise have been
 sold. This would be exactly the consequence of the pre-
 vious demand for men occasioned by the trade. It always
 takes some time before the supply can accommodate itself
 to the varied demands of any market, whether the variation
 be that of increase or of diminution.

No measure, surely, could be better calculated to pre-
 serve the lives of wild beasts in any well stocked country,
 than the prohibition of exportation to foreign menageries ;
 yet, for a few seasons, this law would certainly increase
 the number of animals devoted to death ; because those
 whose habits had been formed by the old practice, would
 continue to hunt, and many would still hunt for amusement,
 or the gratification of cruel passions ; and as the price of
 wild beasts would fall in the home market, men would grow
 careless of preserving their lives : nay, more being for some

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time caught than the supply of the home menageries required, many must of necessity be killed. But the supply would soon accommodate itself to the lesser demand; and though some men continued to hunt for pastime, an infinitely smaller number of beasts would be taken and killed than formerly. This case is precisely that of the African slave trade.

The abolition of this traffic will diminish the demand for slaves by seventy or a hundred thousand. The slave trade carried on by the East, through Egypt, is extremely trifling. In Cairo, which is the slave market of Egypt, and the entrepôt of other countries, there are only sold annually from fifteen hundred to two thousand negroes; and the price never exceeds one hundred crowns, the average being about ten pounds Sterling; not above one fifth of the price in the West Indies, and not one half of the price on the west coast.—*Sonnini's Voyage in Egypt, chap. XXXVI.*—*Report of Committee 1789, Part VI.*—*Edwards' West Indies, B. IV. c. 2.*

Besides, it is universally admitted, that no comparison whatever can be drawn between the eastern and the western slave traffic. The treatment of the negroes in those Oriental nations which employ them as slaves, is mild and gentle: they are used entirely for domestic, and even honourable purposes: they soon acquire their freedom with the favour of their masters, and partake as much of the refinement and comforts of the society in which they reside, as our menial negroes do in Europe.—*Sonnini, chap. XXXVI.*—*Bruce's Travels, vol. I. p. 392.*

It is maintained by some, that the slave trade both in the east and west of Africa, has abolished the use of human flesh, and the practice of human sacrifices.—*Bruce, I. 392.* But, besides that this fact appears extremely repugnant to the character of the negroes, which the best and latest travellers have given, (*Park's Travels, chap. XX. XXI. XXII.*) admitting all the advantage just now stated to have been
gained

gained from the slave traffic, do we by the instant abolition of this traffic, lose any of the steps already gained in improving Africa? For who can be so foolish as to imagine that the Africans, in whatever manner they have been civilized, will ever return to their ancient habits of cannibalism and human sacrifices? Let us, then, by abolishing the trade, secure and carry forward those very improvements which the trade may have been the means of beginning.

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The labours of the African Association cannot be mentioned with too much respect. An institution more purely disinterested, more unquestionably influenced by the highest motives of utility, and the most exalted views of universal benevolence, has never yet arisen among men. Their successes have been proportioned to their deserts; and the public are waiting with impatience for the annunciation of new and splendid achievements, planned by their wisdom, and effected by their assistance. That Africa will probably owe much to the labours of the Society, we may safely assert; but while the great cause of barbarism exists, and while those who wish well to that quarter of the globe in the Association, yet cling to the root of the evil, we cannot expect any sensible effects to result from this very praiseworthy Establishment.

It is indeed a matter deeply to be regretted, that the Society should, except at first, always have entrusted the important office of secretary and editor to persons patrimonially interested in the negro slave trade. The narratives which have been published by Mr Edwards, for instance, are evidently influenced by his views of the negro system. If we may credit common report, confirmed by the statements of Sir William Young, in his edition of his friend's last volume, (*Policy of the West Indies*, vol. III. *Prefatory advertisement*, p. 8.), Mr Park's Narrative was the work of Mr Edwards. Our confidence in many of the traveller's statements is by

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this circumstance greatly diminished ; yet enough is still contained in Mr Park's work to justify stronger inferences than any of those which I have drawn with respect to the connexion between the slave trade and the barbarism of Africa. As this work is in the hands of every one, I shall only refer my readers to the various admissions made by the traveller and his *redacteur*, of the extent to which plunder is carried on in Africa, for the purpose of selling the captives. The whole account of the negroes, above referred to, and the previous statements contained in chapter II. deserve particular attention, as coming from persons evidently inclined to favour the negro system.

To Mr Edwards has succeeded in the office of secretary and editor, Sir William Young ; and he scruples not, in the last publication (*Horneman's Journal*), to augur most favourably of the effects of the Society's labours in civilizing the great African continent. This strenuous advocate of the slave trade seriously imagines, that the efforts of a few learned men to explore the interior of the country, will be sufficient to enlighten and humanize its barbarous inhabitants, whom the constant exertions of traders and factories are inciting to war and plunder, by the irresistible temptation of setting a price upon their enemies taken alive. The men who can so easily conceive hopes of human improvement, must surely wonder how the premiums of our old Saxon king should have extirpated the wolf from this country, when a few nobles and *virtuosi* would every now and then desire to obtain a living specimen for sport or show.

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
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
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